Editing Ethnic conflict (section)

=== Institutional ethnic conflict resolution ===
A number of scholars have attempted to synthesize the methods available for the [[conflict resolution|resolution]], [[conflict management|management]] or transformation of their ethnic conflict. [[John Coakley]], for example, has developed a [[wiktionary:Typology|typology]] of the methods of conflict resolution that have been employed by states, which he lists as: [[indigenization]], accommodation, [[Cultural assimilation|assimilation]], [[acculturation]], [[population transfer]], boundary alteration, [[genocide]] and ethnic suicide.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Coakley | first1 = John | year = 1992 | title = The resolution of ethnic conflict: Towards a typology | journal = International Political Science Review | volume = 13 | issue = 4| pages = 343–358 | doi=10.1177/019251219201300401| s2cid = 146798940 }}</ref> [[John McGarry]] and [[Brendan O'Leary]] have developed a taxonomy of eight macro-political ethnic conflict regulation methods, which they note are often employed by states in combination with each other.<ref>John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary (1993) 'Introduction: The macro-political regulation of ethnic conflict', in John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary (eds.) ''The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts'', London: Routledge, pp. 1-40</ref> They include a number of methods that they note are clearly morally unacceptable.

With increasing interest in the field of ethnic conflict, many policy analysts and political scientists theorized potential resolutions and tracked the results of institutional policy implementation. As such, theories often focus on which [[Institutions]] are the most appropriate for addressing ethnic conflict.

==== Consociationalism ====
Consociationalism is a [[power sharing]] agreement which coopts the leaders of ethnic groups into the central state's government. Each nation or ethnic group is represented in the government through a supposed spokesman for the group. In the power sharing agreement, each group has veto powers to varying degrees, dependent on the particular state. Moreover, the norm of proportional representation is dominant: each group is represented in the government in a percentage that reflects the ethnicity's demographic presence in the state.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|title=Containing Nationalism|last=Hechter|first=Michael|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2000|location=New York}}</ref> Another requirement for [[Arend Lijphart]] is that the government must be composed of a "grand coalition" of the ethnic group leaders which supposes a top-down approach to conflict resolution.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last=Stroschein|first=Sherrill|date=November 2014|title=Consociational Settlements and Reconstruction: Bosnia in Comparative Perspective (1995- Present)|journal=Annals of the American Academy|doi=10.1177/0002716214544459|s2cid=8830183}}</ref>

In theory, this leads to self governance and protection for the ethnic group. Many scholars<ref name=":4">{{Cite book|title=Nationalism Reframed|last=Brubaker|first=Roger|publisher=Cambridge|year=1996|location=New York}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Kaufman|first=Stuart|date=Fall 1996|title=Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War|journal=International Security|doi=10.1162/isec.21.2.108|volume=21|issue=2|pages=108–138|s2cid=57559698}}</ref> maintain that since ethnic tension erupts into ethnic violence when the ethnic group is threatened by a state, then veto powers should allow the ethnic group to avoid legislative threats. Switzerland is often characterized as a successful consociationalist state.<ref name=":0" />

A recent example of a consociational government is the post-conflict [[Bosnia and Herzegovina|Bosnian government]] that was agreed upon in the [[Dayton Agreement|Dayton Accords]] in 1995. A tripartite presidency was chosen and must have a Croat, a Serb, and a Bosniak. The presidents take turns acting as the forefront executive in terms of 8 months for 4 years.<ref name=":1" /> Many have credited this compromise of a consociational government in Bosnia for the end of the violence and the following long-lasting peace.<ref name=":1" />

