Editing Second Boer War (section)

== First phase: The Boer offensive (October–December 1899) ==

=== British Army deployed ===

When war with the Boer republics was imminent in September 1899, a Field Force, referred to as the Army Corps (sometimes 1st Army Corps) was mobilised and sent to Cape Town. It was "about the equivalent of the [[I Corps (United Kingdom)|I Army Corps]] of the existing mobilization scheme" and was placed under the command of Gen Sir [[Redvers Buller]], general officer commanding-in-chief of [[Aldershot Command]].<ref>Dunlop, Colonel John K., ''The Development of the British Army 1899–1914'', London, Methuen (1938) p. 72.</ref> In South Africa the corps never operated as such and the [[History of the British 1st Division between 1809–1909|1st]], [[2nd Infantry Division (United Kingdom)|2nd]], [[3rd Division (United Kingdom)|3rd]] divisions were widely dispersed.

=== Boer organization and skills ===

War was declared on 11 October 1899 with a Boer offensive into the British-held Natal and Cape Colony areas. The Boers had about 33,000 soldiers, and decisively outnumbered the British, who could move only 13,000 troops to the front line.{{sfn|Searle|2004|p=276}} The Boers had no problems with mobilisation, since the fiercely independent Boers had no regular army units, apart from the ''Staatsartillerie'' (Dutch for 'State Artillery') of both republics. As with the First Boer War, since most of the Boers were members of civilian militias, none had adopted uniforms or insignia. Only the members of the ''Staatsartillerie'' wore light green uniforms.

[[File:Mafikeng Second Boer War.jpg|thumb|upright=1.3|Boers in a trench at Mafeking, 1899]]

When danger loomed, all the ''burgers'' (citizens) in a district would form a military unit called a ''commando'' and would elect officers. A full-time official called a ''Veldkornet'' maintained muster rolls but had no disciplinary powers. Each man brought his own weapon, usually a hunting rifle, and his own horse. Those who could not afford a gun were given one by the authorities.<ref name="Wessels2000" />{{rp|80}} The Presidents of the Transvaal and Orange Free State simply signed decrees to concentrate within a week, and the commandos could muster between 30,000 and 40,000 men.<ref name="Pakenham1979" />{{rp|56}} The average Boer nevertheless was not thirsty for war. Many did not look forward to fighting against fellow [[Christians]] and, by and large, fellow Protestants. Many may have had an overly optimistic sense of what the war would involve, imagining that victory could be achieved as fast and easily as it had been in the First Anglo-Boer War.<ref name="Wessels2000">{{Cite book|last=Wessels |first=André |year=2000 |chapter=Afrikaners at War |editor-first1=John |editor-last1=Gooch |title=The Boer War: Direction, Experience and Image |location=London |publisher=Cass }}</ref>{{rp|74}} Many, including many generals, also had a sense that their cause was holy and just, and blessed by God.<ref name="Wessels2000" />{{rp|179}}

It rapidly became clear that the Boer forces presented the British forces with a severe tactical challenge. What the Boers presented was a mobile and innovative approach to warfare, drawing on their experiences from the First Boer War. The average Boers who made up their commandos were farmers who had spent almost all their working life in the saddle, both as farmers and hunters. They depended on the pot, horse and rifle; they were also skilled stalkers and marksmen. As hunters, they had learned to fire from cover; from a [[prone position]] and to make the first shot count, knowing that if they missed, the game would either be long gone or could charge and potentially kill them.

At community gatherings, target shooting was a major sport; they practised shooting at targets, such as hens' eggs perched on posts {{convert|100|m|yd}} away. They made expert [[mounted infantry]], using every scrap of cover, from which they could pour in a destructive fire using modern, smokeless, [[Mauser]] rifles. In preparation for hostilities, the Boers had acquired around one hundred of the latest [[Krupp]] [[8 cm Kanone C/80|field guns]], all horse-drawn and dispersed among the various Kommando groups and several [[Le Creusot]] "Long Tom" siege guns. The Boers' skill in adapting themselves to become first-rate artillerymen shows that they were a versatile adversary.<ref name="Pakenham1979" />{{rp|30}} The Transvaal also had an intelligence service that stretched across South Africa and of whose extent and efficiency the British were as yet unaware.<ref name="Wessels2000" />{{rp|81}}

=== Boers besiege Ladysmith, Mafeking and Kimberley ===

[[File:NorthNatalWarTheatre, colour, crop.png|thumb|right|War theatre in [[Northern Natal Commando|northern Natal]]]]

