Editing Battle of Midway (section)

===Attacks on the Japanese fleet===
[[File:Pilots of U.S. Navy Torpedo Squadron 8 (VT-8) aboard USS Hornet (CV-8), circa mid-May 1942 (NH 93595).jpg|thumb|Pilots of Navy Torpedo Squadron 8 (VT-8) aboard {{USS|Hornet|CV-8|6}}, circa mid-May 1942. Only one member of [[VT-8]] who flew from ''Hornet'' on 4 June 1942 survived in the action.]]
[[File:Vt8-g-gay-may42.jpg|thumb|[[Ensign (rank)|Ensign]] [[George H. Gay, Jr.|George Gay]] (right), sole survivor of VT-8's [[Douglas TBD Devastator|TBD Devastator]] squadron, in front of his aircraft, 4 June 1942]]
The Americans had already launched their carrier aircraft against the Japanese. Fletcher, in overall command aboard ''Yorktown'', and benefiting from PBY sighting reports from the early morning, ordered Spruance to launch against the Japanese as soon as was practical, while initially holding ''Yorktown'' in reserve in case any other Japanese carriers were found.{{sfn|Shepherd|2006}}

Spruance judged that, though the range was extreme, a strike could succeed and gave the order to launch the attack. He left Halsey's Chief of Staff, Captain [[Miles Browning]], to work out the details and oversee the launch. The carriers had to launch into the wind, so the light southeasterly breeze would require them to steam away from the Japanese at high speed. Browning, therefore, suggested a launch time of 07:00, giving the carriers an hour to close on the Japanese at {{cvt|25|kn}}. This would place them at about {{cvt|155|nmi}} from the Japanese fleet, assuming it did not change course. The first plane took off from Spruance's carriers ''Enterprise'' and ''Hornet'' a few minutes after 07:00.<ref>{{Harvnb|Lundstrom|1984|pp=332–333}}</ref> Fletcher, upon completing his own scouting flights,<!--Why was Fletcher scouting the wrong direction?--> followed suit at 08:00 from ''Yorktown''.<ref name="Cressman; Parshall, Tully; Buell">{{Harvnb|Cressman|1990|pp=84–89}}; {{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=215–216, 226–227}}; {{Harvnb|Buell|1987|p=494}}</ref>

Fletcher, along with ''Yorktown''{{'}}s commanding officer, Captain [[Elliott Buckmaster]], and their staffs, had acquired the first-hand experience needed in organizing and launching a full strike against an enemy force [[Battle of the Coral Sea|in the Coral Sea]], but there was no time to pass these lessons on to ''Enterprise'', commanded by Captain [[George D. Murray|George Murray]], and ''Hornet'', commanded by Captain [[Marc Mitscher]], which were tasked with launching the first strike.<ref name="cv6.org p2">{{Harvnb|Shepherd|2006|at=[http://www.cv6.org/1942/midway/midway_2.htm p. 2]}}</ref> Spruance ordered the striking aircraft to proceed to target immediately rather than waiting for the strike force to assemble, since neutralizing the Japanese carriers was the key to the survival of his own task force.<ref name="Cressman; Parshall, Tully; Buell" /><ref name="cv6.org p2" />

While the Japanese were able to launch 108 aircraft in just seven minutes, it took ''Enterprise'' and ''Hornet'' over an hour to launch 117.<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|p=174}}</ref> Spruance judged that the need to throw something at the Japanese as soon as possible was greater than the need to coordinate the attack by aircraft of different types and speeds (fighters, bombers, and torpedo bombers). Accordingly, American squadrons were launched piecemeal and proceeded to the target in several different groups. It was accepted that the lack of coordination would diminish the impact of the American attacks and increase their casualties, but Spruance calculated that this was worthwhile, since keeping the Japanese under aerial attack impaired their ability to launch a counterstrike (Japanese tactics preferred fully constituted attacks), and he gambled that he would find Nagumo with his flight decks at their most vulnerable.<ref name="Cressman; Parshall, Tully; Buell" /><ref name="cv6.org p2" />

American carrier aircraft had difficulty locating the target, despite the positions they had been given. The strike from ''Hornet'', led by Commander Stanhope C. Ring, followed an incorrect heading of 265 degrees rather than the 240 degrees indicated by the contact report. As a result, Air Group Eight's dive bombers missed the Japanese carriers:<ref>{{Harvnb|Mrazek|2008|p=113}}; {{Harvnb|Lundstrom|1984|p=341}}</ref> the 10 [[Grumman F4F Wildcat|F4Fs]] from ''Hornet'' ran out of fuel and had to [[Water landing|ditch]].{{sfn|Ewing|2004|pp=71, 85, 86, 307}} This became known as the Flight to Nowhere.<ref>{{Cite AV media |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sKNDR7_DT24 |title=Deep Intel on the Infamous Flight to Nowhere |date=2023-06-06 |last=Ward Carroll |access-date=2025-05-01 |via=YouTube}}</ref> [[Torpedo Squadron 8]] (VT-8, from ''Hornet''), led by Lieutenant Commander [[John C. Waldron]], broke formation from Ring and followed the correct heading.

