Editing Bruce Schneier (section)

=== System design ===
Schneier has criticized security approaches that try to prevent any malicious incursion, instead arguing that designing systems to [[failing badly|fail well]] is more important.<ref name="ATLANTIC">[http://charlesmann.org/articles/Homeland-Insecurity-Atlantic.pdf Homeland Insecurity] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110928002928/http://charlesmann.org/articles/Homeland-Insecurity-Atlantic.pdf |date=September 28, 2011 }}, ''[[Atlantic Monthly]]'', September 2002</ref> The designer of a system should not underestimate the capabilities of an attacker, as technology may make it possible in the future to do things that are not possible at the present.<ref name="crypto_harder" /> Under [[Kerckhoffs's Principle]], the need for one or more parts of a cryptographic system to remain secret increases the fragility of the system; whether details about a system should be obscured depends upon the availability of persons who can make use of the information for beneficial uses versus the potential for attackers to misuse the information.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0205.html |title=Crypto-Gram: May 15, 2002 |date=2002-05-15 |author=Schneier, Bruce |access-date=2011-04-08}}</ref>

{{quote|Secrecy and security aren't the same, even though it may seem that way. Only bad security relies on secrecy; good security works even if all the details of it are public.<ref>Doctorow, Cory. Little Brother. New York: Tor Teen, 2008, page 129.</ref>}}