Editing Battle of Zama (section)

==Battle==
===Numbers involved===
[[File:Hannibal Slodtz Louvre MR2093 (cropped2).png|left|upright=0.75|thumb|alt=a photograph of a white marble head depicting Hannibal|{{center|1704 French bust of Hannibal}}]]

Little is known of the number of men Scipio commanded at Zama.{{sfn|Edwell|2015|p=336}} An estimated 25,000–30,000 men had landed in Africa the year before and there is no record of any reinforcements arriving from Italy. However, the strength of the force left to guard their camp and continue the siege of Utica is not known, nor is the level of attrition suffered in the three major battles and several skirmishes the legions had so far been involved in.{{sfn|Lazenby|1998|p=221}}{{sfn|Miles|2011|p=309}} The ancient sources agree that the Romans were supported by 6,000 Numidian infantry and 4,000 cavalry under Masinissa. The ancient historian Appian, writing 350 years after the event, states that the Numidians brought the total to 34,500 troops, but modern historians do not accept this.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|pp=301–302}}{{sfn|Edwell|2015|p=336}} They usually give a total of 29,000{{sfn|Miles|2011|p=316}}{{sfn|Taylor|2019|p=316}} or 30,000,{{sfn|Lazenby|1998|p=219}}{{sfn|Taylor|2019|p=316}} although [[Nigel Bagnall]] gives 40,000.{{sfn|Bagnall|1999|p=291}} Of these, slightly more than 6,000 were cavalry.{{sfn|Lazenby|1998|p=221}}

Appian states that the Carthaginian army at the battle of Zama consisted of 50,000 men; this is discounted by many modern historians,{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|p=302}} although some accept it with provisos.{{sfn|Taylor|2019|p=317, 317 n. 24}} Most give 40,000, based on Polybius. Of these, all but 4,000 were infantry. Hannibal's army had abandoned its horses in Italy because of a lack of shipping space and Masinissa's defeat of Syphax had dried up the supply of Numidian cavalry; thus, even with the recent addition of 2,000 Numidians the Carthaginians fielded only 4,000 cavalry.{{sfn|Lazenby|1998|pp=220–221}}{{sfn|Bahmanyar|2016|p=41}}{{sfn|Carey|2007|p=115}} Hannibal also deployed 80 war elephants, the first time these are recorded as being used since Scipio invaded. Hannibal delayed seeking battle to give his army time to train up a force of elephants. Such forces had been fielded earlier in the war in both Italy and Iberia. Hannibal had famously taken elephants over the Alps in 218 BC. It is unclear why Carthage was not able to field a force of fully trained war elephants at Zama, or at any time since Scipio invaded.{{sfn|Edwards|2001|p=903}}{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|pp=163–166, 250, 279}}{{sfn|Bahmanyar|2016|p=53}}

===Initial dispositions===
[[File:Mohammad adil rais-battle of zama-1.PNG|thumb|upright=1.3|alt=A map showing the initial dispositions of both armies|right|{{center| The initial deployment of the Roman and Carthaginian armies}}]]

The Roman army formed up with the heavy infantry of its two Roman legions in the centre and with allied legions on each side of them.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|p=302}}{{sfn|Bahmanyar|2016|p=41}} As usual, the {{lang|la|hastati}} formed the front rank with the {{lang|la|principes}} and then the {{lang|la|triarii}} behind them. Instead of organising each legion's maniples{{snd}}the basic Roman infantry manoeuvre unit of 120 men each{{snd}}in the usual "checkerboard" or {{lang|la|[[quincunx]]}} formation, Scipio arranged a {{lang|la|principes}} maniple directly behind each maniple of {{lang|la|hastati}}. This left broad avenues through the Roman lines, which were occupied by the Roman light infantry, the {{lang|la|velites}}. Masinissa's 4,000 Numidian cavalry were on the right of the infantry. Laelius led 1,500 Roman and allied cavalry positioned on the left. There were a further 600 Numidian cavalry under Dacamas, but it is not known whether they were attached to Masinissa's or Laelius's force.{{sfn|Lazenby|1998|pp=221–222}} It is not stated in the ancient sources what role or roles the 6,000 Numidian infantry took up. Modern suggestions include operating in close support of their cavalry, guarding the Roman camp, supplementing the {{lang|la|velites}} as skirmishers or forming up as close-order infantry to one side of the legions.{{sfn|Taylor|2019|p=322}}

