Editing Rational choice model (section)

==Criticism==
{{criticism section|date=February 2025}}
[[File:Daniel Kahneman (3283955327) (cropped).jpg|thumb|180px|[[Daniel Kahneman]]]]
Both the assumptions and the behavioral predictions of rational choice theory have sparked criticism from various camps.

===The limits of rationality===
As mentioned above, some economists have developed models of [[bounded rationality]], such as Herbert Simon, which hope to be more [[Psychology|psychologically]] plausible without completely abandoning the idea that [[reason]] underlies decision-making processes. Simon argues factors such as imperfect information, uncertainty and time constraints all affect and limit our rationality, and therefore our decision-making skills. Furthermore, his concepts of 'satisficing' and 'optimizing' suggest sometimes because of these factors, we settle for a decision which is good enough, rather than the best decision.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Loasby|first1=B. J.|last2=McGuire|first2=C. B.|last3=Radner|first3=R.|date=December 1972|title=Decision and Organisation: A Volume in Honor of Jacob Marschak.|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2231324|journal=The Economic Journal|volume=82|issue=328|pages=1414|doi=10.2307/2231324|jstor=2231324 |issn=0013-0133}}</ref> Other economists have developed more theories of human decision-making that allow for the roles of [[uncertainty]], [[institutions]], and determination of individual tastes by their socioeconomic environment (cf. Fernandez-Huerga, 2008).

===Philosophical critiques===
[[Martin Hollis (philosopher)|Martin Hollis]] and [[Edward J. Nell]]'s 1975 book offers both a philosophical critique of [[neo-classical economics]] and an innovation in the field of economic methodology. Further, they outlined an alternative vision to neo-classicism based on a rationalist theory of knowledge. Within neo-classicism, the authors addressed [[consumer behaviour]] (in the form of indifference curves and simple versions of [[revealed preference theory]]) and [[marginalist]] producer behaviour in both product and factor markets. Both are based on rational optimizing behaviour. They consider imperfect as well as perfect markets since neo-classical thinking embraces many market varieties and disposes of a whole system for their classification. However, the authors believe that the issues arising from basic maximizing models have extensive implications for econometric methodology (Hollis and Nell, 1975, p.&nbsp;2). In particular it is this class of models – rational behavior as maximizing behaviour – which provide support for specification and identification. And this, they argue, is where the flaw is to be found. Hollis and Nell (1975) argued that [[positivism]] (broadly conceived) has provided neo-classicism with important support, which they then show to be unfounded. They base their critique of neo-classicism not only on their critique of positivism but also on the alternative they propose, [[rationalism]].<ref>For an in-depth examination of rationality and economic complexity, see Foley (1998). For an account of rationality, methodology and ideology, see Foley (1989, 2003).</ref> Indeed, they argue that rationality is central to neo-classical economics – as rational choice – and that this conception of rationality is misused. Demands are made of it that it cannot fulfill. Ultimately, individuals do not always act rationally or conduct themselves in a utility maximising manner.<ref>Somewhat surprisingly and independently, Hollis and Nell (1975) and Boland (1982) both use a ‘cross sectional approach’ to the understanding of neo-classical economic theory and make similar points about the foundations of neo-classicism. For an account see Nell, E.J. and Errouaki, K (2011)</ref>

[[Duncan K. Foley]] (2003, p.&nbsp;1) has also provided an important criticism of the concept of ''rationality'' and its role in economics. He argued that<blockquote>“Rationality” has played a central role in shaping and establishing the hegemony of contemporary mainstream economics. As the specific claims of robust neoclassicism fade into the history of economic thought, an orientation toward situating explanations of economic phenomena in relation to rationality has increasingly become the touchstone by which mainstream economists identify themselves and recognize each other. This is not so much a question of adherence to any particular conception of rationality, but of taking rationality of individual behavior as the unquestioned starting point of economic analysis.</blockquote>

