Editing Battle of Cold Harbor (section)

===June 3===
[[File:ColdHarbor-June3.png|thumb|upright=1.5|Cold Harbor, June 3]]
<!-- [[File:CH01 Battle of Cold Harbor.jpg|thumb|upright=1.5|Cold Harbor, June 3 (additional map)]] Probably superfluous, definitely disrupts page layout due to verticality of these images -->

At 4:30&nbsp;a.m. on June 3, the three Union corps began to advance through a thick ground fog. Massive fire from the Confederate lines quickly caused heavy casualties and the survivors were pinned down. Although the results varied in different parts of the line, the overall repulse of the Union advance resulted in the most lopsided casualties since the assault on Marye's Heights at the [[Battle of Fredericksburg]] in 1862.<ref>Salmon, p. 296; Trudeau, p. 284; Catton, p. 267.</ref>

The most effective performance of the day was on the Union left flank, where Hancock's corps was able to break through a portion of Breckinridge's front line and drive those defenders out of their entrenchments in [[hand to hand combat|hand-to-hand fighting]]. Several hundred prisoners and four guns were captured. However, nearby Confederate artillery was brought to bear on the entrenchments, turning them into a death trap for the Federals. Breckinridge's reserves counterattacked these men from the division of Brig. Gen. [[Francis C. Barlow]] and drove them off. Hancock's other advanced division, under Brig. Gen. [[John Gibbon]], became disordered in swampy ground and could not advance through the heavy Confederate fire, with two brigade commanders (Cols. [[Peter A. Porter (colonel)|Peter A. Porter]] and H. Boyd McKeen) lost as casualties. One of Gibbon's men, complaining of a lack of reconnaissance, wrote, "We felt it was murder, not war, or at best a very serious mistake had been made."<ref>Rhea, pp. 360–361; Grimsley, pp. 211–212; Trudeau, pp. 285–286, 289–290; King, p. 304.</ref>

In the center, Wright's corps was pinned down by the heavy fire and made little effort to advance further, still recovering from their costly charge on June 1. The normally aggressive Emory Upton felt that further movement by his division was "impracticable." Confederate defenders in this part of the line were unaware that a serious assault had been made against their position.<ref>Grimsley, pp. 214–215; Trudeau, pp. 286, 290; King, p. 305.</ref>

[[File:3g05970v.jpg|thumb|left|7th New York Heavy Artillery (serving as infantry) preparing to leave the trenches and charge the Confederate line, sketched by [[Alfred Waud]]]]
[[File:Unburied_Dead_on_Battlefield._(19948752786).jpg|thumb|left|"Unburied Dead on Battlefield" by [[John Reekie]]; issued as Stero #914 being taken on the 1862 Battlefield of Gaines Mills aka First Cold Harbor April 1865; taken near the Adams Farm where 7th New York artillery was stationed June 1864 see [https://civilwartalk.com/threads/april-1865-gaines-mills-cold-harbor-picture.88976/ Civil war Talk].]]

On the Union right, Smith's men advanced through unfavorable terrain and were channeled into two ravines. When they emerged in front of the Confederate line, rifle and artillery fire mowed them down. A Union officer wrote, "The men bent down as they pushed forward, as if trying, as they were, to breast a tempest, and the files of men went down like rows of blocks or bricks pushed over by striking against one another." A Confederate described the carnage of double-canister artillery fire as "deadly, bloody work." The artillery fire against Smith's corps was heavier than might have been expected because Warren's V Corps to his right was reluctant to advance and the Confederate gunners in Warren's sector concentrated on Smith's men instead.<ref>Rhea, pp. 353, 356; Grimsley, p. 215; Trudeau, pp. 286, 290–291.</ref>

The only activity on the northern end of the field was by Burnside's IX Corps, facing Jubal Early. He launched a powerful assault at 6 a.m. that overran the Confederate skirmishers but mistakenly thought he had pierced the first line of earthworks and halted his corps to regroup before moving on, which he planned for that afternoon.<ref>Welcher, p. 992; Grimsley, pp. 215–216.</ref>

At 7 a.m. Grant advised Meade to vigorously exploit any successful part of the assault. Meade ordered his three corps commanders on the left to assault at once, without regard to the movements of their neighboring corps. But all had had enough. Hancock advised against the move. Smith, calling a repetition of the attack a "wanton waste of life," refused to advance again. Wright's men increased their rifle fire but stayed in place. By 12:30&nbsp;p.m. Grant conceded that his army was done. He wrote to Meade, "The opinion of the corps commanders not being sanguine of success in case an assault is ordered, you may direct a suspension of further advance for the present." Union soldiers still pinned down before the Confederate lines began entrenching, using cups and bayonets to dig, sometimes including bodies of dead comrades as part of their improvised earthworks.<ref>Rhea, pp. 374–379; Grimsley, pp. 216–217.</ref>

Meade inexplicably bragged to his wife the next day that he was in command for the assault. But his performance had been poor. Despite orders from Grant that the corps commanders were to examine the ground, their reconnaissance was lax and Meade failed to supervise them adequately, either before or during the attack. He was able to motivate only about 20,000 of his men to attack—the II Corps and parts of the XVIII and IX—failing to achieve the mass he knew he required to succeed. His men paid heavily for the poorly coordinated assault. Estimates of casualties that morning are from 3,000 to 7,000 on the Union side, no more than 1,500 on the Confederate.<ref>Rhea, p. 234; Catton, p. 265. See additional casualty estimates in the [[#Aftermath|'''Aftermath''' section]].</ref> Grant commented after the war:

{{Blockquote
|text=I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made. I might say the same thing of the assault of the 22d of May, 1863, at Vicksburg. At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed, the advantages other than those of relative losses, were on the Confederate side. Before that, the Army of Northern Virginia seemed to have acquired a wholesome regard for the courage, endurance, and soldierly qualities generally of the Army of the Potomac. They no longer wanted to fight them "one Confederate to five Yanks." Indeed, they seemed to have given up any idea of gaining any advantage of their antagonist in the open field. They had come to much prefer breastworks in their front to the Army of the Potomac. This charge seemed to revive their hopes temporarily; but it was of short duration. The effect upon the Army of the Potomac was the reverse. When we reached the James River, however, all effects of the battle of Cold Harbor seemed to have disappeared.
|source=Ulysses S. Grant, ''Personal Memoirs''<ref>Grant, vol. 2, pp. 276–277.</ref>
}}

At 11 a.m. on June 3, the Confederate [[postmaster general]], [[John Henninger Reagan]], arrived with a delegation from Richmond. He asked Robert E. Lee, "General, if the enemy breaks your line, what reserve have you?" Lee provided an animated response: "Not a regiment, and that has been my condition ever since the fighting commenced on the Rappahannock. If I shorten my lines to provide a reserve, he will turn me; if I weaken my lines to provide a reserve, he will break them."<ref>Grimsley, p. 220; Foote, p. 293.</ref> Modern scholarship has shown Lee had ample reserves unengaged. His comments likely were to persuade Richmond to send more troops.<ref>Rhea, p. 273.</ref>