Editing Islamism (section)

==Types==
Islamism is not a united movement and takes different forms and spans a wide range of strategies and tactics towards the powers in place—"destruction, opposition, collaboration, indifference"<ref name=ORFPI1994:24/>—not because (or not just because) of differences of opinions, but because it varies as circumstances change.<ref name=ORFPI1994:109>[[#ORFPI1994|Roy, ''Failure of Political Islam'', 1994]]: p. 109</ref><ref name="Valbjørn-POMEPS"/><sup>p.&nbsp;54</sup>

Moderate and reformist Islamists who accept and work within the democratic process include parties like the Tunisian [[Ennahda Movement]]. Some Islamists can be religious [[Populism|populists]] or far-right.<ref name="k356">{{cite journal | last1=Barton | first1=Greg | last2=Yilmaz | first2=Ihsan | last3=Morieson | first3=Nicholas | title=Religious and Pro-Violence Populism in Indonesia: The Rise and Fall of a Far-Right Islamist Civilisationist Movement | journal=Religions | volume=12 | issue=6 | date=29 May 2021 | issn=2077-1444 | doi=10.3390/rel12060397 | doi-access=free | page=397}}</ref> 
[[Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan|Jamaat-e-Islami]] of Pakistan is basically a socio-political and "[[vanguard party]]" working with in Pakistan's Democratic political process, but has also gained political influence through military coup d'états in the past.<ref name=ORFPI1994:24/> Other Islamist groups like [[Hezbollah]] in [[Lebanon]] and [[Hamas]] in [[Palestine]] claim to participate in the democratic and political process as well as armed attacks by their powerful paramilitary wings. [[Jihadist]] organizations like [[al-Qaeda]] and the [[Egyptian Islamic Jihad]], and groups such as the [[Taliban]], entirely reject democracy, seeing it as a form of ''[[kufr]]'' (disbelief) calling for [[offensive jihad]] on a religious basis.

Another major division within Islamism is between what [[Graham E. Fuller]] has described as the ''conservative'' "guardians of the tradition" ([[Salafism|Salafis]], such as those in the [[Wahhabi]] movement) and the ''revolutionary'' "vanguard of change and Islamic reform" centered around the [[Muslim Brotherhood]].<ref name="Fuller, 2003 pp. 194">Fuller, ''The Future of Political Islam'', (2003), pp. 194–95</ref> [[Olivier Roy (professor)|Olivier Roy]] argues that "[[Sunni Islam|Sunni]] [[pan-Islamism]] underwent a remarkable shift in the second half of the 20th century" when the Muslim Brotherhood movement and its focus on Islamisation of [[pan-Arabism]] was eclipsed by the [[Salafi]] movement with its emphasis on "sharia rather than the building of Islamic institutions".<ref>Roy, Olivier, ''The Politics of Chaos in the Middle East'', Columbia University Press, (2008), pp. 92–93</ref> Following the [[Arab Spring]] (starting in 2011), Roy has described Islamism as "increasingly interdependent" with democracy in much of the [[Arab world|Arab Muslim world]], such that "neither can now survive without the other." While Islamist political culture itself may not be democratic, Islamists need democratic elections to maintain their legitimacy. At the same time, their popularity is such that no government can call itself democratic that excludes mainstream Islamist groups.<ref name="foreignpolicy1"/>

Arguing distinctions between "radical/moderate" or "violent/peaceful" Islamism were "simplistic", circa 2017, scholar Morten Valbjørn put forth these "much more sophisticated typologies" of Islamism:<ref name="Valbjørn-POMEPS">{{cite web |last1=Valbjørn |first1=Morten |title=Bringing the 'Other Islamists' back in: Sunni and Shia Islamism(s) in a sectarianized new Middle East |url=https://pomeps.org/bringing-the-other-islamists-back-in-sunni-and-shia-islamisms-in-a-sectarianized-new-middle-east |website=POMEPS, Project on Middle East Political Science |publisher=Elliott School of International Affairs |access-date=27 January 2023 |date=c. 2017}}</ref>
{{blockquote| 
* resistance/revolutionary/reformist Islamism,<ref name="Robinson, 2007">Robinson, Glenn E. (2007). "The battle for Iraq: Islamic insurgencies in comparative perspective". Third World Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 261–273.</ref> 
* Islahi-Ikhwani/Jihadi-Ikhwani/Islah-salafi/Jihadi-salafi Islamism,<ref name="Utvik, 2011">Utvik, Bjørn Olav (2011). Islamismen, Oslo: Unipub.</ref>
* reformist/revolutionary/societal/spiritual Islamism,<ref name="Yavuz, 2003">Yavuz, M. Hakan (2003). Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, Oxford: Oxford University Press.</ref> 
* Third Worldist/Neo-Third Worldist Islamism,<ref name="Strindberg and Wärn, 2005">Strindberg, Anders & Mats Wärn (2005). "Realities of Resistance: Hizballah, the Palestinian rejectionists, and al-Qa'ida compared". Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 23–41.</ref> 
* Statist/Non-Statist Islamism,<ref name="Volpi-and-Stein-2015">Volpi, Frédéric & Ewan Stein (2015). "Islamism and the state after the Arab uprisings: Between people power and state power". Democratization, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 276–293.</ref> 
* Salafist Jihadi/Ikhwani Islamism,<ref name="Lynch, 2010">Lynch, Marc (2010). "Islam Divided Between 'Salafi-jihad' and the 'Ikhwan'". Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 33, no. 6, pp. 467–487.</ref> or 
* mainstream/irredentist jihadi/doctrinaire jihadi Islamism.<ref name="Gerges, 2005">Gerges, Fawaz (2005). The Far Enemy : why jihad went global, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</ref>}}

