Editing Battle of Carillon (section)

===Analysis===
The actions of both commanders have been extensively analyzed in this action. While Montcalm performed well during the battle, some tactical options escaped his notice, and some of his actions in preparing the defenses at Carillon are open to question. In contrast, almost everything Abercrombie did has been questioned. It is widely held among historians that he was an incompetent commander.<ref name="Nester162_4Fault">[[#Nester|Nester (2008)]], pp. 162–164 lists a variety of historically critical sources, and also rebuts a number of attempted defenses of Abercrombie.</ref><ref name="Anderson173Fault">[[#AndersonMade|Anderson (2005)]], p. 172, calls Abercrombie "the least competent officer ever to serve as British commander in chief in America"</ref>

Both commanders were a product of the environment of European warfare, which generally took place in open fields with relatively easy mobility, and were thus uncomfortable with woodland warfare. Neither liked the irregular warfare practiced by the Indians and British counterparts like [[Rogers' Rangers]], but saw them as a necessary evil, given the operating environment.<ref name="Nester147"/><!--Abercrombie--><ref name="Chartrand20">{{harvnb|Chartrand|2000|p=20}}</ref><!--Montcalm--> Although the French depended on Indian support to increase their comparatively small numbers throughout the war, Indian forces were quite low in this battle, and Montcalm generally disliked them and their practices.<ref name="Nester159">[[#Nester|Nester (2008)]], p. 159</ref><!--few Indians--><ref name="Chartrand25_50">{{harvnb|Chartrand|2000|pp=25, 50}}</ref><!--Montcalm dislike-->

Montcalm in particular would have benefited from practicing a more irregular form of warfare. He apparently never inspected the landing area at the north end of Lake George, which was a location from which he could contest the British landing. Furthermore, the French could then have used the confined woodlands to blunt the numerical advantage of the British, and contested the entire portage road. The fact that fortifications were built along the portage road but then abandoned by the French is one indication of this failure of strategic thinking. Nester estimates that contesting the first crossing on the portage road would have gained Montcalm an additional day for defensive preparations.<ref name="Nester117_8">[[#Nester|Nester (2008)]], pp. 117–118</ref>
<!--TODO Montcalm not fortifying Defiance-->

Criticisms of Abercrombie begin with his reliance on relatively poor intelligence. Reports reached him that the French strength at Carillon was 6,000, and that a further 3,000 were expected. Many of these reports were from French deserters or captives, and Abercrombie should have investigated them by sending out scouts or light infantry. Even if the reports were accurate, Abercrombie's army still significantly outnumbered that of Montcalm. The same sources must also have reported the shortage of provisions at the fort, a sign that a siege would have ended quickly.<ref name="Nester146">[[#Nester|Nester (2008)]], p. 146</ref>
[[File:James-abercrombie-by-ramsay-ca-1759-60.jpg|left|thumb|General [[James Abercrombie (British Army general)|James Abercrombie]]|alt=Half-length portrait of a man against a dark background. He is wearing a red military jacket with a gold tassel on the right shoulder. His body is facing three-quarters right, but he is looking straight ahead.]]

Abercrombie's next error was an apparent over-reliance on the analysis of Matthew Clerk. His lack of experienced engineers caused the state of French defences to be repeatedly misread.<ref name="Nester145">[[#Nester|Nester (2008)]], p. 145</ref> What is clear is that Abercrombie, in his stated desire for haste, did not want to act on Clerk's recommendation to fortify Rattlesnake Hill, and then sought to blame Clerk, claiming he was merely acting on the engineer's advice. Clerk was one of the battle's casualties, so he was unavailable to defend himself against assignment of some of the blame.<ref name="Nester144">[[#Nester|Nester (2008)]], p. 144</ref> Captain [[Charles Lee (general)|Charles Lee]] of the [[44th Foot]] wrote, on the prospect of using cannon on Rattlesnake Hill, "There was one hill in particular, which seem'd to offer itself as an ally to us, it immediately commanded the lines from hence two small cannon well planted must have drove the French in a very short time from their breast work [...] this was never thought of, which (one wou'd imagine) must have occur'd to any blockhead who was not absolutely so far sunk into Idiotism as to be oblig'd to wear a bib and bells."<ref name="AndersonC247_8">[[#AndersonCrucible|Anderson (2000)]], pp. 247–248</ref>

The tactical decision not to bring cannons forward was probably one of Abercrombie's most significant errors. The use of cannon against the French works would have cleared paths through the abatis and breached the breastworks.<ref name="Nester152"/>

Abercrombie also had the option to avoid a [[pitched battle]], instead beginning [[siege]] operations against the French position. His force was large enough that he could have fully [[investment (military)|invested]] the French position and fended off any arriving reinforcements.<ref name="Nester152"/>