The Carthaginian deployment reflected the fact that Hannibal's command was made up of the survivors of three different armies. Hannibal had not had time to integrate the forces he had been allocated into a unified command and so felt it wisest to deploy them separately.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|p=303}} The Carthaginian infantry, like the Romans', went in the centre. Its first line was made up largely of veterans of Mago's failed expedition to northern Italy. The close-order troops were [[Iberians]], [[Gauls]] and [[Ligurians]]. In front of these heavy infantry were light-infantry skirmishers consisting of Balearic slingers, [[Mauri|Moor]] archers and Moor and Ligurian javelin-men. The total strength of this component was 12,000 men. In front of these infantry were the 80 war elephants, evenly spaced along the line, approximately {{convert|30|m}} apart.{{sfn|Lazenby|1998|p=222}}{{sfn|Bagnall|1999|p=291}}{{sfn|Bahmanyar|2016|p=55}} The modern historian José Lago states that the Carthaginian light infantry were sent out in front of the whole Carthaginian army, as was usual, including in front of the elephants,{{sfn|Lago|2013|p=60}}{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|p=57}} for the several hours it took the army to form up.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|p=304}}

Carthaginians and other Africans made up the second line. They were either survivors of the earlier campaigns whose morale was poor or freshly raised recruits who had received little training. They probably fought as close-order infantry; Polybius describes them as adopting phalanx formations, but there is modern debate as to just what this describes. The strength of the second line is not known, but it is sometimes assumed by modern historians to have consisted of a further 12,000 men.{{sfn|Lazenby|1998|p=222}}{{sfn|Bahmanyar|2016|p=56}}{{sfn|Daly|2002|p=87}} About {{convert|200|m|sigfig=1}} behind the Carthaginian second line were the infantry Hannibal had brought back from Italy. Most of them were [[Bruttians]], but they included some Africans and Iberians who had left Iberia with Hannibal more than 17 years before, and Gauls recruited in northern Italy in 218 and 217 BC. All were battle-hardened veterans.{{sfn|Lazenby|1998|p=222}}{{sfn|Carey|2007|p=117}} This third line is variously estimated at 12,000,{{sfn|Carey|2007|p=116}} 15,000–20,000{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|p=303}} or 20,000{{sfn|Miles|2011|p=317}}{{sfn|Taylor|2019|p=318}} men by modern historians. The Carthaginians are believed to have fielded approximately 4,000 cavalry. Hannibal placed the Numidians among them on his left flank, facing Masinissa's Numidians; and the other African cavalry on the right. How many of the total of 4,000 cavalry were in each of these contingents is not known, although Lazenby suggests that the Numidians on the left would have been the stronger.{{sfn|Lazenby|1998|p=222}}

===Initial charges===
[[File:Roman Consular Army.png|thumb|left|upright=1.2|alt=A diagram showing the usual deployment of a legionary maniple and how that fitted within a legion and a typical army|{{center|How a consular army would usually deploy, at Zama each maniple of {{lang|la|principes}} deployed slightly to the left, leaving nine broad avenues through each legion.{{sfn|Bagnall|1999|p=292}}}}]]

The armies advanced towards each other, the first clashes occurring on the Carthaginian left flank, the Roman right, between the 2,000 or more Carthaginian-supporting Numidian cavalry and the 4,000{{snd}}or possibly 4,600{{snd}}siding with the Romans. Each force sent detachments to hurl javelins at the other and then withdraw. Lazenby describes these skirmishes as "desultory". Hannibal then ordered a charge against the Roman infantry by his 80 elephants, with the whole of his first two lines moving forward in support.{{sfn|Carey|2007|pp=117–118}}{{sfn|Lazenby|1998|p=223}} The modern historian Jacob Edwards, in a study of Hannibal's use of elephants during the war, describes their deployment at Zama as "an ill-advised practice which departed from the successful tactics used previously". He suggests that they would have been better employed against the superior Roman cavalry on the flanks, rather than directly charging the Roman infantry.{{sfn|Edwards|2001|p=903}} It is possible that Hannibal believed the elephants would have brought an element of surprise, as their previous use in the war had been limited.{{sfn|Dorey|Dudley|1971|p=144}} Most modern accounts have the elephants in front of the Carthaginian infantry,{{sfn|Lazenby|1998|p=222}}{{sfn|Bagnall|1999|p=291}}{{sfn|Bahmanyar|2016|p=55}} but Lago has the Carthaginian light infantry in front of the whole Carthaginian army,{{sfn|Lago|2013|p=60}} skirmishing with their opposite numbers, as was usual before armies were formed up and ready to commence the battle proper.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|p=57}} Lago states that they stayed in front of and between the elephants, protecting them from the javelins of the Roman {{lang|la|velites}} until the elephants charged.{{sfn|Lago|2013|p=60}}