===Moderate and reformist Islamism===
{{See also|Islamic democracy}}

Throughout the 1980s and '90s, major moderate Islamist movements such as the [[Muslim Brotherhood]] and the Ennahda were excluded from democratic political participation. At least in part for that reason, Islamists attempted to overthrow the government in the [[Algerian Civil War]] (1991–2002) and waged a [[terrorism in Egypt|terror campaign in Egypt]] in the '90s. These attempts were crushed and in the 21st century, Islamists turned increasingly to non-violent methods,<ref name="Is">{{cite journal |url=http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pb40.hamzawy.FINAL.pdf |title=The Key to Arab Reform: Moderate Islamists |journal=Carnegie Endowment for Peace |pages=2 |access-date=4 December 2017 |archive-date=4 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221004005113/https://carnegieendowment.org/files/pb40.hamzawy.FINAL.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> and "moderate Islamists" now make up the majority of the contemporary Islamist movements.<ref name="Ham"/><ref name="Fuller, 2003 pp. 194"/><ref name="Om">Moussalli, Ahmad S. ''Islamic democracy and pluralism''. from Safi, Omid. ''Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender, and Pluralism''. Oneworld Publications, 1 April 2003.</ref>

Among some Islamists, Democracy has been harmonized with Islam by means of ''[[Shura]]'' (consultation). The tradition of consultation by the ruler being considered [[Sunnah]] of the [[Islamic prophet|prophet]] [[Muhammad]],<ref name="Om"/><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.alhewar.com/SadekShura.htm|title=The Shura Principle in Islam – by Sadek Sulaiman|website=alhewar.com|access-date=4 December 2017|archive-date=24 July 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190724034351/http://www.alhewar.com/SadekShura.htm|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>Esposito, J. & Voll, J.,2001, Islam and Democracy, ''Humanities'', Volume 22, Issue 6</ref> (''Majlis-ash-Shura'' being a common name for legislative bodies in Islamic countries).

Among the varying goals, strategies, and outcomes of "moderate Islamist movements" are a formal abandonment of their original vision of implementing ''[[sharia]]'' (also termed [[Post-Islamism]]) – done by the [[Ennahda Movement]] of Tunisia,<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/ennahda-gives-political-islam|title=Ennahda is "Leaving" Political Islam|date=20 May 2016|work=Wilson Center|access-date=23 August 2017|archive-date=24 August 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170824012939/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/ennahda-gives-political-islam|url-status=live}}</ref> and [[Prosperous Justice Party]] (PKS) of Indonesia.<ref name="Al">Al-Hamdi, Ridho. (2017). ''Moving towards a Normalised Path: Political Islam in Contemporary Indonesia''. JURNAL STUDI PEMERINTAHAN (JOURNAL OF GOVERNMENT & POLITICS). Vol. 8 No. 1, February 2017. p. 53, 56–57, 62.</ref> Others, such as the National Congress of Sudan, have implemented the sharia with support from wealthy, conservative states (primarily Saudi Arabia).<ref name="Human Rights Watch Report">{{cite web |url=https://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/sudan/ |work=Human Rights Watch Report |date=November 1994 |volume=6 |issue=9 |title=SUDAN: "IN THE NAME OF GOD", Repression Continues in Northern Sudan |access-date=2 December 2016 |archive-date=5 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221005172932/https://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/sudan/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Fuller, Graham E. 2003 p. 108">Fuller, Graham E., ''The Future of Political Islam'', Palgrave MacMillan, (2003), p. 108</ref>

According to one theory – "inclusion-moderation"—the interdependence of political outcome with strategy means that the more moderate the Islamists become, the more likely they are to be politically included (or unsuppressed); and the more accommodating the government is, the less "extreme" Islamists become.<ref>Pahwa, Sumita (2016). ''Pathways of Islamist adaptation: the Egyptian Muslim Brothers' lessons for inclusion moderation theory''. Democratization, Volume 24, 2017 – Issue 6. pp. 1066–1084.</ref> A prototype of harmonizing Islamist principles within the modern state framework was the "[[Turkish model]]", based on the apparent success of the rule of the Turkish [[Justice and Development Party (Turkey)|Justice and Development Party]] (AKP) led by [[Recep Tayyip Erdoğan]].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/12/19/can-turkish-model-gain-traction-in-new-middle-east |title=Can the Turkish Model Gain Traction in the New Middle East? |author1=Sinan Ülgen |author2=Marwan Muasher |author3=Thomas de Waal |author4=Thomas Carothers |work=[[Carnegie Endowment for International Peace]] |date=19 December 2011 |access-date=4 December 2017 |archive-date=30 November 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181130043236/http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/12/19/can-turkish-model-gain-traction-in-new-middle-east |url-status=dead }}</ref> Turkish model, however, came "unstuck" after [[Gezi Park protests|a purge and violations of democratic principles by the Erdoğan regime]].<ref name=surreal>{{cite journal|last=de Bellaigue|first=Christopher|title=Turkey: 'Surreal, Menacing…Pompous'|journal=New York Review of Books|date=19 December 2013|url=http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/dec/19/turkey-surreal-menacing-pompous/?pagination=false|access-date=12 December 2013|archive-date=17 July 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150717145313/http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/dec/19/turkey-surreal-menacing-pompous/?pagination=false|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="NYT-23-7-16">{{cite news|last1=Akyol|first1=Mustafa|title=Who Was Behind the Coup Attempt in Turkey?|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/opinion/who-was-behind-the-coup-attempt-in-turkey.html |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220103/https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/opinion/who-was-behind-the-coup-attempt-in-turkey.html |archive-date=3 January 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live|access-date=23 July 2016|work=The New York Times|date=22 July 2016}}{{cbignore}}</ref> Critics of the concept – which include both Islamists who reject democracy and anti-Islamists – hold that Islamist aspirations are fundamentally incompatible with the democratic principles.