Foley (2003, p.&nbsp;9) went on to argue that<blockquote>The concept of rationality, to use Hegelian language, represents the relations of modern capitalist society one-sidedly. The burden of rational-actor theory is the assertion that ‘naturally’ constituted individuals facing existential conflicts over scarce resources would rationally impose on themselves the institutional structures of modern capitalist society, or something approximating them. But this way of looking at matters systematically neglects the ways in which modern capitalist society and its social relations in fact constitute the ‘rational’, calculating individual. The well-known limitations of rational-actor theory, its static quality, its logical antinomies, its vulnerability to arguments of [[infinite regress]], its failure to develop a progressive concrete research program, can all be traced to this starting-point.</blockquote>

More recently [[Edward J. Nell]] and Karim Errouaki (2011, Ch. 1) argued that:<blockquote>The DNA of neoclassical economics is defective. Neither the [[induction problem]] nor the problems of [[methodological individualism]] can be solved within the framework of neoclassical assumptions. The neoclassical approach is to call on rational economic man to solve both. Economic relationships that reflect rational choice should be ‘projectible’. But that attributes a deductive power to ‘rational’ that it cannot have consistently with positivist (or even [[Pragmatism|pragmatist]]) assumptions (which require deductions to be simply analytic). To make rational calculations projectible, the agents may be assumed to have idealized abilities, especially foresight; but then the induction problem is out of reach because the agents of the world do not resemble those of the model. The agents of the model can be abstract, but they cannot be endowed with powers actual agents could not have. This also undermines methodological individualism; if behaviour cannot be reliably predicted on the basis of the ‘rational choices of agents’, a social order cannot reliably follow from the choices of agents.</blockquote>

=== Psychological critiques ===
The validity of Rational Choice Theory has been generally refuted by the results of research in behavioral psychology. The revision or alternative theory that arises from these discrepancies is called [[Prospect theory|Prospect Theory]].

The 'doubly-divergent'<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Levy |first=Jack |date=1992 |title=Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems |url=https://fas-polisci.rutgers.edu/levy/articles/1992%20Prospect%20Theory%20-%20Analytical%20Problems.pdf |journal=Political Psychology |volume=13 |issue=4 |pages=283–310 |doi=10.2307/3791682 |jstor=3791682 |archive-date=2024-05-12 |access-date=2024-02-28 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240512203554/https://fas-polisci.rutgers.edu/levy/articles/1992%20Prospect%20Theory%20-%20Analytical%20Problems.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> critique of Rational Choice Theory implicit in [[Prospect theory|Prospect Theory]] has sometimes been presented as a revision or alternative.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Guthrie |first=Chris |date=2003 |title=Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law |url=https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1760&context=faculty-publications#:~:text=Like%20rational%20choice%20theory%2C%20prospect,in%20systematic%20and%20predictable%20ways. |website=Northwestern University Law Review}}</ref> [[Daniel Kahneman|Daniel Kahneman's]] work has been notably elaborated by research undertaken and supervised by [[Jonathan Haidt]] and other scholars.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Haidt |first=Jonathan |title=The Rationalist Delusion? A Post Hoc Investigation |url=https://academic.oup.com/book/10621/chapter-abstract/158619079?redirectedFrom=fulltext |access-date=2024-02-28 |website=academic.oup.com|date=29 September 2016 |doi=10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199357666.003.0003 |isbn=978-0-19-935766-6 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Haidt |first=Jonathan |title=The Righteous Mind |publisher=Vintage |year=2012}}</ref>

===Empirical critiques===
In their 1994 work, ''Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory'', [[Donald Green|Donald P. Green]] and [[Ian Shapiro]] argue that the empirical outputs of rational choice theory have been limited. They contend that much of the applicable literature, at least in political science, was done with weak statistical methods and that when corrected many of the empirical outcomes no longer hold. When taken in this perspective, rational choice theory has provided very little to the overall understanding of political interaction – and is an amount certainly disproportionately weak relative to its appearance in the literature. Yet, they concede that cutting-edge research, by scholars well-versed in the general scholarship of their fields (such as work on the U.S. Congress by [[Keith Krehbiel]], [[Gary Cox (political scientist)|Gary Cox]], and [[Mat McCubbins]]) has generated valuable scientific progress.<ref>Donald P. Green and [[Ian Shapiro]] (1994). ''Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science''. New Haven: Yale University Press.{{ISBN?}}{{page?|date=January 2025}}</ref>

