Editing Munich massacre (section)

==Second rescue effort==
The West German plan was to deceptively offer to transport the terrorists and the hostages by plane to Cairo.<ref name="FDO1" /><ref name=":0">{{Cite news |last=Doubek |first=James |date=4 September 2022 |title=50 years ago, the Munich Olympics massacre changed how we think about terrorism |language=en |work=NPR |url=https://www.npr.org/2022/09/04/1116641214/munich-olympics-massacre-hostage-terrorism-israel-germany |access-date=4 September 2022 |archive-date=17 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231117174325/https://www.npr.org/2022/09/04/1116641214/munich-olympics-massacre-hostage-terrorism-israel-germany |url-status=live }}</ref> Two [[Bell UH-1]] helicopters from the Federal Border Guard were assigned to take them to nearby [[Fürstenfeldbruck Air Base|Fürstenfeldbruck]], a [[West German Air Force]] [[NATO]] airbase. Initially, the perpetrators planned to go to [[Munich-Riem airport]], which was the international airport near Munich at the time, but the German negotiators convinced them that Fürstenfeldbruck would be more practical.

The operation in Fürstenfeldbruck was designed as an alternative to one in the Olympic Village.<ref name="FDO1" /> Georg Wolf, Schreiber's deputy, who later led the police team in Fürstenfeldbruck, advocated to the crisis team for freeing the hostages at the Fürstenfeldbruck airbase.<ref name="FDO1" /> This location was advantageous because the West German police could arrive before the hostage-takers and set up the operation. Being a military airbase, it could be easily cleared, ensuring no external parties would be at risk during a shootout.<ref name="FDO1" />

[[File:Connollystraße GO-7.jpg|thumb|right|Underground car parking garage at Connollystraße in 2013]]
A plan was devised to walk the Palestinians and Israelis through the basement garage of the Olympic Village to the helicopters. The West German police saw an opportunity to ambush the terrorists and positioned sharpshooters in the garage basement.<ref name="FDO1" /> However, at 8:30&nbsp;pm, "Issa" insisted on checking the route first from Connollystraße 31 to the helicopters.<ref name="FDO1" /> He became suspicious and demanded to travel the entire route from Munich to Fürstenfeldbruck by bus.<ref name="FDO1" /> The German negotiators did not agree to this, as the entire route could not be adequately secured.<ref name="FDO1" /> Eventually, the crisis team and the hostage-takers agreed to transport the group by bus to the helicopters. Thus, the plan to free the hostages in the basement garage of the Olympic Village had failed.<ref name="FDO1" />

The terrorists wanted to first check the transport that would drive them the {{cvt|400|m}} to the helicopters and requested it be brought to the basement garage. Jürgen Kuhr, a soldier and driver in a transport squadron with the [[Air Transport Wing 63]] of the [[German Air Force]], was assigned, along with five colleagues and four civilian drivers, to provide transport during the Games for athletes, visitors, officials, and security personnel using two Mercedes minibuses with a total of 22 seats between them. In the evening, they received a request for one of the minibuses to go to the basement garage. Kuhr volunteered because he was single, while his colleague on the other bus was married with children. At 9:03&nbsp;pm, Kuhr made his way. He was instructed to drive the minibus to the underground garage with exterior lights off, and interior lights on, and wait.<ref name="SHZ1">{{cite news|access-date=2024-08-22|date=3 September 2022|language=de|location=Flensburg|publisher=Schleswig-Holsteinischer Zeitungsverlag (sh:z)|first=Gero|last=Trittmaack|title=Attentat bei Olympia 1972: Als Jürgen Kuhr aus Büdelsdorf den Terroristen-Anführer "Issa" unter vier Augen traf|trans-title=Attack at the 1972 Olympics: When Jürgen Kuhr from Büdelsdorf met the terrorist leader "Issa" under four eyes|url=https://www.shz.de/lokales/rendsburg/artikel/olympia-attentat-1972-als-juergen-kuhr-dem-terroristen-begegnete-42990823}}</ref>

