Editing Islamic philosophy (section)

== Metaphysics ==

===Cosmological and ontological arguments===
{{Further|Proof of the Truthful|Kalam cosmological argument}}
[[Avicenna]]'s proof for the [[existence of God]] was the first [[ontological argument]], which he proposed in the ''Metaphysics'' section of ''[[The Book of Healing]]''.<ref name=Johnson>Steve A. Johnson (1984), "Ibn Sina's Fourth Ontological Argument for God's Existence", ''The Muslim World'' '''74''' (3–4), 161–71.</ref><ref name=Morewedge>{{citation |last=Morewedge |first=P. |title=Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Malcolm and the Ontological Argument |journal=Monist |volume=54 |issue=2 |pages=234–49|doi=10.5840/monist197054212 |year=1970 }}</ref> This was the first attempt at using the method of [[A priori (philosophy)|a priori proof]], which utilizes intuition and reason alone. Avicenna's proof of God's existence is unique in that it can be classified as both a [[cosmological argument]] and an ontological argument. "It is ontological insofar as ‘necessary existence’ in intellect is the first basis for arguing for a Necessary Existent". The proof is also "cosmological insofar as most of it is taken up with arguing that contingent existents cannot stand alone and must end up in a Necessary Existent."<ref>{{citation |first=Toby |last=Mayer |title=Ibn Sina's 'Burhan Al-Siddiqin' |year=2001 |journal=Journal of Islamic Studies |publisher=[[Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies]], Oxford Journals, Oxford University Press |volume=12 |issue=1 |pages=18–39 |doi=10.1093/jis/12.1.18}}</ref>

===Essence and existence===
Theologians, particularly among the [[Mu'tazilism|Muʿtazilites]], agreed with Aristotelian metaphysics that non-existence is a thing (''s̲h̲ayʾ'') and an entity (''d̲h̲āt''). According to Aristotelian philosophy, non-existence has to be distinguished by absolute non-existence, that is absolute nothingness, and relative non-existence. The latter can refer to the absence of a quality or the potentiality of something.<ref>Bergh, S. van den, “ʿAdam”, in: Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Consulted online on 17 August 2023 {{doi|10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_0296}} First publishedonline: 2012 First print edition: {{ISBN|9789004161214}}, 1960-2007</ref> Muʿtazilite thinkers such as [[al-Fārābī]] and [[ibn Sīnā]] hold the position that things had a relative existence prior to creation. God knew what he was going to create and God gave them the accident of existence. Contrarily, Asharites regard existence as essence.<ref>Bergh, S. van den, “ʿAdam”, in: Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Consulted online on 17 August 2023 {{doi|10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_0296}}
First published online: 2012
First print edition: {{ISBN|9789004161214}}, 1960-2007</ref>

Islamic philosophy, imbued as it is with [[Kalam|Islamic theology]], distinguishes more clearly than [[Aristotelianism]] the difference between [[essence]] and [[existence]]. Whereas existence is the domain of the [[Contingency (philosophy)|contingent]] and the accidental, essence endures within a [[being]] beyond the accidental. This was first described by [[Avicenna]]'s works on [[metaphysics]], who was himself influenced by [[al-Farabi]].

Some orientalists (or those particularly influenced by [[Thomism|Thomist]] scholarship) argued that Avicenna was the first to view existence (''wujud'') as an accident that happens to the essence (''mahiyya''). However, this aspect of ontology is not the most central to the distinction that Avicenna established between essence and existence. One cannot therefore make the claim that Avicenna was the proponent of the concept of [[essentialism]] ''per se'', given that existence (''al-wujud'') when thought of in terms of necessity would ontologically translate into a notion of the "Necessary-Existent-due-to-Itself" (''wajib al-wujud bi-dhatihi''), which is without description or definition and, in particular, without [[quiddity]] or essence (''la mahiyya lahu''). Consequently, Avicenna's [[ontology]] is '[[Existentialism|existentialist]]' when accounting for being–''[[wikt:qua|qua]]''–existence in terms of necessity (''wujub''), while it is [[Essentialism|essentialist]] in terms of thinking about being–''qua''–existence in terms of "contingency–''qua''–possibility" (''imkan'' or ''mumkin al-wujud'', meaning "contingent being").<ref>For recent discussions of this question, see Nader El-Bizri, "Avicenna and Essentialism", ''The Review of Metaphysics'', Vol. 54 (June 2001), pp. 753–78.</ref>

