Editing Yuri Andropov (section)

==Leader of the Soviet Union (1982–1984)==
{{Further|History of the Soviet Union (1982–1991)}}
[[File:1982 Ceausescu la Moscova la 60 de ani de la formarea URSS.JPG|thumb|right|Andropov (seated second from right in the front row) presides over the USSR's 60th Anniversary shortly after succeeding Brezhnev as its [[List of leaders of the Soviet Union|leader]].]]

Two days after [[Death and state funeral of Leonid Brezhnev|Brezhnev's death]], on 12 November 1982, Andropov was elected general secretary of the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union|CPSU]], the first former head of the KGB to become general secretary. His appointment was received in the West with apprehension in view of his roles in the KGB and in Hungary. At the time his personal background was a mystery in the West, with major newspapers printing detailed profiles of him that were inconsistent and in several cases fabricated.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.edwardjayepstein.com/archived/andropov.htm |title=The Andropov Hoax|publisher=Edward Jayepstein|access-date=30 March 2013}}</ref>

Andropov divided responsibilities in the Politburo with his chief deputy, [[Konstantin Chernenko]]. Andropov took control of organizing the work of the Politburo, supervising national defense, supervising the main issues of domestic and foreign policy and foreign trade, and making leadership assignments in the top ranks of the party and the government. Chernenko handled espionage, KGB, the Interior Ministry, party organs, ideology, organizational matters, propaganda, culture, science, and higher education. He was also given charge of the Central Committee. It was far too much for Chernenko to handle, and other Politburo members were not given major assignments.<ref>Dimitri Volkogonov, ''Autopsy for an empire: The seven leaders who built the Soviet regime'' (1998) pp 344–345.</ref>

===Domestic policy===
[[File:CIA-RDP91B00135R000601030003-0.pdf|thumb|Original CIA profile on Andropov]]
====Economy====
At home, Andropov attempted to improve the [[Economy of the Soviet Union#1970–1990|USSR's economy]] by increasing its workforce's efficiency. He cracked down on Soviet laborers' lack of discipline by decreeing the arrest of absentee employees and penalties for tardiness.<ref>{{cite book|author= Sakwa, Richard |title= Soviet Politics in Perspective|date=1998|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-0-415-16992-9|pages= 73–74}}</ref> For the first time, the facts about [[Brezhnev stagnation|economic stagnation]] and obstacles to scientific progress were made available to the public and open to criticism.<ref name="GRE">[[Great Russian Encyclopedia]] (2005), Moscow: Bol'shaya Rossiyskaya Enciklopediya Publisher, vol. 1, p. 742.</ref> Furthermore, Andropov gave select industries greater autonomy from state regulations<ref>{{cite book|author=Brown, Archie|title=The Gorbachev Factor|date=1996|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-288052-9|pages=[https://archive.org/details/gorbachevfactor00brow_0/page/64 64–65]|url=https://archive.org/details/gorbachevfactor00brow_0/page/64}}</ref> and enabled factory managers to retain control over more of their profits.<ref>{{cite book|author= Sakwa, Richard |title= Soviet Politics in Perspective|date=1998|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-0-415-16992-9|page=74}}</ref> Such policies resulted in a 4% rise in industrial output and increased investment in new technologies such as robotics.<ref>{{cite book|author= Kort, Michael |title= The Soviet Colossus:History and Aftermath |date=2001 |publisher= M. E. Sharpe |isbn=978-0-7656-0396-8|page= 315}}</ref>

Despite such reforms, Andropov refused to consider any changes that sought to dispense with the [[Planned economy]] introduced under [[Joseph Stalin]]. In his memoirs, Gorbachev wrote that when Andropov was the leader, Gorbachev and [[Gosplan]] chairman [[Nikolai Ryzhkov]] asked him for access to real budget figures. "You are asking too much", Andropov responded. "The budget is off limits to you."<ref>{{cite book|author=Gorbachev, Mikhail|title=Memoirs|date=1996|publisher=Doubleday|isbn=978-0385480192|page=[https://archive.org/details/memoirsgorb00gorb/page/147 147]|url=https://archive.org/details/memoirsgorb00gorb/page/147}}</ref>

