Editing Battle of Chosin Reservoir (section)

==Aftermath==
===Casualties===
The US X&nbsp;Corps and the ROK I Corps reported a total of 10,495 battle [[Casualty (person)|casualties]]: 4,385 US Marines, 3,163 US Army personnel, 2,812 South Koreans attached to American formations and 78 British Royal Marines.{{sfn|Appleman|1990|p=347}} The 1st Marine Division also reported 7,338 non-battle casualties due to the cold weather, adding up to a total of 17,833 casualties.{{sfn|Appleman|1990|p=345}} Despite the losses, the US X&nbsp;Corps preserved much of its strength.{{sfn|Appleman|1990|p=356}} About 105,000 soldiers, 98,000 civilians, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of supplies were shipped from Hungnam to [[Pusan]],{{sfn|Alexander|1986|p= 367}} and they later rejoined the war effort in Korea. Commanding General Smith was credited for saving the US X&nbsp;Corps from destruction,{{sfn|Halberstam|2007|p= 430}} while the 1st Marine Division, 41 (Royal Marine) Commando and RCT-31 were awarded the [[Presidential Unit Citation (United States)|Presidential Unit Citation]] for their tenacity during the battle.{{sfn|Daily|1999|p=78}}{{sfn|Cunningham-Boothe|Farrar|1989|p=50}}{{sfn|Seelinger|2015}} Fourteen Marines, two soldiers and one Navy pilot received the [[Medal of Honor]], and all of the UN troops that served at Chosin were later nicknamed "The Chosin Few".{{sfn|Daily|1999|p=78}}{{sfn|Ham|2010}} 

According to official estimates by the [[People's Liberation Army General Logistics Department]] published in 1988, the PVA 9th Corps suffered 21,366 combat casualties, including 7,304 killed. In addition, 30,732 non-combat casualties were attributed to the harsh Korean winter and lack of food.{{sfn|Department of Health, People's Liberation Army General Logistics Department|1988|p=327}} Total casualties thus amounted to 52,098 - more than one third of its total strength. Outside of official channels, the estimation of Chinese casualties has been described as high as 60,000 by Patrick C. Roe, the chairman of Chosin Few Historical Committee, citing the number of replacements requested by 9th Corps in the aftermath of the battle.{{sfn|Roe|2000|p=394}} Regardless of the varying estimates, historian Yan Xue of [[PLA National Defence University]] noted that the 9th Corps was put out of action for three months.{{sfn|Xue|1990|p=59}} With the absence of 9th Corps the Chinese order of battle in Korea was reduced to 18 infantry divisions by 31 December 1950,{{sfn|Chinese Military Science Academy|2000|pp=368-369}} as opposed to the 30 infantry divisions present on 16 November 1950.{{sfn|Chinese Military Science Academy|2000|pp=365-366}}

====Operation Glory====
[[Image:Punchbowl (1237).JPG|thumb|The National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific where many of the UN war dead, which were exchanged under Operation Glory, are buried.]]
During the battle, UN dead were buried at temporary grave sites along the road. [[Operation Glory]] took place from July to November 1954, during which the dead of each side were exchanged. The remains of 4,167 US soldiers were exchanged for 13,528 North Korean and Chinese dead. In addition, 546 civilians who died in UN prisoner-of-war camps were turned over to the South Korean government.{{sfn|Operation Glory}} After Operation Glory, 416 Korean War "unknowns" were buried in the [[National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific]], the "Punchbowl Cemetery" in Honolulu, Hawaii. According to a Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) white paper, 1,394 names were also transmitted from the Chinese and North Koreans during the operation, of which 858 proved to be correct.{{sfn|DPMO White Paper, Punch Bowl 239}} 

The 4,167 returned remains were found to be 4,219 individuals, of whom 2,944 were found to be Americans, with all but 416 identified by name. Of the 239 Korean War unaccounted for, 186 are not associated with the Punchbowl Cemetery unknowns.{{efn|176 were identified and of the remaining 10 cases, four were non-Americans of Asiatic descent; one was British; three were identified and two cases unconfirmed. See [https://web.archive.org/web/20110427180422/http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo/news/special_reports/documents/010228_punch_bowl_239.pdf "DPMO White Paper, Punch Bowl 239"]. Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Defense. Retrieved 2009-08-27.}} From 1990 to 1994, North Korea excavated and returned more than 208 sets of remains, which possibly include 200 to 400 US servicemen, but very few have been identified due to the co-mingling of remains.{{sfn|Wars and Conflict}} From 2001 to 2005, more remains were recovered from the Chosin Battle site, and around 220 were recovered near the Chinese border between 1996 and 2006.{{sfn|DWPO Release |2008}}{{sfn|Remains from Korea identified}}