As the elephants advanced, the {{lang|la|velites}} moved forward into the gap between the armies, hurled javelins at the elephants, and fell back.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|p=304}} The Roman heavy infantry then sounded their bugles, and possibly rhythmically banged their weapons against their shields – swashbuckling.{{efn|Swashbuckling is to noisily strike{{snd}}"[[:wikt:swash|swash]]"{{snd}}a sword or spear against one's shield or "[[buckler]]".{{sfn|SOED|1962|p=1098}}|group=note}}{{sfn|Bagnall|1999|p=293}} This startled some of the elephants and several of those on the left turned and fled, past the end of the line of infantry behind them. Edwards expresses amazement that war elephants should be so easily panicked and again suggests that at least some of the animals were "young and inexperienced at battle" making them "a liability rather than an asset". These out-of-control elephants trampled their way through the Carthaginian-backing Numidian cavalry, thoroughly disordering them.{{sfn|Carey|2007|p=115}}{{sfn|Edwards|2001|p=903}} Masinissa took advantage of the situation by ordering a charge. This routed the disordered cavalry and they fled, pursued by Masinissa's force.{{sfn|Bagnall|1999|p=293}}

Most of the rest of the elephants charged into the Roman infantry, amid showers of javelins. Terrified by the swashbuckling infantry and their bugles the majority stampeded into the broad gaps the Romans had left between their maniples. Many of the {{lang|la|velites}} were killed as they ran back in front of the elephants and into the gaps between the ranks of the heavy infantry. From there they hurled javelins into the elephants' flanks. Those elephants, which emerged into the rear of the Roman army, were all wounded and now cut off. They were subsequently hunted down and killed. Some elephants did charge into the {{lang|la|hastati}} as planned, where they caused heavy casualties before being driven off. This causes Mir Bahmanyar to suggest that the elephants accomplished what Hannibal expected of them. Some elephants balked at charging the {{lang|la|hastati}} on the Roman left and attacked the cavalry alongside them, who also showered the elephants with javelins. Most of these elephants were badly wounded and had lost their crews by this point; those that could flee avoided the line of Carthaginian infantry, but not the Carthaginian cavalry on the right flank. This cavalry force became disorganised by the out-of-control elephants and like Masinissa, Laelius ordered his cavalry to take advantage of this and charge. The Carthaginian cavalry were swept from the field and the Roman cavalry closely pursued them.{{sfn|Carey|2007|pp=118, 122}}{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|p=304}}{{sfn|Bagnall|1999|p=293}}{{sfn|Koon|2015|p=84}}{{sfn|Bahmanyar|2016|p=67}}

===Infantry engagement===

With the battlefield cleared of both elephants and cavalry all three ranks of the Roman heavy infantry and the first two of Carthaginian advanced towards each other. The Carthaginian third rank, Hannibal's Italian veterans, remained in place. The two front ranks charged enthusiastically and violently into each other and commenced a hard-fought, close-quarter, hand-to-hand combat. The Romans' superior weaponry and organisation eventually told and despite the {{lang|la|hastati}} taking further heavy losses, the Carthaginian front rank broke and fled. They attempted to make their way through the Carthaginian second rank, but these men refused to let them pass; according to Polybius to the point of fighting them off. The survivors of the front rank were forced to make their escape around the flanks of the second rank. Many of these then rallied and rejoined the fight by extending the flanks of the Carthaginian second rank.{{sfn|Bahmanyar|2016|p=70}}{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|pp=305–306}}

The {{lang|la|hastati}}, despite having taken casualties from the elephants and the Carthaginian first rank, now attacked the Carthaginian second rank. Polybius reports that the Carthaginian and other African spearmen who made up this force fought "fanatically and in an extraordinary manner".{{sfn|Lazenby|1998|p=224}} The Romans were pushed back in disorder. Bahmanyar opines that the Roman front rank came close to being broken at this stage.{{sfn|Bahmanyar|2016|p=71}} The Romans were forced to commit their second line, the {{lang|la|principes}}, to the fight.{{sfn|Bagnall|1999|pp=293–294}}{{sfn|Carey|2007|p=124}} [[B. H. Liddell Hart|Liddell Hart]] writes that even the {{lang|la|principes}} struggled to hold the line,{{sfn|Liddell Hart|1976|p=182}} but eventually this reinforcement was sufficient to break the Carthaginian second line; they fled, pursued impetuously by the {{lang|la|hastati}}.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|p=306}}

