Editing Ethics (section)

== Metaethics ==
{{main|Metaethics}}

Metaethics is the branch of ethics that examines the nature, foundations, and scope of [[Moral reasoning|moral judgments]], concepts, and values. It is not interested in which [[Action (philosophy)|actions]] are right but in what it means for an action to be right and whether moral judgments are [[Subjectivity and objectivity (philosophy)|objective]] and can be true at all. It further examines the [[Meaning (philosophy)|meaning]] of ''morality'' and other moral terms.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Harrison|2005|pp=588–589}} | {{harvnb|DeLapp|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Sayre-McCord|2023|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> Metaethics is a [[metatheory]] that operates on a higher level of abstraction than normative ethics by investigating its underlying assumptions. Metaethical theories typically do not directly judge which normative ethical theories are correct. However, metaethical theories can still influence normative theories by examining their foundational principles.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|DeLapp|loc=Lead section, § 2. The Normative Relevance of Metaethics}} | {{harvnb|Sayre-McCord|2023|loc=Lead section, § 1. General Observations}} }}</ref>

Metaethics overlaps with various branches of philosophy. On the level of [[ontology]],{{efn|Ontology is the branch of philosophy that studies the nature and categories of being.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005|p=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-1806 671]}} | {{harvnb|Campbell|2006|pp=21–22}} | {{harvnb|Craig|1998|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref>}} it examines whether there are [[Subjectivity and objectivity (philosophy)|objective]] moral facts.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|DeLapp|loc=Lead section, § 4. Ontological Issues in Metaethics}} | {{harvnb|Sayre-McCord|2023|loc=Lead section, § 3. Naturalism and Non-naturalism}} }}</ref> Concerning [[semantics]], it asks what the meaning of moral terms are and whether moral statements have a [[truth value]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|DeLapp|loc=Lead section, § 3. Semantic Issues in Metaethics}} | {{harvnb|Sayre-McCord|2023|loc=Lead section, § 4. Is/Ought and the Open Question Argument}} }}</ref> The [[epistemological]] side of metaethics discusses whether and how people can acquire moral knowledge.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|DeLapp|loc=Lead section, § 6. Epistemological Issues in Metaethics}} | {{harvnb|Sayre-McCord|2023|loc=Lead section, § 5. Moral Epistemology}} }}</ref> Metaethics overlaps with [[psychology]] because of its interest in how moral judgments motivate people to act. It also overlaps with [[anthropology]] since it aims to explain how [[Cultural diversity|cross-cultural differences]] affect moral assessments.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|DeLapp|loc=Lead section, § 5. Psychology and Metaethics, 7. Anthropological Considerations}} | {{harvnb|Sayre-McCord|2023|loc=Lead section, § 6. Morals, Motives, and Reasons, § 7. Freedom and Responsibility}} }}</ref>

=== Basic concepts ===
[[File:Deontic square.svg|thumb|upright=1.2|alt=Diagram of the deontic square|The deontic square visualizes the relations between possible moral statuses of an act.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|McNamara|Van De Putte|2022|loc=Lead section, § 1.2 The Traditional Scheme and the Modal Analogies}} | {{harvnb|Ribino|Lodato|2019|p=3}} }}</ref>]]

Metaethics examines basic ethical concepts and their relations. Ethics is primarily concerned with [[normative statement]]s about what [[Is–ought problem|ought]] to be the case, in contrast to [[Positive statement|descriptive statements]], which are about what is the case.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Miller|2023|pp=1–4}} | {{harvnb|Lloyd|Hansen|2003|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=agwMiPq5R1QC&pg=PA21 21]}} }}</ref>{{efn|This contrast is closely related to the [[is–ought problem]] problem, first articulated by [[David Hume]], which states that one cannot deduce a normative statement from a descriptive statement.<ref>{{harvnb|Fieser|2000|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9Jl2x7G1G90C&pg=PA159 159]}}</ref> The exact relation between these types of statements is disputed.<ref>{{harvnb|Hudson|1969|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=m_-vCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA11 11–13]}}</ref>}} [[Duty|Duties]] and [[obligation]]s express requirements of what people ought to do.<ref>{{harvnb|O'Neill|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=KfeOAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA423 423–424 ]}}</ref> Duties are sometimes defined as counterparts of the [[rights]] that always accompany them. According to this view, someone has a duty to benefit another person if this other person has the right to receive that benefit.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Stoljar|1984|pp=36–37}} | {{harvnb|Feibleman|2012|pp=121–122}} | {{harvnb|Corbin|1924|pp=501–502}} }}</ref>