In contrast to Lijphart, several political scientists and policy analysts have condemned consociationalism.<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal|last=Howard|first=Lisa Morje|date=October 2012|title=The Ethnocracy Trap|journal=Journal of Democracy|volume=23|issue=4|pages=155–169|doi=10.1353/jod.2012.0068|s2cid=145795576}}</ref><ref name=":3">{{Cite book|title=Reconstructing Multiethnic Societies: The Case of Bosnia-Hercegovina|last=Bieber|first=Florian|publisher=Ashgate Press|year=2001|pages=109–121|chapter=Challenge of Democracy in Divided Societies: Lessons from Bosnia-- Challenges for Kosovo}}</ref> One of the many critiques is that consociationalism locks in ethnic tensions and identities. This assumes a primordial stance that ethnic identities are permanent and not subject to change.<ref name=":3" /> Furthermore, this does not allow for any "others" that might want to partake in the political process.<ref name=":3" />  As of 2012 a Jewish Bosnian is suing the Bosnian government for precluding him from running for presidential office since only a Croat, Serb, or Bosniak can run under the consociational government.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Guss|first1=Jason|last2=Siroky|first2=David S.|date=2012|title=Living with Heterogeneity: Bridging the Ethnic Divide in Bosnia|journal=Comparative Sociology|doi=10.1163/156913312X638570}}</ref> Determining ethnic identities in advance and implementing a power sharing system on the basis of these fixed identities is inherently discriminatory against minority groups that might be not be recognized.<ref name="RefError">{{Cite journal|last=Lijphart|first=Arend|date=Winter 2001|title=Constructivism and Consociational Theory|url=http://comparativenewsletter.com/files/archived_newsletters/2001_winter.pdf|journal=Newsletter of the Organized Section in Comparative Politics of the American Political Science Association}}</ref> Moreover, it discriminates against those who do not choose to define their identity on an ethnic or communal basis. In power sharing-systems that are based on pre-determined identities, there is a tendency to rigidly fix shares of representation on a permanent basis which will not reflect changing demographics over time.<ref name="RefError"/> The categorization of individuals in particular ethnic groups might be controversial anyway and might in fact fuel ethnic tensions.

The inherent weaknesses in using pre-determined ethnic identities to form power sharing systems has led Ljiphart to argue that adopting a constructivist approach to consociationalism can increase its likelihood of success.<ref name="RefError"/> The [[self-determination]] of ethnic identities is more likely to be "non-discriminatory, neutral, flexible and self-adjusting".<ref name="RefError"/> For example, in South Africa, the toxic legacy of apartheid meant that successful consociation could only be built on the basis of the self-determination of groups. Ljiphart claims that because ethnic identities are often "unclear, fluid and flexible,"<ref name="RefError"/> self-determination is likely to be more successful than pre-determination of ethnic groups.  A constructivist approach to consociational theory can therefore strengthen its value as a method to resolve ethnic conflict.

Another critique points to the privileging of ethnic identity over personal political choice.<ref name=":2" /> Howard has deemed consociationalism as a form of ethnocracy and not a path to true pluralistic democracy.<ref name=":2" /> Consociationalism assumes that a politician will best represent the will of his co-ethnics above other political parties. This might lead to the polarization of ethnic groups and the loss of non-ethnic ideological parties.<ref name=":5">{{Cite journal|last=Stroschein|first=Sherill|date=December 2008|title=Making or Breaking Kosovo: Applications of Dispersed State Control|journal=Perspectives on Politics|doi=10.1017/s153759270808184x|volume=6|issue=4|page=655|s2cid=154841501}}</ref>

Horowitz has argued that a single transferable vote system could prevent the ethnification of political parties because voters cast their ballots in order of preference.<ref name=":18">{{Cite book|title=A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society|last=Horowitz|first=Donald|publisher=University of California Press|year=1992|pages=167–173}}</ref> This means that a voter could cast some of his votes to parties other than his co-ethnic party.<ref name=":18" /> This in turn would compel political parties to broaden their manifestos to appeal to voters across the ethnic divide to hoover up second and third preference votes.