[[File:VT-6TBDs.jpg|thumb|left|Devastators of VT-6 aboard {{USS|Enterprise|CV-6|6}} being prepared for takeoff during the battle]]
Waldron's squadron sighted the Japanese carriers and began attacking at 09:20, followed at 09:40<ref>{{Harvnb|Cressman|1990|pp=91–94}}</ref> by [[VF-6]] from ''Enterprise'', whose Wildcat fighter escorts lost contact, ran low on fuel, and had to turn back.{{sfn|Ewing|2004|pp=71, 85, 86, 307}} Without fighter escort, all 15 [[Douglas TBD Devastator|TBD Devastators]] of VT-8 were shot down without being able to inflict any damage. Ensign [[George H. Gay, Jr.]] was the only survivor of the 30 aircrew of VT-8. He launched his [[torpedo]] on ''Sōryū'' before he was shot down, but ''Sōryū'' evaded it.<ref name="nhcgay">{{cite web |url=https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/oral-histories/wwii/battle-of-midway/recollections-of-lieutenant-george-gay.html |title=Recollections of Lieutenant George Gay, USNR |date=21 September 2015 |publisher=Naval History and Heritage Command |access-date=23 April 2020 |archive-date=12 October 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191012225459/https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/oral-histories/wwii/battle-of-midway/recollections-of-lieutenant-george-gay.html |url-status=live}}</ref> VT-6, led by Lieutenant Commander [[Eugene E. Lindsey]] lost 9 of its 14 Devastators (one ditched later), and 10 of 12 Devastators from ''Yorktown''{{'}}s [[VA-35 (U.S. Navy)|VT-3]] (who attacked at 10:10) were shot down with no hits to show for their effort, thanks in part to the abysmal performance of their unimproved [[Mark 13 torpedo]]es.<ref>{{Harvnb|Blair|1975|p=238}}</ref> Midway was the last time the TBD Devastator was used in combat.<ref name="Military Factory">{{cite web |title=Douglas TBD Devastator Torpedo Bomber (1937) |url=http://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail-page-2.asp?aircraft_id=732 |website=Military Factory |access-date=27 August 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150907011849/http://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail-page-2.asp?aircraft_id=732 |archive-date=7 September 2015 |url-status=dead}}</ref>

The Japanese combat air patrol, flying Zeros,<ref>{{Harvnb|Thruelsen|1976|pp=186, 189, 190}}</ref> made short work of the unescorted, slow, under-armed TBDs. A few TBDs managed to get within a few ship-lengths range of their targets before dropping their torpedoes—close enough to be able to strafe the Japanese ships and force their carriers to make sharp evasive maneuvers—but all of their torpedoes either missed or failed to explode.<ref name="cv6.org p3">{{Harvnb|Shepherd|2006|at=[url=http://www.cv6.org/1942/midway/midway_3.htm p. 3]}}</ref> The performance of American torpedoes early in the war was extremely poor, as shot after shot missed by running directly under the target (deeper than intended), prematurely exploded, or failed to explode at all.<ref name="Morison IV">{{Harvnb|Morison|1949|pp=230–232}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last=Patrick |first=John |url=http://www.public.navy.mil/subfor/underseawarfaremagazine/Issues/Archives/issue_47/torpedo.html |access-date=23 July 2015 |title=The Hard Lessons of World War II Torpedo Failures |journal=Undersea Warfare |issue=47 |year=2013 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150723172623/http://www.public.navy.mil/subfor/underseawarfaremagazine/Issues/Archives/issue_47/torpedo.html |archive-date=23 July 2015}}</ref> Remarkably, senior Navy and [[Bureau of Ordnance]] officers never questioned why half a dozen torpedoes, released so close to the Japanese carriers, produced no results.<ref>{{Harvnb|Crenshaw|1995|p=158}}</ref>

