Editing Neville Chamberlain (section)

== Prime Minister (1937–1940)<span class="anchor" id="Premiership"></span><!-- linked from redirects [[Premiership of Neville Chamberlain]], [[Prime ministership of Neville Chamberlain]] --> ==
{{further|National Government (1937–1939)|Chamberlain war ministry}}
Upon his appointment, Chamberlain considered calling a general election, but with three and a half years remaining in the current Parliament's term he decided to wait. At 68 he was the second-oldest person in the 20th century (after [[Henry Campbell-Bannerman]]) to become prime minister for the first time,{{sfn|Self|2006|p=261}} and was widely seen as a caretaker who would lead the Conservative Party until the next election and then step down in favour of a younger man, with Foreign Secretary [[Anthony Eden]] a likely candidate. From the start of Chamberlain's premiership a number of would-be successors were rumoured to be jockeying for position.{{sfn|Smart|2010|pp=224–25}}

Chamberlain had disliked what he considered to be the overly sentimental attitude of both Baldwin and MacDonald on Cabinet appointments and reshuffles. Although he had worked closely with the [[President of the Board of Trade]], [[Walter Runciman, 1st Viscount Runciman of Doxford|Walter Runciman]], on the tariff issue, Chamberlain dismissed him from his post, instead offering him the token position of [[Lord Privy Seal]], which an angry Runciman declined. Chamberlain thought Runciman, a member of the [[Liberal National Party (UK, 1931)|Liberal National Party]], to be lazy.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=261}} Soon after taking office Chamberlain instructed his ministers to prepare two-year policy programmes. These reports were to be integrated with the intent of co-ordinating the passage of legislation through the current Parliament, the term of which was to expire in November 1940.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=264}}

At the time of his appointment, Chamberlain's personality was not well known to the public, though he had made annual budget broadcasts for six years. According to Chamberlain biographer Robert Self, these appeared relaxed and modern, showing an ability to speak directly to the camera.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=261}} Chamberlain had few friends among his parliamentary colleagues; an attempt by his [[Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Prime Minister|parliamentary private secretary]], Lord Dunglass (later prime minister himself as [[Alec Douglas-Home]]), to bring him to the Commons Smoking Room to socialise with colleagues ended in embarrassing silence.{{sfn|Faber|2008|p=171}} Chamberlain compensated for these shortcomings by devising the most sophisticated [[spin doctor|press management system]] employed by a prime minister up to that time, with officials at [[10 Downing Street|Number 10]], led by his chief of press George Steward, convincing members of the press that they were colleagues sharing power and insider knowledge, and should espouse the government line.{{sfn|Faber|2008|p=172}}

=== Domestic policy ===
[[File:INF3-46 Neville Chamberlain Artist Wooding.jpg|thumb|right|Caricature of Chamberlain, {{circa|1940}}]]
Chamberlain saw his elevation to the premiership as the final glory in a career as a domestic reformer, not realising that he would be remembered for foreign policy decisions.{{sfn|Macklin|2006|p=48}} One reason he sought the settlement of European issues was the hope it would allow him to concentrate on domestic affairs.{{sfn|Macklin|2006|p=52}}

Soon after attaining the premiership, Chamberlain obtained passage of the [[Factories Act 1937]]. This Act was aimed at bettering working conditions in factories, and placed limits on the working hours of women and children.{{sfn|Macklin|2006|p=158}} In 1938, Parliament enacted the [[Coal Act 1938]], which allowed for nationalisation of coal deposits. Another major law passed that year was the [[Holidays with Pay Act 1938]].{{sfn|Macklin|2006|p=158}} Though the Act only recommended that employers give workers a week off with pay, it led to a great expansion of [[holiday camp]]s and other leisure accommodation for the working classes.{{sfn|Dawson|2006}} The Housing Act 1938 provided subsidies aimed at encouraging [[Slum clearance in the United Kingdom|slum clearance]] and maintained [[rent control]].{{sfn|Macklin|2006|p=158}} Chamberlain's plans for the reform of local government were shelved because of the outbreak of war in 1939. Likewise, the raising of the school-leaving age to 15, scheduled for implementation on 1 September 1939, did not go into effect.{{sfn|Taylor|1965|p=406}}

=== Relations with Ireland ===
Relations between the United Kingdom and the [[Irish Free State]] had been strained since the 1932 appointment of [[Éamon de Valera]] as [[President of the Executive Council of the Irish Free State|President of the Executive Council]]. The [[Anglo-Irish Trade War]], sparked by the withholding of money that Ireland had agreed to pay the United Kingdom, had caused economic losses on both sides, and the two nations were anxious for a settlement. The de Valera government also sought to sever the remaining ties between Ireland and the UK, such as ending the King's status as Irish Head of State. As chancellor, Chamberlain had taken a hard-line stance against concessions to the Irish, but as premier sought a settlement with Ireland, being persuaded that the strained ties were affecting relations with other Dominions.{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=298–99}}

Talks had been suspended under Baldwin in 1936 but resumed in November 1937. De Valera sought not only to alter the constitutional status of Ireland, but to overturn other aspects of the [[Anglo-Irish Treaty]], most notably the issue of [[Partition of Ireland|partition]], as well as obtaining full control of the three [[Treaty Ports (Ireland)|Treaty Ports]] which had remained in British control. Britain, on the other hand, wished to retain the Treaty Ports, at least in time of war, and to obtain the money that Ireland had agreed to pay.{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=298–99}}

