Editing Otto von Bismarck (section)

==Chancellor of the German Empire==
{{Main|Bismarck cabinet}}
{{Conservatism in Germany|Politicians}}
[[File:Otto von Bismarck.JPG|thumb|left|upright|Bismarck in 1873]]

In 1871, Bismarck was raised to the rank of ''[[Fürst]]'' (Prince). He was also appointed as the first Imperial Chancellor (''[[Reichskanzler]]'') of the German Empire but retained his Prussian offices, including those of Minister-President and Foreign Minister. He was also promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general and bought a former hotel in [[Friedrichsruh]] near Hamburg, which became an estate. He also continued to serve as his own foreign minister. Because of both the imperial and the Prussian offices that he held, Bismarck had nearly complete control over domestic and foreign policy. The office of Minister President of Prussia was temporarily separated from that of Chancellor in 1873, when Albrecht von Roon was appointed to the former office. But by the end of the year, Roon resigned due to ill health, and Bismarck again became Minister-President.

===''Kulturkampf''===
{{Main|Kulturkampf}}
[[File:Kladderadatsch 1875 - Zwischen Berlin und Rom.png|thumb|left|upright|''Between Berlin and Rome'', Bismarck confronts [[Pope Pius IX]], 1875.]]

Bismarck launched an anti-Catholic ''[[Kulturkampf]]'' ("culture struggle") in Prussia in 1871. This was partly motivated by Bismarck's fear that [[Pius IX]] and his successors would use [[papal infallibility]] to achieve the "papal desire for international political hegemony.... The result was the Kulturkampf, which, with its largely Prussian measures, complemented by similar actions in several other German states, sought to curb the clerical danger by legislation restricting the Catholic church's political power."{{Sfn | Hollyday | 1970 | p = 6}} In May 1872 Bismarck thus attempted to reach an understanding with other European governments to manipulate future [[Papal conclave]]s; governments should agree beforehand on unsuitable candidates, and then instruct their national cardinals to vote appropriately. The goal was to end the pope's control over the bishops in a given state, but the project went nowhere.

Bismarck accelerated the ''Kulturkampf''. In its course, all Prussian bishops and many priests were imprisoned or exiled.{{Sfn | Blackbourn | 1998 | pp = 261–63}} Prussia's population had greatly expanded in the 1860s and was now one-third Catholic. Bismarck believed that the pope and bishops held too much power over the German Catholics and was further concerned about the emergence of the [[Centre Party (Germany)|Catholic Centre Party]], organised in 1870. With support from the anticlerical [[National Liberal Party (Germany)|National Liberal Party]], which had become Bismarck's chief ally in the [[Reichstag (German Empire)|Reichstag]], he abolished the Catholic Department of the Prussian Ministry of Culture. That left the Catholics without a voice in high circles. Moreover, in 1872, the [[Society of Jesus|Jesuits]] were expelled from Germany. In 1873, more anti-Catholic laws allowed the Prussian government to supervise the education of the Roman Catholic clergy and curtailed the disciplinary powers of the Church. In 1875, civil ceremonies were required for civil weddings. Hitherto, weddings in churches were civilly recognised.{{Sfn | Ross | 1998}}{{Sfn | Gross | 2005}}

''Kulturkampf'' became part of Bismarck's foreign policy, as he sought to destabilise and weaken Catholic regimes, especially in Belgium and France, but he had little success.<ref name="stone281">{{Cite journal |last=Stone |first=James |date=1994 |title=Bismarck and the Containment of France, 1873–1877 |url=http://utpjournalsreview.com/index.php/CJOH/article/download/10365/9240 |journal=Canadian Journal of History |volume=29 |issue=2 |pages=281–304 |doi=10.3138/cjh.29.2.281 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141214134224/http://utpjournalsreview.com/index.php/CJOH/article/download/10365/9240 |archive-date=14 December 2014|doi-access=free }}</ref>

The British ambassador [[Odo Russell, 1st Baron Ampthill|Odo Russell]] reported to London in October 1872 that Bismarck's plans were backfiring by strengthening the [[Ultramontanism|ultramontane]] (pro-papal) position inside German Catholicism: "The German Bishops, who were politically powerless in Germany and theologically in opposition to the Pope in Rome, have now become powerful political leaders in Germany and enthusiastic defenders of the now infallible Faith of Rome, united, disciplined, and thirsting for martyrdom, thanks to Bismarck's uncalled for antiliberal declaration of War on the freedom they had hitherto peacefully enjoyed."<ref>Quoted in {{harvnb|Crankshaw|1981|pp=308–09}}</ref>

The Catholics reacted by organising themselves and strengthening the Centre Party. Bismarck, a devout pietistic Protestant, was alarmed that secularists and socialists were using the ''Kulturkampf'' to attack all religions. He abandoned it in 1878 to preserve his remaining political capital since he now needed the Centre Party votes in his new battle against socialism. Pius IX died that year, replaced by the more pragmatic [[Pope Leo XIII]] who negotiated away most of the anti-Catholic laws. The Pope kept control of the selection of bishops, and Catholics for the most part supported unification and most of Bismarck's policies. However, they never forgot his culture war and preached solidarity to present organised resistance should it ever be resumed.<ref>Rebecca Ayako Bennette, ''Fighting for the Soul of Germany: The Catholic Struggle for Inclusion after Unification'' (Harvard U.P. 2012)</ref>

