Editing Chrysippus (section)

===Fate===
For Chrysippus, all things happen according to [[destiny|fate]]: what seems to be accidental has always some hidden cause.<ref name="zeller178">{{Harvnb|Zeller|1880|p=178}}</ref> The unity of the world consists in the chain-like dependence of cause upon cause.<ref name="zeller176">{{Harvnb|Zeller|1880|p=176}}</ref> Nothing can take place without a sufficient cause.<ref name="zeller175">{{Harvnb|Zeller|1880|p=175}}</ref> According to Chrysippus, every proposition is either true or false, and this must apply to future events as well:<ref name="zeller174">{{Harvnb|Zeller|1880|p=174}}</ref>
<blockquote>If any motion exists without a cause, then not every proposition will be either true or false. For that which has not efficient causes is neither true nor false. But every proposition is either true or false. Therefore, there is no motion without a cause. And if this is so, then all effects owe their existence to prior causes. And if this is so, all things happen by fate. It follows therefore that whatever happens, happens by fate.<ref>Cicero, ''On Fate'', 20–21</ref></blockquote>
The Stoic view of fate is entirely based on a view of the universe as a whole. Individual things and persons only come into consideration as dependent parts of this whole.<ref name="zeller177">{{Harvnb|Zeller|1880|p=177}}</ref> Everything is, in every respect, determined by this relation, and is consequently subject to the general order of the world.<ref name="zeller176"/>

If his opponents objected that, if everything is determined by destiny, there is no [[individual responsibility]], since what has been once foreordained must happen, come what may, Chrysippus replied that there is a distinction to be made between simple and complex predestination.<ref name="zeller181">{{Harvnb|Zeller|1880|p=181}}</ref> Becoming ill may be fated whatever happens but, if a person's recovery is linked to consulting a doctor, then consulting the doctor is fated to occur together with that person's recovery, and this becomes a complex fact.<ref name="kenny195">{{Harvnb|Kenny|2006|p=195}} referencing [[Cicero]], ''On Fate'', 28–29</ref> All human actions{{snd}}in fact, our destiny{{snd}}are decided by our relation to things,<ref name="zeller182">{{Harvnb|Zeller|1880|p=182}}</ref> or as Chrysippus put it, events are "co-fated" to occur:<ref name="kenny195"/>
<blockquote>The non-destruction of one's coat, he says, is not fated simply, but co-fated with its being taken care of, and someone's being saved from his enemies is co-fated with his fleeing those enemies; and having children is co-fated with being willing to lie with a woman. ... For many things cannot occur without our being willing and indeed contributing a most strenuous eagerness and zeal for these things, since, he says, it was fated for these things to occur in conjunction with this personal effort. ... But it will be in our power, he says, with what is in our power being included in fate.<ref>[[Diogenianus]] in [[Eusebius of Caesarea|Eusebius]], ''[[Praeparatio evangelica]]'', vi. 8, quoted in {{harvnb|Inwood|Gerson|1997|p=190}}</ref></blockquote>
Thus our actions are predetermined, and are causally related to the overarching network of fate, but nevertheless the moral responsibility of how we respond to impressions remains our own.<ref>{{Harvnb|Brunschwig|Sedley|2003|p=172}}</ref> The one all-determining power is active everywhere, working in each particular being according to its nature, whether in rational or irrational creatures or in inorganic objects.<ref name="zeller179">{{Harvnb|Zeller|1880|p=179}}</ref> Every action is brought about by the co-operation of causes depending on the nature of things and the character of the agent.<ref name="zeller179"/> Our actions would only be involuntary if they were produced by external causes alone, without any co-operation – on the part of our wills – with external causes.<ref name="zeller179"/> Virtue and vice are set down as things in our power, for which, consequently, we are responsible.<ref name="zeller180">{{Harvnb|Zeller|1880|p=180}}</ref> Moral responsibility depends only on freedom of the will, and what emanates from our will is our own, no matter whether it is possible for us to act differently or not.<ref name="zeller180"/> This rather subtle position, which attempts to reconcile determinism with human responsibility, is known as soft-determinism, or as [[compatibilism]].<ref>{{Harvnb|Gould|1970|p=152, note 3}}</ref>