Some argue that Avicenna anticipated [[Frege]] and [[Bertrand Russell]] in "holding that existence is an accident of accidents" and also anticipated [[Alexius Meinong]]'s "view about [[nonexistent object]]s."<ref>{{citation |first=Herrera Ibáñez |last=Alejandro |title=La distinción entre esencia y existencia en Avicena |journal=Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía |volume=16 |pages=183–95 |year=1990 |url=http://www.formalontology.it/avicenna.htm |access-date=2008-01-29}}</ref> He also provided early arguments for "a "[[Necessary and sufficient conditions|necessary]] being" as [[First cause|cause of all other existents]]."<ref>{{citation |first=Hourani George |last=Fadlo |title=Ibn Sina on necessary and possible existence |journal=Philosophical Forum |volume=4 |pages=74–86 |year=1972 |url=http://www.formalontology.it/avicenna-biblio-one.htm |access-date=2008-01-29}}</ref>

The idea of "essence preced[ing] existence" is a concept which dates back to [[Avicenna]]<ref name=Irwin/> and [[Avicennism|his school]] as well as [[Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi]]<ref name="Razavi 1997 129">{{Harvp|Razavi|1997|p=129}}</ref> and his [[Illuminationist philosophy]]. "[[Existence precedes essence|Existence preced[ing] essence]]", the opposite (existentialist) notion, was developed in the works of [[Averroes]]<ref name=Irwin/> and [[Mulla Sadra]]'s [[transcendent theosophy]].
<!----Following sounds more like opinion than encyclopedic content..?:
More careful approaches are needed in terms of thinking about philosophers (and theologians) in Islam in terms of phenomenological methods of investigation in [[ontology]] (or onto-theology), or by way of comparisons that are made with [[Heidegger]]'s thought and his critique of the history of metaphysics.<ref>For recent studies that engage in this line of research with care and thoughtful deliberation, see: Nader El-Bizri, ''The Phenomenological Quest between Avicenna and Heidegger'' (Binghamton, N.Y.: Global Publications SUNY, 2000)</ref>
 ----->

===Resurrection===
[[Ibn al-Nafis]] wrote the ''[[Theologus Autodidactus]]'' as a defense of "the system of Islam and the Muslims' doctrines on the missions of Prophets, the religious laws, the resurrection of the body, and the transitoriness of the world." The book presents rational arguments for bodily [[resurrection]] and the [[immortality]] of the human soul, using both demonstrative [[reasoning]] and material from the hadith corpus as forms of [[evidence]]. Later Islamic scholars viewed this work as a response to [[Avicenna]]'s [[Metaphysics|metaphysical]] argument on spiritual resurrection (as opposed to bodily resurrection), which was earlier criticized by [[al-Ghazali]].<ref>Fancy, pp. 42, 60</ref>

===Soul and spirit===
The [[Islamic medicine|Muslim physician]]-philosophers, [[Avicenna]] and [[Ibn al-Nafis]], developed their own theories on the soul. They both made a distinction between the soul and the spirit, and in particular, the [[Avicennism|Avicennian]] doctrine on the nature of the soul was influential among the [[Scholasticism|Scholastics]]. Some of Avicenna's views on the soul included the idea that the [[immortality]] of the soul is a consequence of its nature, and not a purpose for it to fulfill. In his theory of "The Ten Intellects", he viewed the human soul as the tenth and final [[intellect]].

Avicenna and Ibn al-Nafis (Ibn al-Nafis), Islamic philosophers and physicians who followed Aristotle, put forward a different theory about the soul than Aristotle's, and made a distinction between soul (In. spirit) and soul (In. soul). [32] Especially Avicenna's teaching on the nature of the soul had a great influence on the Scholastics. According to Ibn Sina, the soul is a spiritual substance separate from the body, it uses the body as a tool. The famous example given by Ibn Sina to show that the soul is a spiritual substance separate from the material body and to show one's self-awareness, is known as "insan-i tair" (flying person) and was used throughout the West in the Middle Ages. In this example, he asks his readers to imagine themselves suspended in the sky (in the air), without any sensory contact, isolated from all sensations: The person in this state is still realizing himself even though there is no material contact. In that case, the idea that the soul (person) is dependent on matter, that is, any physical object, does not make sense, and the soul is a substance on its own. (Here, the concept of “I exist even though I am not in the dense-rough matter of the world” is treated.) This "proving by reflection" study by Ibn Sina was later simplified by René Descartes and expressed in epistemological terms as follows: “I can isolate myself from all supposed things outside of me. , but I can never (abstract) from my own consciousness.”.<ref>Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman (1996), History of Islamic Philosophy, p. 315, Routledge, ISBN 0-415-13159-6.</ref> According to Ibn Sina, immortality of the soul is not a goal, but a necessity and consequence of its nature.<ref>Emanasyon görüşüne göre, maddi evren, her şeyin kaynağı Tanrı'nın kendini kademe kademe açığa vuruşu, tezahür edişi ya da yansımasıdır. Catholic Encyclopedia/ Emanation, Jewish Encyclopedia/Emanation , 22 Eylül 2008 tarihinde erişild</ref>