[[Jonathan Steinberg (historian)|Steinberg]] comments: <blockquote>The anti-Catholic hysteria in many European countries belongs in its European setting. Bismarck's campaign was not unique in itself, but his violent temper, intolerance of opposition, and paranoia that secret forces had conspired to undermine his life's work, made it more relentless. His rage drove him to exaggerate the threat from Catholic activities and to respond with very extreme measures. ... As Odo Russell wrote to his mother, [Lady Emily Russell,] "The demonic is stronger in him than in any man I know." ... The bully, the dictator, and the "demonic" combined in him with the self-pity and the hypochondria to create a constant crisis of authority, which he exploited for his own ends. ... Opponents, friends, and subordinates all remarked on Bismarck as "demonic", a kind of uncanny, diabolic personal power over men and affairs. In these years of his greatest power, he believed that he could do anything.<ref>Steinberg, 2011, pp. 335–336.</ref></blockquote>

===Economy===
[[File:Krupp factory 1880.jpg|thumb|320px|The [[Krupp]] factory in [[Essen]], 1880]]

In 1873, Germany and much of Europe and America entered the [[Long Depression]], the ''Gründerkrise''. A downturn hit the German economy for the first time since industrial development began to surge in the 1850s. To aid faltering industries, the Chancellor abandoned free trade and established [[German tariff of 1879|protectionist import-tariffs]], which alienated the National Liberals who demanded free trade. The ''Kulturkampf'' and its effects had also stirred up public opinion against the party that supported it, and Bismarck used this opportunity to distance himself from the National Liberals. That marked a rapid decline in the support of the National Liberals, and by 1879 their close ties with Bismarck had all but ended. Bismarck instead returned to conservative factions, including the Centre Party, for support. He helped foster support from the conservatives by enacting several tariffs protecting German agriculture and industry from foreign competitors in 1879.<ref>E. J. Feuchtwanger, ''Bismarck'' (2002) p. 208.</ref>

===Germanisation===
Imperial and provincial government bureaucracies attempted to [[Germanisation|Germanise]] the state's national minorities situated near the borders of the empire: the [[Danish minority of Southern Schleswig|Danes]] in the North, the Francophones in the West and [[Germanisation of Poles during the Partitions|Poles in the East]]. As minister president of Prussia and as imperial chancellor, Bismarck "sorted people into their linguistic [and religious] 'tribes'"; he pursued a policy of hostility in particular toward the Poles, which was an expedient rooted in Prussian history.{{Sfn | Taylor | 1969 | p = 124}} "He never had a Pole among his peasants" working the Bismarckian estates; it was the educated Polish bourgeoisie and revolutionaries he denounced from personal experience, and "because of ''them'' he disliked intellectuals in politics."{{Sfn | Taylor | 1969 | p = 10}} Bismarck's antagonism is revealed in a private letter to his sister in 1861: "Hammer the Poles until they despair of living [...] I have all the sympathy in the world for their situation, but if we want to exist we have no choice but to wipe them out: wolves are only what God made them, but we shoot them all the same when we can get at them."{{sfn|Crankshaw|1981|p=149}}<ref>Cited from ''Bismarck: Die gesammelten Werke'', edited by H. von Petersdorff, et al. (Berlin, 1923), Volume XIV, p. 568. Letter to Malwine von Arnim, 14 March 1861</ref><ref>Norman Davies, ''God's Playground, a History of Poland: 1795 to the present'' (1982) [https://archive.org/details/godsplaygroundhi00norm_0/page/124 <!-- quote=bismarck poles wolves shoot intitle:poland inauthor:davies. --> p. 124 online]</ref> Later that year, the public Bismarck modified his belligerence and wrote to Prussia's foreign minister: "Every success of the Polish national movement is a defeat for Prussia, we cannot carry on the fight against this element according to the rules of civil justice, but only in accordance with the rules of war."{{sfn|Crankshaw|1981|p=149}}<ref>Cited from ''Bismarck: Die gesammelten Werke'', edited by H. von Petersdorff, et al. (Berlin, 1923), Volume III, pp. 289–290. Letter to Albrecht von Bernstorff, 13 November 1861</ref>

===Socialism===
{{See also|State Socialism (Germany)}}

Bismarck viewed the growing international socialist movement and the non-violent German [[Social Democratic Party of Germany|Social Democratic Party (SDP)]], in particular, with alarm. Since the SDP's existence was protected by the terms of the German constitution, Bismarck found ways to weaken it, short of an outright ban. In 1878, he instituted the first of a series of repressive [[Anti-Socialist Laws]] forbidding socialist organisations and meetings, outlawing trade unions, closing newspapers, and banning the circulation of socialist literature. The SPD continued to take part in the elections, but police officers were now empowered to stop, search, and arrest SDP members and their leaders, numbers of whom were then tried by police courts (one-way socialists used to get around these harsh measures was to run as independent candidates, unaffiliated with any party). Despite, or possibly because of the laws, the SDP steadily gained supporters and seats in the Reichstag.

During the 1880s, Bismarck also tried to win the allegiance of the working classes to the conservative regime by implementing positive social benefits, such as accident and old-age insurance, as well as pioneering a form of socialised medicine{{snd}}reforms which are now grouped under the label [[State Socialism (Germany)|State Socialism]]. Bismarck himself called it that, in addition to referring to them as "practical Christianity":
<blockquote>The whole problem is rooted in the question: does the state have the responsibility to care for its helpless fellow citizens, or does it not? I maintain that it does have this duty, and to be sure, not simply the Christian state, as I once permitted myself to allude to with the words "practical Christianity", but rather every state by its very nature. ... There are objectives that only the state in its totality can fulfil. [...] Among the last mentioned objectives [of the state] belong national defence [and] the general system of transportation. [...] To these belong also the help of persons in distress and the prevention of such justified complaints as in fact provide excellent material for exploitation by the Social Democrats. That is the responsibility of the state from which the state will not be able to withdraw in the long run. [https://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/429_BismarckWorker's%20Comp_130.pdf . Bismarck's Reichstag Speech on the Law for Workmen's Compensation", p. 4 (15 March 1884)]</blockquote>

Yet, notwithstanding these strategies, Bismarck did not completely succeed in crushing socialism. Support for the SDP increased with each election.