''Obligation'' and ''[[Permission (philosophy)|permission]]'' are contrasting terms that can be defined through each other: to be obligated to do something means that one is not permitted not to do it and to be permitted to do something means that one is not obligated not to do it.<ref name="auto">{{multiref | {{harvnb|McNamara|Van De Putte|2022|loc=§ 1.2 The Traditional Scheme and the Modal Analogies}} | {{harvnb|Belzer|loc=§ 1. Standard Deontic Logic (SDL)}} }}</ref>{{efn|[[Deontic logic]] provides a [[formal system]] describing the logical relations between these and similar concepts.<ref name="auto"/>}} Some theorists define obligations in terms of [[Value (ethics)|values]] or what is [[good]]. When used in a general sense, ''good'' contrasts with ''bad''. When describing people and their intentions, the term ''[[evil]]'' rather than ''bad'' is often employed.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Haiming|2021|pp=75–76}} | {{harvnb|Miller|2023|pp=4–5}} | {{harvnb|Calder|2022|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref>

Obligations are used to assess the moral status of actions, [[Motivation|motives]], and [[character trait]]s.<ref>{{harvnb|Miller|2023|pp=4–5}}</ref> An action is morally right if it is in tune with a person's obligations and morally wrong if it violates them.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pick|2004|pp=159–160}} | {{harvnb|Haiming|2021|pp=88–89}} | {{harvnb|Miller|2023|pp=5–6}} }}</ref> [[Supererogation]] is a special moral status that applies to cases in which the agent does more than is morally required of them.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Heyd|2019|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Miller|2023|pp=5–6}} }}</ref> To be [[Moral responsibility|morally responsible]] for an action usually means that the person possesses and exercises certain capacities or some form of [[Control (psychology)|control]].{{efn|Some philosophers suggest that there is [[moral luck]], which occurs when factors outside a person's control influence the moral status of that person.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Latus|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Nelkin|2023|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref>}} If a person is morally responsible then it is appropriate to respond to them in certain ways, for example, by [[praise|praising]] or [[blame|blaming]] them.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Talbert|2019|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Williams|loc=Lead section, § 1. Introduction}} }}</ref>

=== Realism, relativism, and nihilism ===
A major debate in metaethics is about the ontological status of morality, questioning whether ethical values and principles are real. It examines whether moral [[Property (philosophy)|properties]] exist as objective features independent of the human [[mind]] and [[culture]] rather than as subjective constructs or expressions of personal preferences and [[Social norm|cultural norms]].<ref name="ReferenceB">{{multiref | {{harvnb|DeLapp|loc=Lead section, § 4a. Moral Realisms}} | {{harvnb|Sayre-McCord|2023a|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref>

[[Moral realism|Moral realists]] accept the claim that there are objective moral facts. This view implies that moral values are mind-independent aspects of reality and that there is an absolute fact about whether a given action is right or wrong. A consequence of this view is that moral requirements have the same ontological status as non-moral facts: it is an objective fact whether there is an obligation to keep a promise just as it is an objective fact whether a thing is rectangular.<ref name="ReferenceB"/> Moral realism is often associated with the claim that there are universal ethical principles that apply equally to everyone.<ref>{{harvnb|DeLapp|loc=§ 4a. Moral Realisms}}</ref> It implies that if two people disagree about a moral evaluation then at least one of them is wrong. This observation is sometimes taken as an argument against moral realism since moral disagreement is widespread in most fields.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sayre-McCord|2023a|loc=§ 1. Moral Disagreement}} | {{harvnb|DeLapp|loc=§ 4a. Moral Realisms}} }}</ref>