====Anti-corruption campaign====
In contrast to Brezhnev's policy of avoiding conflicts and dismissals, Andropov began to fight violations of party, state and labor discipline, which led to significant personnel changes during an anti-corruption campaign against many of Brezhnev's cronies.<ref name="Century Communism 2010"/> During his 15 months in office, Andropov dismissed 18 ministers and 37 first secretaries of [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union|obkoms]], kraikoms and Central Committees of Communist Parties of Soviet Republics, and [[criminal case]]s against high-level party and state officials were started. Biographers including Solovyov and Klepikova<ref name="Solovyov-and-Klepikova-1983">{{cite book |last1=Solovyov |first1=Vladimir |last2=Klepikova |first2=Elena |year=1983 |title=Yuri Andropov: A Secret Passage Into the Kremlin |publisher=Macmillan |location=New York |isbn=9780026122900}}</ref> and [[Zhores Medvedev]]<ref name="Medvedev-1983">{{cite book |last1=Medvedev |first1=Zhores A. |year=1983 |title=Andropov |publisher=W.W. Norton |location=New York |isbn=9780393017915}}</ref> have discussed the complex possibilities underlying the motivations of anti-corruption campaigning in the Soviet Union during the 1970s and early 1980s: it is true that Andropov fought corruption for moral, ethical, ascetic, and ideological reasons, but it was also an effective way for party members from the police and security organizations to defeat competitors for power at the party's senior levels. Thus Andropov himself, as well as such protégés as [[Eduard Shevardnadze]], could advance their power by the same efforts that also promised to be better for the country in terms of justice, economic performance, and even defense readiness (which depended on economic performance). Part of the complexity is that in the Brezhnev era, corruption was pervasive and implicitly tolerated (though officially denied), and many a member of the police and security organizations participated in it to various degrees, but only those organizations had access to the power to measure it and monitor its details. In such an environment, anti-corruption campaigning is a way for police and security people to appear to be cleaning up villains' malfeasance and coincidentally increasing their own power, when in fact one set of antiheroes may be defeating another set in a [[wikt:grey area|morally gray]] power struggle.<ref name="Solovyov-and-Klepikova-1983"/><ref name="Medvedev-1983"/>

===Foreign policy===
[[File:Anti kernwapendemonstratie in Den Haag ( 550 duizend deelnemers ) overzichten m, Bestanddeelnr 253-8819.jpg|thumb|Protest against the [[nuclear arms race]] between the U.S./NATO and the Soviet Union, [[The Hague]], Netherlands, 1983]]
Andropov faced a series of foreign policy crises: the [[Soviet–Afghan War#Impact|hopeless situation of the Soviet army in Afghanistan]], [[Martial law in Poland|threatened revolt in Poland]], [[Sino-Soviet relations (1969–1991)|growing animosity with China]], the [[International aid to combatants in the Iran–Iraq War|polarization threat of war in the Middle East]], and [[Ethiopian Civil War|civil strife in Ethiopia]] and [[Internal resistance to apartheid|South Africa]]. The most critical threat was the "[[Cold War (1979–1985)|Second Cold War]]" U.S. President [[Ronald Reagan]] launched, and the specific attack on rolling back what he called the "[[Evil Empire speech|Evil Empire]]". Reagan used American economic power and Soviet economic weakness to escalate massive spending on the [[Cold War]], emphasizing technology that Moscow lacked.<ref>Lawrence T. Caldwell, and Robert Legvold, "Reagan through Soviet eyes." ''Foreign Policy'' 52 (1983): 3–21 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/1148230 Online].</ref> The main response was to raise the Soviet military budget to 70% of the total budget and supply billions of dollars of military aid to [[Syria]], [[Ba'athist Iraq|Iraq]], [[Libyan Arab Jamahiriya|Libya]], [[South Yemen]], the [[Palestine Liberation Organization]], [[Cuba]], and [[North Korea]]. That included tanks and armored troop carriers, hundreds of fighter planes, anti-aircraft systems, artillery systems, and other high-tech equipment of which the USSR was its allies' main supplier. Andropov's main goal was to avoid an open war.<ref>Dimitri Volkogonov, ''Autopsy for an empire''  (1998) pp 358–360.</ref><ref>Taylor Downing, ''Reagan, Andropov, and a World on the Brink'' (2018) pp. 34–50.</ref><ref>{{cite book|author=Jonathan Steele|title=Soviet Power|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dYqQYs8lnWQC&pg=PA4|year=1984|publisher=Simon and Schuster|pages=4–5|isbn=9780671528133}}</ref>