The Irish proved very tough negotiators, so much so that Chamberlain complained that one of de Valera's offers had "presented United Kingdom ministers with a three-leafed shamrock, none of the leaves of which had any advantages for the UK."{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=298–99}} With the talks facing deadlock, Chamberlain made the Irish a final offer in March 1938 which acceded to many Irish positions, though he was confident that he had "only given up the small things", and the agreements were signed on 25 April 1938.{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=298–99}} The issue of partition was not resolved, but the Irish agreed to pay £10&nbsp;million to the British. There was no provision in the treaties for British access to the Treaty Ports in time of war, but Chamberlain accepted de Valera's oral assurance that in the event of war the British would have access.{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=298–99}} Conservative backbencher [[Winston Churchill]] attacked the agreements in Parliament for surrendering the Treaty Ports, which he described as the "sentinel towers of the [[Western Approaches]]".{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=298–99}} When war came, de Valera denied Britain access to the Treaty Ports under [[Irish neutrality]].{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=298–99}} Churchill railed against these treaties in ''[[The Second World War (book series)|The Gathering Storm]]'', stating that he "never saw the House of Commons more completely misled" and that "members were made to feel very differently about it when our existence hung in the balance during the [[Battle of the Atlantic]]."{{sfn|Macklin|2006|p=64}} Chamberlain believed that the Treaty Ports were unusable if Ireland was hostile, and deemed their loss worthwhile to assure friendly relations with Dublin.{{sfn|Taylor|1965|p=406}}

=== Foreign policy ===
{{main|European foreign policy of the Chamberlain ministry}}

==== Early days (May 1937 – March 1938) ====
Chamberlain sought to conciliate Germany and make the Nazi state a partner in a stable Europe.{{sfn|Smart|2010|p=225}} He believed Germany could be satisfied by the restoration of some of its colonies, and during the [[Remilitarisation of the Rhineland|Rhineland crisis]] of March 1936 he had stated that "if we were in sight of an all-round settlement the British government ought to consider the question" of restoration of colonies.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=279}}

The new prime minister's attempts to secure such a settlement were frustrated because Germany was in no hurry to talk to Britain. Foreign Minister [[Konstantin von Neurath]] was supposed to visit Britain in July 1937 but cancelled his visit.{{sfn|Smart|2010|p=225}} [[Lord Halifax]], the [[Lord President of the Council]], visited Germany privately in November and met Hitler and other German officials. Both Chamberlain and British Ambassador to Germany [[Nevile Henderson]] pronounced the visit a success.{{sfn|Smart|2010|p=226}} Foreign Office officials complained that the Halifax visit made it appear Britain was too eager for talks, and the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, felt that he had been bypassed.{{sfn|Smart|2010|pp=225–26}}

Chamberlain also bypassed Eden while the latter was on holiday by opening direct talks with Italy, an international pariah for its [[Second Italo-Ethiopian War|invasion and conquest]] of [[Ethiopian Empire|Ethiopia]].{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=273–74}} At a Cabinet meeting on 8 September 1937, Chamberlain indicated that he saw "the lessening of the tension between this country and Italy as a very valuable contribution toward the pacification and appeasement of Europe" which would "weaken the [[Axis powers|Rome–Berlin axis]]."{{sfn|Self|2006|p=274}} Chamberlain also set up a private line of communication with the Italian ''Duce'' [[Benito Mussolini]] through the Italian Ambassador, Count [[Dino Grandi]].{{sfn|Smart|2010|pp=228–29}}

In February 1938, Hitler began to press the Austrian government to accept ''[[Anschluss]]'' or joining Germany and Austria into a single state. Chamberlain believed that it was essential to cement relations with Italy in the hope that an Anglo–Italian alliance would forestall Hitler from imposing his rule over Austria. Eden believed that Chamberlain was being too hasty in talking with Italy and holding out the prospect of ''[[de jure]]'' recognition of Italy's conquest of Ethiopia. Chamberlain concluded that Eden would have to accept his policy or resign.{{sfn|Smart|2010|pp=230–32}} The Cabinet heard both men out but unanimously decided for Chamberlain, and despite efforts by other Cabinet members to prevent it, Eden resigned from office.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=286}} In later years, Eden tried to portray his resignation as a stand against appeasement (Churchill described him in ''The Second World War'' as "one strong young figure standing up against long, dismal, drawling tides of drift and surrender"){{sfn|Faber|2008|p=103}} but many ministers{{sfn|Self|2006|p=286}} and MPs believed there was no issue at stake worth resignation.{{sfn|Smart|2010|p=232}} Chamberlain appointed Lord Halifax as foreign secretary in Eden's place.{{sfn|Smart|2010|p=232}}

==== Road to Munich (March 1938 – September 1938) ====
In March 1938, Austria became a part of Germany in the ''Anschluss''. Though the beleaguered Austrians requested help from Britain, none was forthcoming.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=304}} Britain did send Berlin a strong note of protest{{sfn|Faber|2008|p=148}} without specifying any actual action that the British government might take. In addressing the Cabinet shortly after German forces crossed the border, Chamberlain placed blame on both Germany and Austria.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=304}} Chamberlain noted,

{{blockquote| It is perfectly evident now that force is the only argument Germany understands and that "collective security" cannot offer any prospect of preventing such events until it can show a visible force of overwhelming strength backed by the determination to use it.&nbsp;... Heaven knows I don't want to get back to alliances but if Germany continues to behave as she has done lately she may drive us to it.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=304}}}}

On 14 March, the day after the ''Anschluss'', Chamberlain addressed the House of Commons and strongly condemned the methods used by the Germans in the takeover of Austria. Chamberlain's address met with the approval of the House.{{sfn|Faber|2008|p=148}}

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-H12967, Münchener Abkommen, Chamberlain.jpg|thumb|right|Chamberlain arrives in Munich, September 1938]]
With Austria absorbed by Germany, attention turned to Hitler's obvious next target, the [[Sudetenland]] region of Czechoslovakia. With three million ethnic Germans, the Sudetenland represented the largest German population outside the ''Reich''{{sfn|Self|2006|p=302}} and Hitler began to call for the union of the region with Germany.{{sfn|Faber|2008|p=156}} Britain had no military obligations toward Czechoslovakia,{{sfn|Smart|2010|p=237}} but France and Czechoslovakia had a mutual assistance pact{{sfn|Self|2006|p=304}} and both the French and Czechoslovaks also had an alliance with the Soviet Union. After the fall of Austria, the Cabinet's Foreign Policy Committee considered seeking a "grand alliance" to thwart Germany or, alternatively, an assurance to France of assistance if the French went to war. Instead, the committee chose to advocate that Czechoslovakia be urged to make the best terms it could with Germany.{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=159–60}} The full Cabinet agreed with the committee's recommendation, influenced by a report from the chiefs of staff stating that there was little that Britain could do to help the Czechs in the event of a German invasion.{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=159–60}} Chamberlain reported to an amenable House that he was unwilling to limit his government's discretion by giving commitments.{{sfn|Faber|2008|p=160}}

