Editing Nguyễn Khánh (section)

==Attempted coup by Generals Phát and Đức and further instability==
In September 1964, Khánh dismissed General [[Lâm Văn Phát]] as Interior Minister, while General [[Dương Văn Đức]] was about to be removed as [[IV Corps (South Vietnam)|IV Corps]] commander.<ref name=k396/> Both were removed as known Diệmists due to pressure from Buddhist activists.<ref name=m327>Moyar (2006), p. 327.</ref> Disgruntled, the pair launched a coup attempt before dawn on 13 September, using ten army battalions that they had recruited.<ref name=m326>Moyar (2006), p. 326.</ref> They took over the city without any firing, and used the national radio station to proclaim the deposal of Khánh's junta. Phat said that he would use the ideology and legacy of Diệm to lay the foundation for his new junta. There was little reaction from most of the military commanders.<ref name=m327/>

However, Phát and Đức could not apprehend Khánh, who had escaped the capital and flew to the central highlands resort town of [[Da Lat|Đà Lạt]]. American officials flew after Khánh to encourage him to return to Saigon and reassert his control. He refused to do so unless the Americans publicly announced their support for him to the nation. They then asked Khánh about his plans for the future, but felt that he was directionless. After talking to Phát and Đức, they concluded the same, thus deciding to publicly release a statement through the embassy endorsing Khánh.<ref name=m327/> This helped deter ARVN officers from joining Phát and Đức, who decided to give up. Khánh returned to Saigon and put down the putsch, aided mainly by the Vietnamese Air Force, under the leadership of Air Marshal [[Nguyễn Cao Kỳ]], whose political star began to rise. Kỳ had Air Force jets flew over the headquarters of the coup leaders while threatening to bomb them if they did not surrender immediately.<ref name=k396>Karnow, p. 396.</ref> Khánh imprisoned Lam and Đức for two months. He then removed three of the four corps commanders and six of the nine division commanders for failing to move against Lam and Đức.<ref name=k396/> The Secretary of State, [[Dean Rusk]], sent a message to Taylor to deliver to Khánh stating: "The United States has not provided massive assistance to South Vietnam, in military equipment, economic resources, and personnel in order to subsidize continuing quarrels among South Vietnamese leaders.<ref name=k396/>

On 19/20 September, an armed revolt by [[Degar|Montagnards]] serving in the armed forces took place. The indigenous paramilitaries took control of four military camps in Darlac Province, killing 70 ARVN troops of Vietnamese ethnicity, and then taking a number of others and their US advisers hostage. However, the Americans eventually convinced the Montagnards to stop, after Khánh made concessions.<ref>Moyar (2006), pp. 327–28.</ref> On 20 September, the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor and their 300,000 members staged a general strike for two days, causing electricity in the cities to be cut for two days. This prompted Khánh to make concessions to laborers.<ref name=m327/> This was followed by other protests and riots in some cities, the largest being in the southern coastal town of [[Qui Nhơn|Quy Nhơn]] where the public service stopped functioning for a short period.<ref name=mo765/> In some areas of I Corps, the commanders were not disturbed by the unrest so they did nothing to stop them.<ref name=mo765/>

Ambassador [[Maxwell Taylor]] deplored the repeated concessions, saying that "Khánh contributes further to the atmosphere of weakness that increasingly surrounds him"<ref name=mo765/> and that he "has survived only by making virtually unending concessions to every pressure group that has presented itself. There is general recognition that such a process cannot continue indefinitely and still have anything left deserving the name of a government. We are now close to that stage".<ref name=mo765>Moyar (2004), p. 765.</ref>

Khánh and his generals created a semblance of civilian rule by creating the High National Council, an appointed advisory body. He put Minh in charge of picking the 17 members of the group, and he filled it with figures sympathetic to him. They then made a resolution to recommend a model with a powerful head of state, which would likely be Minh. Khánh did not want his rival taking power, so he and the Americans convinced the HNC to dilute the powers of the position so as to make it unappealing to Minh, who was then sent on an overseas diplomatic goodwill tour.<ref name=m328>Moyar (2006), p. 328.</ref>

