Editing Ford Pinto (section)

=== Cost–benefit analysis, the Pinto Memo ===
In 1973, Ford's Environmental and Safety Engineering division developed a [[cost–benefit analysis]] entitled ''Fatalities Associated with Crash Induced Fuel Leakage and Fires'' for submission to the NHTSA in support of Ford's objection to proposed stronger fuel system regulation.<ref name=PintoMemo>{{cite report |title=Fatalities Associated With Crash Induced Fuel Leakage and Fires |first1=E.S. |last1=Grush |first2=C.S. |last2=Saundy |website=autosafety.org |url= http://www.autosafety.org/wp-content/uploads/import/phpq3mJ7F_FordMemo.pdf |access-date=March 2, 2016 |archive-date=February 2, 2017 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20170202162449/http://www.autosafety.org/wp-content/uploads/import/phpq3mJ7F_FordMemo.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> The document has become known as the ''Grush/Saunby Report'', named for its authors,<ref name="Danley"/> and as the "Pinto Memo".<ref>{{harvnb|Rossow|2015}}</ref> Cost-benefit analysis was one tool used in the evaluation of safety design decisions accepted by the industry and the NHTSA.<ref>{{harvnb|Gioia|1992}}: The National Highway Traffic Safety Association (NHTSA, a federal agency) had approved the use of cost-benefit analysis as an appropriate means for establishing automotive safety design standards.</ref> The analysis compared the cost of repairs to the societal costs for injuries and deaths related to fires in cases of vehicle rollovers for all cars sold in the US by all manufacturers. The values assigned to serious burn injuries and loss of life were based on values calculated by NHTSA in 1972.<ref>{{harvnb|Danley|2005}}: In calculating the benefits, the analysis used a figure of $200,000 per life. NHTSA developed this figure in 1972.</ref> In the memo Ford estimated the cost of fuel system modifications to reduce fire risks in rollover events to be $11 per car across 12.5&nbsp;million cars and light trucks (all manufacturers), for a total of $137&nbsp;million. The design changes were estimated to save 180 burn deaths and 180 serious injuries per year, a benefit to society of $49.5&nbsp;million.

In August 1977, having been provided with a copy of the memo by ''[[Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.]]'' plaintiffs before trial,<ref name=Frank>{{cite news|last1=Frank |first1=Ted |title=Rollover Economics: Arbitrary and Capricious Product Liability Regimes |work=American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Lee|Ermann|1999}}: Based on the information given to it by lawyers preparing cases against Ford, the Center for Auto Safety petitioned NHTSA in the mid-1970s to investigate the Pinto's rear-end design. According to the material presented on the Center's website, Dowie's article is based on that information, made available to him by the Center (www.autosafety.org). "Pinto Madness" is still available on the ''Mother Jones'' website along with a video clip showing a Pinto catching fire after being rear-ended. In an interview with Gary T. Schwartz of the ''[[Rutgers Law Review]]'', Copp asserted that he was also a major source of the information for the ''[[Mother Jones (magazine)|Mother Jones]]'' story, Schwartz, "The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case," 1027, n.53</ref> Mark Dowie's investigative article "Pinto Madness", published in ''[[Mother Jones (magazine)|Mother Jones]]'' magazine, emphasized the emotional aspects of the Grush/Saunby Report and implied Ford was callously trading lives for profits.<ref>{{harvnb|Schwartz|1991}}:The Mother Jones article is suffused with outrage at companies that apply a pernicious cost-benefit analysis to achieve "corporate profits".</ref> The ''Mother Jones'' article also erroneously claimed that somewhere between 500 and 900 persons had been killed in fires attributed to the Pinto's unique design features.<ref>{{harvnb|Schwartz|1991}}: According to the Mother Jones article, as of 1977, somewhere between 500 and 900 persons had been killed in fires attributed to the Pinto's unique design features</ref>

The public understanding of the cost-benefit analysis has contributed to the mythology of the Ford Pinto case. ''[[Time (magazine)|Time]]'' magazine said the memo was one of the automotive industry's "most notorious paper trails".<ref name=time20070907/> A common misconception is that the document considered Ford's tort liability costs rather than the generalized cost to society and applied to the annual sales of all passenger cars, not just Ford vehicles. The general misunderstanding of the document, as presented by ''Mother Jones,'' gave it an operational significance it never had.<ref>{{harvnb|Schwartz|1991}}:To sum up, the Ford document has been assigned an operational significance that it never possessed, and has been condemned as unethical on account of characterizations of the document that are in significant part unwarranted. Of course, the condemnation of Ford's report is linked to the condemnation imposed by the public on the Pinto itself. The common belief is that the Pinto, on account of its fuel-tank design, was a "firetrap." The Mother Jones article derived emotional power from its presentation of the Pinto as a "firetrap,'' a "death trap," and a "lethal car."47 The combination of that article, the verdict in the Ford Pinto case, the NHTSA initial determination, and the Pinto recall clearly conveyed this sense of the Pinto-as-firetrap to the general public.</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Lee|Ermann|1999}}: Dowie (1977) accurately explains in part of his Mother Jones article that Ford employees wrote this document as part of an ongoing lobbying effort to influence NHTSA (24, 28). But his readers have relied exclusively on his other claim, that it was the "internal" (20, 24) memo on which Ford based its decision to market the dangerous Pinto and settle the few inevitable lawsuits (31).</ref>