Editing Arthur Schopenhauer (section)

=== Ethics ===
{{Main|On the Basis of Morality}}

Schopenhauer asserts that the task of ethics is not to prescribe moral actions that ought to be done, but to investigate moral actions. As such, he states that philosophy is always theoretical: its task to explain what is given.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The World as Will and Representation|last=Schopenhauer|first=Arthur|at=Vol. 1, § 53.}}</ref>

According to Kant's transcendental idealism, space and time are forms of our sensibility in which phenomena appear in multiplicity. Reality [[thing-in-itself|in itself]] is free from multiplicity, not in the sense that an object is one, but that it is outside the ''possibility'' of multiplicity. Two individuals, though they appear distinct, are in-themselves not distinct.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The World as Will and Representation|last=Schopenhauer|first=Arthur|at=Vol. 1, § 23.}}</ref>

Appearances are entirely subordinated to the [[principle of sufficient reason]]. The egoistic individual who focuses his aims on his own interests has to deal with empirical laws as well as he can.

What is relevant for ethics are individuals who can act against their own self-interest. If we take a man who suffers when he sees his fellow men living in poverty and consequently uses a significant part of his income to support ''their'' needs instead of his ''own'' pleasures, then the simplest way to describe this is that he makes ''less distinction between himself'' and others than is usually made.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The World as Will and Representation|last=Schopenhauer|first=Arthur|at=Vol. 1, § 66.}}</ref>

Regarding how things ''appear'' to us, the egoist asserts a gap between two individuals, but the altruist experiences the sufferings of others as his own. In the same way a compassionate man cannot hurt animals, though they appear as distinct from himself.

What motivates the altruist is compassion. The suffering of others is for him not a cold matter to which he is indifferent, but he feels connectiveness to all beings. Compassion is thus the basis of morality.<ref>{{Cite book|title=On the Basis of Morality|last=Schopenhauer|first=Arthur|at=§ 19}}</ref>

==== Eternal justice ====
Schopenhauer calls the principle through which multiplicity appears the ''[[principium individuationis]]''. When we behold nature we see that it is a cruel battle for existence. Individual manifestations of the will can maintain themselves only at the expense of others—the will, as the only thing that exists, has no other option but to devour itself to experience pleasure. This is a fundamental characteristic of the will, and cannot be circumvented.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Parerga and Paralipomena|last=Schopenhauer|first=Arthur|at=Vol. 2, § 173}}</ref>

Unlike temporal or human justice, which requires time to repay an evil deed and "has its seat in the state, as requiting and punishing",<ref name="World as will and idea Vol. 1 § 63"/> eternal justice "rules not the state but the world, is not dependent upon human institutions, is not subject to chance and deception, is not uncertain, wavering, and erring, but infallible, fixed, and sure".<ref name="World as will and idea Vol. 1 § 63">''The World as Will and Idea'' Vol. 1 § 63</ref> Eternal justice is not retributive, because retribution requires time. There are no delays or reprieves. Instead, punishment is tied to the offence, "to the point where the two become one. ... Tormenter and tormented are one. The [Tormenter] errs in that he believes he is not a partaker in the suffering; the [tormented], in that he believes he is not a partaker in the guilt."<ref name="World as will and idea Vol. 1 § 63"/>

Suffering is the moral outcome of our attachment to pleasure. Schopenhauer deemed that this truth was expressed by the Christian dogma of [[original sin]] and, in Eastern religions, by the [[Reincarnation|dogma of rebirth.]]

==== Quietism ====
He who sees through the ''principium individuationis'' and comprehends suffering ''in general'' as his own will see suffering everywhere and, instead of fighting for the happiness of his individual manifestation, will abhor life itself since he knows that it is inseparably connected with suffering. For him, a happy individual life in a world of suffering is like a beggar who dreams one night that he is a king.<ref name="Ascetic">{{Cite book|title=The World as Will and Representation|last=Schopenhauer|first=Arthur|at=Vol. 1, § 68.}}</ref>

Those who have experienced this intuitive knowledge cannot affirm life, but exhibit asceticism and quietism, meaning that they are no longer sensitive to motives, are not concerned about their individual welfare, and accept without resistance the evil that others inflict on them. They welcome poverty and neither seek nor flee death.<ref name="Ascetic"/> Schopenhauer referred to asceticism as the denial of the [[will to live]].

Human life is a ceaseless struggle for satisfaction and, instead of continuing their struggle, ascetics break it. It does not matter if these ascetics adhere to the dogmata of Christianity or to [[Dharmic faith|Dharmic religions]], since their way of living is the result of intuitive knowledge.

{{Quotation|The [[Christian mysticism|Christian mystic]] and the teacher of the [[Vedanta philosophy]] agree in this respect also, they both regard all outward works and religious exercises as superfluous for him who has attained to perfection. So much agreement in the case of such different ages and nations is a practical proof that what is expressed here is not, as optimistic dullness likes to assert, an eccentricity and perversity of the mind, but an essential side of human nature, which only appears so rarely because of its excellence.<ref name="Ascetic"/>}}