Editing Battle of New Orleans (section)

===Right Bank===
The preparations of the British had not gone unnoticed.{{sfnp|Hughes|Brodine|2023|p=1011-1015}} The Louisiana Militia brigade were reinforced by 200 Kentucky militiamen commanded by Colonel Davis. They arrived at 4am, after a five mile march through mud. Exhausted, they had not eaten since noon the prior day. Morgan deployed them between two positions, a mile apart.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|pp=288–289}}

The British dug a canal to enable 42 small boats to get to the river.{{sfnp|Porter|1889|p=361}} Preparations for the attack had floundered early on January 8, as the canal collapsed and the dam failed, leaving the sailors to drag the boats through the mud with Thornton's right bank assault force. This left the force starting off just before daybreak, eight hours late according to Thornton's dispatch,{{sfnp|Thornton|1815|pp=440-441}} assessed in 2008 to be 12 hours late.{{sfnp|Patterson|2008|p=236}}{{NoteTag|Gleig narrates in the third person of his participation on the attack on the Right Bank. 'No boats had arrived; hour after hour elapsed before they came.... Instead of reaching the opposite bank at latest by midnight, dawn was beginning to appear before the boats quitted the canal.... It was in vain that they made good their landing and formed upon the beach, without opposition or alarm; day had already broke, and the signal-rocket was seen in the air, while they were yet four miles from the batteries, which ought hours ago to have been taken.'{{sfnp|Gleig|1827|p=323}} }} In the early morning of January 8, Pakenham gave his final orders for the two-pronged assault. The frontal attack was not postponed, however, as the British hoped that the force on the right bank would create a diversion, even if they did not succeed in the assault.{{sfnp|Porter|1889|p=361}}

As a consequence of the sides of the canal caving in and choking the passage that night, only enough boats got through to carry 560 men,{{sfnmp|Brown|1969|1p=152|Hickey|1989|2p=211}}{{NoteTag|'We were unable to proceed across the river until eight hours after the time appointed, and even then, with only a third of the force which you had allotted for the service.'{{sfnp|Thornton|1815|pp=440-441}}}}{{NoteTag|Concerning the strength and composition of Thornton's force. Correspondence from Cochrane to Admiralty dated January 18, contained within {{London Gazette|startpage=450|issue=16991|date=9 March 1815}}, also in archives with reference ADM 1/508 folio 757, states 'the whole amounting to about six hundred men'. Gleig uses the source document a report from Thornton to Pakenham 'we were unable to proceed across the river until eight hours after the time appointed, and even then with only a third part of the force which you had allotted for the service viz 298 of the 85th, and 200 Seamen and Marines.'{{sfnp|Gleig|1827|p=340}} Duncan, with recourse to Dickson's papers: '[Pakenham] sent to enquire how many men had been embarked: and, having been informed that the 85th Foot, with some Marines—amounting in all to 460 — had been put on board, and that there was room for 100 more, he ordered that additional number to be embarked, and the whole to cross without delay.'{{sfnp|Duncan|1873|p=405-406}} }}{{NoteTag|'The force of the enemy did not exceed four hundred men.' Despatch from Major Foelcker to General Jackson dated January 8, 1815. 'The force of the enemy on this side amounted to 1,000, men.' Despatch from Patterson to [[United States Secretary of the Navy]] dated January 13, 1815. Both reproduced in a secondary source{{sfnp|Hughes|Brodine|2023|p=1014-1015,1018-1019}} }} just one-third of the intended force.{{NoteTag|Hughes & Brodine quotes from a letter from General Lambert to the Secretary of State for War dated January 28, republished in the London Gazette,{{sfnp|Lambert|1815|pp=442–443}} which mentions the original plan was to send over a larger force of a further 100 sailors, a further 300 marines, four cannons with gunners, and the battalion of the 5th West India Regiment.{{sfnp|Hughes|Brodine|2023|p=1002-1006}} }} Captain Rowland Money led the Navy detachment, and Brevet Major Thomas Adair led the Marines. Money was captain of [[French frigate Trave (1812)|HMS ''Trave'']], and Adair was the commanding officer of {{HMS|Vengeur|1810|6}}'s detachment of Marines.{{sfnp|Admiralty|1814|p=145}}Thornton did not make allowance for the current, and it carried him about a thousand yards below the intended landing place.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|pp=293–294}}{{NoteTag|Remini states the plan was to land three miles south of Morgan's position, but they actually landed four miles south.{{sfnp|Remini|1999|pp=134,158}}}}

