Editing Battle of Marengo (section)

==Aftermath==
Bonaparte needed to depart for [[Paris]] urgently and the next morning sent Berthier on a surprise visit to Austrian headquarters.<ref name="Hollins608"/> Within 24 hours of the battle, Melas entered into negotiations (the [[Convention of Alessandria]]) which led to the Austrians evacuating northwestern Italy west of the [[Ticino (river)|Ticino]], and suspending military operations in Italy.

Bonaparte's position as [[First Consul]] was strengthened by the successful outcome of the battle and the preceding campaign.<ref name="Hollins608"/> After this victory, Napoleon could breathe a sigh of relief. The generals who had been hostile to him could see that his luck had not abandoned him. Thus, he had surpassed [[Barthélemy Louis Joseph Schérer|Schérer]], [[Barthélemy Catherine Joubert|Joubert]], [[Jean Étienne Championnet|Championnet]], and even [[Jean Victor Marie Moreau|Moreau]], none of whom having been able to inflict a decisive blow on the Coalition. Moreau's victory at [[Battle of Hohenlinden|Hohenlinden]], which was the one that in reality had put an end to the war, was minimised by Bonaparte who, from then on, would pose as a saviour of the fatherland, and even of the Republic. He rejected offers from [[Louis XVIII of France|Louis XVIII]], who had considered the [[French Consulate|Consulate]] to be a mere transition toward the restoration of the king. Thanks to the victory at Marengo, Napoleon could finally set about [[Napoleon I#Reforms|reforming France according to his own vision]].<ref>Benoît, pp. 124–125</ref>

===Propaganda===
[[File:Rue de Marengo, Paris.JPG|thumb|''Rue de Marengo'' in [[Paris]] is named to commemorate the battle.|alt=Blue street sign with green edges. It says in white: "1er Arrt" and below "RUE DE MARENGO".]]

A last-gasp victory in reality, Marengo was mythologised in an army bulletin and three increasingly glamourised "Official Reports" during Bonaparte's reign. Tales were invented about the Guard and the 72<sup>ème</sup> demibrigade, which had been under his direct control throughout.<ref name="Hollins608"/>

General [[François Étienne de Kellermann|François Kellermann]] distinguished himself at Marengo. Melas, trapped in Alessandria with his hopes of breaking through to the east shattered, sent the same evening to [[Vienna]] a message in which he explained that the "charge of Kellermann had broken the soldiers and this sudden and terrible change of fortunes finished by smashing the courage of the troops. The disorder of the cavalry which had disorganised our infantry precipitated its retreat."<ref name="Benoit123">Benoît, p. 123</ref> At the same time, Murat was writing to Berthier: "I especially have to tell you about Kellermann; through a powerful charge he managed to tilt the balance in our favour."<ref name="Benoit123"/> However, in the ''Bulletin de l'armée'' issued the following day, Napoleon sought to counterbalance Kellermann's charge with [[Jean-Baptiste Bessières]]'s: "The ''[[chef de brigade]]'' Bessières, in front of the reckless grenadiers of the guard, executed a charge with as much activity as valour and penetrated the line of the enemy cavalry; this resulted in the entire rout of the army."<ref>Benoît, p. 124</ref>

Another piece of work which attempted to justify the retreat maneuver and to present it as a highly strategic calculation was Berthier's ''Relation de la bataille de Marengo'', published in 1804. Berthier suggests that time had to be given to Desaix and Boudet's division to occupy their positions: "The enemy general misinterpreted this maneuver and thought the army was in full retreat, while in reality it was only executing a movement of conversion."<ref name="Benoit123"/> However, it is known that Desaix's arrival, while definitely expected, was not certain before the retreat. The bulletin explains that Desaix's forces were waiting in reserve with artillery pieces, which in reality was false, because they arrived late in the battle. Several participants to the fighting reveal the precarious condition of the army throughout the day, including Marmont in his Memoirs, Captain Coignet: "We were retreating in good order but all ready to start running at the earliest sign of danger", Captain Gervais: "In this battle, we were many times on the verge of being defeated. The enemy cavalry, on a terrain favourable to this arm, charged us repeatedly. We were often obliged to concentrate and even to retreat", and General Thévenet: "There is no doubt that a part of the French army was repelled up to the [[Scrivia]]".<ref>Benoît, pp. 123–124</ref>