The Boers struck first on 12 October at the [[Battle of Kraaipan]], an attack that heralded the invasion of the Cape Colony and Natal between October 1899 and January 1900.<ref name="Ash2020">{{cite book |last=Ash | first= Chris | year=2020 | title=The Boer War Atlas |publisher=30 Degrees South |location=Durban|isbn=978-1-928359-83-8|url=http://www.30degreessouth.co.za/the_boer_war_atlas.htm}}</ref>{{rp|20}} With speed and surprise, the Boers drove quickly towards the British garrison at Ladysmith and the smaller ones at Mafeking and Kimberley. The quick Boer mobilisation resulted in early military successes against scattered British forces. Sir [[George White (British Army officer)|George Stuart White]], commanding the British division at [[Ladysmith, KwaZulu-Natal|Ladysmith]], unwisely allowed Major-General [[Penn Symons]] to throw a brigade forward to the coal-mining town of Dundee (also reported as Glencoe), which was surrounded by hills. This became the site of the first major clash of the war, the [[Battle of Talana Hill]]. Boer guns began shelling the British camp from the summit of Talana Hill at dawn on 20 October. Penn Symons immediately counter-attacked: His infantry drove the Boers from the hill, for the loss of 446 British casualties, including Penn Symons.

Another Boer force occupied Elandslaagte, which lay between Ladysmith and Dundee. The British under Major General [[John French, 1st Earl of Ypres|John French]] and Colonel [[Ian Standish Monteith Hamilton|Ian Hamilton]] attacked to clear the line of communications to Dundee. The resulting [[Battle of Elandslaagte]] was a clear-cut British tactical victory,<ref name="Ash2020" />{{rp|29}} but Sir George White feared that more Boers were about to attack his main position and so ordered a chaotic retreat from Elandslaagte, throwing away any advantage gained. The detachment from Dundee was compelled to make an exhausting cross-country retreat to rejoin White's main force. As Boers surrounded Ladysmith and opened fire on the town with siege guns, White ordered a major sortie against their positions.<ref name="Ash2020" />{{rp|33}} The result was a disaster, with 140 men killed and over 1,000 captured. The siege of Ladysmith began: it was to last several months.

Meanwhile, to the north-west at Mafeking, on the border with Transvaal, Colonel [[Robert Baden-Powell, 1st Baron Baden-Powell|Robert Baden-Powell]] had raised two regiments of local forces amounting to about 1,200 men in order to attack and create diversions if things went amiss further south. As a railway junction, Mafeking provided good supply facilities and was the obvious place for Baden-Powell to fortify in readiness for such attacks. However, instead of being the aggressor, Baden-Powell was forced to defend Mafeking when 6,000 Boer, commanded by [[Piet Cronjé]], attempted a determined assault on the town. This quickly subsided into a desultory affair, with the Boers prepared to starve the stronghold into submission. So, on 13 October, the 217-day siege of Mafeking began.

Lastly, over {{convert|360|km|mi}} to the south of Mafeking lay the diamond mining city of Kimberley, which was also subjected to a siege. Although not militarily significant, it nonetheless represented an enclave of British imperialism on the borders of the Orange Free State and was hence an important Boer objective. In early November, about 7,500 Boer began their siege, again content to starve the town into submission. Despite Boer shelling, the 40,000 inhabitants, of which only 5,000 were armed, were under little threat, because the town was well-stocked with provisions. The garrison was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel [[Robert Kekewich]], although Rhodes was also a prominent figure in the town's defences.

Siege life took its toll on both the defending soldiers and the civilians in the cities of Mafeking, Ladysmith, and Kimberley as food began to grow scarce after a few weeks. In Mafeking, [[Sol Plaatje]] wrote, "I saw horseflesh for the first time being treated as a human foodstuff." The cities under siege also dealt with constant artillery bombardment, making the streets a dangerous place. Near the end of the siege of Kimberley, it was expected that the Boers would intensify their bombardment, so Rhodes displayed a notice encouraging people to go down into shafts of the [[Big Hole|Kimberley Mine]] for protection. The townspeople panicked, and people surged into the mineshafts constantly for a 12-hour period. Although the bombardment never came, this did nothing to diminish the anxious civilians' distress. The most well-heeled of the townspeople, including Cecil Rhodes, sheltered in the Sanatorium, site of the present-day [[McGregor Museum]]; the poorer residents, notably the black population, did not have any shelter from shelling.

In retrospect, the Boers' decision to commit themselves to sieges (''[[Sitzkrieg]]'') was a mistake and one of the best illustrations of their lack of strategic vision{{according to whom|date=September 2023}}{{citation needed|date=September 2023}}. Historically, it had little in its favour. Of the seven sieges in the First Boer War, the Boers had prevailed in none. More importantly, it handed the initiative back to the British and allowed them time to recover, which they did. Generally speaking, throughout the campaign, the Boers were too defensive and passive, wasting the opportunities they had for victory. Yet that passivity also testified to the fact that they had no desire to conquer British territory, but only to preserve their ability to rule in their own territory.<ref name="Wessels2000" />{{rp|82–85}}

=== First British relief attempts ===

[[File:VCRedversHenryBuller.jpg|thumb|upright|General [[Redvers Henry Buller]] launched an offensive against the Boers in the early phases of the war but after several defeats, culminating at the [[Battle of Colenso]], he was replaced by [[Frederick Roberts, 1st Earl Roberts|Lord Roberts]].]]

