Editing World War III (section)

===Exercise Able Archer===
{{main|Able Archer 83}}
[[File:Reagan and Gordievsky.jpg|thumb|upright|U.S. president [[Ronald Reagan]] and Soviet double agent [[Oleg Gordievsky]], who later told the West how close the Able Archer 83 exercise had brought the Soviets to ordering a [[Pre-emptive nuclear strike|First Strike]].]]

Exercise Able Archer was an annual exercise by the [[United States European Command|U.S. European Command]] that practiced command and control procedures, with emphasis on the transition from solely conventional operations to chemical, nuclear, and conventional operations during a time of war.

"Able Archer 83" was a five-day [[North Atlantic Treaty Organization]] (NATO) [[command post]] [[military exercise|exercise]] starting on 7 November 1983, that spanned [[Western Europe]], centered on the [[Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe]] (SHAPE) Headquarters in [[Casteau]], north of the city of [[Mons, Belgium|Mons]]. Able Archer's exercises simulated a period of [[conflict escalation]], culminating in a coordinated [[nuclear attack]].<ref name="FischerBenj-2007">{{Cite web|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/a-cold-war-conundrum/source.htm#HEADING1-12|publisher=[[Central Intelligence Agency]]|title=A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare|author=Benjamin B. Fischer|access-date=13 January 2009|date=17 March 2007| archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20090114024850/https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/a-cold-war-conundrum/source.htm| archive-date= 14 January 2009 | url-status= dead}}</ref>

The realistic nature of the 1983 exercise, coupled with [[Cold War (1979–85)|deteriorating relations]] between the United States and the Soviet Union and the anticipated arrival of [[Nuclear strategy|strategic]] [[Pershing II]] nuclear missiles in Europe, led some members of the [[Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Soviet Politburo]] and military to believe that Able Archer 83 was a [[ruse of war]], obscuring preparations for a genuine nuclear first strike.<ref name="FischerBenj-2007"/><ref>Andrew and Gordievsky, ''Comrade Kryucvcov's Instructions'', 85–7.</ref><ref name="FischerBeth">Beth Fischer, ''Reagan Reversal'', 123, 131.</ref><ref name = "Pry Scare 37–9">Pry, ''War Scare'', 37–9.</ref> In response, the Soviets readied their nuclear forces and placed air units in [[East Germany]] and [[Polish People's Republic|Poland]] on alert.<ref>Oberdorfer, ''A New Era'', 66.</ref><ref name = "SNIE 84">''SNIE 11–10–84'' "Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities" Central Intelligence Agency, 18 May 1984.</ref>

This "1983 war scare" is considered by many historians to be the closest the world has come to nuclear war since the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] of 1962.<ref>{{cite news|author=John Lewis Gaddis |author-link=John Lewis Gaddis |author2=John Hashimoto |name-list-style=amp |title=COLD WAR Chat: Professor John Lewis Gaddis, Historian |url=http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/guides/debate/chats/gaddis |access-date=29 December 2005 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050901185224/http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/guides/debate/chats/gaddis/ |archive-date=1 September 2005 }}</ref> The threat of nuclear war ended with the conclusion of the exercise on 11 November.<ref>Andrew and Gordievsky, ''Comrade Kryucvcov's Instructions'', 87–8.</ref><ref name = "Pry Scare 43–4">Pry, ''War Scare'', 43–4.</ref>