===Methodological critiques===
Schram and Caterino (2006) <ref>{{cite book |last1=Caterino, Schram |first1=Brian, Sanford F. |title=Making political science matter: debating knowledge, research, and method |date=2006 |publisher=New York University Press |pages=4–5 |url=https://web-p-ebscohost-com.uea.idm.oclc.org/ehost/ebookviewer/ebook/bmxlYmtfXzIwMDkzOF9fQU41?sid=2c916317-ecdd-4b1b-b4b3-58418d8af99a@redis&vid=0&format=EB&lpid=lp_1&rid=0}}</ref> contains a fundamental methodological criticism of rational choice theory for promoting the view that the natural science model is the only appropriate methodology in social science and that political science should follow this model, with its emphasis on quantification and mathematization. Schram and Caterino argue instead for methodological pluralism. The same argument is made by [[William E. Connolly]], who in his work Neuropolitics <ref>{{cite book |last1=Connolly |first1=Willliam E. |title=Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed |date=2002 |volume=23 |publisher=University of Minnesota Press |isbn=978-0-8166-4021-8 |jstor=10.5749/j.cttts8p6 }}</ref>shows that advances in neuroscience further illuminate some of the problematic practices of rational choice theory.

===Sociological critiques===
[[Pierre Bourdieu]] fiercely opposed rational choice theory as grounded in a misunderstanding of how social agents operate. Bourdieu argued that social agents do not continuously calculate according to explicit rational and economic criteria. According to Bourdieu, social agents operate according to an implicit practical logic – a practical sense – and bodily dispositions. Social agents act according to their "feel for the game" (the "feel" being, roughly, habitus, and the "game" being the [[Field (Bourdieu)|field]]).<ref>For an account of Bourdieu's work, see the wikipedia article on [[Pierre Bourdieu]]. See also Pierre Bourdieu (2005). ''The Social Structures of the Economy'', Cambridge: Polity 2005.</ref>

Other social scientists, inspired in part by Bourdieu's thinking have expressed concern about the inappropriate use of economic metaphors in other contexts, suggesting that this may have political implications. The argument they make is that by treating everything as a kind of "economy" they make a particular vision of the way an economy works seem more natural. Thus, they suggest, rational choice is as much ideological as it is scientific.<ref>A.M. McKinnon (2013). "Ideology and the Market Metaphor in Rational Choice Theory of Religion: A Rhetorical Critique of 'Religious Economies'". Critical Sociology, vol 39, no. 4, pp. 529–543.[http://aura.abdn.ac.uk/bitstream/2164/3714/1/rational_choice_critique_author_final_version.pdf] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141112222515/http://aura.abdn.ac.uk/bitstream/2164/3714/1/rational_choice_critique_author_final_version.pdf|date=2014-11-12}}</ref>

==== Criticism based on motivational assumptions ====
Rational choice theorists discuss individual values and structural elements as equally important determinants of outcomes.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Hechter |first1=Michael |last2=Kanazawa |first2=Satoshi |date=1997-08-01 |title=Sociological Rational Choice Theory |url=https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev.soc.23.1.191 |journal=Annual Review of Sociology |volume=23 |issue=1 |pages=191–214 |doi=10.1146/annurev.soc.23.1.191 |s2cid=14439597 |issn=0360-0572 |archive-date=2022-09-21 |access-date=2022-04-13 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220921152923/https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev.soc.23.1.191 |url-status=live }}</ref> However, for [[Methodology|methodological]] reasons in the empirical application, more emphasis is usually placed on social structural determinants. Therefore, in line with [[structural functionalism]] and [[social network analysis]] perspectives, rational choice explanations are considered mainstream in [[sociology]] .<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Goldtborpe |first=John H. |date=1996-09-01 |title=The Quantitative Analysis of Large-Scale Data-sets and Rational Action Theory: For a Sociological Alliance |url=https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.esr.a018180 |journal=European Sociological Review |volume=12 |issue=2 |pages=109–126 |doi=10.1093/oxfordjournals.esr.a018180 |issn=0266-7215}}</ref>