===Outcome assessment===
Roy E. Appleman, the author of US Army official history ''South to Naktong, North to Yalu'', writes that both sides could claim victory: the PVA 9th Corps ultimately held the battlefield, while X&nbsp;Corps held off the PVA 9th Corps in a series of battles that enabled it to withdraw most of its forces as an effective tactical unit.{{sfn|Appleman|1990|pp=355–356}} Writing for National Public Radio, [[Anthony Kuhn]] said that both sides have remembered the battle in "starkly differing" ways: for the United States, it won because its forces broke out of their encirclement largely intact and "inflicted heavy losses on the Chinese" while for China, it won because it "drove a vastly technologically superior foe from the battlefield, and eventually forced it to sign an armistice agreement some three years later."<ref>{{cite news |last1=Kuhn |first1=Anthony |title='God ... Let Us Survive': Remembering Korean War's Chosin Battle And Evacuation |agency=National Public Radio |date=December 4, 2020 |url=https://www.npr.org/2020/12/04/941237449/god-let-us-survive-remembering-korean-wars-chosin-battle-and-evacuation}}</ref> [[Allan R. Millett]] qualifies his assessment of the battle as a Chinese "geographic victory" in that they ejected X&nbsp;Corps from North Korea with the PVA’s tactical failure of achieving their stated objective of destroying the 1st Marine Division, adding that the campaign gave the UN confidence that it could withstand the superior numbers of the Chinese forces.{{sfn|Millett}} The official Chinese history, published by [[PLA Academy of Military Science]], states that despite the heavy casualties, the PVA 9th Corps had earned its victory by successfully protecting the eastern flank of Chinese forces in Korea, while inflicting over 10,000 casualties to the UN forces.{{sfn|Chinese Military Science Academy|2000|p=126}}

[[Eliot A. Cohen]] writes that the retreat from Chosin was a UN victory which inflicted such heavy losses on the PVA 9th Corps that it was put out of action until March 1951.{{sfn|Cohen|2012|p=186}} Paul M. Edwards, founder of the Center for the Study of the Korean War,{{sfn|Center for Study}} draws parallels between the battle at Chosin and the [[Dunkirk evacuation]]. He writes that the retreat from Chosin following a "massive strategic victory" by the Chinese has been represented as "a moment of heroic history" for the UN forces.{{sfn|Edwards|2018|p=66}} Appleman, on the other hand, questioned the necessity of a sea-borne evacuation to preserve the UN forces, asserting that X&nbsp;Corps had the strength to break out of the Chinese encirclement at Hungnam at the end of the battle.{{sfn|Appleman|1990|pp=371–372}} Chinese historian Li Xiaobing acknowledges X&nbsp;Corps' successful withdrawal from North Korea, and writes that the Battle of Chosin "has become a part of Marine lore, but it was still a retreat, not a victory."{{sfn|Li|2014|p=52}} [[Bruce Cumings]] simply refers to the battle as a "terrible defeat" for the Americans.{{sfn|Cumings|2005|p=280}}

Patrick C. Roe, who served as an intelligence officer with the 7th Marine Regiment at Chosin,{{sfn|Hull|2001}} asserts that X&nbsp;Corps directly allowed the Eighth Army to hold the south{{efn|"Loss of the 1st Marine Division would have resulted in the loss of a substantial portion of X&nbsp;Corps. Instead, X&nbsp;Corps was withdrawn intact, while inflicting such damage upon the twelve divisions of the 9th Army that they were out of action until the last days of March. With the reinforcement by X&nbsp;Corps, and with the absence of nearly 40% of total Chinese strength, the Eighth Army was able to hold the south." See {{harvnb|Roe|2000|pp=411–2}}}} and quoted MacArthur in corroborating his view.{{efn|"General MacArthur agreed that this was the decisive battle. In commenting on a study by the Marine Corps Board, he wrote: "The Marine Corps Board of Study rightfully points out that the campaign of the 1st Marine Division with attached Army elements in North Korea was 'largely responsible for preventing reinforcement of CCF forces on Eighth Army front by 12 divisions during a period when such reinforcement might have meant to Eighth Army the difference between maintaining a foothold in Korea or forced evacuation therefrom.'...""See {{harvnb|Roe|2000|p=412}}}} Yu Bin, a historian and a former member of the [[Chinese People's Liberation Army]], states that while the destruction of Task Force Faith{{efn|Yu Bin states that it was the 32nd Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division that was destroyed, reflecting the Chinese mis-identification of the composition of Task Force Faith.{{sfn|Roe|2000|p=329}}}} was viewed as the single greatest Chinese victory of the war, ultimately the PVA 9th Corps had become "a giant hospital" while failing to destroy the numerically inferior UN forces at Chosin as planned.{{sfn|Ryan|Finkelstein|McDevitt|2003|p=130}} {{ill|Zhang Renchu|zh|张仁初}}, whose 26th Army was blamed for allowing the X&nbsp;Corps to escape,{{sfn|Xue & Li Part Four|2000}} had threatened suicide over the outcome, while Song Shilun offered to resign his post.{{sfn|Spurr|1988|p=266}}

