Editing Blitzkrieg (section)

==Methods of operations==
===''Schwerpunkt''===
''Schwerpunktprinzip'' was a [[heuristic]] device (conceptual tool or thinking formula) that was used in the German Army from the nineteenth century to make decisions from tactics to strategy about priority. ''Schwerpunkt'' has been translated as ''center of gravity'', ''crucial'', ''focal point'' and ''point of main effort''. None of those forms is sufficient to describe the universal importance of the term and the concept of ''Schwerpunktprinzip''. Every unit in the army, from the company to the supreme command, decided on a ''Schwerpunkt'' by ''schwerpunktbildung'', as did the support services, which meant that commanders always knew what was the most important and why. The German army was trained to support the ''Schwerpunkt'' even when risks had to be taken elsewhere to support the point of main effort and to attack with overwhelming firepower.{{sfn|Sheldon|2017|pp=vi, 17}} ''Schwerpunktbildung'' allowed the German Army to achieve superiority at the ''Schwerpunkt'', whether attacking or defending, to turn local success at the ''Schwerpunkt'' into the progressive disorganisation of the opposing force and to create more opportunities to exploit that advantage even if the Germans were numerically and [[strategy|strategically]] inferior in general. In the 1930s, Guderian summarized that as ''Klotzen, nicht kleckern!'' (roughly "splash, don't spill"){{sfn|Frieser|2005|pp=89–90, 156–157}}{{sfn|Alexander|2002|p=227}}

===Pursuit===
Having achieved a breakthrough of the enemy's line, units comprising the ''Schwerpunkt'' were not supposed to become decisively engaged with enemy front line units to the right and the left of the breakthrough area. Units pouring through the hole were to drive upon set objectives behind the enemy front line. During the Second World War, German Panzer forces used their motorized mobility to paralyze the opponent's ability to react. Fast-moving mobile forces seized the initiative, exploited weaknesses and acted before the opposing forces could respond. Central to that was the [[decision cycle]] (tempo). Through superior mobility and faster decision-making cycles, mobile forces could act faster than the forces opposing them.

[[Mission-type tactics|Directive control]] was a fast and flexible method of command. Rather than receiving an explicit order, a commander would be told of his [[commander's intent|superior's intent]] and the role that his unit was to fill in that concept. The method of execution was then a matter for the discretion of the subordinate commander. The staff burden was reduced at the top and spread among tiers of command with knowledge about their situation. Delegation and the encouragement of initiative aided implementation, and important decisions could be taken quickly and communicated verbally or with only brief written orders.{{sfn|Frieser|2005|pp=344–346}}

===Mopping-up===
The last part of an offensive operation was the destruction of unsubdued [[pocket (military)|pockets]] of resistance, which had been [[envelop]]ed earlier and bypassed by the fast-moving armored and motorized spearheads. The ''Kesselschlacht'' ("cauldron battle") was a [[concentric]] attack on such pockets. It was there that most losses were inflicted upon the enemy, primarily through the mass capture of prisoners and weapons. During [[Operation Barbarossa]], huge encirclements in 1941 produced nearly 3.5 million Soviet prisoners, along with masses of equipment.{{sfn|Keegan|1987|p=265}}{{efn|name=Nazi crimes against Soviet POWs}}

===Air power===
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-646-5188-17, Flugzeuge Junkers Ju 87.jpg|thumb|The [[Junkers Ju 87|Ju 87 "Stuka"]] dive-bomber was used in blitzkrieg operations.]]
[[Close air support]] was provided in the form of the [[dive bomber]] and [[medium bomber]], which would support the focal point of attack from the air. German successes are closely related to the extent to which the German ''Luftwaffe'' could control the air war in early campaigns in Western and Central Europe and in the Soviet Union. However, the ''Luftwaffe'' was a broadly based force with no constricting central doctrine other than its resources should be used generally to support national strategy. It was flexible and could carry out both operational-tactical, and strategic bombing.

Flexibility was the strength of the ''Luftwaffe'' in 1939 to 1941. Paradoxically, that became its weakness. While Allied Air Forces were tied to the support of the Army, the ''Luftwaffe'' deployed its resources in a more general operational way. It switched from [[air superiority]] missions to medium-range interdiction, to strategic strikes to close support duties, depending on the need of the ground forces. In fact, far from it being a specialist panzer spearhead arm, less than 15 percent of the ''Luftwaffe'' was intended for close support of the army in 1939.{{sfn|Buckley|1998|pp=126–127}}

===Stimulants===
[[Methamphetamine]] use among troops, especially [[Temmler|Temmler's]] 3 mg Pervitin tablets, likely contributed to the Wehrmacht's ''blitzkrieg'' success by enabling synchronized, high-endurance operations with minimal rest.{{sfn|Andreas|2020}}