Editing Battle of New Orleans (section)

==Battle==
[[File:Edward pakenham.jpg|thumb|upright=1.35|The ''Death of Pakenham at the Battle of New Orleans'' by [[F. O. C. Darley]] shows the death of British Maj. Gen. Sir [[Edward Pakenham]] on January 8, 1815]]

The Americans had constructed three lines of defense, with the forward line four miles south of the city. It was strongly entrenched at the Rodriguez Canal, which stretched from a swamp to the river, with a timber, loop-holed breastwork and earthworks for artillery.{{sfnmp|Davis|2019|1pp=162-165|Porter|1889|2p=361}}

General Lambert and two infantry battalions totaling 1700 soldiers disembarked and reinforced the British on January 5.{{NoteTag|'On the 5th of January the 7th and 43rd landed.. mustering upwards of 1700 bayonets'{{sfnp|Levinge|2009|p=220}}}} This brought the amount of disembarked men to about 8,000.{{NoteTag|'Fresh spirit was given to the army by the unexpected arrival of Major General Lambert, with the 7th and 43rd; two fine battalions, mustering each eight hundred effective men. By this reinforcement, together with the addition of a body of sailors and marines from the fleet, our numbers amounted now to little short of eight thousand men; a force which, in almost any other quarter of America, would have been irresistible.'{{sfnp|Gleig|1827|p=320}} This figure of about 8,000 is corroborated by other sources.}}

The British battle plan was for an attack against the 20-gun right bank battery, then to turn those guns on the American line to assist the frontal attack.{{sfnp|Porter|1889|p=362}} Colonel [[William Thornton (British Army officer)|William Thornton]] was to cross the Mississippi during the night with his force, move rapidly upriver, storm the battery commanded by Commodore [[Daniel Patterson (naval officer)|Daniel Patterson]] on the flank of the main American entrenchments, and then open an [[Enfilade and defilade|enfilading]] fire on Jackson's line with the captured artillery, directly across from the earthworks manned by the vast majority of the American troops.

On the other bank, Major General Samuel Gibbs was to lead the main assault against the center left by his (2nd) brigade. As a feint, a column of light infantry companies (from 4th, 21st Foot) led by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Rennie would march along the river. This would be 'considered as belonging to' the (1st) Brigade commanded by General Keane. Keane's men would move to either exploit the success along the river, or move against the center in support of Gibbs. The right flank, along the swamp, was to be protected by light infantry (detached from 7th, 43rd, 93rd Foot) commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Jones (of the 4th Foot). The (3rd) brigade commanded by Major General [[John Lambert (British Army officer)|John Lambert]] was held in reserve.{{NoteTag|The battle plan was outlined in a memorandum by Pakenham, a copy of which has been reproduced.{{sfnp|Forrest|1961|p=40-42}} }}

Reilly notes that the advance columns of the brigades of Keane and Gibbs would be about 650 yards from the American lines. Given they would be in sight of, and in range of, the artillery, it was important to storm the ditch at first light.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|p=286}}

The start of the battle was marked by the launch of a signal rocket{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|p=289}} at 6:20am, soon after followed by artillery fire from the British lines towards Jackson's headquarters at the McCarty house.{{sfnp|Davis|2019|p=239-241}}

===Right Bank===
The preparations of the British had not gone unnoticed.{{sfnp|Hughes|Brodine|2023|p=1011-1015}} The Louisiana Militia brigade were reinforced by 200 Kentucky militiamen commanded by Colonel Davis. They arrived at 4am, after a five mile march through mud. Exhausted, they had not eaten since noon the prior day. Morgan deployed them between two positions, a mile apart.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|pp=288–289}}