The HNC, which covered a wide cross-section of different social groups, selected the aging [[Phan Khắc Sửu]] as chief of state, and Sửu selected [[Trần Văn Hương]] as Prime Minister, a position with greater power, but the generals and Khánh retained the real power.<ref>Moyar (2004), pp. 765–66.</ref> At the same time, a group of Catholic officers was trying to replace Khánh with Thiệu.<ref name=m334>Moyar (2006), p. 334.</ref> Hương took a firm line against the Buddhists, accusing [[Thich Tri Quang|Thích Trí Quang]] of being a Communist, who in turn charged Hương with being a Diệmist, and responded with mass protests against the new civilian administration, calling for its removal. Huong used the army to break up the demonstrations, resulting in violent confrontations.<ref>Moyar (2004), pp. 766–67.</ref>

By the end of the year, Khánh had sidelined Khiêm and Minh. He despatched Khiêm to Washington as the ambassador with Thảo, his main confidant, as his press attaché. In late December 1964, Khánh summoned Thảo back to Saigon. Thảo suspected Khánh was attempting to have him killed, while Khánh thought Khiêm and Thảo were plotting against him.<ref>Tucker, p. 325.</ref><ref>Tang, pp. 56–57.</ref> Fearing he would be arrested upon arrival, Thảo went underground upon returning to Saigon.<ref name=s3089/><ref name=t57>Tang, p. 57.</ref> In mid-January 1965, Khánh called for Thảo to report to his superiors in the ARVN, warning that he would be "considered guilty of abandoning his post with all the consequences of such a situation" if he failed to do so.<ref name=s3089>Shaplen, pp. 308–09.</ref>

Khánh and a group of younger officers called the "Young Turks", led by Kỳ and Thiệu wanted to forcibly retire officers with more than 25 years of service, as they thought them to be lethargic and ineffective.<ref name=mo769/> Most of the older officers had more experience under the French colonial era, and some of the younger men saw them as too detached from the new era.<ref name=m344>Moyar (2006), p. 344.</ref>

One of the aims of this was to remove Generals Đôn, Minh, Kim and Xuân, who Khánh had put under arrest after his January coup but had now released and put into meaningless desk jobs with no work to do, although they were still being paid.<ref name=s294>Shaplen, p. 294.</ref> According to Khánh and the "Young Turks", the group, led by Minh, who had returned from his overseas tour, had been making plots with the Buddhists to regain power.<ref name=versus/><ref name=k398/> Sửu's signature was required to pass the ruling, but he referred the matter to the HNC.<ref name=versus/>

The HNC turned down the request, which was speculated to be due to the fact that many of them were themselves old, and did not appreciate the negative attitude towards seniors; some South Vietnamese called the HNC the High National Museum.<ref name=m344/> On 19 December, a Sunday, the generals dissolved the High National Council, a civilian advisory body.<ref name=mo769>Moyar (2004), p. 769.</ref> In any case, the HNC had already ceased to function in a meaningful way, as only 9 of the 17 members were still occasionally attending its meetings.<ref name=s294/>

===Deposal of the High National Council===
Before dawn, there were troop movements in the capital, as the junta deposed the civilians. The operation was commanded by Thi,
who had travelled into Saigon from I Corps, and Kỳ. The national police, which was under the control of the army, moved through the streets, arresting five HNC members and other politicians and student leaders they deemed to be an obstacle.<ref name=versus/><ref name=s294/> Minh and the other older generals were arrested and flown to [[Pleiku]], a [[Central Highlands (Vietnam)|Central Highlands]] town in a [[Montagnard (Vietnam)|Montagnard]] area, while other military officers were simply imprisoned.<ref name=k398/> They arrested around 100 members of the National Salvation Council of Lê Khắc Quyến, a new party active in central Vietnam with an anti-war ideology, aligned with Thi and [[Thích Trí Quang]]. As Thi was active in the purge, it was believed that the Quyến had fallen out with Thi in I Corps.{{Clarify|date=November 2012}}<ref name=s295/> At this point, Khánh had not spoken up and allowed the impression that the moves have been against his will, and a move on the part of other officers to take power for themselves.<ref name=versus/> Huong had actually privately endorsed the dissolution of the HNC, as both he and the Young Turks thought it would allow them to gain more power and thus influence over Khánh.<ref name=mo770/>

===Falling out with the Americans===
The infighting exasperated [[Maxwell Taylor]], the US ambassador to South Vietnam and former Chairman of the [[US Joint Chiefs of Staff]],<ref name=l/> who felt that the disputes between the junta's senior officers were derailing the war effort.<ref name=k399/><ref name=lr/> Only a few days later Westmoreland had invited him and the generals to a dinner and asked for an end to the changes in leadership, which Khánh and his men assured would be the case.<ref name=m344/> Westmoreland warned them that persistent instability would turn American political and public opinion against Saigon, fearing it would be useless to support such a regime.<ref name=k398>Karnow, p. 398.</ref> Initially Taylor issued a thinly disguised threat to cut aid, releasing a public statement saying that Washington might reconsider its military aid if "the fabric of legal government" was not reinstated.<ref name=s295/>

