Editing Theophrastus (section)

=== Physics and metaphysics ===
Theophrastus introduced his Physics with the proof that all natural existence, being corporeal and composite, requires ''principles'',<ref>Simplicius, ''in Phys.'' f. 1, 6.</ref> and first and foremost, [[Motion (physics)|motion]], as the basis of all change.<ref>Simplicius, ''in Phys.'' f. 5, 6.</ref> Denying the substance of [[space]], he seems to have regarded it, in opposition to Aristotle, as the mere arrangement and position ({{Transliteration|grc|taxis}} and {{Transliteration|grc|thesis}}) of bodies.<ref>Simplicius, ''in Phys.'' 149, b. 141.</ref> [[Time]] he called an accident of motion, without, it seems, viewing it, with Aristotle, as the numerical determinant of motion.<ref>Simplicius, ''in Phys.'' f. 87, b; John Phil. 213. 4.</ref> He attacked the doctrine of the four [[classical elements]] and challenged whether [[fire (classical element)|fire]] could be called a primary element when it appears to be compound, requiring, as it does, another material for its own nutriment.<ref>Theophrastus, ''On Fire'', 1.</ref>

[[File:Aristoteles Louvre.jpg|thumb|upright|[[Aristotle]]]]
He departed more widely from Aristotle in his doctrine of motion, since on the one hand he extended it over all categories, and did not limit it to those laid down by Aristotle.<ref>Simplicius, ''in Categ.''; comp. Simplicius, ''in Phys.'' 94, 201, 202, 1.</ref> He viewed motion, with Aristotle, as an activity, not carrying its own goal in itself ({{Transliteration|grc|ateles}}), of that which only [[Potentiality and actuality|potentially]] exists,<ref>Simplicius, l. c. and f. 94, 1.</ref> but he opposed Aristotle's view that motion required a special explanation, and he regarded it as something proper both to nature in general and the celestial system in particular:

{{blockquote|Surely, then, if the life in animals does not need explanation or is to be explained only in this way, may it not be the case that in the heavens too, and in the heavenly bodies, movement does not need explanation or is to be explained in a special way?|Theophrastus, ''Metaphysics'', 10a.16–29.{{sfn|Gould|1970|p=24}} }}

He recognised no activity without motion,<ref>Simplicius, ''in Categ.''</ref> and so referred all activities of the [[Soul (spirit)|soul]] to motion: the desires and emotions to corporeal motion, judgment ({{Transliteration|grc|kriseis}}) and contemplation to spiritual motion.<ref>Simplicius, ''in Phys.'' 225.</ref> The idea of a spirit entirely independent of organic activity, must therefore have appeared to him very doubtful; yet he appears to have contented himself with developing his doubts and difficulties on the point, without positively rejecting it.<ref>Themistius, ''in Arist. de An.'' 89, b. 91, b.</ref> Other Peripatetics, like [[Dicaearchus]], [[Aristoxenus]], and especially [[Strato of Lampsacus|Strato]], developed further this [[Naturalism (philosophy)|naturalism]] in Aristotelian doctrine.

Theophrastus seems, generally speaking, where the investigation overstepped the limits of experience, to have preferred to develop the difficulties rather than solve them, as is especially apparent in his ''Metaphysics''.<ref name="SmithDGRBM" /> He was doubtful of Aristotle's [[teleology]] and recommended that such ideas be used with caution:

{{blockquote|With regard to the view that all things are for the sake of an end and nothing is in vain, the assignation of ends is in general not easy, as it is usually stated to be ... we must set certain limits to purposiveness and to the effort after the best, and not assert it to exist in all cases without qualification.|Theophrastus, ''Metaphysics'', 10a.22–24, 11a.1–3.{{sfn|Gould|1970b|p=25}}<!--end of quote-->}}

He did not follow the incessant attempts by Aristotle to refer phenomena to their ultimate foundations, or his attempts to unfold the internal connections between the latter, and between them and phenomena.<ref name="SmithDGRBM" /> In antiquity, it was a subject of complaint that Theophrastus had not expressed himself with precision and consistency respecting [[God]], and had understood it at one time as [[Heaven]], at another an (enlivening) breath (''[[pneuma]]'').<ref>Clement of Alexandria, ''Protrept.''; Cicero, ''de Natura Deorum'', i. 13.</ref>