Editing Ford Pinto (section)

===Fuel system design===
The design of the Pinto fuel system was complicated by the uncertain regulatory environment during the development period. The first federal standard for automotive fuel system safety, passed in 1967, known as Section 301 in the [[Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards]], initially only considered front impacts. In January 1969, 18 months into the Pinto's development cycle, the NHTSA proposed expanding the standard to cover rear-end collisions. The proposed standard was based on a 20&nbsp;mph moving-barrier rear impact test. Ford publicly announced it supported the standard. In August 1970, the month the Pinto went into production, the NHTSA changed the proposal to a more stringent 20&nbsp;mph fixed-barrier standard which car companies were to meet in 18 months. The fixed-barrier standard was seen by the auto industry as a significant increase in test severity. At the same time, the NHTSA announced a long-term goal of setting a 30-mph fixed-barrier standard.<ref>{{harvnb|Rossow|2015}}:'Fixed-barrier' meant that the vehicle was moving (towed backward) into a stationary barrier&nbsp;... The 20-mph fixed barrier standard was greeted with uniform opposition from the auto industry because it was a much more severe test than the moving-barrier standard.</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Lee|Ermann|1999}}: pg 36, 43</ref> Due to the confusion related to the various proposed standards and an expectation that the NHTSA would not select the more stringent 30&nbsp;mph fixed-barrier standard, Ford elected to voluntarily meet the 20&nbsp;mph moving-barrier standard for all cars by 1973.<ref>{{harvnb|Lee|Ermann|1999}}: In the design stage (1967–1970), no company or government standard on rear-end fuel tank integrity existed to guide the engineers, but their actions were consistent with the taken-for-granted, industry-wide tradition of building lower levels of [[crashworthiness]] into small cars. This situation changed in the marketing stage (post-1970). Shortly after the 1971 model year Pintos were released, Ford adopted an internal 20 mile-per-hour moving barrier standard for the 1973 model year-the only manufacturer to do so (Gioia 1996; Strobel 1994). The extant legal/regulatory environment reinforced engineers' beliefs that this standard was quite reasonable" since it was the "same one recommended at that time by the federal General Services Administration; the Canadian equivalent of the GSA; the Society of Automotive Engineers; and a private consulting firm hired by NHTSA&nbsp;..." and by NHTSA itself in 1969 (Strobel 1980:205). This standard would constrain future debates by certifying the Pinto as safe" to Ford's subunit charged with evaluating potential recallable safety problems.</ref><ref>{{Harvnb|Schwartz|1991}}: In August 1970, 1971 model-year Pintos began coming off the assembly line. Just a few days later, NHTSA-which had never acted on its earlier proposal-advanced a more demanding set of proposed regulations. Three months later, Ford officials decided that for purposes of the 1973 model year, Ford would adopt, as its own internal objective, the regulations that NHTSA had suggested in 1969. To respond to NHTSA's more recent proposal, Ford engineers, with actual Pintos now available, stepped up the crash-testing process and identified several design modifications that might improve the Pinto's performance. In October 1971, Ford officials decided against incorporating any of these modifications into the current Pintos; rather, it would wait until NHTSA clarified its position. In 1973, NHTSA promulgated its fuel-tank standard but ruled that this standard would apply only to 1977 models. Ford adopted a 20&nbsp;mph moving-barrier standard for all 1973 cars.</ref> Ford and other automobile manufacturers objected to the more stringent fuel system safety standard and filed objections during the required comment periods of the proposed regulations.<ref>{{harvnb|Strobel|1979}}: Ford then joined other automakers in an aggressive lobbying campaign that was successful in delaying and softening proposed federal standards on how strong fuel systems must be to resist rupture and potential explosion.</ref>

