Editing Hirohito (section)

=== Second Sino-Japanese War ===
Beginning from the [[Mukden Incident]] in 1931 in which Japan staged a [[False flag|false flag operation]] and made a false accusation against Chinese dissidents as a pretext to invade Manchuria, Japan occupied Chinese territories and established [[Puppet state|puppet governments]]. Such aggression was recommended to Hirohito by his chiefs of staff and prime minister [[Fumimaro Konoe]]; Hirohito did not voice objection to the invasion of China.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991}}{{page needed|date=October 2023}}<ref>{{cite web |date=14 August 2000 |title=Detail All of Hirohito's Role |url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-aug-14-me-4022-story.html |website=[[Los Angeles Times]]}}</ref>{{sfn|Rich|2018}}<ref>{{cite web|url=https://pearlharbor.org/blog/the-long-and-eventful-reign-of-hirohito/#:~:text=Already%2Dtense%20relations%20between%20Japan,supported%20and%20encouraged%20by%20Hirohito.|title=The Long and Eventful Reign of Hirohito |last= |first= |date=13 March 2018 |website=pearlharbor.org |publisher= |access-date=11 November 2024 |quote=}}</ref>

A diary by chamberlain Kuraji Ogura says that he was reluctant to start war against China in 1937 because they had underestimated China's military strength and Japan should be cautious in its strategy. In this regard, Ogura writes that Hirohito stated "once you start (a war), it cannot easily be stopped in the middle ... What's important is when to end the war" and "one should be cautious in starting a war, but once begun, it should be carried out thoroughly."<ref>{{cite news |title=Diary shows Hirohito didn't want war in China: media |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-hirohito-idUST22065220070309 |quote=Emperor Hirohito, in whose name Japanese soldiers fought in World War Two, was reluctant to start a war with China in 1937 and had believed in stopping it earlier, media reported on Friday, citing a diary by his former chamberlain. |publisher=[[Reuters]] |date=9 March 2007 |access-date=29 April 2022}}</ref>[[File:Hirohito Sirayuki.jpg|thumb|upright=1|The Emperor on his favorite white horse, Shirayuki ({{literal|white-snow}}), in 1935]]Nonetheless, according to Herbert Bix, Hirohito's main concern seems to have been the possibility of an attack by the Soviet Union given his questions to his chief of staff, [[Prince Kan'in Kotohito]], and army minister, [[Hajime Sugiyama]], about the time it could take to crush Chinese resistance and how could they prepare for the eventuality of a Soviet incursion. Based on Bix's findings, Hirohito was displeased by Prince Kan'in's evasive responses about the substance of such contingency plans but nevertheless still approved the decision to move troops to [[North China]].{{Sfn|Bix|2016|p=319}}

According to [[Akira Fujiwara]], Hirohito endorsed the policy of qualifying the invasion of China as an "incident" instead of a "war"; therefore, he did not issue any notice to observe international law in this conflict (unlike what his predecessors did in previous conflicts officially recognized by Japan as wars), and the Deputy Minister of the Japanese Army instructed the chief of staff of [[Japanese China Garrison Army]] on 5 August not to use the term "prisoners of war" for Chinese captives. This instruction led to the removal of the constraints of international law on the treatment of Chinese prisoners.<ref>Fujiwara, ''Nitchū Sensō ni Okeru Horyo Gyakusatsu'', Kikan Sensō Sekinin Kenkyū 9, 1995, pp. 20–21</ref> The works of [[Yoshiaki Yoshimi]] and Seiya Matsuno show that Hirohito also authorized, by specific orders (''rinsanmei''), the use of chemical weapons against the Chinese.<ref>''Dokugasusen Kankei Shiryō II, Kaisetsu'', 1997, pp. 25–29</ref>

Later in his life, Hirohito looked back on his decision to give the go-ahead to wage a 'defensive' war against China and opined that his foremost priority was not to wage war with China but to prepare for a war with the Soviet Union, as his army had reassured him that the China war would end within three months, but that decision of his had haunted him since he forgot that the Japanese forces in China were drastically fewer than that of the Chinese, hence the shortsightedness of his perspective was evident.{{sfn|Bix|2016|p=320}}

On 1 December 1937, Hirohito had given formal instruction to General [[Iwane Matsui]] to capture and occupy the enemy capital of Nanking. He was very eager to fight this battle since he and his council firmly believed that all it would take is a one huge blow to bring forth the surrender of Chiang Kai-shek.{{sfn|Bix|2016|p=339}} He even gave an Imperial Rescript to Iwane when he returned to Tokyo a year later, despite the brutality that his officers had inflicted on the Chinese populace in Nanking; thus Hirohito had seemingly turned a blind eye to and condoned these monstrosities.

During the [[Battle of Wuhan|invasion of Wuhan]], from August to October 1938, Hirohito authorized the use of toxic gas on 375 separate occasions,<ref>''Dokugasusen Kankei Shiryō II, Kaisetsu'', 1997, p. 28.</ref> despite the resolution adopted by the [[League of Nations]] on 14 May condemning Japanese use of chemical weapons.