Editing Teleology (section)

== Science ==
{{See also|Four causes#The four causes in modern science}}

In modern science, explanations that rely on teleology are often, but not always, avoided, either because they are unnecessary or because whether they are true or false is thought to be beyond the ability of human perception and understanding to judge.<ref name="aristotle" group="lower-roman">"The received intellectual tradition has it that, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, revolutionary philosophers began to curtail and reject the teleology of the medieval and scholastic Aristotelians, abandoning final causes in favor of a purely mechanistic model of the Universe."

{{Citation|last=Johnson|first=Monte Ransom|title=Aristotle on Teleology|year=2008|publisher=Oxford University Press}}. pp. 23–24.</ref> But using teleology as an explanatory style, in particular within evolutionary biology, is still controversial.<ref name="Hanke2004">{{Cite book|author=Hanke, David|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ZWpq14vS7WQC&q=%22biology%20is%20sick%20%22&pg=PA143|title=Explanations: Styles of explanation in science|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2004|isbn=0-19-860778-4|editor=John Cornwell|place=New York|pages=143–155|chapter=Teleology: The explanation that bedevils biology|access-date=18 July 2010}}</ref>

Since the ''[[Novum Organum]]'' of [[Francis Bacon]], teleological explanations in [[Outline of physical science|physical science]] tend to be deliberately avoided in favor of focus on material and efficient explanations, although some recent accounts of quantum phenomena make use of teleology.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Simpson|first=W.M.R|title=Cosmic Hylomorphism: a powerist ontology of quantum mechanics|date=2021|journal=European Journal for Philosophy of Science|volume=11|issue=28|page=28|doi=10.1007/s13194-020-00342-5|pmid=33520035|pmc=7831748}}</ref> Final and formal causation came to be viewed as false or too subjective.<ref name="aristotle" group="lower-roman" /> Nonetheless, some disciplines, in particular within [[evolutionary biology]], continue to use language that appears teleological in describing natural tendencies towards certain end conditions. Some{{Who|date=May 2020}} suggest, however, that these arguments ought to be, and practicably can be, rephrased in non-teleological forms; others hold that teleological language cannot always be ''easily'' expunged from descriptions in the life sciences, at least within the bounds of practical [[pedagogy]].

Contemporary philosophers and scientists still debate whether teleological [[axiom]]s are useful or accurate in proposing modern philosophies and scientific theories. An example of the reintroduction of teleology into modern language is the notion of an ''[[attractor]]''.<ref>[[Heinz von Foerster|von Foerster, Heinz]]. 1992. "Cybernetics". p. 310 in [https://books.google.com/books?id=fKURAQAAMAAJ&q=Teleology+modern+dress+attractors ''Encyclopedia of Artificial'' Intelligence] 1, edited by S. C. Shapiro. {{ISBN|9780471503071}}.</ref> Another instance is when [[Thomas Nagel]] (2012), though not a biologist, proposed a non-[[Darwinism|Darwinian]] account of [[evolution]] that incorporates impersonal and natural teleological laws to explain the existence of life, [[consciousness]], [[rationality]], and objective value.<ref>[[Thomas Nagel|Nagel, Thomas.]] 2012. ''[[Mind and Cosmos]]''. [[Oxford University Press]].</ref> {{Anchor|Pedagogical_allowances}} Regardless, the accuracy can also be considered independently from the usefulness: it is a common experience in [[pedagogy]] that a minimum of apparent teleology can be useful in thinking about and explaining Darwinian evolution even if there is no true teleology driving evolution. Thus it is easier to say that evolution "gave" wolves sharp [[canine tooth|canine teeth]] because those teeth "serve the purpose of" [[predation]] regardless of whether there is an underlying non-teleologic reality in which evolution is not an actor with intentions. In other words, because human [[cognition]] and [[learning]] often rely on the narrative structure of stories – with actors, goals, and immediate (proximate) rather than ultimate (distal) causation (see also [[proximate and ultimate causation]]) – some minimal level of teleology might be recognized as useful or at least tolerable for practical purposes even by people who reject its [[cosmology|cosmologic]] accuracy. Its accuracy is upheld by Barrow and Tipler (1986), whose citations of such teleologists as [[Max Planck]] and [[Norbert Wiener]] are significant for scientific endeavor.<ref>Barrow, John D., and Frank J. Tipler. 1986. ''The Anthropic Cosmological Principle''. New York: Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|9780198519492}}.</ref>

=== Biology ===
{{Main|Teleology in biology}}

Apparent teleology is a recurring issue in [[evolutionary biology]],<ref>Ruse, M., and J. Travis, eds. 2009. ''Evolution: The First Four Billion Years''. Cambridge, MA: [[Harvard University Press|Belknap Press]]. p. 364.</ref> much to the consternation of some writers.<ref name="Hanke2004"/>

Statements implying that nature has goals, for example where a species is said to do something "in order to" achieve survival appear teleological, and therefore invalid. Usually, it is possible to rewrite such sentences to avoid the apparent teleology. Some biology courses have incorporated exercises requiring students to rephrase such sentences so that they do not read teleologically. Nevertheless, biologists still frequently write in a way which can be read as implying teleology even if that is not the intention. John Reiss argues that evolutionary biology can be purged of such teleology by rejecting the analogy of natural selection as a [[watchmaker analogy|watchmaker]].<ref>Reiss, John O. 2009. ''Not by Design: Retiring Darwin's Watchmaker''. Berkeley: [[University of California Press]]. {{Page needed|date=September 2011}}</ref> Other arguments against this analogy have also been promoted by writers such as [[Richard Dawkins]].<ref>[[Richard Dawkins|Dawkins, Richard]]. 1987. ''The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe Without Design''. New York: [[W. W. Norton & Company|W W Norton & Company]].</ref>