===Foreign policies===
[[File:Httpdigi.ub.uni-heidelberg.dediglitklabismarck18900050a.jpg|thumb|upright=1.4|Cartoon from 1867 making fun of Bismarck's different roles, from general to minister of foreign affairs, federal chancellor, hunter, diplomat and president of the parliament of the [[Zollverein]], the Prussian-dominated German customs union]]

One of the secrets of Bismarck's success was his careful in-depth study of the national interest of all the other states. He thereby avoided the pitfall of misunderstandings that led to conflicts. Even more important he identified opportunities whereby the national interest of another state was congruent to that of Germany, and a deal could be achieved to the benefit of both.<ref>Norman Rich, "The question of national interest in Imperial German foreign policy: Bismarck, William II, and the Road to World War I" ''Naval War College Review'', (1973) 26#1 pp. 28-41 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/44641416 online at p. 30]</ref>

Summarizing Bismarck's mastery of diplomacy, [[Jonathan Steinberg (historian)|Jonathan Steinberg]] argues:
:In international relations, it meant absolutely no emotional commitment to any of the actors. Diplomacy should, he believed, deal with realities, calculations of probabilities, assessing the inevitable missteps and sudden lurches by the other actors, states, and their statesmen.  The chessboard could be overseen and it suited Bismarck's peculiar genius for politics to maintain in his head multiple possible moves by adversaries....He had his goals in mind and achieved them. He was and remained to the end master of the finely tuned game of diplomacy. He enjoyed it. In foreign affairs he never lost his temper, rarely felt ill or sleepless. He could outsmart and outplay the smartest people in other states.<ref>Steinberg, ''Bismarck,'' p. 472.</ref>

The powerful [[Imperial German Army]] was under the control of Bismarck's close ally Field Marshall [[Helmuth von Moltke the Elder]]. It was a model of professionalism although it fought no wars. The [[Imperial German Navy]] was small under Bismarck.<ref>Alfred Vagts, "Land and Sea Power in the Second German Reich." ''Journal of Military History'' 3.4 (1939): 210+ [https://www.jstor.org/stable/3038611 online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200716033911/https://www.jstor.org/stable/3038611 |date=16 July 2020 }}</ref>

After fifteen years of warfare in the Crimea, Germany and France, Europe began a period of peace in 1871.<ref>Albrecht-Carrié, ''A Diplomatic history of Europe since the Congress of Vienna'' (1958) pp 145-57.</ref><ref>Taylor, ''The Struggle for Mastery in Europe: 1848–1918'' (1954) pp 201-24.</ref> With the founding of the German Empire in 1871, Bismarck emerged as a decisive figure in European history from 1871 to 1890. He retained control over Prussia and as well as the foreign and domestic policies of the new German Empire. Bismarck had built his reputation as a war-maker but changed overnight into a peacemaker. In this role, he employed [[balance of power (international relations)|balance of power]] diplomacy to maintain Germany's position in a Europe which, despite many disputes and war scares, remained at peace. For historian [[Eric Hobsbawm]], it was Bismarck who "remained undisputed world champion at the game of multilateral diplomatic chess for almost twenty years after 1871, [and] devoted himself exclusively, and successfully, to maintaining peace between the powers".<ref>[[Eric Hobsbawm]], ''The Age of Empire: 1875–1914'' (1987),  p. 312.</ref> Historian [[Paul Knaplund]] concludes:
:A net result of the strength and military prestige of Germany combined with situations created or manipulated by her chancellor was that in the eighties Bismarck became the umpire in all serious diplomatic disputes, whether they concerned Europe, Africa, or Asia. Questions such as the boundaries of Balkan states, the treatment of [[Armenians in the Ottoman Empire|Armenians in the Turkish Empire]] and of [[History of the Jews in Romania|Jews in Rumania]], the [[Caisse de la Dette Publique|financial affairs of Egypt]], Russian expansion in the Middle East, the [[Sino-French War|war between France and China]], and the [[Scramble for Africa|partition of Africa]] had to be referred to Berlin; Bismarck held the key to all these problems.<ref>Paul Knaplund, ed. ''Letters from the Berlin Embassy, 1871–1874, 1880–1885'' (1944) p. 8 [https://archive.org/details/annualreportofth011083mbp/page/n7/mode/2up online]</ref>

Bismarck's main mistake was giving in to the Army and to intense public demand in Germany for the acquisition of the border provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, thereby turning France into a permanent, deeply-committed enemy (''see'' [[French–German enmity]]). [[Theodore Zeldin]] says, "Revenge and the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine became a principal object of French policy for the next forty years. That Germany was France's enemy became the basic fact of international relations."<ref>Theodore Zeldin, ''France, 1848–1945: Volume II: Intellect, Taste, and Anxiety'' (1977) 2: 117.</ref> Bismarck's solution was to make France a pariah nation, encouraging royalty to ridicule its new republican status, and building complex alliances with the other major powers – Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Britain – to keep France isolated diplomatically.<ref>Carlton J. H. Hayes, ''A Generation of Materialism, 1871–1900'' (1941), pp 1-2.</ref><ref>Mark Hewitson, "Germany and France before the First World War: A Reassessment of Wilhelmine Foreign Policy" ''English Historical Review'' (2000) 115#462 pp. 570-606 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/579667 in JSTOR] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200617163234/https://www.jstor.org/stable/579667 |date=17 June 2020 }}</ref> A key element was the [[League of the Three Emperors]], in which Bismarck brought together rulers in Berlin, Vienna and St. Petersburg to guarantee each other's security, while blocking out France; it lasted 1881–1887.<ref>J. A.  Spender, ''Fifty Years of Europe: A study in pre-war documents'' (1933)  pp. 21-27</ref><ref>W. N. Medlicott, "Bismarck and the Three Emperors' Alliance, 1881–1887", ''Transactions of the Royal Historical Society'' Vol. 27 (1945), pp. 61-83 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/3678575 online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180819012339/https://www.jstor.org/stable/3678575 |date=19 August 2018 }}</ref>

