Editing Bill of Rights 1689 (section)

===United Kingdom===
[[File:Allegory of the English Bill of Rights.png|thumb|[[Allegory (painting)|Allegory]] of the Bill of Rights, with [[Britannia (personification)|Britannia]] presenting the Bill to [[William III of England|William]] and [[Mary II of England|Mary]].]]
The Bill of Rights applies in England and Wales; it was enacted in the [[Kingdom of England]] which at the time included Wales. Scotland has its own legislation, the [[Claim of Right Act 1689]], passed before the Act of Union between England and Scotland. There are doubts as to whether, or to what extent, the Bill of Rights applies in [[Northern Ireland]], reflecting [[#Ireland|earlier doubts as regards Ireland]].{{sfn|Lock|1989|pp=540–561}}{{refn|group=nb|The United Kingdom consists of four countries and three distinct legal systems: [[England and Wales]], [[Scotland]] and [[Northern Ireland]].<ref>{{cite web |title=A Guide to the UK Legal System |url=http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/United_Kingdom.html |department=Hauser Global Law School Program |publisher=New York University School of Law |access-date=16 March 2016 |date=November 2005}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=The Legal System of the United Kingdom |url=http://www.cilex.org.uk/about_cilex_lawyers/the_uk_legal_system.aspx |publisher=The Chartered Institute of Legal Executives |access-date=16 March 2016 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160313232551/http://www.cilex.org.uk/about_cilex_lawyers/the_uk_legal_system.aspx |archive-date=13 March 2016}}</ref> These jurisdictions have particular legal considerations of their own, arising from differences in [[English law]], [[Scots law]] and [[Northern Ireland law]].}}

The requirement that jurors be freeholders in cases of high treason was abolished in England and Wales by the [[Juries Act 1825]], and in Northern Ireland (to the extent it applied) by the [[Statute Law Revision Act 1950]].

[[Natural justice]], the right to a fair trial, is in constitutional law held to temper unfair exploitation of parliamentary privilege. On 21&nbsp;July 1995 a [[libel]] case, ''[[Neil Hamilton (politician)|Neil Hamilton]], MP v [[The Guardian]]'', collapsed as the High Court ruled that the Bill of Rights' total bar on bringing into question anything said or done in the House prevented ''The Guardian'' from obtaining a [[fair trial|fair hearing]]. Hamilton could otherwise have carte blanche to allege any background or meaning to his words, and no contradicting direct evidence, inference, extra submission or cross-examination of his words could take place due to the tight strictures of the Bill of Rights. Equally, the House of Lords decided that, absent a 1996 statutory provision, the Bill of Rights' entrenched parliamentary privilege would have prevented a fair trial for Hamilton in the 2001 defamation action of ''Hamilton v Al-Fayed'' which went through the two tiers of appeal to like effect.<ref>As mentioned in {{cite BAILII
|litigants    = Kimathi & Ors v Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|court        = EWHC
|division     = QB
|year         = 2017
|num          = 3379 
|parallelcite = [2018] 4 WLR 48
|date         = 20 December 2017
|courtname    = auto
|juris        = auto
|para         = 11
}}</ref> That provision was section 13 of the [[Defamation Act 1996]], which permits [[Member of Parliament|MP]]s to waive their [[parliamentary privilege]] and thus cite and have examined their own speeches if relevant to litigation.<ref>{{cite news |author1=Alexander Horne |author2=Oonagh Gay |title=Ending the Hamilton Affair? |newspaper=UK Constitutional Law Association |url=http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2014/05/21/alexander-horne-and-oonagh-gay-ending-the-hamilton-affair/ |publisher=UK Constitutional Law Association Blog |access-date=19 March 2015 |date=21 May 2014}}</ref>