Taylor summoned the generals to his office, and Khánh sent Thi, Kỳ, Thiệu and Vice Admiral [[Chung Tan Cang|Cang]], the commander of the navy.<ref name=versus/> He asked the four to sit down and then asked "Do all of you understand English?".<ref name=k398/> The ambassador then angrily denounced the generals. According to [[Stanley Karnow]], Taylor "launched into a tirade, scolding them as if he were still superintendent of [[West Point]] and they a group of cadets caught cheating".<ref name=k398/> He said "I told you all clearly at General Westmoreland's dinner we Americans were tired of coups. Apparently I wasted my words."<ref name=m344/> He decried the removal of the HNC as "totally illegal" and said that "... you have made a real mess. We cannot carry you forever if you do things like this." Taylor believed that the HNC was an essential part of the governance of the country, because as an American, he believed that civilian legitimacy was necessary.<ref name=m344/> He declared that if the military did not transfer some powers or advisory capacity to the HNC or another civilian institution, then aid would be withheld, and some planned military operations against the [[Ho Chi Minh trail|Hồ Chí Minh trail]] that was being used to infiltrate communists into the south would be suspended.<ref name=versus/>

The four officers were taken aback by Taylor's searing words and felt that they had been humiliated. A decade after the incident, Kỳ wrote that Taylor was "the sort of man who addressed people rather than talked to them", referencing the confrontation.<ref name=k399/> Karnow said that "For the sake of their own pride, they [the officers] resented being treated in ways that reminded them of their almost total dependence on an alien power. How could they preserve a sense of sovereignty when Taylor, striving to push them into 'getting things done', behaved like a viceroy?"<ref name=k399/> Thi was seen by a CIA officer soon after, grinning. When asked why he was happy, Thi said "Because this is one of the happiest days of my life ... Today I told the American ambassador that he could not dictate to us."<ref name=post>{{cite news|title=South Vietnamese Gen. Nguyen Chanh Thi|newspaper=[[Washington Post]]|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/26/AR2007062602195.html|author=Sullivan, Patricia|date=26 June 2007|access-date=11 October 2009}}</ref>

Khánh's quartet of delegates responded to Taylor by responding in a circumlocutory way. They remained calm and did not resort to direct confrontation. Kỳ said the change was necessary, as "the political situation is worse than it ever was under Diệm".<ref name=mo770>Moyar (2004), p. 770.</ref> Kỳ explained that the situation mandated the dissolution of the council, saying "We know you want stability, but you cannot have stability until you have unity".<ref name=mo770/> He claimed that some HNC members were disseminating coup rumors and creating doubt among the population and that "both military and civilian leaders regard the presence of these people in the High National Council as divisive of the Armed Forces due to their influence".<ref name=mo770/> Kỳ then promised that he would explain the decision at a media conference and that he and his colleagues would return to their military roles in the near future.<ref name=m345>Moyar (2006), p. 345.</ref> Thiệu said "I do not see how our action has hurt the Hương government ... Hương now has the full support of the Army and has no worries from the High National Council, which we have eliminated". When Taylor said that the moves detracted from Hương and Sửu's powers, the generals disagreed, and said that they supported the pair in full and that Hương had approved of the deposal of the HNC. Taylor was unimpressed by the reassurances, saying at the meeting's end, "I don't know whether we will continue to support you after this ... [Y]ou people have broken a lot of dishes and now we have to see how we can straighten out this mess".<ref name=m345/>

Taylor met Hương and urged the prime minister to reject the dissolution of the HNC. Hương said that he and Suu had not been notified of the moves, but agreed to step in to take over the work of the body. Taylor asked Hương to publicly condemn the deposal of the HNC and to call on the army to release those arrested in the coup.<ref name=m345/> Hương said he would be willing to reorganize his administration to the wishes of the military.<ref name=s295/> Taylor warned that the US did not agree with military rule as a principle, and might reduce aid, but Hương was unmoved and said that the Vietnamese people "take a more sentimental than legalistic approach" and that the existence of civilian procedure and the HNC was much less pressing than the "moral prestige of the leaders".<ref name=m345/> American military advisers and intelligence officers who liaised with senior junta members found out that they were unconcerned with any possible legal ramifications of their actions.<ref name=mo770/>

