Editing John Russell, 1st Earl Russell (section)

=== Foreign policy ===
Lord Palmerston as [[Foreign Secretary (United Kingdom)|Foreign Secretary]] dominated and often dictated the direction of the foreign policy of the Russell government by advancing British interests often at the frustration of both the Cabinet and the Court.{{Sfn|Reid|1895|p=169}}{{Sfn|Reid|1895|p=173}} It was Palmerston's belief that Britain have a duty to champion [[justice]] and [[liberty]] alongside Britain being able to ensure that its status as a [[great power]] be retained.{{Sfn|Reid|1895|p=173}} His handling of foreign affairs came with a penchant for personal ascendancy and his policies regarding [[Europe]], particularly in 1848, proved to perilous and led to conflicts with both Russell and the Queen.{{Sfn|Reid|1895|p=174}} Early during Russell's government, Palmerston's assertive and often confronting treatment of other Cabinet colleagues led to anger among many in Parliament and Robert Peel did not conceal his view that Russell allowed Palmerston to go beyond his restrains. However, Palmerston's position at the [[Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office|Foreign Office]] proved to be consequential and despite being in 'substantial' agreement with his foreign secretary, Russell disapproved of Palmerston's unpredictable and independent action.{{Sfn|Reid|1895|p=170}}

Russell's own approach to Europe and in general diplomacy was shaped by the pressing need for stability amidst a volatile political landscape. Russell believed that Britain's interests were best served by maintaining the territorial settlements established after the [[Napoleonic Wars]] in the [[Congress of Vienna]] in 1815. However, Russell was also keenly aware that Britain should not cling to outdated alliances or strategies if more favourable alternatives were available.{{Sfn|Reid|1895|p=171}} Russell's diplomatic strategy was heavily influenced by pragmatism, particularly when it came to [[Austrian Empire|Austria's]] weakening position in [[Italy]], knowing that Austria was no longer in a position to restore its formal control over the Italian peninsula and lacked both military and financial resources to endure a prolonged conflict, especially with the likelihood of French intervention. Russell, therefore, proposed that the British delegation should exert diplomatic pressure on Vienna to relinquish [[Lombardy]] and [[Venice]], thereby averting further escalation and preserving the [[Balance of power (international relations)|balance of power]] in Europe.{{Sfn|Reid|1895|p=172}}

In addition to the "Italian question", Russell had a nuanced policy towards [[Spain]] and [[Germany]]. On Spain, he adopted a non-interventionist stance, arguing that Britain had no strategic interest in involving itself in Spain's internal affairs. This approach was consistent with Russell's philosophy of respecting the sovereignty of European nations, as long as their actions did not threaten British interests. However, Russell's immediate attention turned to Germany, where the [[Schleswig–Holstein question]] posed a significant risk of destabilising the region. The dispute, which involved competing claims over the duchies of [[Schleswig, Schleswig-Holstein|Schleswig]] and [[Holstein]], threatened to ignite war in [[Central Europe]]. In his [[state paper]], Russell stated: "It is our interest to use our influence as speedily and as generally as possible to settle the pending questions and to fix the boundaries of States. Otherwise, if war once becomes general, it will spread over Germany, reach [[Belgium]], and finally sweep England into its vortex. Should our efforts for peace succeed, Europe may begin a new career with more or less of hope and of concord; should they fail, we must keep our sword in the scabbard as long as we can, but we cannot hope to be neutral in a great European war. England cannot be indifferent to the supremacy of France over Germany and Italy, or to the advance of [[Russia]]n armies to [[Constantinople]]; still less to the incorporation of Belgium with a [[Second French Empire|new French Empire]]."{{Sfn|Reid|1895|p=172}}

In contrast to Russell's cautious policy, Palmerston's approach was characterised by a more independent and often combative stance. Palmerston was known for his willingness to go against the established norms of British and European diplomacy, even when this put him at odds with the Court and his cabinet colleagues. His interventions in foreign affairs, particularly his support for interventionist policies, often led to tensions within the government. Despite facing opposition, Palmerston remained unfazed by criticism and continued to champion his views with remarkable resilience. Unlike Russell, who sought to avoid open conflict and maintain stability through diplomacy, Palmerston was more willing to take bold if not rash action, even if they risked alienating allies or provoking international disputes.{{Sfn|Reid|1895|pp=172–173, 173–174}} By the end of the parliamentary session in 1849, Palmerston found himself in a precarious political position. His policies had generated considerable opposition, both from within the Cabinet and from the Opposition. The growing dissatisfaction with his approach threatened his political future, as several of his colleagues and rivals sought to discredit him. In a letter to his brother, he reflected on the political turbulence of the past months and on winning the success he deserves by writing: "After the trumpetings of attacks that were to demolish first one and then another of the Government: first me, then Grey, then Charles Wood; we have come triumphantly out of the debates and divisions, and end the session stronger than we began it."{{Sfn|Reid|1895|p=174}}