Editing Occam's razor (section)

=== Other philosophers ===

==== Karl Popper ====
[[Karl Popper]] argues that a preference for simple theories need not appeal to practical or aesthetic considerations. Our preference for simplicity may be justified by its [[falsifiability]] criterion: we prefer simpler theories to more complex ones "because their empirical content is greater; and because they are better testable".<ref>{{cite book |last=Popper |first=Karl |author-link=Karl Popper |orig-year=1934 |year=1992 |title=Logik der Forschung |trans-title=The Logic of Scientific Discovery |edition=2nd |location=London |publisher=Routledge |pages=121–132 |isbn=978-84-309-0711-3 }}</ref> The idea here is that a simple theory applies to more cases than a more complex one, and is thus more easily falsifiable. This is again comparing a simple theory to a more complex theory where both explain the data equally well.

==== Elliott Sober ====
The philosopher of science [[Elliott Sober]] once argued along the same lines as Popper, tying simplicity with "informativeness": The simplest theory is the more informative, in the sense that it requires less information to a question.<ref name="Sober975">{{Cite book |url=https://archive.org/details/simplicity0000sobe |title=Simplicity |last=Sober |first=Elliott |publisher=[[Clarendon Press]] |year=1975 |isbn=978-0-19-824407-3 |location=Oxford |author-link=Elliott Sober |url-access=registration}}</ref> He has since rejected this account of simplicity, purportedly because it fails to provide an [[epistemology|epistemic]] justification for simplicity. He now believes that simplicity considerations (and considerations of parsimony in particular) do not count unless they reflect something more fundamental. Philosophers, he suggests, may have made the error of hypostatizing simplicity (i.e., endowed it with a ''[[sui generis]]'' existence), when it has meaning only when embedded in a specific context (Sober 1992). If we fail to justify simplicity considerations on the basis of the context in which we use them, we may have no non-circular justification: "Just as the question 'why be rational?' may have no non-circular answer, the same may be true of the question 'why should simplicity be considered in evaluating the plausibility of hypotheses?{{'"}}<ref name="Sober2002">{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-YdbBN-O-JAC&q=zellner+simplicity |title=Simplicity, Inference and Modeling: Keeping it Sophisticatedly Simple |last=Sober |first=Elliott |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=2004 |isbn=978-0-521-80361-8 |editor-last=Zellner |editor-first=Arnold |location=Cambridge, U.K. |pages=13–31 |chapter=What is the Problem of Simplicity? |access-date=4 August 2012 |editor-last2=Keuzenkamp |editor-first2=Hugo A. |editor-link2=Hugo A. Keuzenkamp |editor-last3=McAleer |editor-first3=Michael |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=J_CDXu24qZUC&q=sober+rival+hypotheses&pg=RA1-PA13 |archive-date=28 October 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231028141247/https://books.google.com/books?id=-YdbBN-O-JAC&q=zellner+simplicity#v=snippet&q=zellner%20simplicity&f=false |url-status=live }} [https://web.archive.org/web/20060901082031/http://philosophy.wisc.edu/sober/TILBURG.pdf Paper as PDF.]</ref>

==== Richard Swinburne ====

[[Richard Swinburne]] argues for simplicity on logical grounds:

{{blockquote|... the simplest hypothesis proposed as an explanation of phenomena is more likely to be the true one than is any other available hypothesis, that its predictions are more likely to be true than those of any other available hypothesis, and that it is an ultimate ''a priori'' epistemic principle that simplicity is evidence for truth.|Swinburne 1997}}

According to Swinburne, since our choice of theory cannot be determined by data (see [[Underdetermination]] and [[Duhem–Quine thesis]]), we must rely on some criterion to determine which theory to use. Since it is absurd to have no logical method for settling on one hypothesis amongst an infinite number of equally data-compliant hypotheses, we should choose the simplest theory: "Either science is irrational [in the way it judges theories and predictions probable] or the principle of simplicity is a fundamental synthetic a priori truth."<ref>Swinburne, Richard (1997). Simplicity as Evidence for Truth. Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press. {{ISBN|978-0-87462-164-8}}.</ref>

==== Ludwig Wittgenstein ====
From the ''[[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus]]'':
* 3.328 "If a sign is not necessary then it is meaningless. That is the meaning of Occam's Razor."
: (If everything in the symbolism works as though a sign had meaning, then it has meaning.)
* 4.04 "In the proposition, there must be exactly as many things distinguishable as there are in the state of affairs, which it represents. They must both possess the same logical (mathematical) multiplicity (cf. Hertz's Mechanics, on Dynamic Models)."
* 5.47321 "Occam's Razor is, of course, not an arbitrary rule nor one justified by its practical success. It simply says that unnecessary elements in a symbolism mean nothing. Signs which serve one purpose are logically equivalent; signs which serve no purpose are logically meaningless."
and on the related concept of "simplicity":
* 6.363 "The procedure of induction consists in accepting as true the simplest law that can be reconciled with our experiences."