==== Criticism based on the assumption of realism ====
Some of the [[Skepticism|scepticism]] among sociologists regarding rational choice stems from a misunderstanding of the lack of realist assumptions. Social research has shown that social agents usually act solely based on habit or impulse, the power of emotion.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Rapetti |first=Martin |date=February 2012 |title=Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why it Matters for Global Capitalism, by George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller |url=http://link.springer.com/10.1057/eej.2010.16 |journal=Eastern Economic Journal |language=en |volume=38 |issue=2 |pages=276–278 |doi=10.1057/eej.2010.16 |s2cid=153652492 |issn=0094-5056}}</ref> Social Agents predict the expected consequences of options in stock markets and economic crises and choose the best option through collective "emotional drives," implying social forces rather than "rational" choices.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Fararo |first=Thomas J. |date=November 1993 |title=General Social Equilibrium: Toward Theoretical Synthesis |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/201972 |journal=Sociological Theory |volume=11 |issue=3 |pages=291–313 |doi=10.2307/201972|jstor=201972 }}</ref>

However, sociology commonly misunderstands rational choice in its critique of rational choice theory. Rational choice theory does not explain what rational people would do in a given situation, which falls under [[decision theory]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Haller |first=Max |date=2001-09-01 |title=Erklärt die Rational Choice Theorie die Ungleichheit der Bildungschancen? |url=https://doi.org/10.1007/s11577-001-0079-1 |journal=KZFSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie |language=de |volume=53 |issue=3 |pages=569–574 |doi=10.1007/s11577-001-0079-1 |s2cid=141730470 |issn=1861-891X}}</ref> Theoretical choice focuses on social outcomes rather than individual outcomes. Social outcomes are identified as stable equilibria in which individuals have no incentive to deviate from their course of action.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Quackenbush |first=Stephen |date=2004-04-01 |title=The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory |url=https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620490462595 |journal=International Interactions |volume=30 |issue=2 |pages=87–107 |doi=10.1080/03050620490462595 |s2cid=8811977 |issn=0305-0629}}</ref> This orientation of others' behaviour toward social outcomes may be unintended or undesirable. Therefore, the conclusions generated in such cases are relegated to the "study of irrational behaviour".<ref>{{Cite journal |title= Rational Choice Theory at the Origin? Forms and Social Factors of "Irrational Choice"|url=https://auth.uq.edu.au/idp/module.php/core/loginuserpass.php?AuthState=_1e3a271625f0748c647a27d5b571f765ed7a93240c%3Ahttps%3A%2F%2Fauth.uq.edu.au%2Fidp%2Fsaml2%2Fidp%2FSSOService.php%3Fspentityid%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fauth.library.uq.edu.au%252Fsso%252Fmodule.php%252Fsaml%252Fsp%252Fmetadata.php%252Fuqlsso%26RelayState%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fauth.library.uq.edu.au%252Flogin%253Freturn%253DaHR0cHM6Ly9hdXRoLmxpYnJhcnkudXEuZWR1LmF1L2xvZ2luP3R5cGU9ZXpwcm94eSZ1cmw9aHR0cHMlM2ElMmYlMmZkb2kub3JnJTJmMTAuMTA4MCUyZjAyNjkxNzI4LjIwMTYuMTE3MjM1OA%253D%253D%26cookieTime%3D1651224707 |access-date=2022-04-29 |journal=Social Epistemology | date=November 2016 | volume=30 | issue=5–6 | pages=728–763 |doi=10.1080/02691728.2016.1172358| s2cid=147848024 | last1=Zafirovski | first1=Milan }}</ref>

=== Criticism based on the biopolitical paradigm ===
The basic assumptions of rational choice theory do not take into account external factors (social, cultural, economic) that interfere with autonomous decision-making. Representatives of the [[Biopolitics|biopolitical]] paradigm such as [[Michel Foucault]] drew attention to the micro-power structures that shape the soul, body and mind and thus top-down impose certain decisions on individuals.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Foucault |first=Michel |url=https://libcat.simmons.edu/Record/b1331290/TOC |title=The history of sexuality / |date=1990 |publisher=Vintage Books |isbn=978-0-679-72469-8 |edition=Vintage books |archive-date=2024-08-13 |access-date=2024-08-13 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240813152553/https://libcat.simmons.edu/Record/b1331290/TOC |url-status=live }}</ref> Humans – according to the assumptions of the biopolitical paradigm – therefore conform to dominant social and cultural systems rather than to their own subjectively defined goals, which they would seek to achieve through rational and optimal decisions.