[[Moral relativism|Moral relativists]] reject the idea that morality is an objective feature of reality. They argue instead that moral principles are human inventions. This means that a behavior is not objectively right or wrong but only subjectively right or wrong relative to a certain standpoint. Moral standpoints may differ between persons, cultures, and historical periods.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|DeLapp|loc=§ 4b. Moral Relativisms}} | {{harvnb|Gowans|2021|loc=Lead section, § 2. Forms and Arguments}} | {{harvnb|Westacott|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Dreier|2007|pp=240–241}} }}</ref> For example, moral statements like "Slavery is wrong" or "Suicide is permissible" may be true in one culture and false in another.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Westacott|loc=§ 2g. Moral Relativism}} | {{harvnb|Gowans|2021|loc=§ 6. Metaethical Moral Relativism}} }}</ref>{{efn|This position can be understood by analogy to [[Einstein's theory of relativity]], which states that the magnitude of physical properties like mass, length, and duration depends on the [[frame of reference]] of the observer.<ref>{{harvnb|Dreier|2007|pp=240–241}}</ref>}} Some moral relativists say that moral systems are constructed to serve certain goals such as social coordination. According to this view, different societies and different social groups within a society construct different moral systems based on their diverging purposes.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|DeLapp|loc=§ 4b. Moral Relativisms}} | {{harvnb|Gowans|2021|loc=§ 6. Metaethical Moral Relativism}} }}</ref> [[Emotivism]] provides a different explanation, stating that morality arises from moral emotions, which are not the same for everyone.<ref>{{harvnb|Dreier|2007|p=241}}</ref>

[[Moral nihilism|Moral nihilists]] deny the existence of moral facts. They reject the existence of both objective moral facts defended by moral realism and subjective moral facts defended by moral relativism. They believe that the basic assumptions underlying moral claims are misguided. Some moral nihilists conclude from this that anything is allowed. A slightly different view emphasizes that moral nihilism is not itself a moral position about what is allowed and prohibited but the rejection of any moral position.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dreier|2007|pp=240–241}} | {{harvnb|Krellenstein|2017|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/44631529 75–90]}} }}</ref> Moral nihilism, like moral relativism, recognizes that people judge actions as right or wrong from different perspectives. However, it disagrees that this practice involves morality and sees it as just one type of human behavior.<ref>{{harvnb|Dreier|2007|pp=241–242}}</ref>

==== Naturalism and non-naturalism ====
{{main|Ethical naturalism|Ethical non-naturalism|l1=Naturalism|l2=Non-naturalism}}

A central disagreement among moral realists is between naturalism and non-naturalism. Naturalism states that moral properties are [[Naturalism (philosophy)|natural]] properties accessible to [[Empirical evidence|empirical observation]]. They are similar to the natural properties investigated by the [[natural sciences]], like color and shape.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lutz|2023|loc=Lead section, § 1. What Is Moral Naturalism?}} | {{harvnb|DeLapp|loc=§ 4a. Moral Realisms}} }}</ref> Some moral naturalists hold that moral properties are a unique and basic type of natural property.{{efn|For example, [[natural law]] ethics, an influential position in [[Christian ethics]], says that morality is based on a natural law created by God.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Murphy|2019a|loc=§ 1. Key Features of Natural Law Theories}} | {{harvnb|Lisska|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Cgg1DQAAQBAJ&pg=PA635 635]}} | {{harvnb|DeNicola|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5uCGDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA66 66]}} }}</ref>}} Another view states that moral properties are real but not a fundamental part of reality and can be reduced to other natural properties, such as properties describing the causes of [[pleasure]] and [[pain]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lutz|2023|loc=§ 1. What Is Moral Naturalism?, § 2. Descriptivism and Reductivism}} | {{harvnb|DeLapp|loc=§ 4a. Moral Realisms}} }}</ref>