Some authors, like [[James G. Lennox|James Lennox]], have argued that [[Charles Darwin|Darwin]] was a teleologist,<ref>[[James G. Lennox|Lennox, James G.]] (1993). "Darwin was a Teleologist". ''[[Biology & Philosophy]]'' 8:409–21.</ref> while others, such as [[Michael Ghiselin]], describe this claim as a myth promoted by misinterpretations of his discussions and emphasized the distinction between using teleological metaphors and being teleological.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Ghiselin|first1=Michael T.|author-link=Michael Ghiselin|year=1994|title=Darwin's language may seem teleological, but his thinking is another matter|journal=[[Biology & Philosophy]]|volume=9|issue=4|pages=489–492|doi=10.1007/BF00850377|s2cid=170997321}}</ref>

Biologist philosopher [[Francisco J. Ayala|Francisco Ayala]] has argued that all statements about processes can be trivially translated into teleological statements, and vice versa, but that teleological statements are more explanatory and cannot be disposed of.<ref name="Ayala 1998">[[Francisco J. Ayala|Ayala, Francisco]] (1998). "Teleological explanations in evolutionary biology". ''Nature's Purposes: Analyses of Function and Design in Biology''. Cambridge: [[MIT Press]].</ref> [[Karen Neander]] has argued that the modern concept of biological '[[Biological functionalism|function]]' is dependent upon selection. So, for example, it is not possible to say that anything that simply winks into existence without going through a process of selection has functions. We decide whether an appendage has a function by analysing the process of selection that led to it. Therefore, any talk of functions must be posterior to natural selection and function cannot be defined in the manner advocated by Reiss and Dawkins.<ref>[[Karen Neander|Neander, Karen]]. 1998. "Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst's Defense". pp. 313–333 in ''Nature's Purposes: Analyses of Function and Design in Biology'', edited by C. Allen, M. Bekoff, and G. Lauder. Cambridge, MA: [[MIT Press]].</ref>

[[Ernst Mayr]] states that "adaptedness ... is an ''[[Empirical evidence|a posteriori]]'' result rather than an ''[[A priori and a posteriori|a priori]]'' goal-seeking".<ref>[[Ernst Mayr|Mayr, Ernst W.]] 1992. "The idea of teleology". ''[[Journal of the History of Ideas]]'' 53:117–35.</ref> Various commentators view the teleological phrases used in modern evolutionary biology as a type of shorthand. For example, [[Simon Hugh Piper Maddrell]] writes that "the proper but cumbersome way of describing change by evolutionary adaptation [may be] substituted by shorter overtly teleological statements" for the sake of saving space, but that this "should not be taken to imply that evolution proceeds by anything other than from mutations arising by chance, with those that impart an advantage being retained by natural selection".<ref>Madrell, S. H. P. 1998. "Why are there no insects in the open sea?" ''[[The Journal of Experimental Biology]]'' 201:2461–64.</ref> Likewise, [[J. B. S. Haldane]] says, "Teleology is like a mistress to a biologist: he cannot live without her but he's unwilling to be seen with her in public."<ref>Hull, D. 1973. ''Philosophy of Biological Science, Foundations of Philosophy Series''. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: [[Prentice Hall]].</ref><ref>[[Ernst Mayr|Mayr, Ernst]]. 1974. ''Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science'' XIV pp. 91–117.</ref>

=== Cybernetics ===
{{Main|Cybernetics}}
[[Cybernetics]] is the study of the [[communication]] and [[control theory|control]] of [[regulatory feedback]] both in living beings and machines, and in combinations of the two.

[[Arturo Rosenblueth]], [[Norbert Wiener]], and [[Julian Bigelow]] had conceived of [[feedback|feedback mechanisms]] as lending a teleology to machinery.<ref name=":5">{{Cite journal|last1=Rosenblueth|first1=Arturo|last2=Wiener|first2=Norbert|last3=Bigelow|first3=Julian|date=1943-01-01|title=Behavior, Purpose and Teleology|url=https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/286788|journal=Philosophy of Science|volume=10|issue=1|pages=18–24|doi=10.1086/286788|s2cid=16179485|issn=0031-8248}}</ref> Wiener coined the term ''[[cybernetics]]'' to denote the study of "teleological mechanisms".<ref>[[Norbert Wiener|Wiener, Norbert]]. 1948. ''[[Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine]]''.</ref> In the cybernetic classification presented by Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow, ''teleology'' is feedback controlled purpose.<ref name=":5" /><ref>{{cite book |last=Conway |first=Patrick |title=Development of volitional competence |publisher=MSS Information Corp |year=1974 |pages=60 |isbn=0-8422-0424-5}}</ref>

The classification system underlying cybernetics has been criticized by [[Frank Honywill George]] and Les Johnson, who cite the need for an external observability to the purposeful behavior in order to establish and validate the goal-seeking behavior.<ref name=":6" /> In this view, the purpose of observing and observed systems is respectively distinguished by the system's subjective [[autonomy]] and objective control.<ref name=":6">{{cite book |last=George| first=Frank Honywill |author-link=Frank Honywill George|author2=Johnson, Les |title=Purposive behavior and teleological explanations |publisher=Gordon and Breach |pages=xII |year=1985| isbn=2881241107 }}</ref>