Editing Truth (section)

=====Redundancy and related=====
{{Main|Redundancy theory of truth}}

An early variety of deflationary theory is the [[redundancy theory of truth]], so-called because—in examples like those above, e.g. "snow is white [is true]"—the concept of "truth" is redundant and need not have been articulated; that is, it is merely a word that is traditionally used in conversation or writing, generally for emphasis, but not a word that actually equates to anything in reality. This theory is commonly attributed to [[Frank P. Ramsey]], who held that the use of words like ''fact'' and ''truth'' was nothing but a [[periphrasis|roundabout]] way of asserting a proposition, and that treating these words as separate problems in isolation from judgment was merely a "linguistic muddle".<ref name="EPT"/><ref>Ramsey, F.P. (1927), "Facts and Propositions", Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 7, 153–170. Reprinted, pp. 34–51 in F.P. Ramsey, Philosophical Papers, David Hugh Mellor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990</ref><ref>Le Morvan, Pierre. (2004) "Ramsey on Truth and Truth on Ramsey", ''The British Journal for the History of Philosophy'' 12(4), pp. 705–718.</ref>

A variant of redundancy theory is the "disquotational" theory, which uses a modified form of the logician [[Alfred Tarski]]'s [[#Semantic theory of truth|schema]]: proponents observe that to say that "'P' is true" ''is'' to assert "P". A version of this theory was defended by [[C. J. F. Williams]] (in his book ''What is Truth?''). Yet another version of deflationism is the prosentential theory of truth, first developed by Dorothy Grover, Joseph Camp, and [[Nuel Belnap]] as an elaboration of Ramsey's claims. They argue that utterances such as "that's true", when said in response to (e.g.) "it's raining", are "[[prosentence]]s"—expressions that merely repeat the content of other expressions. In the same way that ''it'' means the same as ''my dog'' in the statement "my dog was hungry, so I fed it", ''that's true'' is supposed to mean the same as ''it's raining'' when the former is said in reply to the latter.<ref>{{Cite book |last=David |first=Marian Alexander |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=szl6AsLmKIEC |title=Correspondence and Disquotation: An Essay on the Nature of Truth |date=1994 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-507924-1 |language=en}}</ref> 

As noted above, proponents of these ideas do not necessarily follow Ramsey in asserting that truth is not a ''property;'' rather, they can be understood to say that, for instance, the assertion "P" ''may well'' involve a substantial truth—it is only the redundancy involved in statements such as "that's true" (i.e., a prosentence) which is to be minimized.<ref name=EPT/>