The only British success of the battle was the delayed attack on the right bank of the Mississippi River, where Thornton's brigade of the [[85th Regiment of Foot (Bucks Volunteers)|85th Regiment of Foot]] and detachments from the Royal Navy and Royal Marines{{sfnp|Patterson|2008|p=230}} attacked and overwhelmed the American line.{{sfnp|Thornton|1815|pp=440-441}} The 700 militiamen were routed.{{sfnp|Hickey|1989|p=211}} Reilly felt the fault lay with Morgan, who had dispersed his troops, rather than concentrating most of them around his main defence, whilst deploying a picket, to give advance warning once the British arrived.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|pp=293–294}} The decision by General Morgan to deploy his troops in two positions a mile apart, neither defensible, was favorable for the British. Morgan's mismanagement of his Kentucky and Louisiana militiamen was an open invitation to defeat.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|p=298}} Whilst the retreat of the militia has been criticized, such a move was no less than prudent.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|pp=302-303}} An inquiry, overseen by Major General William Carroll of the Tennessee Militia, found that the conduct was 'not reprehensible'.{{NoteTag|Court martial of inquiry, relative to the retreat on January 8, reproduced in Latour (1816), appendix LXII.{{sfnp|Latour|1999|p=cxxxii}}}} Major Paul Arnaud, commanding officer of the 2nd Louisiana militia brigade, was targeted as a scapegoat for the retreat on the Right Bank.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|p=307}} His fellow Louisiana Militia officers Dejean, Cavallier and Declouet were admonished, as was Colonel John Davis of the Kentucky Militia.{{sfnp|Latour|1999|p=cxxxii}}

At around 10&nbsp;am, Lambert was made aware that the right bank had been taken,{{sfnmp|1a1=Hughes|1a2=Brodine|1y=2023|1p=1005|2a1=Parton|2y=1861|2p=217}} as signalled by a rocket launched by Gubbins. His brigade won their battle, but Thornton was badly wounded, and delegated his command to Gubbins. Army casualties among the 85th Foot were two dead, one captured, and 41 wounded,{{sfnp|Thornton|1815|pp=440-441}} the battalion reduced to 270 effectives on the Right Bank.{{sfnp|Brown|1969|p=156}} Royal Navy casualties were two dead, Captain Rowland Money and 18 seamen wounded. Royal Marine casualties were two dead, with three officers, one sergeant, and 12 other ranks wounded. By contrast, the defenders' casualties were two dead, eleven wounded and nineteen missing.{{NoteTag|Greene, with reference to both Jackson's papers and Tatum's journal (both edited by Bassett) and Bassett, with reference to Tatum's journal corroborated Tatum's figures.{{sfnmp|Bassett|1911|1p=143|Greene|2009|2p=159|Tatum|1922|3p=130}}}} Both Jackson and Commodore Patterson reported that the retreating forces had [[Touch hole#Spiking the guns|spiked their cannon]], leaving no guns to turn on the Americans' main defense line; Major Michell's diary, however, claims that he had "commenced cleaning enemy's guns to form a battery to enfilade their lines on the left bank".{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|p=305}}

General Lambert ordered his Chief of Artillery Colonel [[Alexander Dickson (British Army officer)|Alexander Dickson]] to assess the position. Dickson reported back that no fewer than 2,000 men would be required to hold the position. Lambert issued orders to withdraw after the defeat of their main army on the east bank and retreated, taking a few American prisoners and cannon with them.{{sfnmp|Patterson|2008|1p=253|Thornton|1815|2pp=440-441}} The Americans were so dismayed by the loss of this battery, which would be capable of inflicting much damage on their lines when the attack was renewed, that they were preparing to abandon the town when they received the news that the British were withdrawing, according to one British regimental historian.{{sfnp|Porter|1889|p=363}} Reilly does not agree, but does note that Jackson was eager to send [[Jean Joseph Amable Humbert|Humbert]] to take command of 400 men to retake the position from Thornton's troops.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|p=305}}{{NoteTag|Davis, quoting from correspondence from Shaumburg to Claiborne, states that Humbert arrived, demanding 400 men without written orders, and was rebuffed by Morgan.{{sfnp|Davis|2019|p=273}} The written order from Jackson has survived, however, with Humbert accompanied by Lafitte. Patterson's letter dated January 13 mentions 'a large re-enforcement of militia having been immediately despatched by general Jackson to this side.'{{sfnp|Latour|1999|p=lxii}} Latour, an eye witness, has the following to say: '[Humbert was ordered] to cross over with a re-enforcement of four hundred men, take the command of the troops, and repulse the enemy.. The order he had received, was only verbal, owing to the urgency of the occasion. There arose disputes concerning military precedence. Other militia officers did not think it right that a French general... should be sent to remedy the faults of others...[The implication is that the militia officers were refusing to be subordinate to Humbert, and that they considered Morgan to continue to be the Commanding Officer.] Happily, during this discussion, the enemy, as I have observed, thought it prudent to retreat, which they did that night and next morning.'{{sfnp|Latour|1999|p=175-176}} }} Carson Ritchie goes as far to assert that 'it was not Pakenham, but Sir Alexander Dickson who lost the third battle of New Orleans' in consequence of his recommendation to evacuate the Right Bank,{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|p=305}} and that 'he could think of nothing but defense'.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|p=305}}

This success, being described as 'a brilliant exploit by the British, and a disgraceful exhibition [of General Morgan's leadership] by the Americans,'{{sfnp|Brown|1969|p=157}}{{sfnp|Roosevelt|1900|p=232}} had no effect on the outcome of the battle.{{sfnp|Brown|1969|p=157}}{{sfnp|Roosevelt|1900|p=232}}

The positions were reoccupied on the 9th, and Patterson reestablished his battery on January 10.{{sfnp|Owsley|2000|p=164}}