Editing Mohammad Najibullah (section)

===Afghan–Soviet relations===

====Soviet withdrawal====
{{Main|Soviet–Afghan War|Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan}}
While he may have been the ''[[de jure]]'' leader of Afghanistan, Soviet advisers still did the majority of work when Najibullah took power. As Gorbachev remarked "We're still doing everything ourselves [...]. That's all our people know how to do. They've tied Najibullah hand and foot."<ref name="MNAS" /> [[Fikryat Tabeev]], the [[Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan]], was accused of acting like a governor general by Gorbachev. Tabeev was recalled from Afghanistan in July 1986, but while Gorbachev called for the end of Soviet management of Afghanistan, he could not help but to do some managing himself. At a Soviet Politburo meeting, Gorbachev said "It's difficult to build a new building out of old material [...] I hope to God that we haven't made a mistake with Najibullah."<ref name="MNAS">{{cite book | author = [[Rodric Braithwaite|Braithwaite, Rodric]] | title = Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 | publisher = Indo-European Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-60444-002-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=guQQKejG3qUC&pg=PA276 276] }}</ref> As time would prove, the problem was that Najibullah's aims were the opposite of the Soviet Union's; Najibullah was opposed to a Soviet withdrawal, the Soviet Union wanted a Soviet withdrawal. This was logical, considering the fact that the Afghan military was on the brink of dissolution. The only means of survival seemed to Najibullah was to retain the Soviet presence.<ref name="MNAS" /> In July 1986 six regiments, which consisted up to 15,000 troops, were withdrawn from Afghanistan. The aim of this early withdrawal was, according to Gorbachev, to show the world that the Soviet leadership was serious about leaving Afghanistan.<ref>{{cite book | author = [[Rodric Braithwaite|Braithwaite, Rodric]] | title = Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 | publisher = Indo-European Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-60444-002-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=guQQKejG3qUC&pg=PA277 277] }}</ref> The Soviets told the United States Government that they were planning to withdraw, but the United States Government did not believe them. When Gorbachev met with [[Ronald Reagan]] during his visit the United States, Reagan called for the dissolution of the Afghan army.<ref>{{cite book | author = [[Rodric Braithwaite|Braithwaite, Rodric]] | title = Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 | publisher = Indo-European Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-60444-002-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=guQQKejG3qUC&pg=PA280 280] }}</ref>
[[File:RIAN archive 12070 Najibullah giving decorations.jpg|thumb|Najibullah giving a decoration to a Soviet serviceman in 1986]]
On 14 April 1988, the Afghan and Pakistani governments signed the [[Geneva Accords (1988)|Geneva Accords]], and the Soviet Union and the United States signed as guarantors; the treaty specifically stated that the Soviet military had to withdraw from Afghanistan by 15 February 1989. Gorbachev later confided to [[Anatoly Chernyaev]], a personal advisor to Gorbachev, that the Soviet withdrawal would be criticised for creating a bloodbath which could have been averted if the Soviets stayed.<ref>{{cite book | author = [[Rodric Braithwaite|Braithwaite, Rodric]] | title = Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 | publisher = Indo-European Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-60444-002-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=guQQKejG3qUC&pg=PA281 281] }}</ref> During a Politburo meeting [[Eduard Shevardnadze]] said "We will leave the country in a deplorable situation",<ref name="Karmal" /> and further talked about the economic collapse, and the need to keep at least 10 to 15,000 troops in Afghanistan. In this [[Vladimir Kryuchkov]], the [[KGB Chairman]], supported him. This stance, if implemented, would be a betrayal of the Geneva Accords just signed.<ref name="Karmal">{{cite book | author = [[Rodric Braithwaite|Braithwaite, Rodric]] | title = Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 | publisher = Indo-European Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-60444-002-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=guQQKejG3qUC&pg=PA282 282] }}</ref> During the second phase of the Soviet withdrawal, in 1989, Najibullah told [[Valentin Varennikov]] openly that he would do everything to slow down the Soviet departure. Varennikov in turn replied that such a move would not help, and would only lead to an international outcry against the war. Najibullah would repeat his position later that year, to a group of senior Soviet representatives in Kabul. This time Najibullah stated that [[Ahmad Shah Massoud]] was the main problem, and that he needed to be killed. In this, the Soviets agreed,<ref>{{cite book | author = [[Rodric Braithwaite|Braithwaite, Rodric]] | title = Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 | publisher = Indo-European Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-60444-002-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=guQQKejG3qUC&pg=PA285 285] }}</ref> but repeated that such a move would be a breach of the Geneva Accords; to hunt for Ahmad Shah Massoud so early on would disrupt the withdrawal, and would mean that the Soviet Union would fail to meet its deadline for withdrawal.<ref>{{cite book | author = [[Rodric Braithwaite|Braithwaite, Rodric]] | title = Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 | publisher = Indo-European Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-60444-002-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=guQQKejG3qUC&pg=PA286 286] }}</ref>