===Salafi movement===
{{Main|Salafi movement}}
{{Salafi|Related}}
[[File:Ansar Dine Rebels - VOA.jpg|thumb|[[Ansar Dine]], a Salafi Islamist group operated between 2012 and 2017, sought to impose absolute [[sharia]] across [[Mali]]]]
The contemporary [[Salafi movement]] is sometimes described as a variety of Islamism and sometimes as a different school of Islam,<ref name=ORFPI1994:35>[[#ORFPI1994|Roy, ''Failure of Political Islam'', 1994]]: p. 35</ref> such as a "phase between fundamentalism and Islamism".<ref name=ORFPI1994:31>[[#ORFPI1994|Roy, ''Failure of Political Islam'', 1994]]: p. 31</ref>
Originally a reformist movement of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abdul, and Rashid Rida, that rejected [[marabout]]ism (Sufism), the established schools of [[fiqh]], and demanded individual interpretation (''[[ijtihad]]'') of the Quran and [[Sunnah]];<ref name=ORFPI1994:32-33>[[#ORFPI1994|Roy, ''Failure of Political Islam'', 1994]]: p. 32-33</ref> it evolved into a movement embracing the conservative doctrines of the medieval [[Hanbali]] theologian [[Ibn Taymiyyah]]. While all salafi believe Islam covers every aspect of life, that sharia law must be implemented completely and that the Caliphate must be recreated to rule the Muslim world, they differ in strategies and priorities, which generally fall into three groups: 
* The "[[Political quietism in Islam#Salafists|quietist]]" school advocates Islamization through preaching, educating the masses on [[sharia]] and "purification" of religious practices and ignoring government. 
* Activist (or ''haraki'') [[Salafi Islamist|Salafi activism]] encourages political participation—opposing government loans with interest or normalization of relations with Israel, etc. As of 2013, this school makes up the majority of Salafism.<ref name=jof>George Joffé, ''Islamist Radicalisation in Europe and the Middle East: Reassessing the Causes of Terrorism'', p. 317. London: [[I.B. Tauris]], 2013.</ref> Salafist political parties in the [[Muslim world]] include the [[Al-Nour Party]] of Egypt, the [[Al-Islah (Yemen)|Al-Islah Party]] of Yemen, and the [[Al Asalah|Al-Asalah Society]] of Bahrain.
* [[Salafi jihadism]], (see below) is inspired by the ideology of [[Sayyid Qutb]] ([[Qutbism]], see below), and sees secular institutions as an enemy of Islam, advocating revolution to pave the way for the establishment of a new [[Caliphate]].<ref name="Mo">Mohie-Eldin, Fatima. ''The Evolution of Salafism A History of Salafi Doctrine''. Al-Noor, Fall 2015. pp. 44–47.</ref>

{{anchor|Militant Islamism}}
===Militant Islamism/Jihadism===
{{main|Jihadism}}
{{see also|Islamic terrorism|Islamic extremism}}

====Qutbism====
{{main|Qutbism}}

[[Qutbism]] refers to the [[Jihadism|Jihadist]] ideology formulated by [[Sayyid Qutb]], (an influential figure of the [[Muslim Brotherhood]] in [[Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt|Egypt]] during the '50s and '60s). Qutbism argued that not only was sharia essential for Islam, but that since it was not in force, Islam did not really exist in the Muslim world, which was in ''Jahiliyya'' (the state of pre-Islamic ignorance). To remedy this situation he urged a two-pronged attack of 1) preaching to convert, and 2) jihad to forcibly eliminate the "structures" of ''Jahiliyya''.<ref>''Muslim extremism in Egypt: the prophet and pharaoh'' by Gilles Kepel, pp. 55–6</ref> Defensive jihad against ''Jahiliyya'' Muslim governments would not be enough. "Truth and falsehood cannot coexist on this earth", so offensive Jihad was needed to eliminate ''Jahiliyya'' not only from the Islamic homeland but from the face of the Earth.<ref name="SOAGE-2009-192">{{cite journal |last1=SOAGE |first1=ANA BELÉN |title=Islamism and Modernity: The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb |journal=Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions |date=June 2009 |volume=10 |issue=2 |page=192 |doi=10.1080/14690760903119092 |s2cid=144071957 |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232945375 |access-date=9 March 2021}}</ref> In addition, vigilance against Western and Jewish conspiracies against Islam would-be needed.<ref name="carlisle.army.mil">{{cite journal |url=http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/07spring/eikmeier.pdf |title=Qutbism: An Ideology of Islamic-Fascism | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170211205245/http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/07spring/eikmeier.pdf |archive-date=11 February 2017 |author=Dale C. Eikmeier |journal=[[Parameters (journal)|Parameters]] |date=Spring 2007 |pages=85–98}}</ref><ref name="Ha">{{cite web |author=Hassan, Hassan |date=13 June 2016 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2016/12/the-sectarianism-of-the-islamic-state-ideological-roots-and-political-context?lang=en |title=The Sectarianism of the Islamic State: Ideological Roots and Political Context |work=Carnegie Endowment for Peace |access-date=4 December 2017 |archive-date=29 October 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191029150445/https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/13/sectarianism-of-islamic-state-ideological-roots-and-political-context-pub-63746 |url-status=live }}</ref>