Moments later, he met "Issa", who was carrying a weapon. "Issa" didn't check Kuhr for weapons, and even reassured him by saying in German that he had nothing to fear and only wanted to inspect the bus. After "Issa" checked the bus with a torch, he found it too small and told Kuhr he could drive away. The encounter lasted two minutes. The hostage-takers and hostages later boarded a larger bus from the basement garage to the helicopters, an event that was filmed live and captured by news photographers.<ref name="FDO1" /><ref name="SHZ1" />

The crisis team made a final attempt to buy time by announcing that no plane was available for the flight to Cairo, which extended the ultimatum to 9 pm. This deadline also passed.<ref name="FDO1" /> At 9:36 pm, the Lufthansa plane was ready at Fürstenfeldbruck, and Wolf then flew back to the airbase at 9:43 pm with five police officers.<ref name="FDO1" />

By 10:06 pm, the heavily armed hostage-takers led the bound hostages onto the bus that transported them to the helicopters. After a brief inspection, "Issa" ordered the Israeli athletes to board them, with four hostage-takers sitting next to the hostages in each helicopter.<ref name="FDO1" />

Police chief Schreiber discovered the exact number of hostage-takers when they boarded the helicopters, realising there were eight instead of the previously believed five.<ref name="FDO1" /> He did not relay this information to Fürstenfeldbruck airbase, assuming the operations team was already aware.<ref name="FDO1" />

The first helicopter to arrive, carrying crisis team members, advisors, and two Israeli security experts, landed at Fürstenfeldbruck airbase.<ref name="FDO1" /> This helicopter was separate from the two others carrying the hostage-takers and hostages that would arrive shortly after.

===Ambush plan at Fürstenfeldbruck airbase===
Five West German police officers were deployed around the airbase in [[sniper]] roles.<ref name="FDO1" /> From behind the cover provided by the balustrade of the control tower platform, Sniper No. 3, supported by an observer, was positioned with a field of fire to the east.<ref name="FDO1" /> Sniper No. 4 had a field of fire to the northeast, while Sniper No. 5 was at the northeast corner of the platform with a field of fire to the east, but could also fire north.<ref name="FDO1" /> Sniper No. 1, along with an observer, was positioned behind a fire engine, to the side of and at a distance from the switchyard, on the grass area beyond the runway northeast of the control tower, with a field of fire in all directions.<ref name="FDO1" /> Sniper No. 2 was positioned behind the low concrete square frame surrounding the switchyard, with a field of fire to the southeast. The field of fire was intensely illuminated with airbase mast lighting, designed to enhance the snipers' accuracy and blind the hostage-takers.<ref name="FDO1" />

However, none of them had any sniper training or special weapons,<ref name="FDO1" /> being equipped with the [[Heckler & Koch G3|H&K G3]], the [[Service rifle|standard-issue battle rifle]] of the [[Bundeswehr|German Armed Forces]], without [[telescopic sights]] or [[night vision]] devices. The officers were chosen due to their performance in shooting exercises.<ref name="FDO1" /> At that time, the Munich police had already acquired the relatively new [[Steyr SSG 69]] sniper rifles in their inventory, but no precision shooters had been trained to use them.

The members of the crisis team{{mdash}}Schreiber, Genscher, Merk, and Schreiber's deputy Georg Wolf{{mdash}}supervised and observed the attempted rescue from the airbase control tower. [[Ulrich Wegener]], a liaison officer from the German Federal Border Guard, Mossad chief Zamir, and Victor Cohen from the [[Israel Security Agency]] were also present,<ref name="ISA1" /> but the German authorities strictly limited the two Israelis to observing.<ref name="FDO1" />

