Editing Failed state (section)

=== Neotrusteeship ===
James Fearon and David Laitin suggest in "Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States" that the problem of failed states can be addressed through a system of "neotrusteeship", which they compare to "postmodern imperialism".<ref name=":12">{{Cite journal|last1=Fearon|first1=James D.|last2=Laitin|first2=David D.|title=Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States|journal=International Security|language=en|volume=28|issue=4|pages=5–43|doi=10.1162/0162288041588296|year=2004|s2cid=57559356}}</ref> Fearon and Laitin's idea of neotrusteeship involves a combination of international and domestic organizations which seek to rebuild states. Fearon and Laitin start with the assumption that failed states comprise a [[Collective action|collective action problem]]. Failed states impose negative externalities on the rest of the international system, like refugees who are displaced by war. It would be a net good for the international system if countries worked to develop and rebuild failed states. However, intervention is very costly, and no single nation has a strong enough incentive to act to solve the problem of a failed state. Therefore, international cooperation is necessary to solve this collective action problem.

Fearon and Laitin identify four main problems to achieving collective action to intervene in failed states:
# Recruitment - getting countries to participate in and pay for interventions
# Coordination - providing good communication between all of the peacekeeping countries
# Accountability - ensuring that any peacekeeping countries that commit human rights abuses are held responsible
# Exit - having some mechanism for the peacekeeping countries to withdraw

Fearon and Laitin do propose some solutions to these problems. To solve the recruitment problem, they argue for having a powerful state with security interests in the failed state to take the lead in the peacekeeping operations and serve a point role. Having a single state lead the peacekeeping operation would also help solve the coordination problem. The empowerment of a UN body to investigate human rights abuses would solve the accountability problem. Finally, forcing the failed state to contribute funds to peacekeeping operations after several years can reduce the incentives of the peacekeepers to exit. Fearon and Laitin believe that multilateral interventions which solve the above four collective action problems will be more effective at rebuilding failed states through neotrusteeship.<ref name=":12"/>