====Early relations with Europe====
{{Main|International relations (1814–1919)}}
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Having unified his nation, Bismarck now devoted himself to preventing war in Europe with his skills in statesmanship. He was forced to contend with French [[revanchism]], the desire to avenge the losses of the Franco-Prussian War. Bismarck, therefore, engaged in a policy of diplomatically isolating France while maintaining cordial relations with other nations in Europe. He had little interest in naval or colonial entanglements and thus avoided discord with Great Britain. Historians emphasise that he wanted no more territorial gains after 1871, and vigorously worked to form cross-linking alliances that prevented any war in Europe from starting. By 1878 both the Liberal and Conservative spokesmen in Britain hailed him as the champion of peace in Europe.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hDiTDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA146 |title=Splendidly Victorian: Essays in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century British History in Honour of Walter L. Arnstein |date=2016 |publisher=[[Routledge]] |isbn=978-1-317-24327-4 |editor-last=Shirley |editor-first=Michael H. |pages=146ff |editor-last2=Larson |editor-first2=Todd E. A. |access-date=28 August 2018 |archive-date=12 July 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210712182202/https://books.google.com/books?id=hDiTDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA146 |url-status=live }}</ref> [[A. J. P. Taylor]], a leading British diplomatic historian, concludes that, "Bismarck was an honest broker of peace; and his system of alliances compelled every Power, whatever its will, to follow a peaceful course".<ref>A.J.P. Taylor, ''Europe: Grandeur and Decline'' (1967) p. 89.</ref>

Well aware that Europe was sceptical of his powerful new Reich, Bismarck turned his attention to preserving the status quo in Europe based on a balance of power that would allow Germany's economy to flourish. Bismarck feared that a hostile combination of Austria-Hungary, France, and Russia would crush Germany. If two of them were allied, then the third would ally with Germany only if Germany conceded excessive demands. The solution was to ally with two of the three. In 1873 he formed the [[League of the Three Emperors]] (''Dreikaiserbund''), an alliance of Wilhelm, Tsar [[Alexander II of Russia]], and Emperor [[Franz Joseph I of Austria|Francis Joseph]] of Austria-Hungary. Together they would control Eastern Europe, making sure that restive ethnic groups such as the Poles were kept under control. The Balkans posed a more serious issue, and Bismarck's solution was to give Austria-Hungary predominance in the western areas, and Russia in the eastern areas. This system collapsed in 1887.<ref>Raymond James Sontag, ''European Diplomatic History: 1871–1932'' (1933) pp. 3–58.</ref><ref>W. N. Medlicott, "Bismarck and the Three Emperors' Alliance, 1881-87", ''Transactions of the Royal Historical Society'' Vol. 27 (1945), pp. 61–83 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/3678575 online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180819012339/https://www.jstor.org/stable/3678575 |date=19 August 2018 }}</ref>

In 1872, a protracted quarrel began to fester between Bismarck and Count [[Harry von Arnim]], the imperial ambassador to France. Arnim saw himself as a rival and competitor for the chancellorship, but the rivalry escalated out of hand, and Arnim took sensitive records from embassy files in Paris to back up his case. He was formally accused of misappropriating official documents, indicted, tried and convicted, finally fleeing into exile where he died. No one again openly challenged Bismarck in foreign policy matters until his resignation.<ref>George O. Kent, ''Arnim and Bismarck'' (Oxford University Press. 1968) pp 182–185.</ref>

====France====
{{Main|International relations (1814–1919)#"War in Sight" crisis of 1875}}
[[File:Otto Fürst von Bismarck.JPG|thumb|right|Bismarck {{Circa|1875}}]]

France was Bismarck's main problem. Peaceful relations with France became impossible after 1871 when Germany annexed all of the province of Alsace and much of Lorraine. Public opinion demanded it to humiliate France, and the Army wanted its more defensible frontiers. Bismarck reluctantly gave in, the French would never forget or forgive, he calculated, so might as well take the provinces. (That was a mistaken assumption—after about five years the French did calm down and considered it a minor issue.)<ref>{{Cite book |last=Mitchell |first=Allan |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gQZfDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT190 |title=The German Influence in France after 1870: The Formation of the French Republic |date=2018 |isbn=978-1-4696-2292-7 |page=190 |publisher=UNC Press Books |access-date=19 July 2018 |archive-date=1 February 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200201123022/https://books.google.com/books?id=gQZfDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT190 |url-status=live }}</ref> Germany's foreign policy fell into a trap with no exit. "In retrospect it is easy to see that the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was a tragic mistake."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Kent |first=George O. |url=https://archive.org/details/bismarckhistimes0000kent |title=Bismarck and His Times |publisher=Southern Illinois UP |date=1978 |isbn=978-0-8093-0859-0 |page=[https://archive.org/details/bismarckhistimes0000kent/page/79 79] |url-access=registration}}</ref><ref>See also {{Cite book |last=Ullrich |first=Volker |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=M1grDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT57 |title=Bismarck |date=2015 |isbn=978-1-910376-24-9 |page=57 |publisher=Haus |access-date=19 July 2018 |archive-date=1 February 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200201123026/https://books.google.com/books?id=M1grDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT57 |url-status=live }} and {{cite book|last=Clark|first=Christopher M.|title=Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600–1947|publisher=Harvard University Press|url=https://archive.org/details/ironkingdomrised00chri|url-access=registration|date=2006|page=[https://archive.org/details/ironkingdomrised00chri/page/553 553]|isbn=978-0-674-02385-7}}</ref> Once the annexation took place the only policy that made sense was trying to isolate France, so it had no strong allies. However, France complicated Berlin's plans when it became friends with Russia. In 1905 a German plan for an alliance with Russia fell through because Russia was too close to France.<ref>John Keiger, ''France and the World since 1870'' (2001) pp 111–17.</ref>