Although Qutb was executed before he could fully spell out his ideology,<ref name="Ke">Kepel, ''Jihad'', 2002, p. 31</ref> his ideas were disseminated and expanded on by the later generations, among them [[Abdullah Yusuf Azzam]] and [[Ayman Al-Zawahiri]], who was a student of Qutb's brother [[Muhammad Qutb]] and later became a mentor of [[Osama bin Laden]].<ref>Sageman, Marc, ''Understanding Terror Networks'', University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p. 63</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://gemsofislamism.tripod.com/qutb_milest_influence_obl.html|title=How Did Sayyid Qutb Influence Osama bin Laden?|access-date=26 February 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101017060150/http://gemsofislamism.tripod.com/qutb_milest_influence_obl.html|archive-date=17 October 2010|url-status=dead}}</ref> Al-Zawahiri helped to pass on stories of "the purity of Qutb's character" and persecution he suffered, and played an extensive role in the normalization of offensive Jihad among followers of Qutb.<ref>Wright, ''Looming Tower'', 2006, p. 32-59</ref>

====Salafi Jihadism====
{{Main|Salafi jihadism}}

Salafi Jihadism or revolutionary Salafism<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Amghar |last2=Cavatorta |first1=Samir |first2=Francesco |date=17 March 2023 |title=Salafism in the contemporary age: Wiktorowicz revisited |url=https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11562-023-00524-x |journal=Contemporary Islam |volume=17 |issue=2 |doi=10.1007/s11562-023-00524-x |via=Springer |page=3 |s2cid=257933043 |access-date=7 May 2023 |archive-date=8 May 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230508090448/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11562-023-00524-x |url-status=live }}</ref> emerged prominent during the 1980s when [[Osama bin Laden]] and thousands of other militant Muslims came from around the Muslim world to unite against the [[Soviet–Afghan War|Soviet Union after it invaded Afghanistan]].<ref name="By"/><ref name="deneoux">Deneoux, Guilain (June 2002). "The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam". ''Middle East Policy''. pp. 69–71."</ref><ref name="BLivesey">{{cite web |url=https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/special/sala.html |title=The Salafist movement by Bruce Livesey |publisher=PBS Frontline |date=2005 |access-date=24 October 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110628202818/http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/special/sala.html |archive-date=28 June 2011 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=Kramer2003>{{cite journal |url=http://www.meforum.org/541/coming-to-terms-fundamentalists-or-islamists |title=Coming to Terms: Fundamentalists or Islamists? |author=Kramer, Martin |journal=[[Middle East Quarterly]] |date=Spring 2003 |volume=X |issue=2 |pages=65–77 |quote=French academics have put the term into academic circulation as 'jihadist-Salafism.' The qualifier of Salafism—an historical reference to the precursor of these movements—will inevitably be stripped away in popular usage. |access-date=15 April 2014 |archive-date=1 January 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150101195913/http://www.meforum.org/541/coming-to-terms-fundamentalists-or-islamists |url-status=live }}</ref> Local Afghan Muslims ([[mujahideen]]) had declared jihad against the Soviets and were aided with [[Operation Cyclone|financial, logistical and military support]] by [[Saudi Arabia]] and the United States, but after Soviet forces left Afghanistan, this funding and interest by America and Saudi ceased. The international volunteers, (originally organized by [[Abdullah Azzam]]), were triumphant in victory, away from the moderating influence of home and family, among the 
radicalized influence of other militants.<ref name=kepel-orig /> Wanting to capitalize on financial, logistical and military network that had been developed<ref name="By">{{cite web |author=Byman, Daniel L |author2=Williams, Jennifer R. |date=24 February 2015 |url=https://www.brookings.edu/articles/isis-vs-al-qaeda-jihadisms-global-civil-war/ |title=ISIS vs. Al Qaeda: Jihadism's global civil war |work=Brookings |access-date=4 December 2017 |archive-date=21 September 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220921200819/https://www.brookings.edu/articles/isis-vs-al-qaeda-jihadisms-global-civil-war/ |url-status=live }}</ref> they sought to continue waging jihad elsewhere.<ref>Kepel, ''Jihad'', 2002, p.219-220</ref> Their new targets, however, included the United States—funder of the mujahideen but "perceived as the greatest enemy of the faith"; and governments of majority-Muslims countries—perceived of as apostates from Islam.<ref name=jihad-220>Kepel, ''Jihad'', 2002, p.220</ref><ref name="kepel-orig">"Jihadist-Salafism" is introduced by Gilles Kepel, ''Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam'' (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2002) pp. 219–222</ref>

Salafist-jihadist ideology combined the literal and traditional interpretations of scripture of Salafists, with the promotion and fighting of jihad against military and [[terrorism|civilian targets]] in the pursuit of the establishment of an [[Islamic state]] and eventually a new [[Caliphate]].<ref name=kepel-orig/><ref name="deneoux"/><ref name="Ha"/><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.alarab.co.uk/?id=30798 |title=القطبية الإخوانية والسرورية قاعدة مناهج السلفية التكفيرية | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171205043603/http://www.alarab.co.uk/?id=30798 |archive-date=5 December 2017 |work=al-Arab Online}}</ref>{{NoteTag|As such, Salafi Jihadism envisions the Islamist goals akin to that of Salafism instead of the traditional Islamism exemplified by the mid-20th century Muslim Brotherhood, which is considered by Salafi Jihadis as excessively moderate and lacking in literal interpretations of the scriptures.<ref name="KepelJihad">{{cite book |url = https://books.google.com/books?id=OLvTNk75hUoC |title = Jihad |access-date=24 October 2014 |isbn=978-1845112578 |last1=Kepel |first1= Gilles |last2 = Roberts |first2 = Anthony F. |year=2006 |publisher = Bloomsbury Publishing PLC }}</ref>}}