A fully fuelled [[Lufthansa]] [[Boeing 727]] aircraft was positioned on the tarmac east of the airbase control tower, with its engines running. The plan was to have the police officers involved in the earlier assault attempt disguised as flight crew inside.<ref name="BRR1" /> It was agreed that "Issa" and "Tony" would inspect the plane. The police officers would then overpower them as they boarded, giving the snipers a chance to eliminate the remaining terrorists at the helicopters.<ref name="FDO1" />

However, the police officers, arriving by car with blue lights flashing, were initially hampered by airbase security and informed they were not authorised to allow anyone onto the airfield.<ref name="BRR1" /> The officers took cover in a ditch and could see the aircraft, with engines running loudly, {{convert|150|m|ft}} away.<ref name="BRR1" />

Heinz Hohensinn, one of the lead police officers, then received a radio message to proceed to the aircraft and was informed of the plan.<ref name="BRR1" /> In the complete helplessness of the situation, he learned they were to disguise themselves as flight crew, board the aircraft, and conduct the assault inside.<ref name="BRR1" /> However, he rejected the idea as a certain failure.<ref name="BRR1" /> He believed the terrorists would not board the aircraft like a "goose march", and if they realised that it was an ambush and that they would not be flown out, the outcome with a fully fuelled aircraft would be disastrous.<ref name="BRR1" />

===Final phase===
During the final moments, as the two Federal Border Guard helicopters approached Fürstenfeldbruck airbase with the terrorists and hostages on board, the West German police officers assigned to board the awaiting 727 aircraft decided it was too dangerous due to inadequate security precautions.<ref name="FDO1" /> They were ill-equipped and poorly protected inside the aircraft, resolving to abandon their mission.<ref name="FDO1" /><ref name="BRR1" /> This left only the five police sharpshooters to try to overpower a larger and more heavily armed group. Wolf could not adjust the operation plan as the two helicopters with the hostage-takers and hostages were already approaching Fürstenfeldbruck.<ref name="FDO1" />

At that point, ''[[Oberleutnant]]'' Ulrich Wegener, Hans-Dietrich Genscher's Federal Border Guard [[liaison officer]] at the Federal Ministry of the Interior, remarked, "I'm sure this will blow the whole affair!".<ref name=Reeve/> Wegener, who later founded and commanded the elite German counter-terrorism intervention unit [[GSG 9]], had an incredulous exchange with Genscher only hours earlier regarding the actions of the Munich and Bavarian police preparing to ambush the terrorists in the Olympic Village apartment.<ref name="WLT1">{{cite web|access-date=2024-08-11|date=29 September 2023|language=de|location=Berlin|publisher=Welt, Axel Springer Deutschland|first1=Sven Felix|last1=Kellerhoff|title=Ulrich Wegener, Er schuf die GSG-9, die in Mogadischu die entführte "Landshut" befreite|trans-title=Ulrich Wegener, He created the GSG-9, which liberated the hijacked "Landshut" in Mogadishu|url=https://www.welt.de/geschichte/kopf-des-tages/article234006458/Ulrich-Wegener-Nach-der-Geiselnahme-in-Muenchen-1972-schuf-er-die-GSG-9.html}}</ref> At around 4:35 pm, Wegener had remarked in consternation to his boss Genscher, "This contradicts all basic tactical rules", to which Genscher replied, "Many of the police know nothing about this".<ref name="WLT1" />

The helicopters landed next to each other just after 10:30 pm,<ref name="FDO1" /> and the four pilots got out first. As previously agreed with the operations team, they opened the doors to the passenger compartments where the hostage-takers and the hostages were. The operational plan called for the pilots to then head north to avoid coming under fire, but two of the hostage-takers had already exited and prevented them from doing so. Meanwhile, operations manager Wolf was lying on the roof of the airbase tower, still unaware of the exact number of hostage-takers. Additionally, the helicopters' rotor blades cast large shadows, providing cover for the hostage-takers. This crucial detail had not been considered during daylight planning.<ref name="FDO1" />