The British dug a canal to enable 42 small boats to get to the river.{{sfnp|Porter|1889|p=361}} Preparations for the attack had floundered early on January 8, as the canal collapsed and the dam failed, leaving the sailors to drag the boats through the mud with Thornton's right bank assault force. This left the force starting off just before daybreak, eight hours late according to Thornton's dispatch,{{sfnp|Thornton|1815|pp=440-441}} assessed in 2008 to be 12 hours late.{{sfnp|Patterson|2008|p=236}}{{NoteTag|Gleig narrates in the third person of his participation on the attack on the Right Bank. 'No boats had arrived; hour after hour elapsed before they came.... Instead of reaching the opposite bank at latest by midnight, dawn was beginning to appear before the boats quitted the canal.... It was in vain that they made good their landing and formed upon the beach, without opposition or alarm; day had already broke, and the signal-rocket was seen in the air, while they were yet four miles from the batteries, which ought hours ago to have been taken.'{{sfnp|Gleig|1827|p=323}} }} In the early morning of January 8, Pakenham gave his final orders for the two-pronged assault. The frontal attack was not postponed, however, as the British hoped that the force on the right bank would create a diversion, even if they did not succeed in the assault.{{sfnp|Porter|1889|p=361}}

As a consequence of the sides of the canal caving in and choking the passage that night, only enough boats got through to carry 560 men,{{sfnmp|Brown|1969|1p=152|Hickey|1989|2p=211}}{{NoteTag|'We were unable to proceed across the river until eight hours after the time appointed, and even then, with only a third of the force which you had allotted for the service.'{{sfnp|Thornton|1815|pp=440-441}}}}{{NoteTag|Concerning the strength and composition of Thornton's force. Correspondence from Cochrane to Admiralty dated January 18, contained within {{London Gazette|startpage=450|issue=16991|date=9 March 1815}}, also in archives with reference ADM 1/508 folio 757, states 'the whole amounting to about six hundred men'. Gleig uses the source document a report from Thornton to Pakenham 'we were unable to proceed across the river until eight hours after the time appointed, and even then with only a third part of the force which you had allotted for the service viz 298 of the 85th, and 200 Seamen and Marines.'{{sfnp|Gleig|1827|p=340}} Duncan, with recourse to Dickson's papers: '[Pakenham] sent to enquire how many men had been embarked: and, having been informed that the 85th Foot, with some Marines—amounting in all to 460 — had been put on board, and that there was room for 100 more, he ordered that additional number to be embarked, and the whole to cross without delay.'{{sfnp|Duncan|1873|p=405-406}} }}{{NoteTag|'The force of the enemy did not exceed four hundred men.' Despatch from Major Foelcker to General Jackson dated January 8, 1815. 'The force of the enemy on this side amounted to 1,000, men.' Despatch from Patterson to [[United States Secretary of the Navy]] dated January 13, 1815. Both reproduced in a secondary source{{sfnp|Hughes|Brodine|2023|p=1014-1015,1018-1019}} }} just one-third of the intended force.{{NoteTag|Hughes & Brodine quotes from a letter from General Lambert to the Secretary of State for War dated January 28, republished in the London Gazette,{{sfnp|Lambert|1815|pp=442–443}} which mentions the original plan was to send over a larger force of a further 100 sailors, a further 300 marines, four cannons with gunners, and the battalion of the 5th West India Regiment.{{sfnp|Hughes|Brodine|2023|p=1002-1006}} }} Captain Rowland Money led the Navy detachment, and Brevet Major Thomas Adair led the Marines. Money was captain of [[French frigate Trave (1812)|HMS ''Trave'']], and Adair was the commanding officer of {{HMS|Vengeur|1810|6}}'s detachment of Marines.{{sfnp|Admiralty|1814|p=145}}Thornton did not make allowance for the current, and it carried him about a thousand yards below the intended landing place.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|pp=293–294}}{{NoteTag|Remini states the plan was to land three miles south of Morgan's position, but they actually landed four miles south.{{sfnp|Remini|1999|pp=134,158}}}}