The Pinto's design positioned its fuel tank between the solid [[Beam axle#Live axle vs dead axle|live rear axle]] and the rear [[Bumper (car)|bumper]], a standard practice in US subcompact cars at the time.<ref>{{harvnb|Gioia|1992}}: The tank was positioned between the rear bumper and the rear axle (a standard industry practice for the time).</ref> The Pinto's vulnerability to fuel leakage and fire in a rear-end collision was exacerbated by reduced rear "crush space", a lack of structural reinforcement in the rear, and an "essentially ornamental" rear bumper (though similar to other manufacturers).<ref>{{harvnb|Schwartz|1991}}: Page 1015 and Footnote 9, "The court of appeal opinion referred to the Pinto's bumper as the flimsiest of any American car. Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 774, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 360. Mark Robinson, Jr., co-counsel for the plaintiffs, is emphatic that this reference is correct. Telephone interview with Mark Robinson, Jr. (Sept. 12, 1990) [hereinafter Robinson Interview). In the later criminal case, however, Byron Bloch, a prosecution witness, stated in cross-examination that the Pinto's bumper was about the same as those of the Gremlin, Vega, and Dodge Colt. See L. Strobel, supra note 5, at 157 ("I would say they were all bad.")."</ref>

As part of a response to the NHTSA's proposed regulations, crash testing conducted in 1970 with modified Ford Mavericks demonstrated vulnerability at fairly low crash speeds. Design changes were made, but post-launch tests showed similar results.<ref>{{harvnb|Danley|2005}}: A few months later Ford began crash-testing modified Mavericks In part to prepare a response to NHTSA'S proposed regulations. The results demonstrated the vulnerability of fuel-integrity at fairly low speeds and some modifications were made. In August of 1970, the first model year Pinto, the 1971, went into production. Post-production testing revealed similar results. Still, there were no federal performance standards at the time and the proposed regulations addressed only front-end collisions.</ref> These tests were conducted to develop crash testing standards rather than specifically investigating fuel system integrity. Though Ford engineers were not pleased with the car's performance, no reports of the time indicate particular concern.<ref>{{harvnb|Lee|Ermann|1999}}: Engineers in the design stage were still trying "to find out how to conduct crash tests" (Feaheny 1997; see also Lacey 1986:613). For example, an internal Pinto test report dated November 1970 listed as its objective "To develop a test procedure to Be used to provide baseline data on vehicle fuel system integrity" (NHTSA C<sup>7−</sup>38-Al.5, Final Test Report #T-0738). In this test, a Pinto sedan exhibited "excessive fuel tank leakage" when towed rearward into a fixed barrier at 21.5 miles per hour, considered roughly equivalent to a car-to-car impact At 35 miles per hour. Nothing in this, or any other, Ford test report indicates that participants felt cause for concern or organizational action. Although some Ford engineers were not especially pleased, they felt that the data were inconclusive or the risks acceptable (Feaheny 1997; Strobel 1980), or they kept their concerns to themselves (Camps 1997). Some felt that cars would rarely be subjected to the extreme forces generated In a fixed-barrier test In real-world collisions (Feaheny 1997; Devine 1996). NHTSA agreed and ultimately replaced the proposed fixed barrier test with a less-stringent moving-barrier test In its final standard (U.S. Department of Transportation 1988)</ref> The Pinto was tested by rival [[American Motors Corporation|American Motors]] (AMC) where in addition to crash-testing, engineers specialized in fuel-system performance because of the potential deadly fires in severe collisions.<ref>{{cite magazine |last1=Foster |first1=Pat |title=A look back at the development of American Motors' crash-testing program |magazine=Hemmings Classic Car |date=February 2021 |url= https://www.hemmings.com/stories/article/collision-course |access-date=31 December 2020 |archive-date=10 January 2021 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20210110120936/https://www.hemmings.com/stories/article/collision-course |url-status=live }}</ref>