===Critiques on the basis of evolutionary psychology===
An [[evolutionary psychology]] perspective suggests that many of the seeming contradictions and biases regarding rational choice can be explained as being rational in the context of maximizing biological [[Fitness (biology)|fitness]] in the ancestral environment but not necessarily in the current one. Thus, when living at subsistence level where a reduction of resources may have meant death it may have been rational to place a greater value on losses than on gains. Proponents argue it may also explain differences between groups.<ref name=AEP>Paul H. Rubin and C. Monica Capra (2011). "The Evolutionary Psychology of Economics". In {{Cite book | last1 = Roberts | first1 = S. C. | editor1-last = Roberts | doi = 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586073.001.0001 | editor1-first = S. Craig | title = Applied Evolutionary Psychology | year = 2011 | publisher = Oxford University Press| isbn = 978-0-19-958607-3 }}</ref>

===Critiques on the basis of emotion research===
Proponents of [[emotional choice theory]] criticize the rational choice paradigm by drawing on new findings from emotion research in [[psychology]] and [[neuroscience]]. They point out that rational choice theory is generally based on the assumption that [[decision-making]] is a conscious and reflective process based on thoughts and beliefs. It presumes that people decide on the basis of calculation and deliberation. However, cumulative research in neuroscience suggests that only a small part of the brain's activities operate at the level of conscious reflection. The vast majority of its activities consist of unconscious appraisals and emotions.<ref>See, for example, David D. Franks (2014), "Emotions and Neurosociology," in Jan E. Stets and Jonathan H. Turner, eds., ''Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions'', vol. 2. New York: Springer, p. 267.</ref> The significance of emotions in decision-making has generally been ignored by rational choice theory, according to these critics. Moreover, emotional choice theorists contend that the rational choice paradigm has difficulty incorporating emotions into its models, because it cannot account for the social nature of emotions. Even though emotions are felt by individuals, psychologists and sociologists have shown that emotions cannot be isolated from the social environment in which they arise. Emotions are inextricably intertwined with people's social norms and identities, which are typically outside the scope of standard rational choice models.<ref>See Arlie Russell Hochschild (2012), ''The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling'', 3rd ed. Berkeley: University of California Press.</ref> Emotional choice theory seeks to capture not only the social but also the physiological and dynamic character of emotions. It represents a unitary action model to organize, explain, and predict the ways in which emotions shape decision-making.<ref>See [[Robin Markwica]] (2018), ''Emotional Choices: How the Logic of Affect Shapes Coercive Diplomacy''. Oxford: Oxford University Press.</ref>

===The difference between public and private spheres===
Herbert Gintis has also provided an important criticism to rational choice theory. He argued that rationality differs between the public and private spheres. The public sphere being what you do in collective action and the private sphere being what you do in your private life. Gintis argues that this is because “models of rational choice in the private sphere treat agents’ choices as instrumental”. “Behaviour in the public sphere, by contrast, is largely non-instrumental because it is non-consequential". Individuals make no difference to the outcome, “much as single molecules make no difference to the properties of the gas" {{Citation needed|date=August 2024}}(Herbert, G). This is a weakness of rational choice theory as it shows that in situations such as voting in an election, the rational decision for the individual would be to not vote as their vote makes no difference to the outcome of the election. However, if everyone were to act in this way the democratic society would collapse as no one would vote. Therefore, we{{who|date=August 2024}} can see that rational choice theory does not describe how everything in the economic and political world works, and that there are other factors of human behaviour at play.