[[Easter Accords|Britain and Italy signed an agreement]] on 16 April 1938. In exchange for ''de jure'' recognition of Italy's Ethiopian conquest, Italy agreed to withdraw some Italian "volunteers" from the Nationalist (pro-[[Francisco Franco|Franco]]) side of the [[Spanish Civil War]]. By this point, the Nationalists strongly had the upper hand in that conflict, and they completed their victory the following year.{{sfn|Smart|2010|p=234}} Later that month, the new French prime minister, [[Édouard Daladier]], came to London for talks with Chamberlain, and agreed to follow the British position on Czechoslovakia.{{sfn|Faber|2008|p=162}}

In May, Czech border guards shot two Sudeten German farmers who were trying to cross the border from Germany into Czechoslovakia without stopping for border controls. This incident caused unrest among the Sudeten Germans, and Germany was then said to be moving troops to the border. In response to the report, Prague moved troops to the German border. Halifax sent a note to Germany warning that if France intervened in the crisis on Czechoslovakia's behalf, Britain might support France. Tensions appeared to calm, and Chamberlain and Halifax were applauded for their "masterly" handling of the crisis.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=304}} Though it was not known at the time, it later became clear that Germany had had no plans for a May invasion of Czechoslovakia.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=304}} Nonetheless, the Chamberlain government received strong and almost unanimous support from the British press.{{sfn|Faber|2008|p=189}}

Negotiations between the Czech government and the Sudeten Germans dragged on through mid-1938.{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=202–03}} They achieved little result; Sudeten leader [[Konrad Henlein]] was under private instructions from Hitler not to reach an agreement. On 3 August, Walter Runciman (by now Lord Runciman) travelled to Prague as a [[Runciman Mission|mediator]] sent by the British government.{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=199–200}} Over the next two weeks, Runciman met separately with Henlein, Czechoslovak president [[Edvard Beneš]], and other leaders, but made no progress.{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=211–14}} On 30 August, Chamberlain met his Cabinet and Ambassador Henderson and secured their backing—with only [[First Lord of the Admiralty]] Duff Cooper dissenting against Chamberlain's policy to pressure Czechoslovakia into making concessions, on the grounds that Britain was then in no position to back up any threat to go to war.{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=230–34}}

Chamberlain realised that Hitler would likely signal his intentions in his 12 September speech at the annual [[Nuremberg Rally]], and so he discussed with his advisors how to respond if war seemed likely. In consultation with his close advisor [[Horace Wilson (civil servant)|Horace Wilson]], Chamberlain set out "Plan Z". If war seemed inevitable, Chamberlain would fly to Germany to negotiate directly with Hitler.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=308}}

=== September 1938: Munich ===

==== Preliminary meetings ====
Lord Runciman continued his attempts to pressure the Czechoslovak government into concessions. On 7 September there was an altercation involving Sudeten members of the Czechoslovak parliament in the North Moravian city of [[Ostrava]] (''Mährisch-Ostrau'' in German). The Germans made considerable propaganda out of the incident, though the Prague government tried to conciliate them by dismissing Czech police who had been involved. As the tempest grew, Runciman concluded that there was no point in attempting further negotiations until after Hitler's speech. The mission never resumed.{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=244–46}}

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-H12486, Vorbereitung Münchener Abkommen, Chamberlain auf dem Flugplatz Oberwiesenfeld.jpg|thumb|upright=1.2|alt=British prime minister Neville Chamberlain and German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, 1938|Chamberlain (centre, hat and umbrella in hands) walks with German foreign minister [[Joachim von Ribbentrop]] (right) as the Prime Minister leaves for home after the Berchtesgaden meeting, 16 September 1938. On the left is [[Alexander von Dörnberg]].]]

There was tremendous tension in the final days before Hitler's speech on the last day of the Rally, as Britain, France, and Czechoslovakia all partially mobilised their troops. Thousands gathered outside 10 Downing Street on the night of the speech. At last Hitler addressed his wildly enthusiastic followers:

{{blockquote| The condition of the Sudeten Germans is indescribable. It is sought to annihilate them. As human beings they are oppressed and scandalously treated in an intolerable fashion&nbsp;... The depriving of these people of their rights must come to an end.&nbsp;... I have stated that the "Reich" would not tolerate any further oppression of these three and a half million Germans, and I would ask the statesmen of foreign countries to be convinced that this is no mere form of words.{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=263–66}}}}

The following morning, 13 September, Chamberlain and the Cabinet were informed by Secret Service sources that all German embassies had been told that Germany would invade Czechoslovakia on 25 September.{{sfn|Faber|2008|p=277}} Convinced that the French would not fight (Daladier was privately proposing a three-Power summit to settle the Sudeten question), Chamberlain decided to implement "Plan Z" and sent a message to Hitler that he was willing to come to Germany to negotiate. Hitler accepted and Chamberlain flew to Germany on the morning of 15 September; this was the first time, excepting a short jaunt at an industrial fair, that Chamberlain had ever flown. Chamberlain flew to Munich and then travelled by rail to Hitler's retreat at [[Berchtesgaden]], (see [[Berchtesgaden meeting]]).{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=310–12}}