While two of the hostage-takers threatened the pilots at gunpoint, their leader "Issa" went to inspect the 727 aircraft immediately after landing, with "Tony", the second leader, following at a distance. Wolf decided to first free the four pilots from their dangerous situation. Two police snipers took positions on the northern balustrade of the tower and targeted the hostage-takers threatening the pilots. Only after they fired would the third sniper on the airbase tower open fire on "Issa" and "Tony". However, the order to fire was delayed because the pilots were in the line of fire. Meanwhile, "Issa" and "Tony" had arrived at the 727 aircraft. Realising there were no personnel on board, they recognised the trap and immediately sprinted back to the helicopters.<ref name="FDO1" />

Only when "Issa" and "Tony" had almost reached the eastern helicopter did the police snipers simultaneously shoot at the two hostage-takers threatening the pilots. Both fell to the ground, unable to use their weapons. The pilots tried to get to safety, with one fleeing behind the low wall of the switchyard, where he encountered a police sniper. The third sniper on the airbase tower had already targeted "Issa" and "Tony" and was waiting for the first shot. However, when he opened fire, he could no longer hit them from his position. The two snipers on the tower, who had already shot at the hostage-takers near the helicopters, turned and aimed at "Issa" and "Tony". Although "Issa" was hit in the leg, he managed to hide with "Tony" in the shadow of the eastern helicopter's rotor blades, from where they kept the upper part of the airbase tower under constant fire. The two snipers positioned on the ground were barely able to intervene in the exchange of fire due to their positions to the east and north of the helicopters. After the first shots were fired, one of the hostage-takers lay behind the rear of the western helicopter, pretending to be dead until he was arrested.<ref name="FDO1" />

Over the next hour, shots were repeatedly fired as the tense standoff continued. Police Chief Schreiber had instructed Officer Anton Fliegerbauer and two colleagues to provide fire support for the snipers positioned on the airfield.<ref name="FDO1" /> Armed with standard police-issue 6-shot [[Walther PP]] sidearms, one spare magazine each, and one radio between them, they had taken up positions crouched behind a wall at the foot of the Fürstenfeldbruck airbase control tower, directly across from where the two helicopters landed.<ref name="KKR1" /> Amid the gunfire, Fliegerbauer's team leader (''Zugführer'') Arved Semerak recalls standing {{cvt|20|m}} away when Fliegerbauer was fatally hit by a stray bullet from the hostage-takers.<ref name="FDO1" /><ref name="KKR1" /> In the chaos, Semerak did not notice what had happened until paramedics began attending to Fliegerbauer.<ref name="KKR1" /> The bullet struck the side of his head, killing him.<ref name="ODIS1" /><ref name="KKR1" />

Due to the danger to the police officers' lives, Wolf felt it was unjustifiable to risk freeing the hostages who might still be alive. He decided to wait for the police armoured personnel carriers requested from the Olympic Village before attempting another assault. However, these vehicles had only been ordered to Fürstenfeldbruck airbase ten minutes after the first shots were fired. Onlookers had flocked to the scene in droves, blocking traffic.<ref name="FDO1" />

Meanwhile, Israeli security expert Cohen grabbed a megaphone and addressed the members of Black September in Arabic: "Surrender. Save your lives." The response was a hail of bullets.<ref name="FDO1" />

===Failed liberation in the early morning of 6 September===
Around 11:50 pm six [[Mowag MR 8]] police armoured personnel carriers, which had been held up in traffic, arrived from Munich. They were tasked with rescuing the injured and providing protection for police officers approaching the helicopters. As Wolf drove towards the helicopters in an armoured personnel carrier, he was shot at. One of the hostage-takers threw a hand grenade into the eastern helicopter and attempted to flee towards the switchyard, but was shot by a police sniper. The grenade detonated, setting the helicopter ablaze. David Berger died in the helicopter from smoke inhalation. The other eight hostages had already been shot by the hostage-takers: Yossef Gutfreund, Kehat Schor, Mark Slavin, Andrei Spitzer, and Amitzur Shapira in the western helicopter, and Yakov Springer, Eliezer Halfin, Ze'ev Friedman, and David Berger in the eastern one.<ref name="FDO1" />