The only British success of the battle was the delayed attack on the right bank of the Mississippi River, where Thornton's brigade of the [[85th Regiment of Foot (Bucks Volunteers)|85th Regiment of Foot]] and detachments from the Royal Navy and Royal Marines{{sfnp|Patterson|2008|p=230}} attacked and overwhelmed the American line.{{sfnp|Thornton|1815|pp=440-441}} The 700 militiamen were routed.{{sfnp|Hickey|1989|p=211}} Reilly felt the fault lay with Morgan, who had dispersed his troops, rather than concentrating most of them around his main defence, whilst deploying a picket, to give advance warning once the British arrived.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|pp=293–294}} The decision by General Morgan to deploy his troops in two positions a mile apart, neither defensible, was favorable for the British. Morgan's mismanagement of his Kentucky and Louisiana militiamen was an open invitation to defeat.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|p=298}} Whilst the retreat of the militia has been criticized, such a move was no less than prudent.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|pp=302-303}} An inquiry, overseen by Major General William Carroll of the Tennessee Militia, found that the conduct was 'not reprehensible'.{{NoteTag|Court martial of inquiry, relative to the retreat on January 8, reproduced in Latour (1816), appendix LXII.{{sfnp|Latour|1999|p=cxxxii}}}} Major Paul Arnaud, commanding officer of the 2nd Louisiana militia brigade, was targeted as a scapegoat for the retreat on the Right Bank.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|p=307}} His fellow Louisiana Militia officers Dejean, Cavallier and Declouet were admonished, as was Colonel John Davis of the Kentucky Militia.{{sfnp|Latour|1999|p=cxxxii}}

At around 10&nbsp;am, Lambert was made aware that the right bank had been taken,{{sfnmp|1a1=Hughes|1a2=Brodine|1y=2023|1p=1005|2a1=Parton|2y=1861|2p=217}} as signalled by a rocket launched by Gubbins. His brigade won their battle, but Thornton was badly wounded, and delegated his command to Gubbins. Army casualties among the 85th Foot were two dead, one captured, and 41 wounded,{{sfnp|Thornton|1815|pp=440-441}} the battalion reduced to 270 effectives on the Right Bank.{{sfnp|Brown|1969|p=156}} Royal Navy casualties were two dead, Captain Rowland Money and 18 seamen wounded. Royal Marine casualties were two dead, with three officers, one sergeant, and 12 other ranks wounded. By contrast, the defenders' casualties were two dead, eleven wounded and nineteen missing.{{NoteTag|Greene, with reference to both Jackson's papers and Tatum's journal (both edited by Bassett) and Bassett, with reference to Tatum's journal corroborated Tatum's figures.{{sfnmp|Bassett|1911|1p=143|Greene|2009|2p=159|Tatum|1922|3p=130}}}} Both Jackson and Commodore Patterson reported that the retreating forces had [[Touch hole#Spiking the guns|spiked their cannon]], leaving no guns to turn on the Americans' main defense line; Major Michell's diary, however, claims that he had "commenced cleaning enemy's guns to form a battery to enfilade their lines on the left bank".{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|p=305}}

General Lambert ordered his Chief of Artillery Colonel [[Alexander Dickson (British Army officer)|Alexander Dickson]] to assess the position. Dickson reported back that no fewer than 2,000 men would be required to hold the position. Lambert issued orders to withdraw after the defeat of their main army on the east bank and retreated, taking a few American prisoners and cannon with them.{{sfnmp|Patterson|2008|1p=253|Thornton|1815|2pp=440-441}} The Americans were so dismayed by the loss of this battery, which would be capable of inflicting much damage on their lines when the attack was renewed, that they were preparing to abandon the town when they received the news that the British were withdrawing, according to one British regimental historian.{{sfnp|Porter|1889|p=363}} Reilly does not agree, but does note that Jackson was eager to send [[Jean Joseph Amable Humbert|Humbert]] to take command of 400 men to retake the position from Thornton's troops.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|p=305}}{{NoteTag|Davis, quoting from correspondence from Shaumburg to Claiborne, states that Humbert arrived, demanding 400 men without written orders, and was rebuffed by Morgan.{{sfnp|Davis|2019|p=273}} The written order from Jackson has survived, however, with Humbert accompanied by Lafitte. Patterson's letter dated January 13 mentions 'a large re-enforcement of militia having been immediately despatched by general Jackson to this side.'{{sfnp|Latour|1999|p=lxii}} Latour, an eye witness, has the following to say: '[Humbert was ordered] to cross over with a re-enforcement of four hundred men, take the command of the troops, and repulse the enemy.. The order he had received, was only verbal, owing to the urgency of the occasion. There arose disputes concerning military precedence. Other militia officers did not think it right that a French general... should be sent to remedy the faults of others...[The implication is that the militia officers were refusing to be subordinate to Humbert, and that they considered Morgan to continue to be the Commanding Officer.] Happily, during this discussion, the enemy, as I have observed, thought it prudent to retreat, which they did that night and next morning.'{{sfnp|Latour|1999|p=175-176}} }} Carson Ritchie goes as far to assert that 'it was not Pakenham, but Sir Alexander Dickson who lost the third battle of New Orleans' in consequence of his recommendation to evacuate the Right Bank,{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|p=305}} and that 'he could think of nothing but defense'.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|p=305}}