The face-to-face meeting lasted about three hours. Hitler demanded the annexation of the Sudetenland, and through questioning him, Chamberlain was able to obtain assurances that Hitler had no designs on the remainder of Czechoslovakia or on the areas in Eastern Europe which had German minorities. After the meeting Chamberlain returned to London, believing that he had obtained a breathing space during which agreement could be reached and the peace preserved.{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=312–14}} Under the proposals made at Berchtesgaden the Sudetenland would be annexed by Germany if a plebiscite in the Sudetenland favoured it. Czechoslovakia would receive international guarantees of its independence which would replace existing treaty obligations—principally the French pledge to the Czechoslovaks.{{sfn|Smart|2010|p=242}} The French agreed to the requirements. Under considerable pressure the Czechoslovaks also agreed, causing the Czechoslovak government to fall.{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=319–24}}

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-H12751, Godesberg, Vorbereitung Münchener Abkommen.jpg|thumb|left|upright=1.2|alt=Chamberlain and Hitler leave the Bad Godesberg meeting, 1938|Chamberlain (left) and Hitler leave the Bad Godesberg meeting, 23 September 1938]]

Chamberlain flew back to Germany, meeting Hitler in [[Bad Godesberg]] on 22 September.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=316}} Hitler brushed aside the proposals of the previous meeting, saying "that won't do any more".{{sfn|Self|2006|p=316}} Hitler demanded immediate occupation of the Sudetenland and that Polish and Hungarian territorial claims on Czechoslovakia be addressed. Chamberlain objected strenuously, telling Hitler that he had worked to bring the French and Czechoslovaks into line with Germany's demands, so much so that he had been accused of giving in to dictators and had been booed on his departure that morning. Hitler was unmoved.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=316}}

That evening, Chamberlain told Lord Halifax that the "meeting with Herr Hitler had been most unsatisfactory".{{sfn|Faber|2008|p=334}} The following day, Hitler kept Chamberlain waiting until mid-afternoon, when he sent a five-page letter, in German, outlining the demands he had made orally the previous day. Chamberlain replied by offering to act as an intermediary with the Czechoslovaks, and suggested that Hitler put his demands in a memorandum which could be circulated to the French and Czechoslovaks.{{sfn|Faber|2008|p=337}}

The leaders met again late on the evening of 23 September—a meeting that stretched into the early morning hours. Hitler demanded that fleeing Czechs in the zones to be occupied take nothing with them. He extended his deadline for occupation of the Sudetenland to 1 October—the date he had long before secretly set for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The meeting ended amicably, with Chamberlain confiding to Hitler his hopes they would be able to work out other problems in Europe in the same spirit. Hitler hinted that the Sudetenland fulfilled his territorial ambitions in Europe. Chamberlain flew back to London, saying "It is up to the Czechs now."{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=340–42}}

==== Munich conference ====
Hitler's proposals met with resistance not only from the French and Czechoslovaks, but also from some members of Chamberlain's cabinet. With no agreement in sight, war seemed inevitable.{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=318–20}} Chamberlain issued a press statement calling on Germany to abandon the threat of force in exchange for British help in obtaining the concessions it sought.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=321}} On the evening of 27 September, Chamberlain addressed the nation by radio, and after thanking those who wrote to him, stated:

{{blockquote
| How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing. It seems still more impossible that a quarrel that has already been settled in principle should be the subject of war.{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=375–76}}
}}

On 28 September, Chamberlain called on Hitler to invite him to Germany again to seek a solution through a summit involving the British, French, Germans, and Italians.{{sfn|Faber|2008|p=382}} Hitler replied favourably, and word of this response came to Chamberlain as he was winding up a speech in the House of Commons which sat in gloomy anticipation of war. Chamberlain informed the House of this in his speech.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=323}} The response was a passionate demonstration, with members cheering Chamberlain wildly. Even diplomats in the galleries applauded. Lord Dunglass later commented, "There were a lot of appeasers in Parliament that day."{{sfn|Self|2006|p=323}}

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-R69173, Münchener Abkommen, Staatschefs.jpg|thumb|upright=1.2|left|alt=Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler, Mussolini, and Italian foreign minister Count Ciano as they prepared to sign the Munich Agreement|From left to right, Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler, Mussolini and Italian foreign minister Count [[Galeazzo Ciano]] as they prepare to sign the [[Munich Agreement]]]]

On the morning of 29 September Chamberlain left [[Heston Aerodrome]] (to the east of today's [[Heathrow Airport]]) for his third and final visit to Germany.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=324}} On arrival in Munich the British delegation was taken directly to the ''[[Führerbau]]'', where Daladier, Mussolini, and Hitler soon arrived. The four leaders and their translators held an informal meeting; Hitler said that he intended to invade Czechoslovakia on 1 October. Mussolini distributed a proposal similar to Hitler's Bad Godesberg terms. In reality, the proposal had been drafted by German officials and transmitted to Rome the previous day. The four leaders debated the draft and Chamberlain raised the question of compensation for the Czechoslovak government and citizens, but Hitler refused to consider this.{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=403–07}}

The leaders were joined by advisors after lunch, and hours were spent on long discussions of each clause of the "Italian" draft agreement. Late that evening the British and French left for their hotels, saying that they had to seek advice from their respective capitals. Meanwhile, the Germans and Italians enjoyed the feast which Hitler had intended for all the participants. During this break, Chamberlain advisor Horace Wilson met with the Czechoslovaks; he informed them of the draft agreement and asked which districts were particularly important to them.{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=407–10}} The conference resumed at about 10&nbsp;pm and was mostly in the hands of a small drafting committee. At 1:30&nbsp;am the [[Munich Agreement]] was ready for signing, though the signing ceremony was delayed when Hitler discovered that the ornate inkwell on his desk was empty.{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=410–11}}

Chamberlain and Daladier returned to their hotel and informed the Czechoslovaks of the agreement. The two prime ministers urged quick acceptance by the Czechoslovaks of the agreement, since the evacuation by the Czechs was to begin the following day. At 12:30&nbsp;pm the Czechoslovak government in Prague objected to the decision but agreed to its terms.{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=413–14}}

