Editing Natural disaster (section)

=== On governments and voting processes ===
Disasters stress government capacity, as the government tries to conduct routine as well as emergency operations.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Clarke |first1=Daniel J. |url=https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/32368 |title=Dull Disasters? How planning ahead will make a difference |last2=Dercon |first2=Stefan |date=2016 |publisher=Oxford University Press |hdl=20.500.12657/32368 |isbn=978-0-19-878557-6 |language=English |access-date=2021-10-04 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211004224335/https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/32368 |archive-date=2021-10-04 |url-status=live}}</ref> Some theorists of voting behavior propose that citizens update information about government effectiveness based on their response to disasters, which affects their vote choice in the next election.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Ashworth |first1=Scott |last2=Bueno de Mesquita |first2=Ethan |last3=Friedenberg |first3=Amanda |date=May 2017 |title=Accountability and Information in Elections |url=https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20150349 |url-status=live |journal=American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |language=en |volume=9 |issue=2 |pages=95–138 |doi=10.1257/mic.20150349 |s2cid=17843113 |issn=1945-7669 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211004225730/https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257%2Fmic.20150349 |archive-date=2021-10-04 |access-date=2022-04-18}}</ref> Indeed, some evidence, based on data from the United States, reveals that incumbent parties can lose votes if citizens perceives them as responsible for a poor disaster response<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Gasper |first1=John T. |last2=Reeves |first2=Andrew |date=April 2011 |title=Make It Rain? Retrospection and the Attentive Electorate in the Context of Natural Disasters |journal=American Journal of Political Science |volume=55 |issue=2 |pages=340–355 |doi=10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00503.x |jstor=23025055}}</ref> or gain votes based on perceptions of well-executed relief work.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal |last1=Healy |first1=Andrew |last2=Malhotra |first2=Neil |date=August 2009 |title=Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/myopic-voters-and-natural-disaster-policy/039708A3223EC114365ADF56F1D26423 |url-status=live |journal=American Political Science Review |language=en |volume=103 |issue=3 |pages=387–406 |doi=10.1017/S0003055409990104 |issn=1537-5943 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211004224325/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/myopic-voters-and-natural-disaster-policy/039708A3223EC114365ADF56F1D26423 |archive-date=2021-10-04 |access-date=2021-10-04 |s2cid=32422707}}</ref> The latter study also finds, however, that voters do not reward incumbent parties for [[disaster preparedness]], which may end up affecting government incentives to invest in such preparedness.<ref name=":0" />