Between 1873 and 1877, Germany repeatedly manipulated the internal affairs of France's neighbours to hurt France. Bismarck put heavy pressure on Belgium, Spain, and Italy hoping to obtain the election of liberal, anticlerical governments. His plan was to promote [[republicanism]] in France by isolating the clerical-monarchist regime of President [[Patrice de MacMahon]]. He hoped that surrounding France with liberal states would help the French republicans defeat MacMahon and his reactionary supporters.<ref name="stone281"/>

The bullying, however, almost got out of hand in mid-1875, when an editorial entitled "''Krieg-in-Sicht''" ("War in Sight") was published in a Berlin newspaper close to the government, the ''Post''. The editorial indicated that highly influential Germans were alarmed by France's rapid recovery from defeat in 1875 and its announcement of an increase in the size of its army, as well as talks of launching a preventive war against France. Bismarck denied knowing about the article ahead of time, but he certainly knew about the talk of preventive war. The editorial produced a war scare, with Britain and Russia warning that they would not tolerate a preventive war against France. Bismarck had no desire for war either, and the crisis soon blew over. It was a rare instance where Bismarck was outmanoeuvred and embarrassed by his opponents, but from that, he learned an important lesson. It forced him to take into account the fear and alarm that his bullying and Germany's fast-growing power were causing among its neighbours and reinforced his determination that Germany should work in a proactive fashion to preserve the peace in Europe, rather than passively let events take their own course and reacting to them.<ref>Lothar Gall, ''Bismarck: The White Revolutionary, Volume 2: 1871–1898'' (1986) pp. 46–48.</ref><ref>William L. Langer, ''European Alliances and Alignments, 1871–1890'' (2nd ed. 1950) pp. 44–55.</ref><ref>James Stone, ''The War Scare of 1875: Bismarck and Europe in the mid-1870s'' (2010)</ref><ref>Joseph V. Fuller, "The War-Scare of 1875" ''American Historical Review'' (1919) 24#2 pp. 196-226 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/1835164 online]</ref>

====Italy====
Bismarck maintained good relations with [[Kingdom of Italy|Italy]], although he had a personal dislike for Italians and their country.{{Sfn|Taylor|1969|p=212}} He can be seen as a marginal contributor to [[Italian unification]]. Politics surrounding the 1866 [[Austro-Prussian War]] allowed Italy to annex [[Veneto|Venetia]], which had been a ''kronland'' ("crown land") of the Austrian Empire since the 1815 [[Congress of Vienna]]. In addition, French mobilisation for the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871 made it necessary for Napoleon III to withdraw his troops from Rome and the [[Papal States]]. Without these two events, Italian unification would have been a more prolonged process.

====Russia====
After [[Russian Empire|Russia]]'s victory over the [[Ottoman Empire]] in the [[Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878)|Russo-Turkish War]] of 1877–1878, Bismarck helped negotiate a settlement at the [[Congress of Berlin]]. The [[Treaty of Berlin (1878)|Treaty of Berlin]] revised the earlier [[Treaty of San Stefano]], reducing the size and sovereignty of the new [[Principality of Bulgaria]] (a pro-Russian state at that time). Bismarck and other European leaders opposed the growth of Russian influence and tried to protect the integrity of the Ottoman Empire (see [[Eastern Question]]). As a result, Russo-German relations further deteriorated, with the Russian Foreign Minister Gorchakov denouncing Bismarck for compromising his nation's victory. The relationship was additionally strained due to Germany's protectionist trade policies. Some in the German military clamoured for a [[preemptive war]] with Russia; Bismarck refused, stating: "Preemptive war is like committing suicide for fear of death."{{Sfn|Retallack|2008|p=29}}

Bismarck realised that both Russia and Britain considered control of central Asia a high priority, dubbed the "[[Great Game]]". Germany had no direct stakes, however, its dominance of Europe was enhanced when Russian troops were based as far away from Germany as possible. Over two decades, 1871–1890, he manoeuvred to help the British, hoping to force the Russians to commit more soldiers to Asia.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Stone | first1 = James | date = 2015 | title = Bismarck and the Great Game: Germany and Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia, 1871–1890 | journal = Central European History | volume = 48 | issue = 2| pages = 151–175 | doi = 10.1017/s0008938915000321 | s2cid = 146241990 }}</ref>

====Triple Alliance====
{{Main|Triple Alliance (1882)}}

The League of the Three Emperors having fallen apart, Bismarck negotiated the [[Dual Alliance (1879)|Dual Alliance]] with Austria-Hungary, in which each guaranteed the other against Russian attack. He also negotiated the [[Triple Alliance (1882)|Triple Alliance]] in 1882 with Austria-Hungary and Italy, and Italy and Austria-Hungary soon reached the "Mediterranean Agreement" with Britain. Attempts to reconcile Germany and Russia did not have a lasting effect: the Three Emperors' League was re-established in 1881 but quickly fell apart, ending Russian-Austrian-Prussian solidarity, which had existed in various forms since 1813. Bismarck therefore negotiated the secret [[Reinsurance Treaty]] of 1887 with Russia, in order to prevent the Franco-Russian encirclement of Germany. Both powers promised to remain neutral towards one another unless Russia attacked Austria-Hungary. However, after Bismarck's departure from office in 1890, the treaty was not renewed, thus creating a critical problem for Germany in the event of a war.{{citation needed|date=April 2021}}