==== Aftermath and reception ====
[[File:MunichAgreement.jpg|thumb|upright=1.2|alt=A large crowd on an airfield; British prime minister Neville Chamberlain presents an assurance from German chancellor Adolf Hitler.|Chamberlain holding up the paper signed by both Hitler and himself on his return from [[Munich]] to [[Heston Aerodrome]].]]
{{listen
| filename = Another talk with the German Chancellor, Herr Hitler.ogg
| title = Chamberlain's return to Britain after Munich
| description = Neville Chamberlain speaks to the crowd upon arrival at Heston Aerodrome, 30 September 1938.
}}

Before leaving the ''Führerbau'', Chamberlain requested a private conference with Hitler. Hitler agreed, and the two met at Hitler's apartment in the city later that morning. Chamberlain urged restraint in the implementation of the agreement and requested that the Germans not bomb Prague if the Czechs resisted, to which Hitler seemed agreeable. Chamberlain took from his pocket a paper headed "Anglo–German Agreement", which contained three paragraphs, including a statement that the two nations considered the Munich Agreement "symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war again." According to Chamberlain, Hitler interjected "''Ja! Ja!''" ("Yes! Yes!").{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=324–25}} The two men signed the paper then and there. When, later that day, German foreign minister [[Joachim von Ribbentrop]] remonstrated with Hitler for signing it, the Führer replied, "Oh, don't take it so seriously. That piece of paper is of no further significance whatever."{{sfn|Faber|2008|p=417}} Chamberlain, on the other hand, patted his breast pocket when he returned to his hotel for lunch and said, "I've got it!"{{sfn|Self|2006|p=325}} Word leaked of the outcome of the meetings before Chamberlain's return, causing delight among many in London but gloom for Churchill and his supporters.{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=417–18}}

Chamberlain returned to London in triumph. Large crowds mobbed Heston, where he was met by the [[Lord Chamberlain]], [[George Villiers, 6th Earl of Clarendon|the Earl of Clarendon]], who gave him a letter from [[King George VI]] assuring him of the Empire's lasting gratitude and urging him to come straight to [[Buckingham Palace]] to report.{{sfn|Faber|2008|p=5}} The streets were so packed with cheering people that it took Chamberlain an hour and a half to journey the {{convert|9|mi|km|spell=in}} from Heston to the Palace. After reporting to the King, Chamberlain and his wife appeared on the Palace balcony with the King and [[Queen Elizabeth The Queen Mother|Queen]]. He then went to Downing Street; both the street and the front hall of Number 10 were packed.{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=5–7}} As he headed upstairs to address the crowd from a first-floor window, someone called to him, "Neville, go up to the window and say 'peace for our time'."{{efn|name=Peace in our time}} Chamberlain turned around and responded, "No, I don't do that sort of thing."{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=5–7}} Nevertheless, in his statement to the crowd, Chamberlain recalled the words of his predecessor, [[Benjamin Disraeli]], upon the latter's return from the [[Congress of Berlin]]:{{efn|name=Disraeli peace}}

{{blockquote| My good friends, this is the second time there has come back from Germany to Downing Street peace with honour. I believe it is [[peace for our time]]. We thank you from the bottom of our hearts. Now I recommend you go home, and sleep quietly in your beds.{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=5–7}}}}

King George issued a statement to his people, "After the magnificent efforts of the Prime Minister in the cause of peace it is my fervent hope that a new era of friendship and prosperity may be dawning among the peoples of the world."{{sfn|Faber|2008|p=420}} When the King met Duff Cooper, who resigned as First Lord of the Admiralty over the Munich Agreement, he told Cooper that he respected people who had the courage of their convictions, but could not agree with him.{{sfn|Faber|2008|p=420}} He wrote to his mother, [[Mary of Teck|Queen Mary]], that "the Prime Minister was delighted with the results of his mission, as are we all."{{sfn|Faber|2008|p=6}} She responded to her son with anger against those who spoke against Chamberlain: "He brought home peace, why can't they be grateful?"{{sfn|Faber|2008|p=420}} Most newspapers supported Chamberlain uncritically, and he received thousands of gifts, from a silver dinner service to many of his trademark umbrellas.{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=420–21}}

The Commons discussed the Munich Agreement on 3 October. Though Cooper opened by setting forth the reasons for his resignation{{sfn|Self|2006|p=330}} and Churchill spoke harshly against the pact, no Conservative voted against the government. Only between 20 and 30 abstained, including Churchill, Eden, Cooper, and [[Harold Macmillan]].{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=424–25}}

=== Path to war (October 1938 – August 1939) ===
In the aftermath of Munich, Chamberlain continued to pursue a course of cautious rearmament. He told the Cabinet in early October 1938, "<nowiki>[I]</nowiki>t would be madness for the country to stop rearming until we were convinced that other countries would act in the same way. For the time being, therefore, we should relax no particle of effort until our deficiencies had been made good."{{sfn|Self|2006|p=333}} Later in October, he resisted calls to put industry on a war footing, convinced that such an action would show Hitler that Chamberlain had decided to abandon Munich.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=333}} Chamberlain hoped that the understanding he had signed with Hitler at Munich would lead toward a general settlement of European disputes, but Hitler expressed no public interest in following up on the accord.{{sfn|Smart|2010|p=249}} Having considered a general election immediately following Munich,{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=334–35}} Chamberlain instead [[Cabinet reshuffle|reshuffled his Cabinet]].{{sfn|Smart|2010|p=250}} By the end of the year, public concerns caused Chamberlain to conclude that "to get rid of this uneasy and disgruntled House of Commons by a General Election" would be "suicidal".{{sfn|Self|2006|p=341}}