Ford also tested several different vehicle modifications that could improve rear impact performance.<ref>{{harvnb|Gioia|1992}}: Ford had crash-tested 11 vehicles; 8 of these cars suffered potentially catastrophic gas tank ruptures. The only 3 cars that survived intact had each been modified in some way to protect the tank.</ref> However, the engineer's occupational caution and aversion to "unproven" solutions, as well as a view that the crash test results were inconclusive, resulted in the use of a conventional fuel tank design and placement.<ref>{{harvnb|Lee|Ermann|1999}}: Occupational caution encouraged engineers to view many design adjustments that improved test performance as "unproven" in real-world accidents (Devine 1996; Feaheny 1997; Schwartz 1991; Strickland 1996; Strobel 1980). Engineers, who typically value "uncertainty avoidance" (Allison 1971:72 ), chose to stick with an existing design rather than face uncertainties associated with novel ones (Devine 1996; Strobel 1980). One series of tests, for instance, showed that Pintos equipped with pliable foam-like gas tanks would not leak in 30-mile-per-hour crashes. However, some engineers feared that such a tank might melt and disagreed with others who felt it was safer than the existing metal design (Devine 1996, see also Strobel 1980). Other engineers believed that rubber bladders improved performance in tests, but anticipated problems under real-world conditions (Strobel 1980).</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Schwartz|1991}}: As for additional design proposals brought forward by the plaintiffs, several of them-for example, a bladder within the gas tank, and a "tank within the tank"-concerned somewhat innovative technology that had never been utilized in actual auto production. At trial, there was testimony that a bladder would have been feasible in the early 1970s, but also rebuttal testimony that a bladder was at this time beyond the bounds of feasibility.</ref> The use of an above-the-axle tank location was considered safer by some, but not all, at Ford. This placement was not a viable option for the hatchback and station wagon body styles.<ref>{{harvnb|Lee|Ermann|1999}}: Ford whistle-blower Harley Copp's argument - that the Pinto would have been safer had its gas tank been placed above the axle rather than behind it - is often cited in Pinto narratives as an example of safety being sacrificed to profits, or at least trunk space, in the design stage (Cullen, Maakestad and Cavender 1987; Dowie 1977; Strobel1994). Yet Copp did not reach this conclusion until 1977 (Strobel1980). Other engineers were considerably less certain about it, even though the above-the-axle design did perform better in one set of crash tests. The engineer overseeing the Pinto's design, Harold MacDonald (whose father died in a fuel tank fire when his Model A Ford exploded after a frontal collision with a tree), felt that the above-the-axle placement was less safe under real-world conditions because the tank was closer to the passenger compartment and more likely to be punctured by items in the trunk (Strobel1980).</ref>

Beginning in 1973, field reports of Ford Pintos consumed by fire after low-speed rear-end collisions were received by Ford's recall coordinator office.<ref>{{harvnb|Gioia|1992}}: I began to construct my own files of incoming safety problems. One of these new files concerned reports of Pintos "lighting up" (in the words of a field representative) in rear-end accidents. There were actually very few reports, perhaps because component failure was not initially assumed. These cars simply were consumed by fire after apparently very low-speed accidents.</ref> Based on standard procedures used to evaluate field reports, Ford's internal recall evaluation group twice reviewed the field data and found no actionable issue.<ref>{{harvnb|Lee|Ermann|1999}}: When Gioia became Recall Coordinator, he inherited about 100 active recall campaigns, half of them safety-related. As with most jobs, the enormous workload required him to use standard operating procedures" (SOPs) to organize and manage information for decision-making (d. Kriesberg 1976:1102). SOPs increase organizational efficiency by operating as cognitive scripts that transform decision-making opportunities into largely predetermined action patterns. Existing SOPs required that, to be "recallable," problems needed either high frequency or a directly traceable causal link to a design defect. When reports began to trickle in to Gioia that Pintos were "lighting up" in relatively low-speed accidents, and after viewing the burned wreckage of a Pinto, he initiated a meeting to determine if this represented a recallable problem. His workgroup voted unanimously not to recall the Pinto because the weak data did not meet SOP criteria (Gioia 1996). The workgroup was unaware of any cost-benefit analyses or Pinto crash test results. Reports of Pinto fires continued to trickle in, and eventually, Gioia did become aware of and concerned about the crash test results. Again he wondered if the Pinto had a recallable problem, so he initiated a second meeting to convince his co-workers that crash tests showed a possible design flaw. But others again saw no design flaws—after all, the Pinto met internal company standards, and no contradictory external standard existed. The workgroup conceived the tank leak "problem" not as a defect, but as a fundamental and unalterable design feature: the car's small size, the use of light metals, and unibody construction produced a tendency for Pintos (and others in its class) to "crush up like an accordion" in rear-end collisions (Gioia 1996).</ref>