Editing Federal Reserve Act (section)

== Criticisms ==
{{main|Criticism of the Federal Reserve}}
Throughout the history of the United States, there has been an enduring economic and political debate regarding the costs and benefits of central banking.  Since the inception of a central bank in the United States, there were multiple opposing views to this type of economic system. Opposition was based on protectionist sentiment; a central bank would serve a handful of financiers at the expense of small producers, businesses, farmers and consumers, and could destabilize the economy through speculation and inflation. This created even further controversy over who would select the decision-makers in charge of the Federal Reserve. Proponents argued that a strong banking system could provide enough credit for a growing economy and avoid economic depressions. Other critical views included the belief that the bill gave too much power to the federal government after the senate revised the bill to create 12 board members who were each appointed by the president.

Preceding the creation of the Federal Reserve, no U.S. central banking systems lasted for more than 25 years. Some of the questions raised include: whether Congress has the Constitutional power to delegate its power to coin money ([[Enclave Clause|Article 1, Sec. 8, Clause 5]], states: "The Congress shall have power To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures"), whether the structure of the federal reserve is transparent enough, whether the Federal Reserve is a public [[Cartel]] of private banks (also called a private banking cartel) established to protect powerful financial interests, fears of inflation, high government deficits, and whether the Federal Reserve's actions increased the severity of the Great Depression in the 1930s (and/or the severity or frequency of other [[boom and bust|boom-bust]] economic cycles, such as the [[late 2000s recession]]).<ref>{{cite journal|author-link2=Christina D. Romer |last1=Hsieh|first1=Chang Tai|last2=Romer|first2=Christina D.|title=Was the Federal Reserve Constrained by the Gold Standard During the Great Depression? Evidence from the 1932 Open Market Program|journal=[[Journal of Economic History]]|year=2006|volume=66|issue=1|pages=140–176|doi=10.1017/S0022050706000064|s2cid=6337216|url=http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/chang-tai.hsieh/research/jeh%201932%20omo.pdf}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|title=Monetary Intervention Mitigated Banking Panics during the Great Depression: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from a Federal Reserve District Border, 1929–1933|first1=Gary|last1=Richardson|first2=William|last2=Troost|journal=[[Journal of Political Economy]]|volume=117|issue=6|year=2009|pages=1031–1073|doi=10.1086/649603|s2cid=154627950}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Wheelock|first=David C.|url=http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/92/03/Depression_Mar_Apr1992.pdf|title=Monetary Policy in the Great Depression: What the Fed Did, and Why|journal=Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review|pages=3–28}}</ref>