==== Federalism ====
The theory of implementing federalism in order to curtail ethnic conflict assumes that self-governance reduces "demands for sovereignty".<ref name=":0" /> Hechter argues that some goods such as language of education and bureaucracy must be provided as local goods, instead of statewide, in order to satisfy more people and ethnic groups.<ref name=":0" /> Some political scientists such as Stroschein contend that [[ethnic federalism|ethnofederalism]], or federalism determined along ethnic lines, is "asymmetric" as opposed to the equal devolution of power found in non-ethnic federal states, such as the United States. In this sense, special privileges are granted to specific minority groups as concessions and incentives to end violence or mute conflict.<ref name=":5" />

The [[Soviet Union]] divided its structure into ethnic federal states termed [[Republics of the Soviet Union|Union Republics]]. Each Union Republic was named after a titular ethnic group who inhabited the area as a way to Sovietize nationalist sentiments during the 1920s.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The Revenge of the Past Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union|last=Suny|first=Ronald|publisher=Stanford University Press|year=1993}}</ref> Brubaker asserts that these titular republics were formed in order to absorb any potential elite led nationalist movements against the Soviet center by incentivizing elite loyalty through advancement in the Soviet political structure.<ref name=":4" />

Thus, federalism provides some self-governance for local matters in order to satisfy some of the grievances which might cause ethnic conflict among the masses. Moreover, federalism brings in the elites and ethnic entrepreneurs into the central power structure; this prevents a resurgence of top-down ethnic conflict.

Nevertheless, after the [[dissolution of the Soviet Union]] many critiques of federalism as an institution to resolve ethnic conflict emerged. The devolution of power away from the central state can weaken ties to the central state.<ref name=":4" /> Moreover, the parallel institutions created to serve a particular nation or ethnic group might provide significant resources for [[secession]] from the central state.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Bunce|author-link=Valerie Jane Bunce|first=Valerie|date=1998|title=Subversive Institutions: The End of Soviet State in Comparative Perspective|journal=Post-Soviet Affairs|volume=14|issue=4|pages=323–354|doi=10.1080/1060586X.1998.10641456}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Derluguian|first=Georgi M.|date=1999|title=Ethnofederalism and Ethnonationalism: The Separatist politics of Chechnya and Tatarstan: Sources or Resources?|journal=International Journal of Public Administration|volume=22|issue=9–10|pages=1387–1428|doi=10.1080/01900699908525435}}</ref> As most states are unwilling to give up an integral portion of their territory, secessionist movements may trigger violence.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Rights of Minority Cultures|last=Buchanan|first=Allen|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=1995|editor-last=Kymlicka|editor-first=Will|chapter=Morality of Secession}}</ref>

Furthermore, some competing elite political players may not be in power; they would remain unincorporated into the central system. These competing elites can gain access through federal structures and their resources to solidify their political power in the structure.<ref name=":4" /> According to V.P. Gagnon this was the case in the former [[Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia|Yugoslavia]] and its [[Yugoslav Wars|disintegration]] into its ethnic federal states. Ethnic entrepreneurs were able to take control of the institutionally allocated resources to wage war on other ethnic groups.<ref name="RefError2">{{Cite book|title=The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s|last=Gagnon|first=V.P.|publisher=Cornell University Press|year=2004|url=http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100628500}}</ref>

==== Non-territorial autonomy ====
A recent theory of ethnic tension resolution is [[non-territorial autonomy]] or NTA. NTA has emerged in recent years as an alternative solution to ethnic tensions and grievances in places that are likely to breed conflict.<ref name=":8">{{Cite journal|last=Osipov|first=Alexander|date=2013|title=Non-Territorial Autonomy during and after Communism: In the Wrong or Right Place?|journal=Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe}}</ref> For this reason, NTA has been promoted as a more practical and state building solution than consociationalism.<ref name=":8" /> NTA, alternatively known as non-cultural autonomy (NCA), is based on the difference of ''[[jus soli]]s'' and ''[[jus sanguinis]],'' the principles of territory versus that of personhood.<ref name=":9">{{Cite journal|last=Coakley|first=John|date=1994|title=Approaches to the Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: The Strategy of Non-territorial Autonomy|journal=International Political Science Review|volume=15|issue=3|pages=297–314|doi=10.1177/019251219401500305|s2cid=154019481}}</ref> It gives rights to ethnic groups to self-rule and govern matters potentially concerning but limited to: education, language, culture, internal affairs, religion, and the internally established institutions needed to promote and reproduce these facets.<ref name=":8" /><ref name=":9" /><ref name=":10">{{Cite web|url=http://www.stefanwolff.com/files/ConsociationalTheoryPaper.pdf|title=A Consociational Theory of Conflict Management|last=Wolff|first=Stefan|access-date=2016-05-07|archive-date=2015-02-18|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150218104705/http://www.stefanwolff.com/files/ConsociationalTheoryPaper.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref> In contrast to federalism, the ethnic groups are not assigned a titular sub-state, but rather the ethnic groups are dispersed throughout the state unit. Their group rights and autonomy are not constrained to a particular territory within the state. This is done in order not to weaken the center state such as in the case of ethnofederalism.<ref name=":4" /><ref name=":0" />

