Editing Metaethics (section)

=== Moral relativism ===
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[[Moral relativism]] maintains that all moral judgments have their origins either in societal or in individual standards, and that no single standard exists by which one can objectively assess the truth of a moral proposition. Metaethical relativists, in general, believe that the descriptive properties of terms such as "good", "bad", "right", and "wrong" do not stand subject to [[Universality (philosophy)|universal]] [[truth]] conditions, but only to societal convention and personal preference. Given the same set of verifiable facts, some societies or individuals will have a fundamental disagreement about what one ''ought'' to do based on societal or individual [[norm (sociology)|norm]]s, and one cannot adjudicate these using some independent standard of evaluation. The latter standard will always be societal or personal and not universal, unlike, for example, the scientific standards for assessing [[thermodynamic temperature|temperature]] or for determining [[proof theory|mathematical truths]]. {{Clarify span|text=Some philosophers maintain that moral relativism entails [[non-cognitivism]], while others consider it a form of [[Cognitivism (ethics)|cognitivism]]. Some but not all relativist theories are forms of [[moral subjectivism]], although not all subjectivist theories are relativistic.|date=February 2019}}