Avicenna generally supported [[Aristotle]]'s idea of the soul originating from the [[heart]], whereas Ibn al-Nafis on the other hand rejected this idea and instead argued that the soul "is related to the entirety and not to one or a few [[Organ (anatomy)|organ]]s." He further criticized Aristotle's idea that every unique soul requires the existence of a unique source, in this case the heart. Ibn al-Nafis concluded that "the soul is related primarily neither to the spirit nor to any organ, but rather to the entire matter whose temperament is prepared to receive that soul" and he defined the soul as nothing other than "what a human indicates by saying ‘[[I (pronoun)|I]]’."<ref>Nahyan A. G. Fancy (2006), [http://etd.nd.edu/ETD-db/theses/available/etd-11292006-152615 "Pulmonary Transit and Bodily Resurrection: The Interaction of Medicine, Philosophy and Religion in the Works of Ibn al-Nafīs (d. 1288)"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150404020329/http://etd.nd.edu/ETD-db/theses/available/etd-11292006-152615 |date=2015-04-04 }}, pp. 209–10 (''Electronic Theses and Dissertations'', [[University of Notre Dame]]).</ref>

===Thought experiments===
{{Further|Avicenna#Thought experiments}}
While he was imprisoned in the castle of Fardajan near [[Hamadhan]], [[Avicenna]] wrote his "Floating Man" [[thought experiment]] to demonstrate human [[self-awareness]] and the substantiality of the soul. He referred to the living human [[intelligence]], particularly the [[active intellect]], which he believed to be the [[Hypostatic abstraction|hypostasis]] by which God communicates truth to the human [[mind]] and imparts order and [[intelligibility (philosophy)|intelligibility]] to [[nature]]. His "Floating Man" thought experiment tells its readers to imagine themselves suspended in the air, isolated from all [[Wikt:sensation|sensations]], which includes no [[Sense|sensory]] contact with even their own bodies. He argues that, in this scenario, one would still have [[self-consciousness]]. He thus concludes that the idea of the [[Self (philosophy)|self]] is not logically dependent on any physical [[Object (philosophy)|thing]], and that the soul should not be seen in [[relative term]]s, but as a primary given, a [[Substance theory|substance]].<ref name=Leaman>Seyyed [[Hossein Nasr]] and [[Oliver Leaman]] (1996), ''History of Islamic Philosophy'', p. 315, Routledge, {{ISBN|0-415-13159-6}}.</ref>

This argument was later refined and simplified by [[René Descartes]] in [[epistemic]] terms when he stated: "I can abstract from the supposition of all external things, but not from the supposition of my own consciousness."<ref name=Leaman/>

===Time===
While ancient Greek philosophers believed that the universe had an infinite past with no beginning, early [[Medieval philosophy|medieval philosophers]] and theologians developed the concept of the universe having a [[Temporal finitism|finite past]] with a beginning. This view was inspired by the [[creationism]] shared by [[Judaism]], [[Christianity]] and [[Islam]]. The [[Christian philosophy|Christian philosopher]] [[John Philoponus]] presented a detailed argument against the ancient Greek notion of an infinite past. Muslim and Arab Jewish philosophers like [[Al-Kindi]], [[Saadia Gaon]], and [[Al-Ghazali]] developed further arguments, with most falling into two broad categories: assertions of the "impossibility of the existence of an actual infinite" and of the "impossibility of completing an actual infinite by successive addition".<ref name=Craig>{{citation |title=Whitrow and Popper on the Impossibility of an Infinite Past |first=William Lane |last=Craig |journal=The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science |volume=30 |issue=2 |date=June 1979 |pages=165–70 [165–66] |doi=10.1093/bjps/30.2.165}}</ref>

===Truth===
In [[metaphysics]], [[Avicenna]] (Ibn Sina) defined truth as:

{{Blockquote|What corresponds in the mind to what is outside it.<ref>Osman Amin (2007), "Influence of Muslim Philosophy on the West", ''Monthly Renaissance'' '''17''' (11).</ref>}}

Avicenna elaborated on his definition of truth in his ''[[Metaphysics]]'':

{{Blockquote|The truth of a thing is the property of the being of each thing which has been established in it.<ref name=Aertsen>Jan A. Aertsen (1988), ''Nature and Creature: Thomas Aquinas's Way of Thought'', p. 152. BRILL, {{ISBN|90-04-08451-7}}.</ref>}}

In his ''[[Quodlibeta]]'', [[Thomas Aquinas]] wrote a commentary on Avicenna's definition of truth in his ''Metaphysics'' and explained it as follows:

{{Blockquote|The truth of each thing, as Avicenna says in his ''Metaphysica'', is nothing else than the property of its being which has been established in it. So that is called true gold which has properly the being of gold and attains to the established determinations of the nature of gold. Now, each thing has properly being in some nature because it stands under the complete form proper to that nature, whereby being and species in that nature is.<ref name=Aertsen/>}}

Early [[#Political philosophy|Islamic political philosophy]] emphasized an inexorable link between science and religion and the process of [[ijtihad]] to find truth.

[[Ibn al-Haytham]] (Alhacen) reasoned that to discover the truth about nature, it is necessary to eliminate human opinion and error, and allow the universe to speak for itself.<ref name=Ezine/> In his ''Aporias against Ptolemy'', Ibn al-Haytham further wrote the following comments on truth:

{{Blockquote|Truth is sought for itself [but] the truths, [he warns] are immersed in uncertainties [and the scientific authorities (such as Ptolemy, whom he greatly respected) are] not immune from error...<ref name=Sabra/>}}

{{Blockquote|Therefore, the seeker after the truth is not one who studies the writings of the ancients and, following his natural disposition, puts his trust in them, but rather the one who suspects his faith in them and questions what he gathers from them, the one who submits to argument and demonstration, and not to the sayings of a human being whose nature is fraught with all kinds of imperfection and deficiency. Thus the duty of the man who investigates the writings of scientists, if learning the truth is his goal, is to make himself an enemy of all that he reads, and, applying his mind to the core and margins of its content, attack it from every side. He should also suspect himself as he performs his critical examination of it, so that he may avoid falling into either prejudice or leniency.<ref name=Sabra/>}}

{{Blockquote|I constantly sought knowledge and truth, and it became my belief that for gaining access to the [[Wiktionary:effulgence|effulgence]] and closeness to God, there is no better way than that of searching for truth and knowledge.<ref name=Plott/>}}

=== Free will and predestination ===

The issue of free will versus predestination is one of the "most contentious topics in classical Islamic thought."<ref>{{cite book|last1=Cillis|first1=Maria|title=Free Will and Predestination in Islamic Thought: Theoretical Compromises in the Works of Avicenna, al-Ghazali and Ibn 'Arabi|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1YliAgAAQBAJ&q=predestination&pg=PA142|isbn=9781317937043|date=2013-12-17|publisher=Routledge }}</ref> In accordance with the Islamic belief in [[predestination]], or divine preordainment (''al-qadā wa'l-qadar''), God has full knowledge and control over all that occurs. This is explained in Qur'anic verses such as "Say: 'Nothing will happen to us except what Allah has decreed for us: He is our protector'..."<ref>
* {{qref|9|51|b=y}}
* {{Harvtxt|Cohen-Mor|2001|p=4}}: "The idea of predestination is reinforced by the frequent mention of events 'being written' or 'being in a book' before they happen: 'Say: "Nothing will happen to us except what Allah has decreed for us..."&nbsp;'&nbsp;"
* {{Cite encyclopedia | title=Fate | encyclopedia=Encyclopaedia of the Qur'an Online | author=Ahmet T. Karamustafa }}: The verb ''qadara'' literally means "to measure, to determine". Here it is used to mean that "God measures and orders his creation".
</ref> For Muslims, everything in the world that occurs, good or bad, has been preordained and nothing can happen unless permitted by God. According to Islamic tradition, all that has been decreed by God is written in ''al-Lawh al-Mahfūz'', the "Preserved Tablet".<ref>
* {{Harvtxt|Farah|2003|pp=119–22}}
* {{Harvtxt|Patton|1900|p=130}}
</ref>