Editing Meme (section)

==Applications==
Opinions differ as to how best to apply the concept of memes within a "proper" disciplinary framework. One view sees memes as providing a useful philosophical perspective with which to examine [[cultural evolution]]. Proponents of this view (such as [[Susan Blackmore]] and [[Daniel Dennett]]) argue that considering cultural developments from a meme's-eye view—''as if'' memes themselves respond to pressure to maximise their own replication and survival—can lead to useful insights and yield valuable predictions into how culture develops over time. Others such as Bruce Edmonds and Robert Aunger have focused on the need to provide an empirical grounding for memetics to become a useful and respected [[scientific discipline]].<ref>
{{cite journal |url=http://cfpm.org/jom-emit/2002/vol6/edmonds_b_letter.html |last=Edmonds |first=Bruce |date=September 2002 |volume=6 |issue=2 |title=Three Challenges for the Survival of Memetics |journal=Journal of Memetics |access-date=8 October 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210908040830/http://cfpm.org/jom-emit/2002/vol6/edmonds_b_letter.html |archive-date=8 September 2021}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Aunger|2000}}</ref>

A third approach, described by Joseph Poulshock, as "radical memetics" seeks to place memes at the centre of a [[Eliminative materialism|materialistic]] [[theory of mind]] and of [[personal identity]].<ref>{{harvnb|Poulshock|2002}}</ref>

Prominent researchers in [[evolutionary psychology]] and [[anthropology]], including [[Scott Atran]], [[Dan Sperber]], [[Pascal Boyer]], [[John Tooby]] and others, argue the possibility of incompatibility between [[modularity of mind]] and memetics.{{citation needed|date=December 2010}} In their view, minds structure certain communicable aspects of the ideas produced, and these communicable aspects generally trigger or elicit ideas in other minds through inference (to relatively rich structures generated from often low-fidelity input) and not high-fidelity replication or imitation. Atran discusses communication involving religious beliefs as a case in point. In one set of experiments he asked religious people to write down on a piece of paper the meanings of the [[Ten Commandments]]. Despite the subjects' own expectations of consensus, interpretations of the commandments showed wide ranges of variation, with little evidence of consensus. In another experiment, subjects with autism and subjects without autism interpreted ideological and religious sayings (for example, "Let a thousand flowers bloom" or "To everything there is a season"). People with autism showed a significant tendency to closely paraphrase and repeat content from the original statement (for example: "Don't cut flowers before they bloom"). Controls tended to infer a wider range of cultural meanings with little replicated content (for example: "Go with the flow" or "Everyone should have equal opportunity"). Only the subjects with autism—who lack the degree of inferential capacity normally associated with aspects of [[theory of mind]]—came close to functioning as "meme machines".<ref>{{harvnb|Atran|2002}}</ref>

In his book ''The Robot's Rebellion'', [[Keith Stanovich]] uses the memes and memeplex concepts to describe a program of cognitive reform that he refers to as a "rebellion". Specifically, Stanovich argues that the use of memes as a descriptor for cultural units is beneficial because it serves to emphasize transmission and acquisition properties that parallel the study of [[epidemiology]]. These properties make salient the sometimes parasitic nature of acquired memes, and as a result individuals should be motivated to reflectively acquire memes using what he calls a "[[Neurathian bootstrap]]" process.<ref>{{cite book |last=Stanovich |first=Keith E. |date=2004 |title=The Robot's Rebellion: Finding Meaning in the Age of Darwin |publisher=University of Chicago Press |isbn=9780226770895}}</ref>

===Memetic explanations of racism===
In ''Cultural Software: A Theory of Ideology'', [[Jack Balkin]] argued that memetic processes can explain many of the most familiar features of [[ideology|ideological]] thought. His theory of "cultural software" maintained that memes form [[narrative]]s, social networks, metaphoric and [[metonymy|metonymic]] models, and a variety of different mental structures. Balkin maintains that the same structures used to generate ideas about free speech or free markets also serve to generate racistic beliefs. To Balkin, whether memes become harmful or maladaptive depends on the environmental context in which they exist rather than in any special source or manner to their origination. Balkin describes racist beliefs as "fantasy" memes that <!-- may? or must? -->become harmful or unjust "ideologies" when diverse peoples come together, as through trade or competition.<ref>{{harvnb|Balkin|1998}}</ref>