This success, being described as 'a brilliant exploit by the British, and a disgraceful exhibition [of General Morgan's leadership] by the Americans,'{{sfnp|Brown|1969|p=157}}{{sfnp|Roosevelt|1900|p=232}} had no effect on the outcome of the battle.{{sfnp|Brown|1969|p=157}}{{sfnp|Roosevelt|1900|p=232}}

The positions were reoccupied on the 9th, and Patterson reestablished his battery on January 10.{{sfnp|Owsley|2000|p=164}}

===Left Bank===
[[File:NewOrleansBattle.gif|thumb|right|upright=1.35|''The Battle of New Orleans: Situation on 8 January 1815'']]
[[File:Battle of New Orleans 1815.jpg|thumb|upright=1.35|''Battle of New Orleans: Jan. 8th'']]

====Preparation for the assault by the 44th Foot====
The [[44th (East Essex) Regiment of Foot|44th Regiment of Foot]] was assigned by General [[Edward Pakenham]] to be the advance guard for the first column of attack on 8 January 1815, and to carry the [[fascine]]s and ladders which would enable the British troops to cross the ditch and scale the American ramparts. The commanding officer of the 44th, Lieutenant Colonel [[Thomas Mullins (British Army officer)|Thomas Mullins]] had been commended twice during the Chesapeake campaign, and was recently promoted. He was noted as being haughty, and less than diligent in his duties as a staff officer in the days prior to the attack.{{sfnp|Davis|2019|p=200}} Pakenham ordered Mullins to determine the locations of those fascines and ladders that evening of the 7th, in order that there would be no delays in retrieving them the following morning.{{sfnp|Davis|2019|p=200}}

Gibbs also instructed him to confirm the locations of those fascines and ladders. Mullins delegated this to a subordinate, Johnston, who went to headquarters to do so. Whilst there, he was observed by General Gibbs, who enquired what he was doing. Upon being told, Gibbs wrote a formal order to Mullins that 'The Commanding Officer of the 44th will ascertain where the fascines and Ladders are deposited this evening.' A map of where the items were stored was given to Johnston. Upon returning, he presented the map to Mullins, which he dismissively put in his waistcoat.{{sfnp|Davis|2019|p=224-225}}

At 5&nbsp;pm that evening, Mullins summoned his officers for a meeting, to discuss the attack. One of his subordinates questioned the location of the ladders, and received a caustic rebuke. He was approached by his Captain and hut-mate at 8&nbsp;pm, and diplomatically suggested preparing for the next day, including the order from Gibbs to personally see where the items were stored. Mullins was dismissive, and stated there would be plenty of time in the morning.{{sfnp|Davis|2019|p=224-225}} Pakenham sent an order to an engineer officer to communicate with Mullins as to where the items were stored, in the redoubt. Coincidentally, Mullins arrived in the presence of the engineer officer and the artillery officer. Upon being read Pakenham's instructions, and being asked if he had any questions, Mullins replied that it was clear.{{sfnp|Davis|2019|p=225-226}}