Despite their failure to score any hits, the American torpedo attacks achieved three important results. First, they kept the Japanese carriers off balance and unable to prepare and launch their own counterstrike. Second, the poor control of the Japanese CAP meant they were out of position for subsequent attacks. Third, many of the Zeros ran low on ammunition and fuel.<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=215–216, 226–227}}</ref> The appearance of a third torpedo plane attack from the southeast by VT-3 from ''Yorktown'', led by Lieutenant Commander [[Lance Edward Massey]] at 10:00 quickly drew the majority of the Japanese CAP to the southeast quadrant of the fleet.<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=226–227}}</ref> Better discipline and the employment of a greater number of Zeros for the CAP might have enabled Nagumo to prevent (or at least mitigate) the damage caused by the coming American attacks.<ref>{{Harvnb|Bicheno|2001|p=62}}</ref>

By chance, at the same time VT-3 was sighted by the Japanese, three squadrons of SBDs from ''Enterprise'' and ''Yorktown'' were approaching from the southwest and northeast. The ''Yorktown'' squadron (VB-3) had flown just behind VT-3 but elected to attack from a different course. The two squadrons from ''Enterprise'' (VB-6 and VS-6) were running low on fuel because of the time spent looking for the Japanese ships. Air Group Commander [[C. Wade McClusky, Jr.]] decided to continue the search and by good fortune spotted the wake of the Japanese destroyer {{ship|Japanese destroyer|Arashi||2}}, steaming at full speed to rejoin Nagumo's carriers after having unsuccessfully [[depth-charge]]d U.S. submarine {{USS|Nautilus|SS-168|2}}, which had unsuccessfully attacked the battleship {{Ship|Japanese battleship|Kirishima||2}}.<ref name="kirishimamove">{{cite web |year=2006 |url=http://www.combinedfleet.com/Kirishima.html |title=IJN Kirishima: Tabular Record of Movement |work=Senkan! |publisher=combinedfleet.com |access-date=6 June 2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070610144811/http://www.combinedfleet.com/Kirishima.html |archive-date=10 June 2007 |url-status=live}}</ref> Some bombers were lost from fuel exhaustion before the attack commenced.<ref>{{Harvnb|Tillman|1976|pp=69–73}}</ref>

McClusky's decision to continue the search and his judgment, in the opinion of Admiral [[Chester Nimitz]], "decided the fate of our carrier task force and our forces at Midway&nbsp;..."<ref>{{Harvnb|Shepherd|2006|at=[http://www.cv6.org/company/accounts/wmcclusky/ Accounts—C. Wade McClusky]}}</ref> All three American dive-bomber squadrons (VB-6, VS-6, and VB-3) arrived almost simultaneously at the perfect time, locations and altitudes to attack.<ref>{{Harvnb|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1982|pp=259–261, 267–269}}; {{Harvnb|Cressman|1990|pp=96–97}}; {{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=215–216, 226–227}}</ref> Most of the Japanese CAP was directing its attention to the torpedo planes of VT-3 and was out of position; meanwhile, armed Japanese strike aircraft filled the hangar decks, fuel hoses snaked across the decks as refueling operations were hastily being completed, and the repeated change of ordnance meant that bombs and torpedoes were stacked around the hangars, rather than stowed safely in the [[Magazine (artillery)|magazines]], making the Japanese carriers extraordinarily vulnerable.<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|p=250}}</ref>

====Destruction of ''Kaga'', ''Sōryū'' and ''Akagi''====
Beginning at 10:22, the two squadrons of ''Enterprise''{{'}}s air group split up with the intention of sending one squadron each to attack ''Kaga'' and ''Akagi''. A miscommunication caused both of the squadrons to dive at ''Kaga''. Recognizing the error, Lieutenant [[Richard Halsey Best]] and his two wingmen were able to pull out of their dives and, after judging that ''Kaga'' was doomed, headed north to attack ''Akagi''. Coming under an onslaught of bombs from almost two full squadrons, ''Kaga'' sustained three to five direct hits, which caused heavy damage and started multiple fires. One of the bombs landed on or right in front of the bridge, killing Captain [[Jisaku Okada]] and most of the ship's senior officers.<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=235–236}}</ref> Lieutenant Clarence E. Dickinson, part of McClusky's group, recalled:

{{blockquote|We were coming down in all directions on the port side of the carrier&nbsp;... I recognized her as the ''Kaga''; and she was enormous&nbsp;... The target was utterly satisfying&nbsp;... I saw a bomb hit just behind where I was aiming&nbsp;... I saw the deck rippling and curling back in all directions exposing a great section of the hangar below&nbsp;... I saw [my] {{cvt|500|lb|adj=on|disp=sqbr|}} bomb hit right abreast of the [carrier's] island. The two {{cvt|100|lb|adj=on|disp=sqbr|}} bombs struck in the forward area of the parked planes&nbsp;...{{Sfn|Miller|2001|p=123}}}}