Despite Hitler's relative quietness as the "Reich" absorbed the Sudetenland, foreign policy concerns continued to preoccupy Chamberlain. He made trips to Paris and Rome, hoping to persuade the French to hasten their rearmament and Mussolini to be a positive influence on Hitler.{{sfn|Smart|2010|pp=250–51}} Several of his Cabinet members, led by Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, began to draw away from the appeasement policy. Halifax was by now convinced that Munich, though "better than a European war," had been "a horrid business and humiliating".{{sfn|Self|2006|p=339}} Public revulsion over the pogrom of ''[[Kristallnacht]]'' on 9 November 1938 made any attempt at a "rapprochement" with Hitler unacceptable, though Chamberlain did not abandon his hopes.{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=344–45}}

Still hoping for reconciliation with Germany, Chamberlain made a major speech in Birmingham on 28 January 1939, in which he expressed his desire for international peace, and had an advance copy sent to Hitler at Berchtesgaden. Hitler seemed to respond; in his "[[Reichstag (Weimar Republic)|Reichstag]]" speech on 30 January 1939, he stated that he wanted a "long peace".{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=345–46}} Chamberlain was confident that improvements in British defence since Munich would bring the dictator to the bargaining table.{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=345–46}} This belief was reinforced by a German official's conciliatory speech welcoming Ambassador Henderson back to Berlin after an absence for medical treatment in Britain. Chamberlain responded with a speech in [[Blackburn]] on 22 February hoping that the nations would resolve their differences through trade, and was gratified when his comments were printed in German newspapers.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=347}} With matters appearing to improve, Chamberlain's rule over the House of Commons was firm and he was convinced the government would "romp home" in a late 1939 election.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=348}}

On 15 March 1939, Germany invaded the Czech provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, including Prague. Though Chamberlain's initial parliamentary response was, according to biographer Nick Smart, "feeble", within 48&nbsp;hours he had spoken more forcefully against the German aggression.{{sfn|Smart|2010|p=254}} In another Birmingham speech, on 17 March, Chamberlain warned that Hitler was attempting to "dominate the world by force" and that "no greater mistake could be made than to suppose that because it believes war to be a senseless and cruel thing the nation has so lost its fibre that it will not take part to the utmost of its power in resisting such a challenge if it were ever made."{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=352–53}} The Prime Minister questioned whether the invasion of Czechoslovakia was "the end of an old adventure, or the beginning of a new" and whether it was "a step in the direction of an attempt to dominate the world by force."{{sfn|Dutton|2001|p=58}} [[Secretary of State for the Colonies|Colonial Secretary]] [[Malcolm MacDonald]] said, "whereas the Prime Minister was once a strong advocate of peace, he has now definitely swung around to the war point of view."{{sfn|Self|2006|p=353}} This speech was met with widespread approval in Britain and recruitment for the armed services increased considerably.{{sfn|de Courcy|1940|p=98}}

Chamberlain set out to build an interlocking series of defence pacts among the remaining European countries as a means of deterring Hitler from war.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=354}} He sought an agreement among Britain, France, the USSR, and Poland, whereby the first three would go to the assistance of Poland if her independence were threatened, but Polish mistrust of the Soviet Union caused those negotiations to fail.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=354}} Instead, on 31 March 1939, Chamberlain informed an approving House of Commons of [[Anglo-Polish military alliance|British and]] [[Franco-Polish military alliance|French guarantees]] that they would lend Poland all possible aid in the event of any action which threatened Polish independence.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=357}} In the ensuing debate, Eden stated that the nation was now united behind the government.{{sfn|Dutton|2001|pp=58–59}} Even Churchill and Lloyd George praised Chamberlain's government for issuing the guarantee to Poland.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=358}}

The Prime Minister took other steps to deter Hitler from aggression. He doubled the size of the [[Territorial Army (United Kingdom)|Territorial Army]], created a [[Ministry of Supply]] to expedite the provision of equipment to the armed forces, and instituted peacetime conscription.{{sfn|Smart|2010|p=255}} The [[Italian invasion of Albania]] on 7 April 1939 led to guarantees being given to Greece and Romania.{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=358–59}} On 17 June 1939, [[Handley Page]] received an order for 200 [[Handley Page Hampden|Hampden]] twin-engined medium bombers, and by 3 September 1939, the [[Chain Home|chain of radar stations]] girding the British coast was fully operational.<ref>{{cite book|last=Philpott|first=Ian M.|title=The Royal Air Force: An Encyclopedia of the Inter-War Years. Volume II: Rearmament 1930–1939|publisher=Pen and Sword|year=2008|isbn=978-1-84415-391-6|pages=[https://archive.org/details/royalairforceenc0000phil/page/222 222–23]|url=https://archive.org/details/royalairforceenc0000phil/page/222}}</ref>

Chamberlain was reluctant to seek a military alliance with the Soviet Union; he distrusted [[Joseph Stalin]] ideologically and felt that there was little to gain, given the recent massive purges in the [[Red Army]]. Much of his Cabinet favoured such an alliance, and when Poland withdrew her objection to an Anglo–Soviet alliance, Chamberlain had little choice but to proceed. The talks with Soviet foreign minister [[Vyacheslav Molotov]], to which Britain sent only a low-level delegation, dragged on over several months and eventually foundered on 14 August 1939 when Poland and Romania refused to allow Soviet troops to be stationed on their territories. A week after the failure of these talks, the Soviet Union and Germany signed the [[Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact]], committing the countries to non-aggression toward each other.{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=367–69}} A secret agreement divided up Poland in the event of war.{{sfn|Halsall|1997}} Chamberlain had disregarded rumours of a Soviet–German "rapprochement" and was dismissive of the publicly announced pact, stating that it in no way affected British obligations toward Poland.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=369}} On 23 August 1939, Chamberlain had Henderson deliver a letter to Hitler telling him that Britain was fully prepared to comply with its obligations to Poland.{{sfn|Smart|2010|p=261}} Hitler instructed his generals to prepare for [[Fall Weiss (1939)|an invasion of Poland]], telling them, "Our enemies are small worms. I saw them at Munich."{{sfn|Self|2006|p=369}}

