Editing Battle of Cold Harbor (section)

===June 4–12===
[[File:Coehorn at Cold Harbor.jpg|thumb|left|Union [[Coehorn|Coehorn mortars]] in action, drawn by [[Alfred Waud]]]]
Grant and Meade launched no more attacks on the Confederate defenses at Cold Harbor. The two opposing armies faced each other for nine days of trench warfare, in some places only yards apart. Sharpshooters worked continuously, killing many. Union artillery bombarded the Confederates with a battery of eight [[Coehorn|Coehorn mortars]]; the Confederates responded by depressing the trail of a 24-pound [[howitzer]] and lobbing shells over the Union positions. Although there were no more large-scale attacks, casualty figures for the entire battle were twice as large as from the June 3 assault alone.<ref>Catton, p. 267; Furgurson, pp. 181–182; Trudeau, p. 298.</ref>

The trenches were hot, dusty, and miserable, but conditions were worse between the lines, where thousands of wounded Federal soldiers suffered horribly without food, water, or medical assistance. Grant was reluctant to ask for a formal truce that would allow him to recover his wounded because that would be an acknowledgment he had lost the battle. He and Lee traded notes across the lines from June 5 to 7 without coming to an agreement, and when Grant formally requested a two-hour cessation of hostilities, it was too late for most of the unfortunate wounded, who were now bloated corpses. Grant was widely criticized in the Northern press for this lapse of judgment.<ref>King, p. 311: "Under the accepted rules of warfare of the 19th century, the losing side in a battle was supposed to send a flag of truce to the victor to ask for a cease-fire that would allow both sides to recover their dead and wounded." Grimsley, p. 220; Trudeau, pp. 304–306.</ref>

{{Quote box
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|quote=Every corpse I saw was as black as coal. It was not possible to remove them. They were buried where they fell. ... I saw no live man lying on this ground. The wounded must have suffered horribly before death relieved them, lying there exposed to the blazing southern sun o' days, and being eaten alive by beetles o' nights.
|source=Union artillery officer, Frank Wilkeson<ref>Grimsley, p. 221.</ref>
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On June 4 Grant tightened his lines by moving Burnside's corps behind Matadequin Creek as a reserve and moving Warren leftward to connect with Smith, shortening his lines about {{convert|3|mi|km}}. On June 6 Early probed Burnside's new position but could not advance through the impassable swamps.<ref>Furgurson, pp. 206–208.</ref>
Grant realized that, once again in the campaign, he was in a stalemate with Lee and additional assaults were not the answer. He planned three actions to make some headway. First, in the [[Shenandoah Valley]], Maj. Gen. [[David Hunter]] was making progress against Confederate forces, and Grant hoped that by interdicting Lee's supplies, the Confederate general would be forced to dispatch reinforcements to the Valley. Second, on June 7 Grant dispatched his cavalry under Sheridan (the divisions of Brig. Gens. [[David McM. Gregg]] and [[Wesley Merritt]]) to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad near [[Charlottesville, Virginia|Charlottesville]]. Third, he planned a stealthy operation to withdraw from Lee's front and move across the James River. Lee reacted to the first two actions as Grant had hoped. He pulled Breckinridge's division from Cold Harbor and sent it toward [[Lynchburg, Virginia|Lynchburg]] to parry Hunter. By June 12 he followed this by assigning Jubal Early permanent command of the Second Corps and sending them to the Valley as well. And he sent two of his three cavalry divisions in pursuit of Sheridan, leading to the [[Battle of Trevilian Station]]. However, despite anticipating that Grant might shift across the James, Lee was taken by surprise when it occurred. On June 12 the Army of the Potomac finally disengaged to march southeast to cross the James and threaten [[Petersburg, Virginia|Petersburg]], a crucial rail junction south of Richmond.<ref>McPherson, p. 737; Trudeau, pp. 305–306; Eicher, pp. 686–687; Salmon, pp. 258–259; Grimsley, p. 223; Esposito, text for map 136.</ref>