Other characteristics of the movement include the formal process of taking ''[[bay'ah]]'' (oath of allegiance) to the leader (''amir''), which is inspired by [[Hadith]]s and early Muslim practice and included in Wahhabi teaching;<ref name="wright-12-12-16">{{cite magazine |last=Wright |first=Robin |title=AFTER THE ISLAMIC STATE |magazine=The New Yorker |date=12 December 2016 |url=http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/12/12/after-the-islamic-state |access-date=9 December 2016 |archive-date=7 December 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161207140827/http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/12/12/after-the-islamic-state |url-status=live }}</ref> and the concepts of "near enemy" (governments of majority-Muslims countries) and "far enemy" (United States and other Western countries). (The term "near enemy" was coined by [[Mohammed Abdul-Salam Farag]] who led the assassination of [[Anwar al-Sadat]] with [[Egyptian Islamic Jihad]] (EIJ) in 1981.)<ref name="No">{{cite web |author=Noah, Timothy |date=26 February 2009 |url=http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/chatterbox/2009/02/the_nearenemy_theory.html |title=The Near-Enemy Theory |work=Slate |access-date=4 December 2017 |archive-date=26 July 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180726041454/http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/chatterbox/2009/02/the_nearenemy_theory.html |url-status=live }}</ref> The "far enemy" was introduced and formally declared under attack by [[al-Qaeda]] in 1996.<ref name="No"/><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.thenational.ae/al-qaeda-grows-as-its-leaders-focus-on-the-near-enemy-1.342166 |title=Al Qaeda grows as its leaders focus on the 'near enemy' |work=The National |date=30 August 2013 |access-date=4 December 2017 |archive-date=29 September 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200929145114/https://www.thenational.ae/al-qaeda-grows-as-its-leaders-focus-on-the-near-enemy-1.342166 |url-status=live }}</ref>

The ideology saw its rise during the '90s when the Muslim world experienced numerous geopolitical crisis,<ref name="By" /> notably the [[Algerian Civil War]] (1991–2002), [[Bosnian War]] (1992–1995), and the [[First Chechen War]] (1994–1996). Within these conflicts, political Islam often acted as a mobilizing factor for the local belligerents, who demanded financial, logistical and military support from al-Qaeda, in the exchange for active proliferation of the ideology.<ref name="By" /> After the [[1998 United States embassy bombing|1998 bombings of US embassies]], [[September 11 attacks]] (2001), the [[United States invasion of Afghanistan|US-led invasion of Afghanistan]] (2001) and [[2003 invasion of Iraq|Iraq]] (2003), Salafi Jihadism lost its momentum, being devastated by the US counterterrorism operations, culminating in [[Death of Osama bin Laden|bin Laden's death]] in 2011.<ref name="By" /> After the Arab Spring (2011) and subsequent [[Syrian civil war]] (2011–present), the remnants of al-Qaeda franchise in Iraq restored their capacity, rapidly developing into the [[Islamic State]] of Iraq and the Levant, spreading its influence throughout the conflict zones of [[MENA region]] and the globe. Salafi Jihadism makes up a minority of the contemporary Islamist movements.<ref name="Economist27Jun15">{{cite news |title=Salafism: Politics and the puritanical |url=https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21656189-islams-most-conservative-adherents-are-finding-politics-hard-it-beats |access-date=29 June 2015 |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |date=27 June 2015 |archive-date=28 June 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150628193924/http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21656189-islams-most-conservative-adherents-are-finding-politics-hard-it-beats |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Shi'i Islamism===
{{Main|Islamist Shi'ism}}

Although most of the research and reporting about Islamism or political Islam has been focused on Sunni Islamist movements,{{NoteTag|"The study of Islamist movements has often implicitly meant the study of ''Sunni'' Islamist movements. ... the majority of studies [of Islamism] concern various forms of Sunni Islamism, whereas the "Other Islamists" – different kinds of Shia Islamist groups – have received far less attention ... ."<ref name="Valbjørn-POMEPS"/>}}
Islamism exists in [[Twelver]] [[Shia Islam]] (the second largest branch of Islam that makes up approximately 10% of all Muslims.{{NoteTag|85% of Shi'a Muslims, who make up 10–15% of Muslims}}). Islamist Shi'ism, also known as Shi'i Islamism, is primarily but not exclusively
{{NoteTag| Shia Islamist groups exist outside of the ideology of the Islamic Republic – the [[Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr]] and the [[Islamic Dawa Party]] in Iraqi, for example).<ref name="Valbjørn-POMEPS"/>}} associated with the thought of Ayatollah [[Ruhollah Khomeini]], with the [[Iranian Revolution|Islamist Revolution]] he led, [[History of the Islamic Republic of Iran|Islamic Republic of Iran]] that he founded, and the religious-political activities and resources of the republic.