=== War leader (1939–1940) ===
==== Declaration of war ====
Germany [[invaded Poland]] in the early morning of 1 September 1939. The British Cabinet met late that morning and issued a warning to Germany that unless it withdrew from Polish territory the UK would carry out its obligations to Poland. When the House of Commons met at 6:00&nbsp;pm, Chamberlain and Labour deputy leader Arthur Greenwood (deputising for the sick Clement Attlee) entered the chamber to loud cheers. Chamberlain spoke emotionally, laying the blame for the conflict on Hitler.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=378}}<ref>{{cite web|url=https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1939/sep/01/british-note-to-germany|title=BRITISH NOTE TO GERMANY. (Hansard, 1 September 1939)|website=[[Hansard|Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)]]|access-date=19 February 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161130175057/http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1939/sep/01/british-note-to-germany|archive-date=30 November 2016|date=1 September 1939|url-status=live}}</ref>

No formal declaration of war was immediately made. French foreign minister [[Georges Bonnet]] stated that France could do nothing until its parliament met on the evening of 2 September. Bonnet was trying to rally support for a Munich-style summit proposed by the Italians to be held on 5 September. The British Cabinet demanded that Hitler be given an ultimatum at once and if troops were not withdrawn by the end of 2 September, war would be declared forthwith. Chamberlain and Halifax were convinced by Bonnet's pleas, from Paris, that France needed more time for mobilisation and evacuation. Chamberlain postponed the expiry of the ultimatum which had, in fact, not yet been served.{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=378–79}} Chamberlain's lengthy statement to the House of Commons made no mention of an ultimatum and was consequently poorly received by the House. When Greenwood rose to "speak for the working classes," Conservative backbencher and former First Lord of the Admiralty [[Leo Amery]] shouted, "Speak for England, Arthur!" implying that the Prime Minister was not doing so.{{sfn|Smart|2010|p=263}} Chamberlain replied that telephone difficulties were making it hard to communicate with Paris and tried to dispel fears that the French were weakening. He had little success; too many members knew of Bonnet's efforts. National Labour MP and diarist [[Harold Nicolson]] later wrote, "In those few minutes he flung away his reputation."{{sfn|Self|2006|p=380}} The seeming delay gave rise to fears that Chamberlain would again seek a settlement with Hitler.{{sfn|Dutton|2001|p=59}} Chamberlain's last peacetime Cabinet met at 11:30 that night, with a thunderstorm raging outside, and determined that the ultimatum would be presented in Berlin at nine o'clock the following morning—to expire two hours later, before the House of Commons convened at noon.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=380}} At 11:15&nbsp;am, 3 September 1939, Chamberlain addressed the nation by radio, stating that the United Kingdom was at war with Germany:

{{blockquote
| I am speaking to you from the Cabinet Room at 10, Downing Street. This morning the British Ambassador in Berlin handed the German Government a final Note stating that unless we heard from them by 11 0'clock that they were prepared at once to withdraw their troops from Poland a state of war would exist between us. I have to tell you now that no such undertaking has been received, and that consequently this country is at war with Germany.
You can imagine what a bitter blow it is to me that all my long struggle to win peace has failed. Yet I cannot believe that there is anything more or anything different that I could have done and that would have been more successful.
Up to the very last it would have been quite possible to have arranged a peaceful and honourable settlement between Germany and Poland. But Hitler would not have it. He had evidently made up his mind to attack Poland whatever happened, and although he now says he put forward reasonable proposals which were rejected by the Poles, that is not a true statement.
The proposals were never shown to the Poles, nor to us, and, though they were announced in a German broadcast on Thursday night, Hitler did not wait to hear comments on them, but ordered his troops to cross the Polish frontier. '''His action shows convincingly that there is no chance of expecting that this man will ever give up his practice of using force to gain his will. He can only be stopped by force'''.
We and France are to-day, in fulfillment of our obligations, going to the aid of Poland, who is so bravely resisting this wicked and unprovoked attack upon her people. We have a clear conscience. We have done all that any country could do to establish peace, but a situation in which no word given by Germany's ruler could be trusted and no people or country could feel themselves safe had become intolerable. And now that we have resolved to finish it, I know that you will all play your part with calmness and courage.{{sfn|Feiling|1970|p=416}}
}}

That afternoon Chamberlain addressed the House of Commons' first Sunday session in over 120 years. He spoke to a quiet House in a statement which even opponents termed "restrained and therefore effective":

{{blockquote| Everything that I have worked for, everything that I have hoped for, everything that I have believed in during my public life has crashed into ruins. There is only one thing left for me to do: that is devote what strength and power I have to forwarding the victory of the cause for which we have sacrificed so much.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=382}}}}

==== "Phoney War" ====
Chamberlain instituted a [[War cabinet#Chamberlain war ministry|War Cabinet]] and invited the Labour and Liberal parties to join his government, but they declined.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=382}} He restored Churchill to the Cabinet as First Lord of the Admiralty, with a seat in the War Cabinet. Chamberlain also gave Eden a government post ([[Secretary of State for the Dominions|dominions secretary]]) but not a seat in the small War Cabinet. The new First Lord deluged the Prime Minister with a sea of lengthy memos. Chamberlain castigated Churchill for sending so many memos, as the two met in War Cabinet every day.{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=386–87}} Chamberlain suspected, correctly as it proved after the war, that "these letters are for the purpose of quotation in the Book that he will write hereafter."{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=387–88}} Chamberlain also deterred some of Churchill's plans, such as [[Operation Catherine]], which would have sent three heavily armoured battleships into the [[Baltic Sea]] with an aircraft carrier and other support vessels as a means of stopping shipments of iron ore to Germany.{{sfn|Smart|2010|p=269}} With the naval war the only significant front involving the British in the early months of the conflict, the First Lord's obvious desire to wage a ruthless, victorious war established him as a leader-in-waiting in the public consciousness and among parliamentary colleagues.{{sfn|Smart|2010|p=265}}

