Editing Ethnic conflict (section)

==== Consociationalism ====
Consociationalism is a [[power sharing]] agreement which coopts the leaders of ethnic groups into the central state's government. Each nation or ethnic group is represented in the government through a supposed spokesman for the group. In the power sharing agreement, each group has veto powers to varying degrees, dependent on the particular state. Moreover, the norm of proportional representation is dominant: each group is represented in the government in a percentage that reflects the ethnicity's demographic presence in the state.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|title=Containing Nationalism|last=Hechter|first=Michael|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2000|location=New York}}</ref> Another requirement for [[Arend Lijphart]] is that the government must be composed of a "grand coalition" of the ethnic group leaders which supposes a top-down approach to conflict resolution.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last=Stroschein|first=Sherrill|date=November 2014|title=Consociational Settlements and Reconstruction: Bosnia in Comparative Perspective (1995- Present)|journal=Annals of the American Academy|doi=10.1177/0002716214544459|s2cid=8830183}}</ref>

In theory, this leads to self governance and protection for the ethnic group. Many scholars<ref name=":4">{{Cite book|title=Nationalism Reframed|last=Brubaker|first=Roger|publisher=Cambridge|year=1996|location=New York}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Kaufman|first=Stuart|date=Fall 1996|title=Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War|journal=International Security|doi=10.1162/isec.21.2.108|volume=21|issue=2|pages=108–138|s2cid=57559698}}</ref> maintain that since ethnic tension erupts into ethnic violence when the ethnic group is threatened by a state, then veto powers should allow the ethnic group to avoid legislative threats. Switzerland is often characterized as a successful consociationalist state.<ref name=":0" />

A recent example of a consociational government is the post-conflict [[Bosnia and Herzegovina|Bosnian government]] that was agreed upon in the [[Dayton Agreement|Dayton Accords]] in 1995. A tripartite presidency was chosen and must have a Croat, a Serb, and a Bosniak. The presidents take turns acting as the forefront executive in terms of 8 months for 4 years.<ref name=":1" /> Many have credited this compromise of a consociational government in Bosnia for the end of the violence and the following long-lasting peace.<ref name=":1" />

In contrast to Lijphart, several political scientists and policy analysts have condemned consociationalism.<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal|last=Howard|first=Lisa Morje|date=October 2012|title=The Ethnocracy Trap|journal=Journal of Democracy|volume=23|issue=4|pages=155–169|doi=10.1353/jod.2012.0068|s2cid=145795576}}</ref><ref name=":3">{{Cite book|title=Reconstructing Multiethnic Societies: The Case of Bosnia-Hercegovina|last=Bieber|first=Florian|publisher=Ashgate Press|year=2001|pages=109–121|chapter=Challenge of Democracy in Divided Societies: Lessons from Bosnia-- Challenges for Kosovo}}</ref> One of the many critiques is that consociationalism locks in ethnic tensions and identities. This assumes a primordial stance that ethnic identities are permanent and not subject to change.<ref name=":3" /> Furthermore, this does not allow for any "others" that might want to partake in the political process.<ref name=":3" />  As of 2012 a Jewish Bosnian is suing the Bosnian government for precluding him from running for presidential office since only a Croat, Serb, or Bosniak can run under the consociational government.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Guss|first1=Jason|last2=Siroky|first2=David S.|date=2012|title=Living with Heterogeneity: Bridging the Ethnic Divide in Bosnia|journal=Comparative Sociology|doi=10.1163/156913312X638570}}</ref> Determining ethnic identities in advance and implementing a power sharing system on the basis of these fixed identities is inherently discriminatory against minority groups that might be not be recognized.<ref name="RefError">{{Cite journal|last=Lijphart|first=Arend|date=Winter 2001|title=Constructivism and Consociational Theory|url=http://comparativenewsletter.com/files/archived_newsletters/2001_winter.pdf|journal=Newsletter of the Organized Section in Comparative Politics of the American Political Science Association}}</ref> Moreover, it discriminates against those who do not choose to define their identity on an ethnic or communal basis. In power sharing-systems that are based on pre-determined identities, there is a tendency to rigidly fix shares of representation on a permanent basis which will not reflect changing demographics over time.<ref name="RefError"/> The categorization of individuals in particular ethnic groups might be controversial anyway and might in fact fuel ethnic tensions.

The inherent weaknesses in using pre-determined ethnic identities to form power sharing systems has led Ljiphart to argue that adopting a constructivist approach to consociationalism can increase its likelihood of success.<ref name="RefError"/> The [[self-determination]] of ethnic identities is more likely to be "non-discriminatory, neutral, flexible and self-adjusting".<ref name="RefError"/> For example, in South Africa, the toxic legacy of apartheid meant that successful consociation could only be built on the basis of the self-determination of groups. Ljiphart claims that because ethnic identities are often "unclear, fluid and flexible,"<ref name="RefError"/> self-determination is likely to be more successful than pre-determination of ethnic groups.  A constructivist approach to consociational theory can therefore strengthen its value as a method to resolve ethnic conflict.

Another critique points to the privileging of ethnic identity over personal political choice.<ref name=":2" /> Howard has deemed consociationalism as a form of ethnocracy and not a path to true pluralistic democracy.<ref name=":2" /> Consociationalism assumes that a politician will best represent the will of his co-ethnics above other political parties. This might lead to the polarization of ethnic groups and the loss of non-ethnic ideological parties.<ref name=":5">{{Cite journal|last=Stroschein|first=Sherill|date=December 2008|title=Making or Breaking Kosovo: Applications of Dispersed State Control|journal=Perspectives on Politics|doi=10.1017/s153759270808184x|volume=6|issue=4|page=655|s2cid=154841501}}</ref>

Horowitz has argued that a single transferable vote system could prevent the ethnification of political parties because voters cast their ballots in order of preference.<ref name=":18">{{Cite book|title=A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society|last=Horowitz|first=Donald|publisher=University of California Press|year=1992|pages=167–173}}</ref> This means that a voter could cast some of his votes to parties other than his co-ethnic party.<ref name=":18" /> This in turn would compel political parties to broaden their manifestos to appeal to voters across the ethnic divide to hoover up second and third preference votes.