Editing Long March (section)

===Escape from Jiangxi===
[[File:Mao Zhou Zhu.jpg|thumb|right|[[Zhou Enlai]], [[Mao Zedong]], and [[Zhu De]] during the Long March.]]
Since the Central Base Area could not be held, the Standing Committee appointed Bo (responsible for politics), Braun (responsible for military strategy), and Zhou (responsible for the implementation of military planning) to organize the evacuation. Since the enemy was close, Zhou, in charge of logistics, made his plans in complete secrecy. It was not disclosed who was to leave or when: even senior leaders were only at the last moments told of the Army's movements. It is not known what criteria were used to determine who would stay and who would go, but 16,000 troops and some of the Communists' most notable commanders at the time (including [[Xiang Ying]], [[Chen Yi (general)|Chen Yi]], [[Tan Zhenlin]], and [[Qu Qiubai]]) were left to form a rear guard, to divert the main force of Nationalist troops from noticing, and preventing, the general withdrawal.{{sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|pp=56–57}}

The first movements to screen the retreat were undertaken by forces led by [[Fang Zhimin]], breaking through Kuomintang lines in June 1934. Although Fang Zhimin's troops were soon destroyed, these movements surprised the Kuomintang, who were numerically superior to the Communists at the time and did not expect an attack on their fortified perimeter.

The early troop movements were actually a diversion to allow the retreat of more important leaders from Jiangxi. On October 16, 1934, a force of about 130,000 soldiers and civilians under Bo Gu and Otto Braun attacked the line of Kuomintang positions near Yudu.  More than 86,000 troops, 11,000 administrative personnel and thousands of civilian porters actually completed the breakout; the remainder, largely wounded or ill soldiers, continued to fight a delaying action after the main force had left, and then dispersed into the countryside.<ref>Mao Zedong, ''On Tactics...'': [http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1935/12_27.htm#n26 Note 26] retrieved 2007-02-17</ref> Several prominent members of the Chinese Soviet who remained behind were captured and executed by the Kuomintang after the fall of Ruijin in November 1934, including [[Qu Qiubai]] and the youngest brother of Mao Zedong, [[Mao Zetan]].
[[File:中国工农红军红星司令部在抢渡湘江前绘制的地图 03572.jpg|thumb|Map drawn by the Red Army Command before the Battle of Xiangjiang]]
The withdrawal began in early October 1934.  Zhou's intelligence agents were successful in identifying a large section of Chiang's blockhouse lines that were manned by troops under General [[Chen Jitang]], a Guangdong warlord who Zhou identified as being likely to prefer preserving the strength of his troops over fighting. Zhou sent [[Pan Hannian]] to negotiate for safe passage with General Chen, who subsequently allowed the Red Army to pass through the territory that he controlled without fighting.{{sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=58}} The Red army successfully crossed the [[Xinfeng River]] and marched through the province of Guangdong and into [[Hunan]] before encountering the last of Chiang's fortifications at the [[Xiang River]].

After passing through three of the four blockhouse fortifications needed to escape Chiang's encirclement, the Red Army was finally intercepted by regular Nationalist troops, and suffered heavy casualties.  Of the 86,000 Communists who attempted to break out of Jiangxi with the First Red Army, only 36,000 successfully escaped. Due to the low morale within the Red Army at the time, it is not possible to know what proportion of these losses were due to military casualties, and which proportion were due to desertion. The conditions of the Red Army's forced withdrawal demoralized some Communist leaders (particularly Bo Gu and Otto Braun), but Zhou remained calm and retained his command.{{sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=58}} Most Communist losses occurred over only two days of heavy fighting, from November 30 to December 1, 1934.