With little land action in the west, the initial months of the war were dubbed the "Bore War", later renamed the "[[Phoney War]]" by journalists.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=383}} Chamberlain, in common with most Allied officials and generals, felt the war could be won relatively quickly by keeping economic pressure on Germany through a blockade while continuing rearmament.{{sfn|Smart|2010|p=268}} The Prime Minister was reluctant to go too far in altering the British economy. The government submitted an emergency war budget about which Chamberlain stated, "the only thing that matters is to win the war, though we may go bankrupt in the process."{{sfn|Self|2006|p=390}} Government expenditures rose by little more than the rate of inflation between September 1939 and March 1940.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=390}} Despite these difficulties, Chamberlain still enjoyed approval ratings as high as 68%{{sfn|Self|2006|p=391}} and almost 60% in April 1940.{{sfn|Dutton|2001|p=61}}

==== Downfall ====
In early 1940 the Allies approved [[Plan R 4|a naval campaign]] designed to seize the northern part of Norway, a neutral country, including the key port of [[Narvik]], and possibly also to seize the iron mines at [[Gällivare]] in northern Sweden, from which Germany obtained much of its iron ore.{{sfn|Smart|2010|p=273}} As the Baltic froze in winter, the iron ore was then sent south by ship from Narvik. The Allies planned to begin by [[Operation Wilfred|mining Norwegian waters]], thus provoking a German reaction in Norway, and then would occupy much of the country. Unforeseen by the Allies, Germany had also planned to occupy Norway, and on 9 April German troops occupied Denmark and began an [[Operation Weserübung|invasion of Norway]]. German forces quickly overran much of the country.{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=415–16}} The Allies sent troops to Norway, but they met with little success, and on 26 April the War Cabinet ordered a withdrawal.{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=415–16}} The Prime Minister's opponents decided to turn the [[adjournment debate]] for the [[Whitsun]] recess into a challenge to Chamberlain, who soon heard about the plan. After initial anger, Chamberlain determined to fight.{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=420–21}}<ref>Erin Redihan,  "Neville Chamberlain and Norway: The Trouble with 'A Man of Peace' in a Time of War." ''New England Journal of History'' (2013) 69#1/2 pp. 1–18.</ref>

What became known as the "[[Norway Debate]]" opened on 7 May, and lasted for two days. The initial speeches, including Chamberlain's, were nondescript, but Admiral of the Fleet [[Roger Keyes, 1st Baron Keyes|Roger Keyes]], member for [[Portsmouth North]], in full uniform, delivered a withering attack on the conduct of the Norway campaign, though he excluded Churchill from criticism. Leo Amery then delivered a speech which he concluded by echoing [[Oliver Cromwell]]'s words on dissolving the [[Long Parliament]]: "You have sat here too long for any good you are doing. Depart, I say, and let us have done with you. [[In the name of God, go]]!"{{sfn|Self|2006|p=423}} When Labour announced that they would call for a division of the House of Commons, Chamberlain called upon his "friends—and I still have some friends in this House—to support the Government tonight."{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=424–25}} Because the use of the word "friends" was a conventional term to refer to party colleagues, and, according to biographer Robert Self, many MPs took it that way, it was an "error of judgment" for Chamberlain to refer to party loyalty "when the gravity of the war situation required national unity."{{sfn|Self|2006|p=425}} Lloyd George joined the attackers, and Churchill concluded the debate with a vigorous speech in support of the government.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=425}} When the division took place, the government, which had a normal majority of over 200, prevailed by only 81, with 38&nbsp;MPs in receipt of the government whip voting against it, with between 20 and 25 abstaining.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=426}}

Chamberlain spent much of 9 May in meetings with his Cabinet colleagues. Many Conservative MPs, even those who had voted against the government, indicated on 9 May and in the days following that they did not wish Chamberlain to depart but rather would seek to reconstruct his government.{{sfn|Dutton|2001|pp=63–64}} Chamberlain decided that he would resign unless the Labour Party was willing to join his government, and so he met with Attlee later that day. Attlee was unwilling, but agreed to consult his National Executive then meeting in [[Bournemouth]]. Chamberlain favoured Halifax as the next prime minister, but Halifax proved reluctant to press his own claims thinking that his position in the House of Lords would limit his effectiveness in the House of Commons, and Churchill emerged as the choice. The following day, Germany [[Battle of France|invaded]] the [[Low Countries]] and Chamberlain considered remaining in office. Attlee confirmed that Labour would not serve under Chamberlain, though they were willing to serve under someone else. Accordingly, Chamberlain went to Buckingham Palace to resign and advise the King to send for Churchill.{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=428–30}} Churchill later expressed gratitude to Chamberlain for not advising the King to send for Halifax, who would have commanded the support of most government MPs.{{sfn|Dutton|2001|p=118}} In a resignation broadcast that evening, Chamberlain told the nation,

{{listen
| filename = Chamberlain resignation.ogg
| title = Neville Chamberlain resigns
| description = Neville Chamberlain speaks to the nation following his resignation as prime minister, 10 May 1940.
}}

{{blockquote| For the hour has now come when we are to be put to the test, as the innocent people of Holland, Belgium, and France are being tested already. And you and I must rally behind our new leader, and with our united strength, and with unshakable courage fight, and work until this wild beast, which has sprung out of his lair upon us, has been finally disarmed and overthrown.{{sfn|Feiling|1970|p=441}}}}

[[Queen Elizabeth The Queen Mother|Queen Elizabeth]] told Chamberlain that her daughter, [[Elizabeth II|Princess Elizabeth]], wept as she heard the broadcast.{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=428–30}} Churchill wrote to express his gratitude for Chamberlain's willingness to stand by him in the nation's hour of need, and Baldwin, the only living former prime minister besides Chamberlain and Lloyd George, wrote, "You have passed through fire since we were talking together only a fortnight ago, and you have come out pure gold."{{sfn|Feiling|1970|p=442}}