Later, the quartet called a media conference, where they maintained that the HNC had been dissolved in the nation's interest and vowed to stand firm and not renege on their decision, although they proclaimed their ongoing confidence for Sửu and Hương.<ref name=versus/> Two days later, went public in support of the coup against the HNC, condemning the advisory body and asserting the army's right to step into government matters if "disputes and differences create a situation favorable to the common enemies: Communism and colonialism."<ref name=versus/> They announced that they had formed a new body called the Armed Forces Council.<ref name=s295>Shaplen, p. 295.</ref>

The day after the press conference, Taylor met Khánh in a private meeting at the latter's office. He complained about the dissolution of the HNC and said that it did not accord with the values of the alliance and the loyalty that Washington expected of [[Saigon]]. Khánh replied that Vietnam was not a satellite of Washington and compared the situation to the US support of a coup against Diệm, saying that loyalty was meant to be reciprocated. Taylor then bemoaned Khánh, saying he had lost confidence in him.<ref name=k399/><ref name=lr>Langguth, pp. 322–25.</ref><ref>Moyar (2006), pp. 344–45.</ref> Taylor added that military supplies being shipped to Vietnam would be withheld after arriving at Saigon and that American help in planning and advising military operations would be suspended.<ref name=s297>Shaplen, p. 297.</ref>

Khánh bristled and said that "You should keep to your place as Ambassador ... as Ambassador, it is really not appropriate for you to be dealing in this way with the commander-in-chief of the armed forces on a political matter, nor was it appropriate for you to have summoned some of my generals to the Embassy yesterday."<ref name=m346/> He threatened to expel Taylor, who said that his forced departure would mean the end of US support for South Vietnam.<ref name=k399>Karnow, p. 399.</ref> However, Khánh later said he was open to the possibility of going abroad and asked Taylor if he thought this would be good for the country, to which the ambassador replied in the affirmative.<ref name=m346>Moyar (2006), p. 346.</ref> Khánh ended the meeting, saying that he would think about his future.<ref name=m346/>

Later, Khánh phoned Taylor from his office and expressed his desire to resign and go abroad along with several other generals, asking for the Americans to fund the costs of travel. He then Taylor the list of generals for whom arrangements needed to be made, and then asked the ambassador to repeat the names for confirmation. Taylor did so, unaware that Khánh was taping the dialogue.<ref name=m346/> Afterwards, Khánh played back the tape out of context to his colleagues, giving them the impression that Taylor was calling for them to be expelled.<ref name=m346/> Khánh asked his colleagues to participate in a campaign of fomenting anti-American street protests and to give the impression that the country did not need aid from Washington.<ref name=s296/>

On 22 December, Khánh went back on his promise to leave the country and announced on Radio Vietnam that "We make sacrifices for the country's independence and the Vietnamese people's liberty, but not to carry out the policy of any foreign country".<ref name=lr/><ref name=m346/> He said it was "better to live poor but proud as free citizens of an independent country rather than in ease and shame as slaves of the foreigners and Communists".<ref name=mo771>Moyar (2004), p. 771.</ref> Khánh explicitly denounced Taylor in an interview published in the ''[[New York Herald Tribune]]'' on 23 December<ref name=k399/><ref name=m346/> saying "if Taylor did not act more intelligently, Southeast Asia would be lost", and that the US could not expect to succeed by modelling South Vietnam on American norms.<ref name=mo771/> He added that Taylor's "attitude during the last 48 hours-as far as my small head is concerned—has been beyond imagination".<ref name=versus/> Justifying the removal of the HNC, Khánh said they were "exploited by counter-revolutionary elements who placed partisan considerations above the homeland's sacred interest".<ref name=s296>Shaplen, p. 296.</ref> Taylor responded by stating that generals had participated in "improper interference" into the purview of civilian government, while embassy staff said that their head had done nothing improper, as did the State Department, effectively again threatening to cut aid.<ref name=s296/>

On 24 December, he issued a declaration of independence from "foreign manipulation",<ref name=lr/> and condemned "colonialism".<ref name=k399/> At the time, Khánh was also secretly negotiating with the communists, hoping to put together a peace deal so he could expel the Americans from Vietnam, although this did not lead anywhere in the two months before Khánh was eventually forced from power.<ref>Kahin. pp. 294–99.</ref>