Both Bahmanyar and Goldsworthy suggest this was an opportunity for the Carthaginian third line to counter-attack the disorganised {{lang|la|hastati}}, but that Hannibal decided against it because his third line was some distance back, the fleeing Carthaginians from the first two lines were inadvertently blocking a clean charge and because the ground over which the third line would have attacked was strewn with corpses.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|p=306}}{{sfn|Bahmanyar|2016|p=76}} According to Polybius the gap between the fighting lines "was now covered with blood, slaughter, and dead bodies&nbsp;... slippery corpses which were still soaked in blood and had fallen in heaps".{{sfn|Koon|2015|pp=91–92}} Bagnall suggests the withdrawal of the Carthaginian second line was more deliberate and orderly than the ancient sources portray.{{sfn|Bagnall|1999|p=294}} Taylor believes that Hannibal had hoped that the Romans would rush forward in pursuit at this stage and that he had prepared an infantry envelopment in anticipation of this. In the event, Scipio saw the potential trap and his troops were disciplined enough to break off their pursuit when recalled.{{sfn|Taylor|2019|pp=324–327}}

===Decision===
The Romans recalled the pursuing {{lang|la|hastati}} by sounding bugles and reformed their line. The Carthaginian third line{{snd}}Hannibal's veterans supplemented by some of the survivors of the first and second lines{{snd}}was longer than the Roman formation and outflanked it on both sides. The {{lang|la|hastati}} formed up in the centre and the {{lang|la|principes}} and {{lang|la|triarii}} moved to each side to make a single, longer line. There was a prolonged pause while this was taking place. The Carthaginians took advantage of the hiatus to rally some of their first and second line troops, using them to extend the length of their own fighting line. This enabled Roman close-order infantry to match the length of the Carthaginian's third line, but correspondingly thinned their line, preventing them from using their habitual tactic of feeding new, less-fatigued men into the fighting line as a combat wore on.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|p=306}}{{sfn|Taylor|2019|pp=324–326}} The surviving heavy infantry of each side were roughly equal in numbers. Most of the original Carthaginian were equipped in the same manner as the Romans they faced. They were veterans of many years' experience and they were fresh, having not yet fought. Many of the Romans were veterans, some having fought at Cannae and almost all having taken part in the two, or for some three, major victories the previous year. Many of the Romans were tired from the two immediately preceding fierce combats, but their victories in both would have boosted their morale.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|pp=306–307}}

Having satisfactorily reorganised, the two lines charged each other, according to Polybius "with the greatest fire and fury".{{sfn|Bagnall|1999|p=294}} The fight continued for some time, neither side gaining the advantage.{{sfn|Carey|2007|p=125}} Lazenby describes this fighting as "a grim business".{{sfn|Lazenby|1998|p=225}} The cavalry commanded by Masinissa and Laelius then returned to the battlefield, apparently at more or less the same time.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|p=307}} Philip Sabin states that they arrived "in the nick of time".{{sfn|Sabin|1996|p=67 n. 52}} Being fiercely engaged to their front, the Carthaginian infantry were helpless to prevent the Roman cavalry from charging into their rear. Their line collapsed and there was a great massacre.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|p=307}} Hannibal was one of the few Carthaginians to escape.{{sfn|Bagnall|1999|p=295}}

===Casualties===

Polybius states that 20,000 Carthaginians were killed and as many again taken prisoner, which accounts for the entire Carthaginian army. He gives Roman losses as 1,500 killed. This is five per cent or more of their total force; Goldsworthy considers this fatality rate "a substantial loss for a victorious army, testimony to the hard fighting" and that the battle as a whole was "a slogging match". The number of wounded is not known, although the ancient sources refer to many wounded Roman soldiers being carried to the rear during the pause before the final engagement.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|pp=306–307}}{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2004|p=76}} At least 11 Carthaginian elephants survived the battle to be captured by the Romans.{{sfn|Carey|2007|p=125}} 

Hannibal and his companions reached the main Carthaginian base at Hadrumetum, where they mustered 6,000 infantry and 500 cavalry. Hannibal considered this too few with which to continue the war and advised the Carthaginian Senate to make peace on whatever terms they could.{{sfn|Taylor|2019|pp=326–327}}