During the night, an ''advance battery'' was set up forward of the ''advance redoubt'', a distance of about {{convert|880|yd|m}}{{sfnp|Davis|2019|p=226}} or {{convert|500|yd|m}},{{sfnp|James|1818|p=374-375}}  positioned {{convert|800|yd|m}} south from Line Jackson.{{NoteTag|'An advanced battery in our front was thrown up during the night about 800 yards from the enemy's line.'{{sfnp|Hughes|Brodine|2023|p=1004}} }} Mullins, thinking this to be the location of the [[materiel]], passed the advance redoubt and halted the regiment at the battery. Upon discovering his mistake, he sent about 300 of his 427 men back to the redoubt at the double-quick to pick up the fascines and ladders, but it was too late. The other regiments were already advancing behind the 44th, the party of 300 lost formation as they struggled to reach the redoubt, and as day dawned, the attack commenced before the supplies could be brought forward.{{sfnp|Gleig|1840|p=339}}{{sfnp|Davis|2019|p=232-237}}

====The attack on the Left Bank====
The main attack began in darkness and a heavy fog, but the fog lifted as the British neared the main American line, exposing them to withering artillery fire. The British column had already been disordered by the passage of the 300 returning to the redoubt, and they advanced into a storm of American fire. Without the fascines and ladders, they were unable to scale and storm the American position.{{sfnp|Porter|1889|p=361}} The British forces fell into confusion, thrown into disorder by the flight of the advance guard.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|p=298}} Most of the senior officers were killed or wounded, including Major General Samuel Gibbs, who was killed leading the main attack column on the right, and Colonel Rennie, who led a detachment on the left by the river.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|p=299}}  Mullins had compromised their attack.{{sfnp|Davis|2019|p=238-239}}

[[File:Battle of New Orleans.jpg|thumb|[[Edward Percy Moran|E. Percy Moran]], ''The Battle of New Orleans'' (1910)]]
The [[93rd (Sutherland Highlanders) Regiment of Foot|Highlanders of the 93rd Regiment of Foot]] were ordered to leave Keane's assault column advancing along the river, possibly because of Thornton's delay in crossing the river and the artillery fire that might hit them, and to move across the open field to join the main force on the right. Keane fell wounded as he crossed the field with the 93rd. Rennie's men managed to attack and overrun an American advance redoubt next to the river, but they could neither hold the position nor successfully storm the main American line behind it without reinforcements.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|p=299}} Within a few minutes, the American 7th US Infantry arrived, moved forward, and fired upon the British in the captured redoubt; within half an hour, Rennie and nearly all of his men were dead. In the main attack on the right, the British infantrymen flung themselves to the ground, huddled in the canal, or were mowed down by a combination of musket fire and [[grapeshot]] from the Americans. A handful made it to the top of the parapet on the right, but they were killed or captured. The [[Rifle Brigade (The Prince Consort's Own)|riflemen of the 95th Regiment of Foot]] had advanced in open skirmish order ahead of the main assault force and were concealed in the ditch below the parapet, unable to advance further without support.

The two large main assaults were repulsed. Pakenham and Gibbs were fatally wounded while on horseback by grapeshot fired from the earthworks.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|p=300}} Major Wilkinson of the [[Royal Scots Fusiliers|21st Regiment of Foot]] reformed his lines and made a third assault. They were able to reach the entrenchments and attempted to scale them. Wilkinson made it to the top before being shot. The Americans were amazed at his bravery and carried him behind the rampart.{{sfnmp|Gleig|1840|1pp=344-345|Stuart|1834|2pp=95-98}} The British soldiers stood out in the open and were shot apart with grapeshot from Line Jackson, including the 93rd Highlanders, having no orders to advance further or retreat.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|p=300}}

The light infantry companies commanded by Jones attacked the right flank, but were repulsed by Coffee's troops. The attack having failed, the troops withdrew, and sought cover in the woods. Lieutenant Colonel Jones was mortally injured.{{sfnmp|Dale|2015|1pp=160,191|Davis|2019|2p=269|Reilly|1976|3p=291}}