The origin of NTA can be traced back to the Marxists works of [[Otto Bauer]] and [[Karl Renner]].<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":11">{{Cite book|title=Challenge of Non-Territorial Autonomy: Theory and Practice|last=Smith|first=David J.|publisher=Peter Lang|chapter=Challenges of Non-Territorial Autonomy in Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe}}</ref> NTA was employed during the interwar period, and the League of Nations sought to add protection clauses for national minorities in new states.<ref name=":9" /> In the 1920s, [[Estonia]] granted some cultural autonomy to the German and Jewish populations in order to ease conflicts between the groups and the newly independent state.<ref name=":11" />

In Europe, most notably in [[Belgium]], NTA laws have been enacted and created parallel institutions and political parties in the same country.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Dalle Mulle|first=Emmanuel|date=2016|title=Belgium and the Brussels Question: The Role of Non-Territorial Autonomy|journal=Ethnopolitics}}</ref> In Belgium, NTA has been integrated within the federal consociational system.<ref name=":10" /> Some scholars of ethnic conflict resolution claim that the practice of NTA will be employed dependent on the concentration and size of the ethnic group asking for group rights.<ref name=":9" /><ref name=":10" />

Other scholars, such as Clarke, argue that the successful implementation of NTA rests on the acknowledgement in a state of "universal" principles: true [[rule of law]], established [[human rights]], stated guarantees to minorities and their members to use their own quotidien language, religion, and food practices, and a framework of anti-discrimination legislation in order to enforce these rights.<ref name=":12">{{Cite book|title=The Challenge of Non-Territorial Autonomy|last=Clarke|first=Charles|publisher=Peter Lang|chapter=Preface: Using the Ideas of 'Non-Territorial Autonomy' to Avoid Violent Conflict and Meet the Modern Challenges of Nationalism}}</ref> Moreover, no individual can be forced to adhere, identify, or emphasize a particular identity (such as race, gender, sexuality, etc.) without their consent in order for NTA to function for its purpose.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny|last=Sen|first=Amartya|publisher=Penguin|year=2007}}</ref>

Nonetheless, Clarke critiques the weaknesses of NTA in areas such as education, a balance between society wide norms and intracommunity values; policing, for criminal matters and public safety; and political representation, which limits the political choices of an individual if based solely on ethnicity.<ref name=":12" /> Furthermore, the challenge in evaluating the efficacy of NTA lies in the relatively few legal implementations of NTA.

====Cultural rights====
Emphasizing the limits of approaches that focus mainly on institutional answers to ethnic conflicts—which are essentially driven by ethnocultural dynamics of which political and/or economic factors are but elements—Gregory Paul Meyjes urges the use of intercultural communication and cultural-rights based negotiations as tools with which to effectively and sustainably address inter-ethnic strife. Meyjes argues that to fully grasp, preempt, and/or resolve such conflicts—whether with or without the aid of territorial or non-territorial institutional mechanism(s) -- a [[cultural rights]] approach grounded in intercultural knowledge and skill is essential.<ref>Meyjes (also: Posthumus Meyjes), Gregory Paul (2012) 'Multi-Ethnic Conflicts in U.S. Military Theatres Overseas: Intercultural Imperatives', in Volker Franke and Robert H. "Robin" Dorff (eds.) ''Conflict Management: A Tool for U.S. National Security Strategy'', Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, pp. 381-438</ref><ref>Meyjes (also: Posthumus Meyjes), Gregory Paul (2007) 'Plan "C" is for Culture: out of Iraq – Opportunity,' Landpower Essay 07-4, May 2007, Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army.</ref>