Compared to the "Types" of Islamism mentioned above, [[Khomeinism]] differs from [[Anti-Shi'ism#Modern times|Wahhabism]] (which does not consider Shi'ism truly Islamic), [[Salafism]] (both orthodox or Jihadi—Shi'a do not consider some of the most prominent [[salaf]] worthy of emulation), reformist Islamism (the Islamic Republic executed more than 3,400 political dissidents between June 1981 and March 1982 in the process of consolidating power).<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |last=Rastyad Collective |title=Rastyad: online database concerning the 1981 Massacre in Iran |url=https://rastyad.com/en/home_en/ |access-date=25 August 2022 |website=Rastyad.com|archive-date=12 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220812190357/https://rastyad.com/en/home_en/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Amsterdam |first=Universiteit van |date=21 June 2022 |title=Onderzoekers lanceren online database over de grootste massamoord uit de Iraanse geschiedenis |url=https://www.uva.nl/shared-content/faculteiten/nl/faculteit-der-geesteswetenschappen/nieuws/2022/06/onderzoekers-lanceren-online-database-over-de-grootste-massamoord-uit-de-iraanse-geschiedenis.html |access-date=25 August 2022 |website=Universiteit van Amsterdam |language=nl |archive-date=25 September 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220925121545/https://www.uva.nl/shared-content/faculteiten/nl/faculteit-der-geesteswetenschappen/nieuws/2022/06/onderzoekers-lanceren-online-database-over-de-grootste-massamoord-uit-de-iraanse-geschiedenis.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

Khomeini and his followers helped translate the works of Maududi and Qutb into Persian and were influenced by them, but their views differed from them and other Sunni Islamists in being "more leftist and more clerical":<ref name=ORFPI1994:2/>
*more leftist in the propaganda campaign leading up to the revolution, emphasizing exploitation of the poor by the rich and of Muslims by imperialism;<ref name=KEA1993:30>[[#KEA1993|Abrahamian, ''Khomeinism'', 1993]]: p.30</ref>{{NoteTag|In addition to offering Iran a direct channel for engaging in the politics of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Hezbollah's military and political influence gained increasing importance, particularly as the organization's position became more uncertain following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in June 1989.<ref>Ranstorp, ''Hizb'allah in Lebanon'', (1997) pp. 103, 126</ref> The radicalism had also come from attempts by Khomeini to counter the attraction of socialism/Marxism to the young with an Islamic version of radical populist, class struggle rhetoric and imagery.<ref name=KEA1993:31>[[#KEA1993|Abrahamian, ''Khomeinism'', 1993]]: p.31</ref><ref name=KEA1993:47>[[#KEA1993|Abrahamian, ''Khomeinism'', 1993]]: p.47</ref> Early radical government policies were later abandoned by the Islamic Republic.}} 
*more clerical in the new post-revolutionary state, where clerics were in control of the levers of power (the [[Supreme Leader of Iran|Supreme Leader]], [[Guardian Council]], etc., under the concept of [[Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist|Velayat-e Faqih]].{{NoteTag|Official histories and propaganda celebrated
clerics (and never secular figures like [[Mohammad Mosaddegh]]) as the protectors of Islam and Iran against Imperialism and royal despotism.<ref name=KEA1993:25-26>[[#KEA1993|Abrahamian, ''Khomeinism'', 1993]]: p.25-26</ref>}}).

Khomeini was a "radical" Islamist,<ref name=ORFPI1994:36>[[#ORFPI1994|Roy, ''Failure of Political Islam'', 1994]]: p.36</ref> like Qutb and unlike Maudidi. He believed that foreigners, Jews and their agents were conspiring "to keep us backward, to keep us in our present miserable state".<ref name=IaR1981:34>[[#IaR1981|Khomeini, ''Islamic Government'', 1981]]: p.34</ref> Those who call themselves Muslims but were secular and Westernizing, were not just corrupt or misguided, but "agents" of the Western governments, helping to "plunder" Muslim lands as part of a long-term conspiracy against Islam.<ref name="Khomeini (1981), p. 54">Khomeini (1981), p. 54</ref> Only the rule of an Islamic jurist, administering Sharia law, stood between this abomination and justice, and could not wait for peaceful, gradual transition. It is the duty of Muslims to "destroy" "all traces" of any other sort of government other than true Islamic governance because these are "systems of [[kufr|unbelief]]".<ref name=IaR1981:48>[[#IaR1981|Khomeini, ''Islamic Government'', 1981]]: p.48</ref> "Troublesome" groups that cause "corruption in Muslim society," and damage "Islam and the Islamic state" are to be eliminated just as the Prophet [[Muhammad]] eliminated the Jews of [[Bani Qurayza]].<ref name=IaR1981:89>[[#IaR1981|Khomeini, ''Islamic Government'', 1981]]: p.89</ref> Islamic revolution to install "the form of government willed by Islam" will not end with one Islamic state in Iran. Once this government comes "into being, none of the governments now existing in the world" will "be able to resist it;" they will "all capitulate".<ref name=IaR1981:122>[[#IaR1981|Khomeini, ''Islamic Government'', 1981]]: p.122</ref>