Non-naturalism argues that moral properties form part of reality and that moral features are not identical or reducible to natural properties. This view is usually motivated by the idea that moral properties are unique because they express what should be the case.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|FitzPatrick|2011|pp=[https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230294899_2 7–8]}} | {{harvnb|Ridge|2019|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> Proponents of this position often emphasize this uniqueness by claiming that it is a [[Naturalistic fallacy|fallacy to define ethics in terms of natural entities]] or to infer prescriptive from descriptive statements.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ridge|2019|loc=§ 1. The Naturalistic Fallacy}} | {{harvnb|Werner|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=rWjxDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA148 148]}} }}</ref>

=== Cognitivism and non-cognitivism ===
{{main|Cognitivism (ethics)|Non-cognitivism|l1=Cognitivism}}

The metaethical debate between cognitivism and non-cognitivism is about the meaning of moral statements and is a part of the study of semantics. According to cognitivism, moral statements like "Abortion is morally wrong" and "Going to war is never morally justified" are truth-apt, meaning that they all have a truth value: they are either true or false. Cognitivism claims that moral statements have a truth value but is not interested in which truth value they have. It is often seen as the default position since moral statements resemble other statements, like "Abortion is a medical procedure" or "Going to war is a political decision", which have a truth value.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|DeLapp|loc=§ 3a. Cognitivism Versus Non-Cognitivism}} | {{harvnb|Miller|2023|pp=14–15}} }}</ref>

There is a close relation between the semantic theory of cognitivism and the ontological theory of moral realism. Moral realists assert that moral facts exist. This can be used to explain why moral statements are true or false: a statement is true if it is consistent with the facts and false otherwise. As a result, philosophers who accept one theory often accept the other as well. An exception is [[error theory]], which combines cognitivism with moral nihilism by claiming that all moral statements are false because there are no moral facts.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Miller|2023|pp=14–15}} | {{harvnb|Sayre-McCord|1988|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-msmrkE-67IC&pg=PA10 10]}} }}</ref>

Non-cognitivism is the view that moral statements lack a truth value. According to this view, the statement "Murder is wrong" is neither true nor false. Some non-cognitivists claim that moral statements have no meaning at all. A different interpretation is that they have another type of meaning. Emotivism says that they articulate emotional attitudes. According to this view, the statement "Murder is wrong" expresses that the speaker has a negative moral attitude towards murder or disapproves of it. [[Universal prescriptivism|Prescriptivism]], by contrast, understands moral statements as [[Imperative mood|commands]]. According to this view, stating that "Murder is wrong" expresses a command like "Do not commit murder".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Miller|2023|pp=14–15}} | {{harvnb|DeLapp|loc=§ 3a. Cognitivism Versus Non-Cognitivism}} | {{harvnb|Moreland|Craig|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=deDeDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA417 417]}} }}</ref>

=== Moral knowledge ===
The epistemology of ethics studies whether or how one can know moral truths. [[Foundationalism|Foundationalist]] views state that some moral beliefs are basic and do not require further justification. [[Ethical intuitionism]] is one such view that says that humans have a [[Intuition|special cognitive faculty]] through which they can know right from wrong. Intuitionists often argue that general moral truths, like "Lying is wrong", are [[self-evident]] and that it is possible to [[A priori and a posteriori|know them without relying on empirical experience]]. A different foundationalist position focuses on particular observations rather than general intuitions. It says that if people are confronted with a concrete moral situation, they can perceive whether right or wrong conduct was involved.<ref name="Sayre-McCord 2023 loc=§ 5. Moral Epistemology">{{multiref | {{harvnb|DeLapp|loc=§ 6. Epistemological Issues in Metaethics}} | {{harvnb|Sayre-McCord|2023|loc=§ 5. Moral Epistemology}} }}</ref>

