Editing Phenomenology (philosophy) (section)

==Concepts==
===Intentionality===
{{Main|Intentionality}}

Intentionality refers to the notion that consciousness is always the consciousness ''of'' something. The word itself should not be confused with the "ordinary" use of the word intentional, but should rather be taken as playing on the etymological roots of the word. Originally, intention referred to a "stretching out" ("in tension," from Latin ''intendere''), and in this context it refers to consciousness "stretching out" towards its object. However, one should be careful with this image: there is not some consciousness first that, subsequently, stretches out to its object; rather, consciousness ''occurs as'' the simultaneity of a conscious act and its object.

Intentionality is often summed up as "[[aboutness]]." Whether this ''something'' that consciousness is about is in direct perception or in fantasy is inconsequential to the concept of intentionality itself; whatever consciousness is directed at, ''that'' is what consciousness is conscious of. This means that the object of consciousness does not ''have'' to be a ''physical'' object apprehended in [[perception]]: it can just as well be a fantasy or a memory. Consequently, these "structures" of consciousness, such as perception, memory, fantasy, and so forth, are called ''intentionalities''.

The term "intentionality" originated with the [[Scholastics]] in the medieval period and was resurrected by Brentano who in turn influenced Husserl's conception of phenomenology, who refined the term and made it the cornerstone of his theory of consciousness. The meaning of the term is complex and depends entirely on how it is conceived by a given philosopher. The term should not be confused with "intention" or the psychoanalytic conception of unconscious "motive" or "gain".

Significantly, "intentionality is not a relation, but rather an intrinsic feature of intentional acts." This is because there are no independent relata. It is (at least in the first place) a matter of indifference to the phenomenologist whether the intentional object has any existence independent of the act.{{sfn|Smith|2023|loc=§3.b}}

===Intuition===
{{Main|Intuition}}

[[Intuition]] in phenomenology refers to cases where the intentional object is directly present to the intentionality at play; if the intention is "filled" by the direct apprehension of the object, one has an intuited object. Having a cup of coffee in front of oneself, for instance, seeing it, feeling it, or even imagining it – these are all filled intentions, and the object is then ''intuited''. The same goes for the apprehension of mathematical formulae or a number. If one does not have the object as referred to directly, the object is not intuited, but still intended, but then ''emptily''. Examples of empty intentions can be signitive intentions – intentions that only ''imply'' or ''refer to'' their objects.{{sfn|Spear|2021}}

===Evidence===
In everyday language, the word [[evidence]] is used to signify a special sort of relation between a state of affairs and a proposition: State A is evidence for the proposition "A is true." In phenomenology, however, the concept of evidence is meant to signify the "subjective achievement of truth."{{sfn|Sokolowski|1999|pages=159–60}} This is not an attempt to reduce the objective sort of evidence to subjective "opinion," but rather an attempt to describe the structure of having something present in intuition with the addition of having it present as ''intelligible'': "Evidence is the successful presentation of an intelligible object, the successful presentation of something whose truth becomes manifest in the evidencing itself."{{sfn|Sokolowski|1999|pages=160–61}}

In ''Ideas'', Husserl presents as the "Principle of All Principles" that, "every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that everything originally (so to speak, in its 'personal' actuality) offered to us in 'intuition' is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there."{{Sfn|Husserl|1982|loc=§24}} It is in this realm of phenomenological givenness, Husserl claims, that the search begins for "indubitable evidence that will ultimately serve as the foundation for every scientific discipline."{{sfn|Smith|2023|loc=§2.b}}

===Noesis and noema===
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{{Main|Noema}}
[[Franz Brentano]] introduced a distinction between [[Sensory perception|sensory]] and '''noetic consciousness'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA-->: the former describes [[Mental representation|presentations]] of sensory objects or [[intuition]]s, while the latter describes the [[thinking]] of [[concept]]s.{{sfn|Tassone|2012|p=307}}

In Husserl's phenomenology, this pair of terms, derived from the Greek ''[[nous]]'' (mind) designate respectively the real content, '''noesis'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA-->, and the ideal content, [[noema]], of an intentional act (an act of consciousness). The noesis is the part of the act that gives it a particular sense or character (as in judging or perceiving something, loving or hating it, accepting or rejecting it, etc.). This is real in the sense that it is actually part of what takes place in the consciousness of the subject of the act. The noesis is always correlated with a noema. For Husserl, the full noema is a complex ideal structure comprising at least a noematic sense and a noematic core. The correct interpretation of what Husserl meant by the noema has long been controversial, but the noematic sense is generally understood as the ideal meaning of the act. For instance, if A loves B, loving is a real part of A's conscious activity – noesis – but gets its sense from the general concept of loving, which has an abstract or ideal meaning, as "loving" has a meaning in the English language independently of what an individual means by the word when they use it. The noematic core as the act's referent or object ''as it is meant in the act''. One element of controversy is whether this noematic object is the same as the actual object of the act (assuming it exists) or is some kind of ideal object.{{sfn|Smith|2007|pages=304–11}}

===Empathy and intersubjectivity===
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{{See also|Empathy|Intersubjectivity}}
{{needs_sources|section|date=May 2024}}
In phenomenology, [[empathy]] refers to the experience of one's own body ''as'' another. While people often identify others with their physical bodies, this type of phenomenology requires that they focus on the [[subjectivity]] of the other, as well as the intersubjective engagement with them. In Husserl's original account, this was done by a sort of [[apperception]] built on the experiences of one's own '''lived body'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA-->. The lived body is one's own body as experienced by oneself, ''as'' oneself. One's own body manifests itself mainly as one's possibilities of acting in the world. It is what lets oneself reach out and grab something, for instance, but it also, and more importantly, allows for the possibility of changing one's point of view. This helps to differentiate one thing from another by the experience of moving around it, seeing new aspects of it (often referred to as making the absent present and the present absent), and still retaining the notion that this is the same thing that one saw other aspects of just a moment ago (it is identical). One's body is also experienced as a duality, both as object (one's ability to touch one's own hand) and as one's own subjectivity (one's experience of being touched).

The experience of one's own body as one's own subjectivity is then applied to the experience of another's body, which, through apperception, is constituted as another subjectivity. One can thus recognise the Other's intentions, emotions, etc. This experience of empathy is important in the phenomenological account of [[intersubjectivity]]. In phenomenology, intersubjectivity constitutes objectivity (i.e., what one experiences as objective is experienced as being intersubjectively available – available to all other subjects. This does not imply that objectivity is reduced to subjectivity nor does it imply a relativist position, cf. for instance [[intersubjective verifiability]]).

In the experience of intersubjectivity, one also experiences oneself as being a subject among other subjects, and one experiences oneself as existing objectively ''for'' these [[Other (philosophy)|Other]]s; one experiences oneself as the noema of Others' noeses, or as a subject in another's empathic experience. As such, one experiences oneself as objectively existing subjectivity. Intersubjectivity is also a part in the constitution of one's lifeworld, especially as "homeworld."

===Lifeworld===
{{Main|Lifeworld}}

The [[lifeworld]] (German: ''Lebenswelt'') is the "world" each one of us ''lives'' in. One could call it the "background" or "horizon" of all experience, and it is that on which each object stands out as itself (as different) and with the meaning it can only hold for us. According to Husserl, the lifeworld is both personal and [[intersubjectivity|intersubjective]] (it is then called a "homeworld"), and, as such, it avoids the threat of [[solipsism]].{{sfn|Beyer|2022|loc=§9. Empathy, intersubjectivity and lifeworld; ethics and value theory}}