General Lambert was in the reserve and took command. He gave the order for his reserve to advance and ordered the withdrawal of the army. The reserve was used to cover the retreat of what was left of the British army in the field. Artillery fire from both sides ceased at 9&nbsp;am{{sfnp|Hughes|Brodine|2023|p=1020}} with American batteries ceasing at 2&nbsp;pm.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|p=296}} Whilst the attack was of two hours duration, the main assault lasted only thirty minutes.{{sfnp|Owsley|2000|p=161}}

{{Image frame|width=300
|content={{Superimpose
  | base = Chalmette Battlefield from Monument.JPG
  | base_width = 300px
  | float = Descento.svg
  | float_width = 24px
  | x = 57
  | y = 74}}
|caption=[[Jean Lafitte National Historical Park and Preserve|Chalmette Battlefield]]: The main British attack was aimed just beyond the two farthest cannons at Batteries 5 and 6|link=|align=|pos=}}

===Analysis===
The Battle of New Orleans was remarkable both for its apparent brevity and its casualties, though some numbers are in dispute and contradict the official statistics. The defenders of the Left Bank had casualties amounting to 11 killed and 23 wounded;{{sfnp|Tatum|1922|p=130}} American losses were only 13 killed, 39 wounded, and 19 missing or captured in total on that day.{{sfnp|Remini|1977|p=285}} Robert Remini{{sfnp|Remini|1999|p=195}} and William C Davis{{sfnp|Davis|2019|p=278}} make reference to the British casualty reports of 291 killed, 1,262 wounded, and 484 missing, a total loss of 2,037 men. Among the prisoners taken when the British retreated from the battlefield, Jackson estimated three hundred were mortally wounded.{{NoteTag|Contains despatch from Jackson to Secretary of War dated January 9. 'The loss which the enemy sustained on this occasion, cannot be estimated at less than 1500 in killed, wounded and prisoners. Upwards of three hundred have already been delivered over for burial.... We have taken about 500 prisoners, upwards of 300 of whom are wounded, and a great part of them mortally.'{{sfnp|James|1818|pp=557-559}} }} Colonel [[Arthur P. Hayne]]'s dispatch to Jackson dated January 13 estimated the British had 700 fatalities and 1400 wounded, with 501 prisoners of war in his custody.{{NoteTag|Brannan contains despatch from Hayne to Jackson dated January 13. 'Prisoners taken - Prisoners taken - One major, 4 captains, 11 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 483 camp followers and privates'{{sfnp|Brannan|1823|p=459}} }} A reduction in headcount due to 443 British soldiers' deaths since the prior month was reported on January 25, which is lower than Hayne's estimate of 700 for the battle alone.{{sfnp|Bamford|2014}}

The large number of casualties suffered by the British on the Left Bank reflects their failure to maintain the element of surprise, with plenty of advance notice being given to the defenders, owing to the delays in executing the attack on the Right Bank.{{sfnp|Gleig|1827|p=332}} The failure of the British to have breached the parapet and conclusively eliminated the first line of defense was to result in high casualties as successive waves of men marching in column whilst the prepared defenders were able to direct their fire into a [[Kill zone]], hemmed in by the riverbank and the swamp.{{sfnp|Gleig|1827|p=335}} The American cannon opened fire when the British were at 500 yards, the riflemen at 300 yards, and the muskets at 100 yards.{{sfnp|Horsman|1969|p=244}}