====Ruling Islamic Jurist====
[[Khomeinism|Khomeini's form of Islamism]] was particularly unique in the world because it completely swept the old regime away, created a new regime with a new constitution, new institutions and a new concept of governance (the [[Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist|''Velayat-e Faqih'']]). A historical event, it changed militant Islam from a topic of limited impact and interest to a topic that few either inside or outside the [[Muslim world]] were unaware of.<ref name="Kepel, Jihad, 2002, p.106">Kepel, ''Jihad'', 2002, p.106</ref> As he originally described it in lectures to his students, the system of "[[Islamic Government]]" was one where the leading Islamic jurist would enforce sharia law—law which "has absolute authority over all individuals and the Islamic government".<ref>Khomeini, ''Islamic Government'', 1981: p.56</ref> The jurist would not be elected, and no legislature would be needed since divine law called for rule by jurist and "there is not a single topic in human life for which Islam has not provided instruction and established a norm".<ref>Khomeini, Islamic Government, 1981: p.29-30, also p.44</ref> Without this system, injustice, corruption, waste, exploitation and sin would reign, and Islam would decay. This plan was disclosed to his students and the religious community but not widely publicized.<ref>Abrahamian, ''Iran between two revolutions'', 1982: p.478-9</ref> The constitution of the Islamic Republic written after the revolution did include a legislature and president, but supervising the entire government was a "[[Supreme Leader of Iran|Supreme Leader]]"/guardian jurist.

Islamist Shi'ism has been crucial to the development of worldwide Islamism, because the Iranian regime attempted to export its revolution.<ref name="halliday">{{cite book |chapter=Revolution and World Politics |author=Fred Halliday |author-link=Fred Halliday |date=1999 |isbn=0-8223-2464-4 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3jCkXQRhHMgC&dq=%22export+of+revolution%22&pg=PA94 |title=Internationalism in Practice: Export of Revolution |pages=94–132 |publisher=Duke University Press |access-date=22 March 2023 |archive-date=2 May 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230502221543/https://books.google.com/books?id=3jCkXQRhHMgC&dq=%22export+of+revolution%22&pg=PA94 |url-status=live }}</ref> Although, the Islamist ideology was originally imported from Muslim Brotherhood, Iranian relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Republic of Iran deteriorated due to its involvement in the Syrian civil war.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Persia|first=Track|date=15 June 2019|title=The historical relationship between the Iranian theocracy and Muslim Brothers in Egypt|url=https://www.trackpersia.com/historical-relationship-iranian-theocracy-muslim-brothers-egypt/|access-date=17 June 2021|website=Track Persia|quote="Syrian war has been a turning point in the relations between the Iranian regime and the Muslim Brotherhood organisation, excluding its branches in Turkey and Hamas. Some of the Muslim Brothers have shown support to Syrian opposition groups against the dictatorship of the Syrian President Bashar al-Asad, Iran's close ally."|archive-date=30 May 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210530235155/https://www.trackpersia.com/historical-relationship-iranian-theocracy-muslim-brothers-egypt/|url-status=dead}}</ref> However, the majority [[Usuli|Usuli Shi'ism]] rejects the idea of an Islamist State in the period of [[Occultation (Islam)|Occultation of the Hidden Imam]].<ref name="Ghobadzadeh 1005–1027">{{Cite journal|last=Ghobadzadeh|first=Naser|date=December 2013|title=Religious secularity: A vision for revisionist political Islam|url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0191453713507014|journal=Philosophy & Social Criticism|volume=39|issue=10|pages=1005–1027|doi=10.1177/0191453713507014|s2cid=145583418|issn=0191-4537|access-date=4 May 2022|archive-date=25 February 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220225200500/https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0191453713507014|url-status=live}}</ref>

====Shi'ism and Iran====
Twelver Shia Muslim live mainly in a half dozen or so countries scattered around the Middle East and South Asia.{{NoteTag| forming majorities in the countries of Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, Azerbaijan,<ref name="Samadov-EAN-2022">{{cite news |last1=Samadov |first1=Bahruz |title=Will new Azerbaijani Islamist movement share the fate of its predecessors? |url=https://eurasianet.org/perspectives-will-new-azerbaijani-islamist-movement-share-the-fate-of-its-predecessors |access-date=27 January 2023 |agency=Eurasia Net |date=18 July 2022 |archive-date=6 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231106203650/https://eurasianet.org/perspectives-will-new-azerbaijani-islamist-movement-share-the-fate-of-its-predecessors |url-status=live }}</ref> and substantial minorities in Afghanistan, India, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Qatar, Syria, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.<ref name="BBC">{{cite web |title=Sunnis and Shia: Islam's ancient schism |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16047709 |publisher=BBC News |access-date=27 January 2023 |date=4 January 2016 |archive-date=11 October 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231011083116/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16047709 |url-status=live }}</ref>}}
The Islamic Republic of Iran has become "the de facto leader"<ref name="Bokhari-2013">{{cite book |last1=Bokhari |first1=Kamran |last2=Senzai |first2=Farid |title=Political Islam in the Age of Democratization |date=2013 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |page=abstract |doi=10.1057/9781137313492_9 |isbn=9781137313492 |url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137313492_9 |access-date=27 January 2023 |archive-date=27 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230127220152/https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137313492_9 |url-status=live }}</ref> of the Shi'i world by virtue of being the largest Shia-majority state, having a long history of national cohesion and Shia-rule, being the site of the first and "only true"<ref name=ORFPI1994:168>[[#ORFPI1994|Roy, ''Failure of Political Islam'', 1994]]: p. 168</ref> [[Iranian Revolution|Islamist revolution]] (see History section below), and having the financial resources of a major petroleum exporter. Iran's influence has spread into a cultural-geographic area of "Irano-Arab Shiism", establishing Iranian regional power,{{NoteTag|" ... the revolutionary Shiite movement, it is the only one to have taken power by way of a true Islamic revolution; it has therefore become identified with the Iranian state, which used it as an instrument in its strategy for gaining regional power, even though the multiplicity of Shiite groups reflects local particularities (in Lebanon, Afghanistan, or Iraq) as much as it does the factional struggles of Tehran."<ref name=ORFPI1994:2>[[#ORFPI1994|Roy, ''Failure of Political Islam'', 1994]]: p. 2</ref>}} supporting "Shia militias and parties beyond its borders",<ref name="BBC"/>{{NoteTag|In the words of pro-Islamic Republic book by Jon Armajani: "Iran's government has attempted to align itself with Shia Muslims in various countries, such as Iraq and Lebanon, [it] ... has attempted to religiously nourish and politically mobilize those Shias as a matter of principle, not only because of the Iranian government's desires to protect Iran from external threats."<ref name="ARMAJANI-2020">{{cite book |last1=ARMAJANI |first1=Jon |title=Shia Islam and Politics Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon |date=2020 |publisher=Lexington Books |page=abstract |url=https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781793621375/Shia-Islam-and-Politics-Iran-Iraq-and-Lebanon |access-date=27 January 2023 |archive-date=31 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230131072639/https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781793621375/Shia-Islam-and-Politics-Iran-Iraq-and-Lebanon |url-status=live }}</ref>}} intertwining assistance to fellow Shi'a with "Iranization" of them.<ref name=ORFPI1994:168/>