The battle exacerbated inter-service hostility, the Marines blaming the US Army and its leadership for the failure.{{sfnm|1a1=Edwards|1y=2006|1p=129|2a1=Edwards|2y=2018|2p=67}} The collapse of the army units fighting on the east of the reservoir was regarded as shameful, and for many years afterwards their role in the battle was largely ignored. Later studies concluded that Task Force MacLean/Faith had held off for five days a significantly larger force than previously thought and that their stand was a significant factor in the Marines' survival. This was eventually recognized in September 1999 when, for its actions at Chosin, Task Force Faith was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation, an award that General Smith blocked when it was first proposed in 1952.{{sfn|Seelinger|2015}}{{sfn|Vogel|2000}}

The Marines evacuated from North Korea and spent January and most of February 1951 rebuilding in the relatively secure South Korea, where they destroyed the well-respected but already weakened North Korean [[10th Division (North Korea)|10th Division]] in [[counter-guerrilla]] operations during the [[First and Second Battles of Wonju#Anti-guerrilla operations|Second Battle of Wonju]].{{sfn|Mossman|1990|p=227}}{{sfn|Brown|2001|p=11}} The Marines returned to regular and heavy action on 21 February in [[Operation Killer]].{{sfn|Brown|2001|pp=20–23}}

===Wider effect on the war===
The battle ended the UN force's expectation of total victory, including the capture of North Korea and the reunification of the peninsula.{{sfn|Stewart|2000|p=33}} By the end of 1950, PVA/KPA forces had recaptured North Korea and pushed UN forces back south of the 38th parallel. Serious consideration was given to the evacuation of all US forces from the Korean peninsula and US military leaders made secret contingency plans to do so.{{sfn|Brown|2001|pp=1–2}} The disregard by [[Far East Command (United States)|Far Eastern Command]] under MacArthur of the initial warnings and diplomatic hints by the PVA almost led the entire UN army to disaster at Ch'ongch'on River and Chosin Reservoir and only after the formation and stabilization of a coherent UN defensive line under Lieutenant General [[Matthew Ridgway]] did the "period of headlong retreats from an attacking, unsuspected foe" cease.{{sfn|Stewart|2000|p=33}}

On the other hand, the battle affected the PVA in two ways, both of which had the result of helping the UN Command to secure its position in South Korea, while losing North Korea. First, according to historian Shu Guang Zhang, PVA commanders were persuaded by their victories at Chosin and Ch'ongch'on that they could "defeat American armed forces", and this led to "unrealistic expectations that the CPV [PVA] would work miracles."{{sfn|Zhang|1995|pp=118-119}}{{sfn|Halberstam|2007|pp= 624–5}} Second, the heavy casualties caused by sub-zero temperatures and combat, plus poor logistical support weakened the PVA's eight elite divisions of the 20th and 27th Corps. Of those eight divisions, two were forced to disband.{{sfn|Guang|2007|p=114}} With the absence of 12 out of 30 of Chinese divisions in Korea in early 1951, Roe says that the heavy Chinese losses at Chosin enabled the UN forces to maintain a foothold in Korea.{{sfn|Roe|2000|p=412}}

===Request for nuclear weapons===
By the end of the withdrawal, the Chinese troops had advanced and retaken almost all of North Korean territories. On 24 December 1950, MacArthur submitted a list of "retardation targets" in Korea, Manchuria and other parts of China, and requested 34 atomic bombs from Washington with the purpose of sowing a belt of radioactive cobalt to prevent further Chinese advances. His request was firmly declined and led to his later [[Relief of Douglas MacArthur|dismissal]].<ref>{{Cite news|date=1964-04-09|title=Texts of Accounts by Lucas and Considine on Interviews With MacArthur in 1954|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1964/04/09/archives/texts-of-accounts-by-lucas-and-considine-on-interviews-with.html|access-date=2021-10-31|issn=0362-4331|archive-date=12 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201112024700/https://www.nytimes.com/1964/04/09/archives/texts-of-accounts-by-lucas-and-considine-on-interviews-with.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Only God Was His Senior|url=https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/00/07/02/reviews/000702.02kennedt.html|access-date=2021-10-31|website=archive.nytimes.com|archive-date=26 January 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210126023645/https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/00/07/02/reviews/000702.02kennedt.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=The Firing of MacArthur {{!}} Harry S. Truman|url=https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/education/presidential-inquiries/firing-macarthur|access-date=2021-10-31|website=www.trumanlibrary.gov|archive-date=23 June 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220623134615/https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/education/presidential-inquiries/firing-macarthur|url-status=live}}</ref>