Editing Richard Helms (section)

===Role of agency===
The ease of access to the president that Helms enjoyed in the [[Lyndon B. Johnson Administration|Johnson Administration]] changed dramatically with the arrival of President Richard Nixon and Nixon's [[National Security Advisor (United States)|national security advisor]] [[Henry Kissinger]]. In order to dominate policy, "Nixon insisted on isolating himself" from the Washington bureaucracy he did not trust. His primary gatekeepers were [[H.R. Haldeman]] and [[John Ehrlichman]]; they screened Nixon from "the face-to-face confrontations he so disliked and dreaded." While thus pushing away even top officials, Nixon started to build policy-making functions inside the White House. From a secure distance he would direct the government and deal with "the outside world, including cabinet members".<ref>[[Henry Kissinger]], ''The White House Years'' (Boston 1979) pp. 47–48, "isolation" and "confrontation" quotes at 48; 74–75.</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 484 ("outside world" quote).</ref> Regarding intelligence matters, Nixon appointed Kissinger and his team to convey his instructions to the CIA and sister services. Accordingly, Nixon and Kissinger understood that "they alone would conceive, command, and control clandestine operations. Covert action and espionage could be tools fitted for their personal use. Nixon used them to build a political fortress at the White House."<ref>Weiner (2007) at 293.</ref>

In his memoirs, Helms writes of his early meeting with Kissinger. "Henry spoke first, advising me of Nixon's edict that effective immediately all intelligence briefings, oral or otherwise, were to come through Kissinger. All intelligence reports? I asked. Yes."<ref>Helms at (2003) p. 382.</ref> A Senate historian of the CIA observes that "it was Kissinger rather than the DCIs who served as Nixon's senior intelligence advisor. Under Kissinger's direction the NSC became an intelligence and policy staff."<ref>Karalekas (1976) p. 83.</ref><ref>Even the [[President's Daily Brief]] by CIA was apparently superseded by the "morning News Summary, an extremely thorough compilation of media reportage prepared overnight by an efficient team of White House aides." Kissinger, ''The White House Years'' (1979) p. 694.</ref> Under Nixon's initial plan, Helms was to be excluded even from the policy discussions at the [[United States National Security Council|National Security Council]] (NSC) meetings.<ref>Helms (2003) p. 384.</ref><ref>Turner (2005); 125.</ref><ref>Hathaway and Smith (1993) p. 8 (Helms excluded from full NSC meetings for first six weeks).</ref>

[[File:Henry Kissinger.png|thumb|[[Henry Kissinger]], Nixon advisor]]

<blockquote>Very early in the Nixon administration it became clear that the President wanted Henry Kissinger to run intelligence for him and that the National Security Council staff in the White House, under Kissinger, would control the intelligence community. This was the beginning of a shift of power away from the CIA to a new center: the National Security Council staff.<ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 500 (quote).</ref></blockquote>

[[Stansfield Turner]] (DCI 1977–1981) describes Nixon as basically being hostile to the CIA, questioning its utility and practical value, based on his low evaluation of the quality of its information. Turner, who served under President Carter, opines that Nixon considered the CIA to be full of elite "liberals" and hence contrary to his policy direction.<ref>Turner (2005) pp. 122–126. Turner quotes Gen. [[Brent Scowcroft]] as saying that Nixon had an "inferiority complex" to [[Ivy League]] graduates, and that Nixon believed such graduates to be dominant at the Agency (at 123).</ref><ref>Henry Kissinger, ''The White House Years'' (1979) at 36: "Nixon considered CIA a refuge of Ivy League intellectuals opposed to him."</ref> Helms agreed regarding Nixon's hostility toward the CIA, also saying in a 1988 interview that "Nixon never trusted anybody."<ref>Weiner (2007) p. 291 (Nixon as anti-CIA), p. 292 (Helms' "never trusted" quote).</ref><ref>Ranelagh (2007) re Nixon: p. 483 ("Georgetown types"), pp. 484–485 ("personal anger about the CIA"), p. 501 ("liberal Georgetown set").</ref> Yet Helms later wrote:

<blockquote>Whatever Nixon's views of the Agency, it was my opinion that he was the best prepared to be President of any of those under whom I served—Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. ... Nixon had the best grasp of foreign affairs and domestic politics. His years as Vice President had served him well.<ref>Helms (2007) pp. 382–383, quote at 383.</ref></blockquote>

When Nixon attended [[United States National Security Council|NSC]] meetings, he would often direct his personal animosity and ire directly at Helms, who led an agency Nixon considered overrated, whose proffered intelligence Nixon thought of little use or value, and which had a history of aiding his political enemies, according to Nixon. Helms found it difficult to establish a cordial working relationship with the new president.<ref>Hathaway and Smith (1993) pp. 8–13 (Helms per Nixon and Kissinger). Helms, interviewed in 1982, spoke about his service under Nixon:<blockquote>It was bound to be a rocky period with Richard Nixon as President, given the fact that he held the Agency responsible for his defeat in 1960. ... He would constantly, in N.S.C. meetings, pick on the Agency for not having properly judged what the Soviets were going to do ..." Helms concludes: "Dealing with him was tough, it seems to me that the fact that I ended up with my head on my shoulders after four years of working with him is not the least achievement of my life" (at 10).</blockquote></ref><ref>Cf., Helms (2003) pp. 382–383; at 386, 387.</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 501: "During National Security Council meetings Helms had to deal with a host of put-downs from Nixon himself."</ref><ref>Turner (2005) p. 126: "During his briefings of the NSC, Helms caught the brunt of Nixon's contempt. The president often interrupted him, corrected him, or badgered him with as much condescension as possible. This happened regularly, not just on particular issues."</ref> [[Ray Cline]], former Deputy Director of Intelligence at CIA, wrote how he saw the agency under Helms during the Nixon years:

<blockquote>Nixon and his principal assistant, Dr. Kissinger, disregarded analytical intelligence except for what was convenient for use by Kissinger's own small personal staff in support of Nixon-Kissinger policies. Incoming intelligence was closely monitored and its distribution controlled by Kissinger's staff to keep it from embarrassing the White House... . " They employed "Helms and the CIA primarily as an instrument for the execution of White House wishes" and did not seem "to understand or care about the carefully structured functions of central intelligence as a whole. ... I doubt that anyone could have done better than Helms in these circumstances.<ref>Cline (1976) p. 216.</ref></blockquote>

Under the changed policies of the Nixon administration, Henry Kissinger in effect displaced the DCI and became "the President's chief intelligence officer".<ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 540 (quote).</ref> Kissinger writes that, in addition, Nixon "felt ill at ease with Helms personally."<ref>Henry Kissinger, ''The White House Years'' (1979) p. 36. Yet Kissinger (p. 37) presents his rather positive appraisal of Helms.</ref>