====Colonies and imperialism====
{{Main|German colonial empire}}
[[File:Hissen der kaiserlichen Flagge auf Mioko.jpg|thumb|left|upright=1.35|Hoisting the German flag at [[Duke of York Islands|Mioko]], [[German New Guinea]] in 1884]]

Bismarck had opposed colonial acquisitions, arguing that the burden of obtaining, maintaining, and defending such possessions would outweigh any potential benefit. He felt that colonies did not pay for themselves, that the German formal bureaucratic system would not work well in the easy-going tropics, and that the diplomatic disputes colonies brought would distract Germany from its central interest, Europe itself.<ref name="Strandmann1969">{{Cite journal |last=von Strandmann |first=Hartmut Pogge |date=1969 |title=Domestic Origins of Germany's Colonial Expansion under Bismarck |journal=Past & Present |issue=42 |pages=140–159 |jstor=650184}}</ref> As for French designs on [[Morocco]], [[Chlodwig, Prince of Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst]] wrote in his memoirs that Bismarck had told him that Germany "could only be pleased if France took possession of the country" since "she would then be very occupied" and distracted from the loss of Alsace-Lorraine.<ref>Chlodwig of Hohenlohe-Schillingsfuerst, ''Memoirs'', W. Heinemann, 1906, p. 259.</ref> However, in 1883–1884 he suddenly reversed himself and overnight built a colonial empire in Africa and the South Pacific. The [[Berlin Conference]] of 1884–1885 organised by Bismarck can be seen as the formalisation of the [[Scramble for Africa]].

Historians have debated the exact motive behind Bismarck's sudden and short-lived move.{{Sfn|Kennedy|1988|loc=ch 10}} He was aware that public opinion had started to demand colonies for reasons of German prestige. He also wanted to undercut the anti-colonial liberals who were sponsored by the Crown Prince, who—given Wilhelm I's old age—might soon become emperor and remove Bismarck.{{Sfn|Eyck|1964|pp=273–76}}{{Sfn|Wehler|1970|pp=119–55}} Bismarck was influenced by Hamburg merchants and traders, his neighbours at Friedrichsruh. The establishment of the [[German colonial empire]] proceeded smoothly, starting with [[German New Guinea]] in 1884.<ref name="Strandmann1969" />{{Sfn|Crankshaw|1981|pp=395–97}}

[[File:Kongokonferenz.jpg|thumb|European officials staking claims to [[Africa]] in the [[Berlin Conference|Conference of Berlin]] in 1884]]

Other European nations, led by Britain and France, were acquiring colonies in a rapid fashion (see [[New Imperialism]]). Bismarck therefore made the decision to join the [[Scramble for Africa]]. [[German colonial empire|Germany's new colonies]] included [[German Togoland|Togoland]] (now [[Togo]] and part of [[Ghana]]), [[German Kamerun]] (now [[Cameroon]] and part of [[Nigeria]]), [[German East Africa]] (now [[Rwanda]], [[Burundi]], and the mainland part of [[Tanzania]]), and [[German South-West Africa]] (now [[Namibia]]). The [[Berlin Conference (1884)|Berlin Conference]] (1884–1885) established regulations for the acquisition of African colonies; in particular, it protected free trade in certain parts of the [[Congo Basin]]. Germany also acquired colonies in the Pacific, such as [[German New Guinea]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Firth |first=S. G. |date=1972 |title=The New Guinea Company, 1885–1899: A case of unprofitable imperialism |journal=Historical Studies |volume=15 |issue=59 |pages=361–377 |doi=10.1080/10314617208595478}}</ref>

[[Hans-Ulrich Wehler]] argues that his imperialistic policies were based on internal political and economic forces; they were not his response to external pressure. At first he promoted liberal goals of free trade commercial expansionism in order to maintain economic growth and social stability, as well as preserve the social and political power structure. However, he changed, broke with the liberals, and adopted tariffs to win Catholic support and shore up his political base. Germany's imperialism in the 1880s derived less from strength and instead represented Bismarck's solution to unstable industrialization. Protectionism made for unity at a time when class conflict was rising. Wehler says the chancellor's ultimate goal was to strengthen traditional social and power structures and avoid a major war.{{Sfn|Wehler|1970|pp=119–55}}

====Avoiding war====
[[File:Franz von Lenbach - Portrait of Otto Eduard Leopold von Bismarck - Walters 371007 - View B.jpg|thumb| [[Franz von Lenbach]]'s portrait of Bismarck in his 75th year. He is in uniform of [[Major General]] of the [[Guards Cuirassiers (Prussia)|Guards Cuirassiers]] of [[Prussia]].]]

In February 1888, during a [[Bulgarian Crisis (1885–1888)|Bulgarian crisis]], Bismarck addressed the Reichstag on the dangers of a European war:

{{blockquote|He warned of the imminent possibility that Germany will have to fight on two fronts; he spoke of the desire for peace; then he set forth the Balkan case for war and demonstrated its futility:
"Bulgaria, that little country between the [[Danube]] and the [[Balkans]], is far from being an object of adequate importance... for which to plunge Europe from Moscow to the [[Pyrenees]], and from the [[North Sea]] to [[Palermo]], into a war whose issue no man can foresee. At the end of the conflict we should scarcely know why we had fought."{{Sfn|Ludwig|1927a|p=73}}}}

Bismarck also repeated his emphatic warning against any German military involvement in Balkan disputes. Bismarck had first made this famous comment to the Reichstag in December 1876, when the Balkan revolts against the Ottoman Empire threatened to extend to a war between Austria-Hungary and Russia:

{{blockquote|Only a year later [1876], he is faced by the alternative of espousing the cause of Russia or that of Austria-Hungary. Immediately after the last crisis, in the summer of 1875, the mutual jealousies between Russia and Austria-Hungary had been rendered acute by the fresh risings in the Balkans against the Turks. Now the issues hung upon Bismarck's decision. Immediately after the peace, he had tried to paralyse the Balkan rivals by the formation of the Three Emperors' League. "I have no thought of intervening," he said privately. "That might precipitate a European war.... If I were to espouse the cause of one of the parties, France would promptly strike a blow on the other side.... I am holding two powerful heraldic beasts by their collars, and am keeping them apart for two reasons: first of all, lest they should tear one another to pieces; and secondly, lest they should come to an understanding at our expense." In the Reichstag, he popularises the same idea in the words: "I am opposed to the notion of any sort of active participation of Germany in these matters, so long as I can see no reason to suppose that German interests are involved, no interests on behalf of which it is worth our risking—excuse my plain speaking—the healthy bones of one of our [[Pomerania]]n [[musketeer]]s."{{Sfn|Ludwig|1927b|p=511}}}}

A leading diplomatic historian of the era, [[William L. Langer]] sums up Bismarck's two decades as Chancellor:
<blockquote>Whatever else may be said of the intricate alliance system evolved by the German Chancellor, it must be admitted that it worked and that it tided Europe over a period of several critical years without a rupture.... there was, as Bismarck himself said, a premium upon the maintenance of peace.<ref>William L. Langer, ''European Alliances and Alignments: 1871–1890'' (2nd ed.) 1950 p. 459.</ref></blockquote>

Langer concludes:
<blockquote>His had been a great career, beginning with three wars in eight years and ending with a period of 20 years during which he worked for the peace of Europe, despite countless opportunities to embark on further enterprises with more than even chance of success.... No other statesman of his standing had ever before shown the same great moderation and sound political sense of the possible and desirable.... Bismarck at least deserves full credit for having steered European politics through this dangerous transitional period without serious conflict between the great powers."<ref>Langer, ''European Alliances and Alignments: 1871–1890'' pp. 503–504.</ref></blockquote>

===Social legislation===
Bismarck's social legislation was a reaction to the [[social question]] triggered by [[industrialisation]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Case |first=Holly |date=November 2016 |title=THE "SOCIAL QUESTION," 1820–1920* |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/modern-intellectual-history/article/abs/social-question-18201920/161912FA1234B9FE6185F59259DAB2D3 |journal=Modern Intellectual History |language=en |volume=13 |issue=3 |pages=747–775 |doi=10.1017/S1479244315000037 |s2cid=143077444 |issn=1479-2443}}</ref>[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1990-023-06A, Otto von Bismarck.jpg|thumb|Photo of Chancellor Bismarck in the 1880s]]

====Early legislation====
In domestic policy, Bismarck pursued a conservative state-building strategy designed to make ordinary Germans—not just his own Junker elite—more loyal to the throne and empire, implementing the modern welfare state in Germany in the 1880s.<ref>Steinberg, 2011, pp. 416–417.</ref> According to Kees van Kersbergen and Barbara Vis, his strategy was:

{{blockquote|granting social rights to enhance the integration of a hierarchical society, to forge a bond between workers and the state so as to strengthen the latter, to maintain traditional relations of authority between social and status groups, and to provide a countervailing power against the modernist forces of [[Classical liberalism|liberalism]] and [[socialism]].<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Kersbergen |first1=Kees van |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UQL3AQAAQBAJ&pg=PA38 |title=Comparative Welfare State Politics: Development, Opportunities, and Reform |last2=Vis |first2=Barbara |publisher=Cambridge UP |date=2013 |isbn=978-1-107-65247-7 |page=38 |access-date=19 April 2016 |archive-date=22 April 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160422170840/https://books.google.com/books?id=UQL3AQAAQBAJ&pg=PA38 |url-status=live }}</ref>}}

Bismarck worked closely with large industries and aimed to stimulate German economic growth by giving workers greater security.<ref>E. P. Hennock, ''The Origin of the Welfare State in England and Germany, 1850–1914: Social Policies Compared'' (Cambridge University Press, 2007)</ref> A secondary concern was trumping the Social Democrats, who had no welfare proposals of their own and opposed Bismarck's. Bismarck especially listened to [[Hermann Wagener]] and [[Theodor Lohmann]], advisers who persuaded him to give workers a corporate status in the legal and political structures of the new German state.<ref>E. P. Hennock. "Social Policy under the Empire: Myths and Evidence" ''German History'' 1998 16(1): 58–74; Herman Beck, ''The Origins of the Authoritarian Welfare State in Prussia. Conservatives, Bureaucracy, and the Social Question, 1815–70''. 1995.</ref> In March 1884, Bismarck declared:

{{blockquote|The real grievance of the worker is the insecurity of his existence; he is not sure that he will always have work, he is not sure that he will always be healthy, and he foresees that he will one day be old and unfit to work. If he falls into poverty, even if only through a prolonged illness, he is then completely helpless, left to his own devices, and society does not currently recognise any real obligation towards him beyond the usual help for the poor, even if he has been working all the time ever so faithfully and diligently. The usual help for the poor, however, leaves a lot to be desired, especially in large cities, where it is very much worse than in the country.<ref>Frederic B. M. Hollyday, ''Bismarck'' (1970) p. 65.</ref>}}

Bismarck's idea was to implement welfare programs that were acceptable to conservatives without any socialistic aspects. He was dubious about laws protecting workers at the workplace, such as safe working conditions, limitation of work hours, and the regulation of women's and child labour. He believed that such regulation would force workers and employers to reduce work and production and thus harm the economy. Bismarck opened debate on the subject in November 1881 in the Imperial Message to the Reichstag, using the term ''practical Christianity'' to describe his program.<ref>Moritz Busch. ''Bismarck: Some secret pages from his history''. New York: Macmillan, 1898. Vol. II, p. 282.</ref> Bismarck's program centred squarely on insurance programs designed to increase productivity and focus the political attention of German workers on supporting the Junkers' government. The program included sickness insurance, accident insurance, disability insurance, and a retirement pension, none of which were then in existence to any great degree.

