Editing Military doctrine (section)

===France===
Following the defeat of the [[French Army]] in the [[Franco-Prussian War]], the French military, as part of its movements to increase professionalism, emphasized officer training at the [[École de Guerre]]. [[Ferdinand Foch]], as an instructor, argued against the concept of a commander moving units without informing subordinates of his intentions. In doing so, a common doctrine served as a point of training.

<blockquote>We have then, a doctrine. All the brains have been limbered up and regard all questions from an identical point of view. The fundamental idea of the problem being known, each one will solve the problem in his own fashion, and these thousand fashions, we may very well be sure, will act to direct all their efforts to a common objective.<ref>Commandant A. Grassez, ''Préceptes et Jugements du marechal Foch'', (Nancy, France, Berger-Leveault, editor; 1919, translated in Futrell, Robert Frank, ''Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907–1960''. December 1989, Air University Press, reprinted by DIANE Publishing, {{ISBN|1-4289-9319-3}}</ref></blockquote>Prior to WWI, France had an offensive military doctrine.<ref name=":02">{{cite journal |last=Sagan |first=Scott D. |date=Fall 1986 |title=1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability |journal=International Security |volume=11 |issue=2 |pages=151–175 |doi=10.2307/2538961 |jstor=2538961 |s2cid=153783717}}</ref>

In the aftermath of WWI, France adopted a defensive military doctrine where the [[Maginot Line]] played a central role in its deterrence of Germany.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Kier |first=Elizabeth |date=1995 |title=Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539120 |journal=International Security |volume=19 |issue=4 |pages=65–93 |doi=10.2307/2539120 |jstor=2539120 |issn=0162-2889}}</ref>