In contrast to foundationalists, [[Coherentism|coherentists]] say that there are no basic moral beliefs. They argue that beliefs form a complex network and mutually support and justify one another. According to this view, a moral belief can only amount to knowledge if it coheres with the rest of the beliefs in the network.<ref name="Sayre-McCord 2023 loc=§ 5. Moral Epistemology"/> [[Moral skepticism|Moral skeptics]] say that people are unable to distinguish between right and wrong behavior, thereby rejecting the idea that moral knowledge is possible. A common objection by critics of moral skepticism asserts that it leads to [[immoral]] behavior.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sinnott-Armstrong|2019|loc=Lead section, § 1. Varieties of Moral Skepticism, § 2. A Presumption Against Moral Skepticism?}} | {{harvnb|Sayre-McCord|2023|loc=§ 5. Moral Epistemology}} }}</ref>

[[File:Trolley Problem.svg|thumb|upright=1.25|alt=Diagram depicting a trolley that is headed towards a group of people. There is an alternate track with only one person and a switch to change tracks.|The [[trolley problem]] is a thought experiment about the moral difference between doing and allowing harm.]]

[[Thought experiment]]s are used as a [[Philosophical methodology|method]] in ethics to decide between competing theories. They usually present an imagined situation involving an [[ethical dilemma]] and explore how people's intuitions of right and wrong change based on specific details in that situation.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Brun|2017|pp=195–196}} | {{harvnb|Brown|Fehige|2019|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Baggini|Fosl|2024|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=mZvfEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA284 284]}} }}</ref> For example, in [[Philippa Foot]]'s [[trolley problem]], a person can flip a switch to redirect a trolley from one track to another, thereby sacrificing the life of one person to save five. This scenario explores how the difference between doing and allowing harm affects moral obligations.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Brun|2017|p=195}} | {{harvnb|Woollard|Howard-Snyder|2022|loc=§ 3. The Trolley Problem and the Doing/Allowing Distinction}} | {{harvnb|Rini|loc=§ 8. Moral Cognition and Moral Epistemology}} }}</ref> Another thought experiment, proposed by [[Judith Jarvis Thomson]], examines the moral implications of [[abortion]] by imagining a situation in which a person gets connected without their consent [[A Defense of Abortion#The violinist|to an ill violinist]]. In this scenario, the violinist dies if the connection is severed, similar to how a fetus dies in the case of abortion. The thought experiment explores whether it would be morally permissible to sever the connection within the next nine months.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Brun|2017|p=195}} | {{harvnb|Brown|Fehige|2019|loc=§ 1. Important Characteristics of Thought Experiments}} }}</ref>

=== Moral motivation ===
On the level of psychology, metaethics is interested in how moral beliefs and experiences affect behavior. According to [[Internalism and externalism#Moral philosophy|motivational internalists]], there is a direct link between moral judgments and action. This means that every judgment about what is right motivates the person to act accordingly. For example, [[Socrates]] defends a strong form of motivational internalism by holding that a person can only perform an evil deed if they are [[ignorance|unaware]] that it is evil. Weaker forms of motivational internalism say that people can act against their own moral judgments, for example, because of the [[weakness of the will]]. Motivational externalists accept that people can judge an act to be morally required without feeling a reason to engage in it. This means that moral judgments do not always provide motivational force.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|DeLapp|loc=§ 5. Psychology and Metaethics}} | {{harvnb|Sayre-McCord|2023|loc=§ 6. Morals, Motives, and Reasons}} | {{harvnb|Rosati|2016|loc=Lead section, § 3. Moral Judgment and Motivation}} | {{harvnb|Reilly|1977|pp=101–102}} | {{harvnb|Milevski|2017|p=3}} }}</ref> A closely related question is whether moral judgments can provide motivation on their own or need to be accompanied by other [[mental states]], such as a [[desire]] to act morally.<ref>{{harvnb|Rosati|2016|loc=Lead section, § 3. Moral Judgment and Motivation}}</ref>