Based on Bismarck's message, the Reichstag filed three bills to deal with the concepts of accident and sickness insurance. The subjects of retirement pensions and disability insurance were placed on the back burner for the time being.<ref name="GERMAN HISTORY">Holborn, Hajo. ''A History of Modern Germany – 1840–1945''. Princeton UP, 1969. pp. 291–293.</ref> The social legislation implemented by Bismarck in the 1880s played a key role in the sharp, rapid decline of German emigration to America. Young men considering emigration looked at not only the gap between higher hourly "direct wages" in the United States and Germany but also the differential in "indirect wages", social benefits, which favoured staying in Germany. The young men went to German industrial cities so that Bismarck's insurance system partly offset low wage rates in Germany and further reduced the emigration rate.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Khoudour-Castéras |first=David |date=2008 |title=Welfare State and Labor Mobility: The Impact of Bismarck's Social Legislation on German Emigration Before World War I |journal=Journal of Economic History |volume=68 |issue=1 |pages=211–243 |doi=10.1017/s0022050708000077 |s2cid=20716760 }}</ref>{{clear left}}

====Sickness Insurance Law of 1883====
The first successful bill, passed in 1883, was the Sickness Insurance Bill. Bismarck considered the program, established to provide sickness insurance for German industrial laborers, the least important and the least politically troublesome.<ref name="Leichter 1979">{{Cite book |last=Leichter |first=Howard M. |title=A comparative approach to policy analysis: health care policy in four nations |publisher=Cambridge University Press |date=1979 |isbn=978-0-521-22648-6 |location=Cambridge |page=<span class="plainlinks">[https://books.google.com/books?id=cfI6AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA121 121]</span> |quote=The Sickness Insurance Law (1883). Eligibility. The Sickness Insurance Law came into effect in December 1884. It provided for compulsory participation by all industrial wage earners (i.e., manual labourers) in factories, ironworks, mines, shipbuilding yards, and similar workplaces.}}</ref><ref name="Hennock 2007">{{Cite book |last=Hennock |first=Ernest Peter |title=The origin of the welfare state in England and Germany, 1850–1914: social policies compared |publisher=Cambridge University Press |date=2007 |isbn=978-0-521-59212-3 |location=Cambridge |page=<span class="plainlinks">[https://books.google.com/books?id=6QysFcGNcBUC&pg=PA157 157]</span>}}</ref> The health service was established on a local basis, with the cost divided between employers and the employed. The employers contributed one-third, and the workers contributed two-thirds. The minimum payments for medical treatment and sick pay for up to 13 weeks were legally fixed. The individual local health bureaus were administered by a committee elected by the members of each bureau, and this move had the unintended effect of establishing a majority representation for the workers on account of their large financial contributions. This worked to the advantage of the Social Democrats who, through heavy worker membership, achieved their first small foothold in public administration.<ref name="GERMAN HISTORY" />

According to a 2019 study, the health insurance legislation caused a substantial reduction in mortality.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Bauernschuster |first1=Stefan |last2=Driva |first2=Anastasia |last3=Hornung |first3=Erik |date=2019 |title=Bismarck's Health Insurance and the Mortality Decline |url=https://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp6601.pdf |journal=Journal of the European Economic Association |volume=18 |issue=5 |pages=2561–2607 |language=en |doi=10.1093/jeea/jvz052 |s2cid=8464915 |access-date=16 December 2019 |archive-date=24 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201024121825/https://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp6601.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>

====Accident Insurance Law of 1884====
Bismarck's government had to submit three draft bills before it could get one passed by the Reichstag in 1884. Bismarck had originally proposed that the federal government pay a portion of the accident insurance contribution. Bismarck wanted to demonstrate the willingness of the German government to reduce the hardship experienced by the German workers so as to wean them away from supporting the various left-wing parties, most importantly the Social Democrats. The National Liberals took this program to be an expression of [[State Socialism (Germany)|State Socialism]], against which they were dead set. The Centre Party was afraid of the expansion of federal power at the expense of states' rights.

As a result, the only way the program could be passed at all was for the entire expense to be underwritten by the employers. To facilitate this, Bismarck arranged for the administration of this program to be placed in the hands of ''Der Arbeitgeberverband in den beruflichen Korporationen'' (the Organisation of Employers in Occupational Corporations). This organisation established central and bureaucratic insurance offices on the federal, and in some cases, the state level to actually administer the program whose benefits kicked in to replace the sickness insurance program as of the 14th week. It paid for medical treatment and a pension of up to two-thirds of earned wages if the worker were fully disabled. This program was expanded, in 1886, to include agricultural workers.<ref name="GERMAN HISTORY" />

====Old Age and Disability Insurance Law of 1889====
The old age pension program, insurance equally financed by employers and workers, was designed to provide a pension annuity for workers who reached the age of 70. Unlike the accident and sickness insurance programs, this program covered all categories of workers (industrial, agrarian, artisans and servants) from the start. Also, unlike the other two programs, the principle that the national government should contribute a portion of the underwriting cost, with the other two portions prorated accordingly, was accepted without question. The disability insurance program was intended to be used by those permanently disabled. This time, the state or province supervised the programs directly.<ref>E. P. Hennock, "Social Policy in the Bismarck Era: A Progress Report", ''German History,'' (June 2003) 21#2 pp. 229–238 [https://web.archive.org/web/20120606013247/http://gh.oxfordjournals.org/content/21/2/229.extract online].</ref>