Shi'i Islamism in Iran has been influenced by the Sunni Islamists and their organizations,<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Farhosh-van Loon |first=Diede |date=2016 |title=The Fusion of Mysticism and Politics in Khomeini's Quatrains |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/intejperslite.1.1.0059 |journal=International Journal of Persian Literature |volume=1 |issue=1 |pages=59–88 |doi=10.5325/intejperslite.1.1.0059 |jstor=10.5325/intejperslite.1.1.0059 |issn=2376-5739 |access-date=5 June 2022 |archive-date=28 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220528095630/https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/intejperslite.1.1.0059 |url-status=live }}</ref>{{sfn|Khalaji|2009}} particularly [[Rashid Rida|Sayyid Rashid Rida]],<ref name="Zhongmin 2013 23–28"/> [[Hassan al-Banna]] (founder of the [[Muslim Brotherhood]] organization),{{sfn|Khalaji|2009}} [[Sayyid Qutb]],<ref>{{Citation|title=Shaykh al Fawzān Warns Against The Books of Sayyid Quṭb {{!}} Shaykh Ṣāliḥ al Fawzān| date=2 May 2016 |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dOvKL2-BNIw|access-date=22 April 2021|archive-date=22 April 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210422085022/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dOvKL2-BNIw|url-status=live}}</ref> [[Abul A'la Maududi]],<ref name="Fuller-Future-120"/> 
but has also been described as "distinct" from Sunni Muslim Brotherhood Islamism, "more leftist and more clerical",<ref name=ORFPI1994:2/> with its own historical influencers:

====Historical figures====
* [[Sheikh]] [[Fazlullah Nouri]],<ref>Mackey, Sandra, The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation by Sandra Mackey, New York : Dutton, c1996, pp. 150–55</ref> a cleric of the Qajar dynasty court and the leader of the anti-constitutionalists during the [[Persian Constitutional Revolution|Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1911]],<ref name="HERMANN-2013-430">{{cite journal |last1=HERMANN |first1=DENIS |title=Akhund Khurasani and the Iranian Constitutional Movement |journal=Middle Eastern Studies |date=May 2013 |volume=49 |issue=3 |pages=430–453 |doi=10.1080/00263206.2013.783828 |jstor=23471080 |s2cid=143672216 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/23471080 |access-date=20 April 2023 |archive-date=5 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230305220832/https://www.jstor.org/stable/23471080 |url-status=live }}</ref> who declared the new constitution contrary to sharia law.<ref>Donzel, Emeri "van" (1994). ''Islamic Desk Reference''. ISBN 90-04-09738-4. pp. 285–286</ref>
* [[Navvab Safavi]], a religious student who founded the ''[[Fada'iyan-e Islam]]'', seeking to purify Islam in Iran by killing off 'corrupting individuals', i.e. certain leading intellectual and political figures (including both a former and current prime minister).<ref name="Taheri, 1985 p.98">Taheri, ''The Spirit of Allah'', (1985), p. 98</ref> After the group was crushed by the government, surviving members reportedly chose Ayatollah Khomeini as a new spiritual leader.<ref name=Moin-224>Moin, ''Khomeini'' (2000), p. 224</ref><ref name=Taheri-187>Taheri, Amir, ''Spirit of Allah : Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution '', Adler and Adler c1985, p.187</ref>
* [[Ali Shariati]], a non-cleric "socialist Shi'i" who absorbed Marxist ideas in France and had considerable influence on young Iranians through his preaching that [[Imam Hussein]] was not just a holy figure but the original oppressed one (''muzloun''), and his killer, the Sunni Umayyad Caliphate, the "analog" of the modern Iranian people's "oppression by the shah".<ref>Kepel, ''Jihad'', 2002, pp. 107–8</ref>
* [[Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr]], a Shi'i Islamic scholar in Iraq who critiqued Marxism, socialism and capitalism and helped lead Shi'i opposition to Saddam Hussein's Baath regime before being executed by them.
* [[Mahmoud Taleghani]], an ayatollah and contemporary of Khomeini, was more leftist, more tolerant and more sympathetic to democracy, but less influential, though he still had a substantial following. Was deposed from revolutionary leadership<ref>Mackay, ''Iranians'', (1998), p. 291</ref> after warning of a "return to despotism" by the revolutionary leadership.<ref>Keddie, ''Modern Iran'', (2006), p. 245</ref>