Editing Epistemology (section)

=== Skepticism and fallibilism ===
{{main|Skepticism|Falliblism|Epistemic relativism}}
[[Philosophical skepticism]] questions the human ability to attain knowledge by challenging the foundations upon which knowledge claims rest. Some skeptics limit their criticism to specific domains of knowledge. For example, [[Religious skepticism|religious skeptics]] say that it is impossible to know about the existence of deities or the truth of other religious doctrines. Similarly, moral skeptics challenge the existence of moral knowledge and metaphysical skeptics say that humans cannot know ultimate reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Cohen|1998|loc=§ Article Summary}} | {{harvnb|Hookway|2005|p=838}} | {{harvnb|Moser|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1ETRCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA200 200]}} }}</ref> External world skepticism questions knowledge of external facts,<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Greco|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1ETRCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA108 108]}} | {{harvnb|McKinsey|2018|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> whereas [[Problem of other minds|skepticism about other minds]] doubts knowledge of the mental states of others.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gomes|Reed|2018|pp=700–702}} | {{harvnb|Avramides|2023|loc=Lead Section, § 1. The (Traditional) Epistemological Problem}} }}</ref>

Global skepticism is the broadest form of skepticism, asserting that there is no knowledge in any domain.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hookway|2005|p=838}} | {{harvnb|Bergmann|2021|p=57}} | {{harvnb|Moreland|Craig|2003|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=mPEN_EDiZuQC&pg=PA95 95]}} }}</ref> In [[ancient philosophy]], this view was embraced by [[Academic skepticism|academic skeptics]], whereas [[Pyrrhonian skeptics]] recommended the [[Epoche|suspension of belief]] to attain [[Ataraxia|tranquility]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hazlett|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=4INnAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA18 18]}} | {{harvnb|Levine|1999|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=umYHtjvOhwIC&pg=PA11 11]}} }}</ref> Few epistemologists have explicitly defended global skepticism. The influence of this position stems from attempts by other philosophers to show that their theory overcomes the challenge of skepticism. For example, [[René Descartes]] used [[Cartesian doubt|methodological doubt]] to find facts that cannot be doubted.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hookway|2005|p=838}} | {{harvnb|Comesaña|Klein|2024|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref>

One consideration in favor of global skepticism is the [[dream argument]]. It starts from the observation that, while people are dreaming, they are usually unaware of this. This inability to distinguish between dream and regular experience is used to argue that there is no certain knowledge since a person can never be sure that they are not dreaming.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Windt|2021|loc=§ 1.1 Cartesian Dream Skepticism}} | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=§ 8. The Epistemic Principles and Scepticism}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|loc=§ 4. Sceptical Doubts About Knowing}} }}</ref>{{efn|The [[brain in a vat]] is a similar [[thought experiment]] assuming that a person does not have a body but is merely a brain receiving electrical stimuli indistinguishable from the stimuli a brain in a body would receive. This argument also leads to the conclusion of global skepticism based on the claim that it is not possible to distinguish stimuli representing the actual world from simulated stimuli.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hookway|2005|p=838}} | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2024|loc=§ 6.1 General Skepticism and Selective Skepticism}} }}</ref>}} Some critics assert that global skepticism is [[self-refuting idea|self-refuting]] because denying the existence of knowledge is itself a knowledge claim. Another objection says that the abstract reasoning leading to skepticism is not convincing enough to overrule common sense.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2024|loc=§ 6.2 Responses to the Closure Argument}} | {{harvnb|Reed|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=geSrCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA75 75]}} }}</ref>

Fallibilism is another response to skepticism.<ref>{{harvnb|Cohen|1998|loc=§ 1. The Philosophical Problem of Scepticism, § 2. Responses to Scepticism}}</ref> Fallibilists agree with skeptics that absolute certainty is impossible. They reject the assumption that knowledge requires absolute certainty, leading them to the conclusion that fallible knowledge exists.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Fallibilism''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Fallibilism''"|loc=Lead section, § 9. Implications of Fallibilism: Knowing Fallibly?}} | {{harvnb|Rescher|1998|loc=§ Article Summary}} }}</ref> They emphasize the need to keep an open and inquisitive mind, acknowledging that doubt can never be fully excluded, even for well-established knowledge claims like thoroughly tested scientific theories.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rescher|1998|loc=§ Article Summary}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Fallibilism''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Fallibilism''"|loc=§ 9. Implications of Fallibilism: Knowing Fallibly?}} }}</ref>

Epistemic relativism is related to skepticism but differs in that it does not question the existence of knowledge in general. Instead, epistemic relativists only reject the notion of universal epistemic standards or absolute principles that apply equally to everyone. This means that what a person knows depends on subjective criteria or social conventions used to assess epistemic status.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carter|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=RzslDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA292 292]}} | {{harvnb|Luper|2004|pp=271–272}} }}</ref>