More police armoured personnel carriers arrived on the airbase. The arriving police officers, confused by the situation, mistakenly shot at a police sniper and the helicopter pilot at the switchyard, thinking they were hostage-takers; both were injured. Five hostage-takers, including the leaders "Issa" and "Tony", had been shot dead by the West German police. Three hostage-takers survived the exchange of fire by pretending to be dead and were arrested; Jamal Al-Gashey had been shot through his right wrist,<ref name=Reeve/> Mohammed Safady had sustained a flesh wound to his leg,<ref name=Groussard/> and Adnan Al-Gashey had escaped injury completely. Almost 90 minutes had passed since the helicopters had landed. By around midnight on 6 September, the battle was over. The operation had failed; none of the hostages was rescued.<ref name="FDO1" />

A ''[[Time (magazine)|Time]]'' magazine reconstruction of the long-suppressed Bavarian prosecutor's report indicates that a third hostage-taker (Reeve identifies him as Adnan Al-Gashey) stood at the door of the western helicopter and raked the remaining five hostages with machine gun fire; Gutfreund, Shorr, Slavin, Spitzer, and Shapira were shot an average of four times each.<ref name=began/><ref name="Groussard">Groussard.</ref>

Of the four hostages in the eastern helicopter, only Ze'ev Friedman's body was relatively intact; he had been blown clear of the helicopter by the explosion. In some cases, the exact cause of death for the hostages in the eastern helicopter was difficult to establish because the rest of the corpses were burned almost beyond recognition in the explosion and subsequent fire.<ref name=Reeve/>

===News wire reports===
Between 11:30&nbsp;pm and midnight, {{Interlanguage link|Conrad Ahlers|de|Conrad Ahlers}}, spoke as a spokesperson for the German government, in several TV interviews.<ref name="BYRF1" /> Despite the ongoing attempt to rescue the Israeli team, he described it, based on the information he had received, as a "fortunate and successful operation."<ref name="BYRF1" /> Initial news reports published all over the world indicated that all the hostages were alive and that all the attackers had been killed. Only later did a representative for the IOC suggest that "initial reports were overly optimistic." At 2:55&nbsp;am, Israel's ambassador in Bonn Ben-Horin reported that he had received information that all the hostages had been killed, and at 3:10&nbsp;am, Mossad's chief Zamir confirmed this information.<ref name="ISA1" />  At 3:17&nbsp;am, [[Reuters]] issued a corrected breaking news story: "All Israeli hostages captured by Arab guerrillas are dead."<ref name="FDO1" /> [[Jim McKay]], who was covering the Olympics that year for the [[American Broadcasting Company]] (ABC), had taken on the job of reporting the events as [[Roone Arledge]] fed them into his earpiece. At 3:24&nbsp;am, McKay received the official confirmation:

{{Blockquote|When I was a kid, my father used to say "Our greatest hopes and our worst fears are seldom realized." Our worst fears have been realized tonight. They've now said that there were eleven hostages. Two were killed in their rooms yesterday morning, nine were killed at the airport tonight. They're all gone.<ref name = "aso">{{cite web|url=http://www.americansportscastersonline.com/mckay5questions.html|title=American Sportscasters Online interview with Jim McKay|publisher=Americansportscastersonline.com|access-date=7 June 2010|archive-date=29 July 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120729050807/http://www.americansportscastersonline.com/mckay5questions.html|url-status=live}}</ref>}}

Several sources listed Ladany as having been killed.<ref name=Turnbull>{{cite news|last=Turnbull|first=Simon|url=https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/olympics/shaul-ladany-still-king-of-the-road-6295322.html|title=Shaul Ladany: Still king of the road&nbsp;– Olympics|newspaper=The Independent|date=27 January 2012|access-date=25 February 2013|archive-date=21 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180621071431/https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/olympics/shaul-ladany-still-king-of-the-road-6295322.html|url-status=live}}</ref> Ladany recalled later:

