Editing Attack on Pearl Harbor (section)

===Possible third wave===
According to some accounts, several Japanese junior officers, including Fuchida and Genda, urged Nagumo to carry out a third strike in order to sink more of the Pearl Harbor's remaining warships, and damage the base's maintenance shops, drydock facilities and oil tank yards.<ref name=Gailey1997p68 /> Most notably, Fuchida gave a firsthand account of this meeting several times after the war. However, some historians have [[Mitsuo Fuchida#Historical controversy|cast doubt]] on this and many other of Fuchida's later claims, which sometimes conflict with documented historic records.{{sfn|Parshall|2010}} Genda, who opined during the planning for the attack that [[Events leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor#Concept of Japanese invasion of Hawaii|without an invasion]] three strikes were necessary to fully disable the Pacific Fleet,{{sfn|Caravaggio|2014}} denied requesting an additional attack.{{sfn|Willmott|2001|p=156–157}} Regardless, it is undisputed that the captains of the other five carriers in the task force reported they were willing and ready to carry out a third strike soon after the second returned,{{sfn|Horn|2005|p=16}} but Nagumo decided to withdraw for several reasons:
*American anti-aircraft performance had improved considerably during the second strike, and two-thirds of Japan's losses were incurred during the second wave.{{sfn|Hoyt|2000|p=190}}
*Nagumo felt if he launched a third strike, he would be risking three-quarters of the Combined Fleet's strength to wipe out the remaining targets (which included the facilities) while suffering higher aircraft losses.{{sfn|Hoyt|2000|p=190}}
*The location of the American carriers remained unknown. In addition, the admiral was concerned his force was now within range of American land-based bombers.{{sfn|Hoyt|2000|p=190}} Nagumo was uncertain whether the United States had enough surviving planes remaining on Hawaii to launch an attack against his carriers.{{sfn|Hoyt|2000|p=191}}
*A third wave would have required substantial preparation and turnaround time, and would have meant returning planes would have had to land at night. At the time, only the [[Royal Navy]] had developed night carrier techniques, so this was a substantial risk.{{sfn|Stephen|1988|pp=34–38}} The first two waves had launched the entirety of the Combined Fleet's air strength. A third wave would have required landing both the first and second wave before launching the first wave again. Compare Nagumo's situation in the [[Battle of Midway]], where an attack returning from Midway kept Nagumo from launching an immediate strike on American carriers.
*The task force's fuel situation did not permit him to remain in waters north of Pearl Harbor much longer, since he was at the very limit of logistical support. To do so risked running unacceptably low on fuel, perhaps even having to abandon destroyers en route home.{{sfn|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1988|p={{Page needed|date=August 2021}}}}
*He believed the second strike had essentially accomplished the mission's main objective (neutralizing the United States Pacific Fleet) and did not wish to risk further losses.{{sfn|Gailey|1997|p=97}} Moreover, it was IJN practice to prefer the conservation of strength over the total destruction of the enemy.{{sfn|Willmott|1983|p=16}}

Although a hypothetical third strike would have likely focused on the base's remaining warships,{{refn|Fuchida would later claim he had designated Pearl Harbor's oil storage facilities as the primary target, although this contradicted Japanese military doctrine and even several interviews on the subject he had given earlier in life{{sfn|Parshall|2010}}}} military historians have suggested any potential damage to the shore facilities would have hampered the Pacific Fleet far more seriously.{{sfn|Willmott|1983}}{{page needed|date=December 2015}}{{sfn|Blair|1975}}{{page needed|date=December 2015}} If they had been wiped out, "serious [American] operations in the Pacific would have been postponed for more than a year";{{sfn|Gailey|1997|pp=97–98}} according to Admiral [[Chester W. Nimitz]], later Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, "it would have prolonged the war another two years".{{sfn|Yergin|1991|p=327}}

At a conference aboard his flagship the following morning, Yamamoto supported Nagumo's withdrawal without launching a third wave.{{sfn|Gailey|1997|p=97}} In retrospect, sparing the vital dockyards, maintenance shops, and the oil tank farm meant the United States could respond relatively quickly in the Pacific. Yamamoto later regretted Nagumo's decision to withdraw and categorically stated it had been a great mistake not to order a third strike.{{sfn|Gailey|1997|p=98}}