Khánh's defiance of Taylor saw his approval rise among the fellow generals, as the ambassador's actions were seen as being an insult to the nation.<ref name=m346/> On the night of 23 December, Khánh convinced his colleagues to join him in lobbying Hương to declare Taylor ''[[persona non grata]]'' and expel him from South Vietnam. They were confident that Hương could not reject them and side with a foreign power at the expense of the military that installed him, and made preparations to meet him the next day. However, someone in the junta was a CIA informant and reported the incident, allowing representatives of Washington to individually lobby the officers to change their stance.<ref name=m346/> The next day, the generals changed their mind and when they called on Huong at his office, only called on him to formally denounce Taylor's behaviour in his meeting with Khánh and his quartet and to "take appropriate measures to preserve the honor of all the Vietnamese armed forces and to keep national prestige intact".<ref name=m347>Moyar (2006), p. 347.</ref> On the same day, the [[1964 Brinks Hotel bombing|Việt Cộng bombed the Brinks Hotel]], where United States officers were billeted. As a result, there was a suspicion among a minority that Khánh's junta had been behind the attack,<ref name=l/> even though the Viet Cong had claimed responsibility through a radio broadcast. When the Americans started making plans to retaliate against North Vietnam, they did not tell Khánh and his junta.<ref name=m348>Moyar (2006), p. 348.</ref>

As a result of these tensions, a standoff started between the Americans and the Vietnamese generals. The US had hoped the generals would relent because they could not survive without aid from Washington, and that they would not be able to repel the communists or rival officers without bending to receive support. On the other hand, Khánh hoped the Americans would become more worried about the communists first and acquiesce to their ''fait accompli'' against the HNC.<ref name=versus/>

The South Vietnamese eventually had their way. Seeing that the generals and Hương were not willing to reinstate the HNC Taylor sent General [[John L. Throckmorton|John Throckmorton]] to meet the generals to mend fences. Throckmorton told the Vietnamese generals that they had read too much into Taylor's comments and that the US had no intention of pressuring them out of power. Khánh appeared reassured by this and made a public statement on 30 December, saying he was not as hostile to the Americans as reported, and he wanted Thiệu and Cang to meet the Americans to relieve any tension that remained.<ref name=m347/> The generals eventually won out, as the Americans did not move against them in any way for their refusal to reinstate the HNC.<ref name=versus/>

The only concession the AFC made was on 6 January, when they made the ostensible move of officially renouncing all their power to Hương, who was asked to organize elections.<ref name=m350>Moyar (2006), p. 350.</ref> They also agreed that a new appointed civilian body would be created in the meantime and that those arrested in December would be released.<ref name=s297/> This resulted in an official announcement by Hương and Khánh three days later, in which the military again reiterated their commitment to civilian rule through an elected legislature and a new constitution, and that "all genuine patriots" would be "earnestly assembled" to collaborate in making a plan to defeat the communists.<ref name=s297/> The Americans were unimpressed with the statement, which was shown to Taylor before it was made public; the State Department dourly announced that "it appears to represent some improvement to the situation".<ref name=s298>Shaplen, p. 298.</ref>

The South Vietnamese won in large part because the Americans had spent so much on the country, and could not afford to abandon it and lose to the communists over the matter of military rule, as it would be a big public relations coup for the Soviet bloc. According to Karnow, for Khánh and his officers, "their weakness was their strength".<ref name=k399/> An anonymous South Vietnamese government official said "Our big advantage over the Americans is that they want to win the war more than we do."<ref name=k399/>

In late January 1965, Buddhist protests against Prime Minister Hương broke out across South Vietnam, and were at their largest in central Vietnam in I Corps. In Huế, matters degenerated into a riot as 5,000 demonstrators attacked the US Information Service Library and burned 8,000 books. Khánh and Thi turned a blind eye to the rioting and destruction of property. It was believed that they did so to allow the disorder to ruin the Hương government and allow them to inherit power.<ref name="Moyar 2004, pp. 774–775">Moyar (2004), pp. 774–75.</ref>

Khánh decided to have the armed forces take over the government, and remove Hương. On the morning of 27 January, Khánh staged a bloodless putsch with the support of Thi and Kỳ. He promised to leave politics once the situation was stabilized and hand over power to a civilian body. It was believed some of the officers supported Khánh's return to power so that it would give him an opportunity to fail and be removed permanently.<ref name=mo775>Moyar (2004), p. 775.</ref> Khánh persisted with the facade of civilian government by retaining Sửu and replacing Huong with the economist [[Nguyễn Xuân Oanh]].<ref name=k400>Karnow, p. 400.</ref>