{{Blockquote|The impact did not hit me at the time, when we were in Munich. It was when we arrived back in Israel. At the airport in Lod there was a huge crowd—maybe 20,000 people—and each one of us, the survivors, stood by one of the coffins on the runway. Some friends came up to me and tried to kiss me and hug me as if I was almost a ghost that came back alive. It was then that I really grasped what had happened and the emotion hit me.<ref name=Turnbull/>}}

===Criticism===
The shootout with the well-trained Black September members underscored a significant lack of preparation by the German authorities. They were ill-equipped to handle such an unprecedented threat previously unknown in Germany.<ref name="IA1" /> There was no single authority overseeing the situation. The Munich police, Bavarian authorities, West German authorities, and even the Olympic committee all intervened, which increased the confusion and difficulty in handling the crisis.<ref name="IA1" />

German authorities faced several critical constraints. First, due to restrictions in the post-war West German [[Grundgesetz|constitution]], the [[German Army|army]] could not participate in the attempted rescue, as the German armed forces were not allowed to operate inside Germany during peacetime.<ref name="IA1" /> The responsibility fell entirely on the Munich police and the Bavarian authorities.<ref name="IA1" /><ref>Interview with [[Ulrich Wegener]] in ''[[One Day in September]]''.<!-- When --></ref>

The Munich massacre was a critical juncture, prompting governments "to think about terrorism as an enduring challenge to security, international and domestic, and to respond to it with a wide range of government resources".<ref name="IA1" /> This led directly to the founding of the German federal border guard's counter-terrorism intervention unit, GSG 9, less than two weeks later.<ref name="IA1" />

It was known half an hour before the hostages and kidnappers arrived at Fürstenfeldbruck airbase that the number of kidnappers was larger than initially believed. Despite this new information, Schreiber decided to proceed with the rescue operation as originally planned. The new information could not reach the police snipers because they had no radios.<ref>Reeve, pp. 103, 107.</ref>

It is a basic tenet of sniping operations that there are enough snipers (at least two for each known target, or in this case a minimum of ten) deployed to neutralise as many of the attackers as possible with the first volley of shots.<ref>Groussard, p. 349.</ref> The 2006 ''National Geographic'' Channel's ''[[Seconds from Disaster]]'' profile on the massacre stated that the helicopters were supposed to land sideways and to the west of the control tower, which would have allowed the snipers clear shots into them as the kidnappers threw open the helicopter doors. Instead, the helicopters landed facing the control tower and at the centre of the airstrip. This not only gave them a place to hide after the gunfight began, but put Snipers 1 and 2 in the line of fire of the other three snipers on the control tower.

According to the same programme, the crisis committee responsible for making decisions on how to handle the incident consisted of Bruno Merk (the Bavarian interior minister), Hans-Dietrich Genscher (the West German interior minister), and Manfred Schreiber (Munich's Chief of Police). The program mentioned that a year before the Games, Schreiber had participated in another hostage crisis (a failed bank robbery) where he ordered a sharpshooter to shoot one of the perpetrators, but only managed to wound the robber. As a result, the robbers shot an innocent woman dead. Schreiber was consequently charged with [[involuntary manslaughter]].