During his January 1989 visit to Shevardnadze, Najibullah wanted to retain a small presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and called for moving Soviet bombers to military bases close to the Afghan–Soviet border and place them on permanent alert.<ref>{{cite book | author = [[Rodric Braithwaite|Braithwaite, Rodric]] | title = Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 | publisher = Indo-European Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-60444-002-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=guQQKejG3qUC&pg=PA287 287] }}</ref> Najibullah also repeated his claims that his government could not survive if Ahmad Shah Massoud remained alive. Shevardnadze again repeated that troops could not stay, since it would lead to international outcry, but said he would look into the matter. Shevardnadze demanded that the Soviet embassy created a plan in which at least 12,000 Soviet troops would remain in Afghanistan either under direct control of the [[United Nations]] or remain as "volunteers".<ref name="volunteers">{{cite book | author = [[Rodric Braithwaite|Braithwaite, Rodric]] | title = Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 | publisher = Indo-European Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-60444-002-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=guQQKejG3qUC&pg=PA288 288] }}</ref> The Soviet military leadership, when hearing of Shevardnadze's plan, became furious. But they followed orders, and named the operation ''Typhoon'', maybe ironic considering that [[Operation Typhoon]] was the German military operation against the city of Moscow during [[World War II]]. Shevardnadze contacted the Soviet leadership about moving a unit to break the siege of [[Kandahar]], and to protect convoys from and to the city. The Soviet leadership were against Shevardnadze's plan, and Chernyaev even believed it was part of Najibullah's plan to keep Soviet troops in the country. To which Shevardnadze replied angrily "You've not been there, [...] You've no idea all the things we have done there in the past ten years."<ref name="volunteers" /> At a Politburo meeting on 24 January, Shevardnadze argued that the Soviet leadership could not be indifferent to Najibullah and his government; again, Shevardnadze received support from Kryuchkov. In the end Shevardnadze lost the debate, and the Politburo reaffirmed their commitment to withdraw from Afghanistan.<ref>{{cite book | author = [[Rodric Braithwaite|Braithwaite, Rodric]] | title = Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 | publisher = Indo-European Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-60444-002-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=guQQKejG3qUC&pg=PA289 289] }}</ref> There was still a small presence of Soviet troops after the Soviet withdrawal; for instance, parachutists who protected the Soviet embassy staff, military advisors and [[special forces]] and reconnaissance troops still operated in the "outlying provinces", especially along the Afghan–Soviet border.<ref>{{cite book | author = [[Rodric Braithwaite|Braithwaite, Rodric]] | title = Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 | publisher = Indo-European Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-60444-002-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=guQQKejG3qUC&pg=PA294 294] }}</ref>

====Aid====
Soviet military aid continued after their withdrawal, and massive quantities of food, fuel, ammunition and military equipment was given to the government. Varennikov visited Afghanistan in May 1989 to discuss ways and means to deliver the aid to the government. In 1990, Soviet aid amounted to an estimated 3 billion [[United States dollar]]s. As it turned out, the Afghan military was entirely dependent on Soviet aid to function.<ref name="NotMN">{{cite book | author = [[Rodric Braithwaite|Braithwaite, Rodric]] | title = Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 | publisher = Indo-European Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-60444-002-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=guQQKejG3qUC&pg=PA296 296] }}</ref> When the Soviet Union was dissolved on 26 December 1991, Najibullah turned to former [[Soviet Central Asia]] for aid. These newly independent states had no wish to see Afghanistan being taken over by religious fundamentalists, and supplied Afghanistan with 6 million barrels of oil and 500,000 tons of [[wheat]] to survive the winter.<ref>{{cite book | author = Hiro, Dilip | title = War Without End: The Rise of Islamist terrorism and Global Response | publisher = [[Routledge]] | year = 2002 | isbn = 978-0-415-28802-6 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=JsFVOiXbad0C&pg=PA230 230] }}</ref>