Editing Condorcet paradox (section)

=== Two-stage voting processes ===
One important implication of the possible existence of the voting paradox in a practical situation is that in a paired voting process like those of standard [[parliamentary procedure]], the eventual winner will depend on the way the majority votes are ordered. For example, say a popular bill is set to pass, before some other group offers an amendment; this amendment passes by majority vote. This may result in a majority of a [[legislature]] rejecting the bill as a whole, thus creating a paradox (where a popular amendment to a popular bill has made it unpopular). This logical inconsistency is the origin of the [[poison pill amendment]], which deliberately engineers a false Condorcet cycle to kill a bill. Likewise, the order of votes in a legislature can be manipulated by the person arranging them to ensure their preferred outcome wins.

Despite frequent objections by [[social choice theory|social choice theorists]] about the logically incoherent results of such procedures, and the existence of better alternatives for choosing between multiple versions of a bill, the procedure of pairwise majority-rule is widely-used and is codified into the [[by-law]]s or parliamentary procedures of almost every kind of [[deliberative assembly]].