The five police snipers lacked radio contact with each other and the German authorities conducting the rescue operation, making it impossible to coordinate their fire. Their only contact with the operational leadership was through Georg Wolf, Schreiber's deputy, who was lying next to the three snipers on the control tower, giving them direct orders.<ref>Reeve, pp. 115–16.</ref> The two snipers at ground level received vague instructions to shoot when the other snipers began firing and were left to fend for themselves.<ref>Reeve, pp. 106–07.</ref>

The police snipers did not have the proper equipment for this hostage rescue operation. The G3 rifles used were considered by several experts to be inadequate for the distance at which the snipers were trying to shoot. The G3, the standard service rifle of the Bundeswehr at that time, had a {{convert|18|in|mm|adj=on|order=flip}} barrel; at the distances the snipers were required to shoot, a {{convert|27|in|mm|adj=on|order=flip}} barrel would have ensured far greater accuracy.<ref>Groussard, pp. 354–55.</ref> None of the rifles were equipped with telescopic or night vision sights.<ref name=Reeve116/> Additionally, none of the snipers were equipped with a steel helmet or bulletproof vest.<ref name=Reeve116>Reeve, p. 116.</ref> No armoured vehicles were at the scene at Fürstenfeldbruck airbase and were only called in after the gunfight was well underway.<ref>Reeve, pp. 118–20.</ref>

There were also numerous tactical errors. "Sniper 2", who was stationed behind the switchyard, was directly in the line of fire of his fellow snipers on the control tower, without any protective gear and without any other police officer being aware of his location.<ref name=Reeve116/> Because of this, "Sniper 2" did not fire any shots until late in the gunfight, when hostage-taker Khalid Jawad attempted to escape on foot and ran at the exposed sniper. "Sniper 2" killed the fleeing perpetrator but was in turn badly wounded by a fellow police officer, who was unaware that he was shooting at one of his own men. One of the helicopter pilots, Gunnar Ebel, was lying near "Sniper 2" and was also wounded by friendly fire. Both Ebel and the sniper recovered from their injuries.<ref>Reeve, pp. 121–22.</ref>

Many of the errors made by the German authorities during the rescue attempt were detailed by leading police officer Heinz Hohensinn, who had participated in Operation Sunshine earlier that day.<ref name="BRR1" /> In ''One Day in September'', he stated that he had also been directed to pose as a flight crew member in the second assault plan involving the 727 aircraft.<ref name="BRR1" /> He and his fellow police officers, who had volunteered to undertake the hostage rescue operation during the first assault attempt in the Olympic Village, understood the second assault plan to be a suicide mission. Consequently, the group unanimously resolved to abandon the second assault plan in the 727.<ref name="BRR1" /> None of them were reprimanded.<ref>Reeve, pp. 236–37.</ref>

===West German report after the attack===
On 20 September, the West German report was published. It examined three key aspects: security measures in Munich and the Olympic Village, efforts to release the hostages without force, and the police operation at the Olympic Village and Fürstenfeldbruck airbase. The report noted warnings of potential terrorist attacks during the Olympics, though none specifically targeted Israelis. It described contacts with Israeli representatives about the security of the Israeli Olympic team, indicating no dissatisfaction with the arrangements. The authors concluded that, given the terrorists' intent, even significant security reinforcements would not have prevented the attack on the Israelis.<ref name="ISA1" />

The second section reviewed the efforts to release the hostages, concluding that a rescue without force or flying them to Cairo was impossible, partly due to Israel's refusal to release Palestinian prisoners. The third section examined the airbase operation, raising operational questions but finding no fault with the police. The ''[[Bundestag]]'' Interior Committee adopted these conclusions, resulting in no disciplinary actions or removals.<ref name="ISA1" />

The significant differences between the Israeli and German assessments of the operation led to a wave of claims and counter-claims following the release of reports by Mossad chief Zamir and the German authorities. The Israeli Foreign Ministry summarised these differences, highlighting major discrepancies between the West German report and the comments by Zamir and Ben-Horin. Director-General [[Mordechai Gazit]] sent this summary to Meir.<ref name="ISA1" />

On 22 September, Zamir also reported to the [[Knesset]] [[Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee]]. He explained that while the West German authorities had a plan and were fully committed to rescuing the hostages, they struggled to improvise and adapt to the unfolding events. This inability to find solutions as the events were occurring partially contributed to the operation's failure.<ref name="ISA1" />