Reilly supports the assertion that it was the American artillery that won the battle. The losses among the regiments out of range of small arms fire were disproportionately high, with almost every British account emphasizing the effect of heavy gunfire. In contrast, the riflemen of the 95th Foot in skirmish order, the most difficult target for artillery, had lost only 11 killed. Dickson's eyewitness account is clear that the British were only within musket shot range for less than five minutes. The account by [[Arsène Lacarrière-Latour|Latour]] states the battalions of Plauché, Daquin, Lacoste, along with three quarters of the 44th US Infantry did not fire at all. In order to have inflicted such a heavy toll on the British, it would not have been possible to have done this primarily with musket fire, of which the best trained men could only manage two shots per minute.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|p=307}} Unlike their British counterparts, the American forces had larger guns, and more of them. They were situated in well-protected earthworks, with a ditch and stockade. The Americans therefore had a number of advantages, but they should not minimize the skill and bravery of their gunners.{{sfnp|Ritchie|1969|p=10}} Stoltz is of the opinion that Jackson was victorious because an American army guarded a strategic choke point and defended it with professionally designed fieldworks and artillery.{{sfnp|Stoltz|2017|p=12}}

Almost universal blame was assigned to Colonel Mullins of the 44th Foot which had been detailed to carry fascines and ladders to the front to enable the British soldiers to cross the ditch and scale the parapet and fight their way to the American breastwork. Mullins was found half a mile to the rear when he was needed at the front.{{NoteTag|Major McDougall, the aide-de-camp to Pakenham testified at the court martial on Mullins. 'It is my opinion, that the whole confusion of the column proceeded from the original defective formation of the 44h; the fall of Sir edward Pakenham deprived the column of its best chance of success; and, had the column moved forward according to order, the enemy's lines would have been carried with little loss.'{{sfnp|Gleig|1840|p=344}} }} Pakenham learned of Mullins' conduct and placed himself at the head of the 44th, endeavoring to lead them to the front with the implements needed to storm the works, when he fell wounded after being hit with grapeshot. He was hit again while being helped to mount a horse, this time mortally wounded.{{sfnmp|Davis|2019|1pp=255-256|Porter|1889|2p=363}}

Pakenham's choice of units has come under question. Pakenham's aide, Wylly, was scornful about the 44th Foot, and thought the 21st Foot was lacking in discipline. His most experienced infantry regiments, the 7th Foot and 43rd Foot, veterans of Wellington's Peninsular War army, were kept in reserve in the plan of attack.{{sfnp|Davis|2019|p=223}}

The inability of Thornton's troops to have taken the Right Bank at night, in advance of the main assault, meant that the British were enfiladed by the American batteries. It has been observed that Keane's failure, to have taken the Chef Menteur Road, was compounded when the aggressively natured Pakenham went ahead and launched a frontal assault before the vital flank operation on the other bank of the river had been completed, at a cost of over 2,000 casualties.{{sfnp|Lambert|2012|p=344}}

Poor British planning and communication, plus costly frontal assaults against an entrenched enemy, caused lopsided British casualties.{{sfnp|NPS ''Alexander Cochrane''|2007}} The [[Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington|Duke of Wellington]] was saddened by the death of this man, his brother-in-law, with whom he had been on campaign in Spain. A grieving Wellington vented his anger towards Cochrane, whom he blamed:

{{blockquote|I cannot but regret that he was ever employed on such a service or with such a colleague. The expedition to New Orleans originated with that colleague&nbsp;... The Americans were prepared with an army in a fortified position which still would have been carried, if the duties of others, that is of the Admiral [Cochrane], had been as well performed as that of he whom we now lament.{{sfnp|Holmes|2003|pp=206-207}}}}

Patterson notes that the plan of attack was not his own, he conceded to follow it, despite his reservations, and his death prevented him from reformulating a subsequent attack, following the initial failure.{{sfnp|Patterson|2008|p=265}}

Reilly opines that the brilliance of Cochrane's plan to take possession of the Right Bank batteries was fully comprehended, after its capture. He believes it was the failure of Pakenham's staff to wake him, and to let him know the Right Bank landing was not possible, neither at daylight, nor with the numbers of soldiers originally envisaged, more than any other action or omission in the entire campaign, that was the biggest failure on the part of the British that led to proceed with the attack, with the disastrous outcome that day.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|p=299}}

Regarding the American forces on the Right Bank, Reilly states their defenses were inadequate, and that Morgan's deployment of his troops was incompetent.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|p=288}} The resultant court of inquiry made no mention of General David Bannister Morgan at all.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|p=321}}