On 31 October 1899, General Sir [[Redvers Henry Buller]], a much-respected commander, arrived in South Africa with the Army Corps, made up of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd divisions. Buller originally intended an offensive straight up the railway line leading from [[Cape Town]] through Bloemfontein to Pretoria. Finding on arrival that the British troops already in South Africa were under siege, he split his army corps into detachments to relieve the besieged garrisons. One division, led by Lieutenant General [[Paul Methuen, 3rd Baron Methuen|Lord Methuen]], was to follow the Western Railway to the north and relieve Kimberley and Mafeking. A smaller force of about 3,000, led by Major General [[William Forbes Gatacre|William Gatacre]], was to push north towards the railway junction at Stormberg and secure the [[Cape Midlands]] District from Boer raids and local rebellions by Boer inhabitants. Buller led the major part of the army corps to relieve Ladysmith to the east.

The initial results of this offensive were mixed, with Methuen winning several bloody skirmishes in the [[Battle of Belmont (1899)|Battle of Belmont]] on 23 November, the [[Battle of Graspan]] on 25 November, and at a larger engagement, the [[Battle of Modder River]], on 28 November resulting in British losses of 71 dead and over 400 wounded. British commanders had been trained on the lessons of the Crimean War and were adept at battalion and regimental set pieces, with columns manoeuvring in jungles, deserts and mountainous regions. What British generals failed to comprehend was the impact of destructive fire from trench positions and the mobility of cavalry raids. The British troops went to war with what would prove to be antiquated tactics—and in some cases antiquated weapons—against the mobile Boer forces with the destructive fire of their modern Mausers, the latest Krupp field guns and their novel tactics.<ref>Field Marshal Lord Carver, ''The Boer War'', pp. 259–262</ref>

The middle of December was disastrous for the British Army. In a period known as [[Black Week]] (10–15 December 1899), the British suffered defeats on each of the three fronts. On 10 December, General Gatacre tried to recapture Stormberg railway junction about {{convert|50|mi|km|order=flip}} south of the [[Orange River]]. Gatacre's attack was marked by administrative and tactical blunders and the Battle of Stormberg ended in a British defeat, with 135 killed and wounded and two guns and over 600 troops captured.

At the [[Battle of Magersfontein]] on 11 December, Methuen's 14,000 British troops attempted to capture a Boer position in a dawn attack to relieve Kimberley. This too turned into a disaster when the [[Highland Brigade (Scottish)|Highland Brigade]] became pinned down by accurate Boer fire. After suffering from intense heat and thirst for nine hours, they eventually broke in ill-disciplined retreat. The Boer commanders, [[Koos de la Rey]] and Cronjé, had ordered [[trench]]es to be dug in an unconventional place to fool the British and to give their riflemen a greater firing range. The plan worked, and this tactic helped to write the doctrine of the supremacy of the defensive position, using modern small arms and trench fortifications.<ref>'Historical Overview' in Antony O'Brien, ''Bye-Bye Dolly Gray''</ref>{{citation needed|date=February 2017}} The British lost 120 killed and 690 wounded and were prevented from relieving Kimberley and Mafeking. A British soldier said of the defeat:

[[File:Cape Town QE4 138.jpg|thumb|Lord Roberts's arrival at Cape Town]]

{{blockquote|Such was the day for our regiment{{br}}Dread the revenge we will take.{{br}}Dearly we paid for the blunder –{{br}}A drawing-room General's mistake.{{br}}Why weren't we told of the trenches?{{br}}Why weren't we told of the wire? {{br}}Why were we marched up in column,{{br}}May [[Tommy Atkins]] enquire&nbsp;...|Private Smith{{efn|From the ''"Battle of Magersfontein"'', verse by Private Smith of the Black Watch December 1899. (Quoted in Pakenham (1979)<ref name="Pakenham1979" />{{rp|115}}}} }}

The [[nadir]] of Black Week was the [[Second Battle of Colenso]] on 15 December, where 21,000 British troops, commanded by Buller, attempted to cross the [[Tugela River]] to relieve Ladysmith, where 8,000 Transvaal Boers under the command of [[Louis Botha]] were waiting for them. Through a combination of artillery and accurate rifle fire and better use of the ground, the Boers repelled all British attempts to cross the river. After his first attacks failed, Buller broke off the battle and ordered a retreat, abandoning many wounded men, several isolated units and ten field guns to be captured by Botha's men. Buller's forces lost 145 men killed and 1,200 missing or wounded and the Boers suffered only 40 casualties, including 8 killed.<ref name="Steele2000" />{{rp|12}}