Several minutes later, Best and his two wingmen dived on ''Akagi''. [[Mitsuo Fuchida]], the Japanese aviator who had led the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], was on ''Akagi'' when it was hit, and described the attack:

{{blockquote|A look-out screamed: "Hell-Divers!" I looked up to see three black enemy planes plummeting towards our ship. Some of our machineguns managed to fire a few frantic bursts at them, but it was too late. The plump silhouettes of the American Dauntless dive-bombers quickly grew larger, and then a number of black objects suddenly floated eerily from their wings.{{sfn|Beevor|2012|p=310}} }}

Although ''Akagi'' sustained only one direct hit (almost certainly dropped by Lieutenant Best), it proved to be a fatal blow: the bomb struck the edge of the mid-ship deck elevator and penetrated to the upper hangar deck, where it exploded among the armed and fueled aircraft in the vicinity. Nagumo's chief of staff, [[Ryūnosuke Kusaka]], recorded "a terrific fire&nbsp;... bodies all over the place&nbsp;... Planes stood tail up, belching livid flames and jet-black smoke, making it impossible to bring the fires under control."{{sfn|Keegan|2004|p=216}} Another bomb exploded underwater very close astern; the resulting geyser bent the flight deck upward "in grotesque configurations" and caused crucial [[rudder]] damage.<ref name="cv6.org p3" />{{sfn|Keegan|2004|p=216}}{{refn|Other sources claim a stern hit, but Parshall and Tully make a case for a near miss, because of rudder damage from a high explosive bomb.<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=253–259}}</ref>|group=nb}}

Simultaneously, ''Yorktown''{{'}}s VB-3, commanded by Lieutenant [[Max Leslie]], went for ''Sōryū'', scoring at least three hits and causing extensive damage. Gasoline ignited, creating an inferno, while stacked bombs and ammunition detonated.{{sfn|Beevor|2012|p=310}} VT-3 targeted ''Hiryū'', which was hemmed in by ''Sōryū'', ''Kaga'', and ''Akagi'', but achieved no hits.<ref name="Parshall 2005 330–353">{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=330–353}}</ref>

Within six minutes, ''Sōryū'' and ''Kaga'' were ablaze from stem to stern. ''Akagi'', having been struck by only one bomb, took longer to burn, but the resulting fires quickly expanded and proved impossible to extinguish; she too was eventually consumed by flames and had to be abandoned. Although Nagumo was reluctant to leave ''Akagi'',<ref>{{cite book |first=Winston |last=Groom |title=1942: The Year That Tried Men's Souls |year=2005 |page=238 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=sDVUcuAUCUwC&q=thorpe&pg=PA36 |publisher=Grove Press |isbn=9780802142504}}</ref> Kusaka was able to persuade him.<ref>{{Harvnb|Lord|1967|p=183}}</ref><ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|p=260}}</ref> At 10:46, Nagumo transferred his [[Flagship|flag]] to the light cruiser {{ship|Japanese cruiser|Nagara||2}}.<ref name="combinedfleet">{{cite web |last=Bob Hackett & Sander Kingsepp |url=http://combinedfleet.com/nagara_t.htm |title=IJN Nagara: Tabular Record of Movement |date=1997–2009 |work=Imperial Japanese Navy Page |access-date=23 April 2020 |archive-date=6 June 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110606040639/http://www.combinedfleet.com/nagara_t.htm |url-status=live}}</ref> All three carriers remained temporarily afloat, as none had suffered damage below the waterline, other than the rudder damage to ''Akagi'' caused by the near miss close astern. Despite initial hopes that ''Akagi'' could be saved or at least towed back to Japan, all three carriers were eventually abandoned and [[scuttling|scuttled]].<ref name="Parshall 2005 330–353"/>{{refn|Parshall and Tully argue that even if ''Kaga'' had been towed back to Japan, the permanent structural damage caused by the inferno on board would likely have made the carrier unusable for anything except [[Ship breaking|scrapping]].{{sfn|Parshall|Tully|2005|p=337}} |group=nb}} While ''Kaga'' was burning, ''Nautilus'' showed up again and launched three torpedoes at her, scoring one dud hit. The ''Kaga'' was later sunk by the Japanese destroyer [[Japanese destroyer Hagikaze|''Hagikaze'']].<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=302–303, 337–338, 565 note 49}}</ref>