Following the [[2016 United Kingdom European Union membership referendum|United Kingdom European Union membership referendum]] in 2016, the Bill of Rights was cited by the Supreme Court in the [[R (Miller and Dos Santos) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union|''Miller'' case]], in which the court ruled that triggering EU exit must first be authorised by an act of Parliament, because doing so would abrogate rights secured by an Act of Parliament (namely, rights of EU citizens arising from the EU treaties given effect in UK law by the [[European Communities Act 1972 (UK)|European Communities Act 1972]], as amended).<ref>{{cite BAILII |litigants=R (on the application of Miller & another) v The Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union |year=2016 |court=EWHC |num=2768 |division=Admin |date=3 November 2016}}
{{quote|This subordination of the Crown (i.e. the executive government) to law is the foundation of the [[rule of law]] in the United Kingdom. It has its roots well before the war between the Crown and Parliament in the seventeenth century but was decisively confirmed in the settlement arrived at with the Glorious Revolution in 1688 and has been recognised ever since. Sir Edward Coke reports the considered view of himself and the senior judges of the time in The ''[[Case of Proclamations]]'' (1610) 12&nbsp;Co. Rep.&nbsp;74, that:
{{quote|style=font-size:inherit|the King by his proclamation or other ways cannot change any part of the common law, or statute law, or the customs of the realm}}
and that:
{{quote|style=font-size:inherit|the King hath no prerogative, but that which the law of the land allows him.}}
The position was confirmed in the first two parts of Section&nbsp;1 of the Bill of Rights 1688:
{{quote|style=font-size:inherit|
Suspending power – That the pretended power of suspending of laws or the execution of laws by regall authority without consent of Parlyament is illegall.

Late dispensing power – That the pretended power of dispensing with laws or the execution of laws by regall authoritie as it hath beene assumed and exercised of late<!--transcription error corrected--> is illegall.}}}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Brexit court ruling: Your questions answered |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-37864983 |access-date=4 November 2016 |work=BBC}}</ref> It was cited again by the Supreme Court in its [[R (Miller) v The Prime Minister and Cherry v Advocate General for Scotland|2019 ruling that the prorogation of parliament was unlawful]]. The Court disagreed with the Government's assertion that prorogation could not be questioned under the Bill of Rights 1689 as a "proceeding of Parliament"; it ruled the opposite assertion, that prorogation "cannot sensibly be described as a 'proceeding in Parliament{{'"}}, as it was imposed upon and not debatable by Parliament, and could bring "core or essential business of Parliament" to an end without debate.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2019-0192-judgment.pdf |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221009/https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2019-0192-judgment.pdf |archive-date=2022-10-09 |url-status=live|title=R (on the application of Miller) (Appellant) v The Prime Minister (Respondent) Cherry and others (Respondents) v Advocate General for Scotland (Appellant) (Scotland)|date=24 September 2019|publisher=The Supreme Court|access-date=24 September 2019|quote=It must therefore follow, as a concomitant of Parliamentary sovereignty, that the power to prorogue cannot be unlimited. Statutory requirements as to sittings of Parliament have indeed been enacted from time to time, for example by the Statute of 1362 (36 Edward III c 10), the Triennial Acts of 1640 and 1664, the Bill of Rights 1688, the Scottish Claim of Right 1689, the Meeting of Parliament Act 1694, and most recently the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation etc) Act 2019, section 3. Their existence confirms the necessity of a legal limit on the power to prorogue, but they do not address the situation with which the present appeals are concerned. ... The prorogation itself takes place in the House of Lords and in the presence of Members of both Houses. But it cannot sensibly be described as a 'proceeding in Parliament'. It is not a decision of either House of Parliament. Quite the contrary: it is something which is imposed upon them from outside. It is not something upon which the Members of Parliament can speak or vote. The Commissioners [when performing the prorogation] are not acting in their capacity as members of the House of Lords but in their capacity as Royal Commissioners carrying out the Queen's bidding. They have no freedom of speech. This is not the core or essential business of Parliament. Quite the contrary: it brings that core or essential business of Parliament to an end.}}</ref>