In foreign policy, the [[Soviet–Afghan War|conflict in Afghanistan]] continued even though Andropov, who now felt the invasion was a mistake, half-heartedly explored options for a negotiated withdrawal. Andropov's rule was also marked by deterioration of relations with the [[United States]]. During a much-publicized "walk in the woods" with Soviet dignitary Yuli Kvitsinsky, American diplomat [[Paul Nitze]] suggested a compromise for reducing nuclear missiles in Europe on both sides that the Politburo ignored.<ref>{{cite book |last=Matlock | first=Jack F. Jr. |title=Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended |publisher=[[Random House]] |year=2005|location=New York |pages=41–46 |isbn=978-0-8129-7489-8}}</ref> Kvitsinsky later wrote that, despite his efforts, the Soviet leadership was not interested in compromise, instead calculating that peace movements in the West would force the Americans to capitulate.<ref>{{cite book |last=Kwizinskij|first=Julij A. |title=Vor dem Sturm: Erinnerungen eines Diplomaten |publisher=Siedler Verlag |year=1993 |location=Berlin |isbn=978-3-88680-464-1}}</ref> On 8 March 1983, Reagan called the Soviet Union an "[[Evil Empire speech|evil empire]]". On 23 March, he announced the [[Strategic Defense Initiative]]. Reagan claimed this research program into ballistic missile defense was "consistent with our obligations under the [[Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty|ABM Treaty]]". Andropov dismissed this claim, saying, "It is time they [Washington] stopped ... search[ing] for the best ways of unleashing [[Nuclear warfare|nuclear war]]. ... Engaging in this is not just irresponsible. It is insane".<ref>''[[Pravda]]'', 27 March 1983.</ref>
[[File:1981-09-15 12-00-00 United States Hawaii Aliamanu 2 (cropped).jpg|thumb|left|A photograph of Korean Air Lines HL7442, the airliner shot down by Soviet aircraft after drifting into [[prohibited airspace]] during the [[Korean Air Lines Flight 007|KAL 007 Flight]].]]

In August 1983, Andropov made an announcement that the USSR would stop all work on [[Space weapon|space-based weapons]]. One of his most notable acts as leader of the Soviet Union was in response to a letter from a 10-year-old American child, [[Samantha Smith]], inviting her to the Soviet Union. She came, but he was too ill to meet with her, thus revealing his grave condition to the world. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union suspended talks with the U.S. on intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe in November 1983, and by the end of the year the Soviets had broken off all arms control negotiations.<ref>{{cite news|last=Church|first=George J.|title=Person of the Year 1983: Ronald Reagan and Yuri Andropov|newspaper=[[Time (magazine)|TIME]]|date=1 January 1984 |url=http://www.time.com/time/subscriber/personoftheyear/archive/stories/1983.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070109235052/http://www.time.com/time/subscriber/personoftheyear/archive/stories/1983.html|url-status=dead|archive-date=9 January 2007|access-date=2 January 2008}}</ref>

Massive bad publicity worldwide came when Soviet fighters shot down a civilian jet liner, [[Korean Air Flight KAL-007]], which carried 269 passengers and crew. It had strayed over the Soviet Union on 1 September 1983 on its scheduled route from [[Anchorage, Alaska|Anchorage]], [[Alaska]], to [[Seoul]], [[South Korea]]. Andropov kept secret that the Soviet Union held in its possession the [[Flight recorder|black box]] from KAL 007 that proved the pilot had made a typographical error when entering data in the automatic pilot. The [[Soviet Air Defence Forces|Soviet air defence system]] was unprepared to deal with a civilian airliner, and the shooting down was a matter of following orders without question.<ref>Jonathan Haslam,  "The KAL shootdown (1983) and the state of Soviet air defence." ''Intelligence and National Security'' 3.4 (1988): 128–133.</ref> Instead of admitting an accident, Soviet media proclaimed a brave decision to meet a Western provocation. Together with the low credibility created by the poor explanation of the [[Chernobyl disaster|1986 Chernobyl disaster]], the episode demonstrated an inability to deal with [[public relations]] crises; the propaganda system was useful only for people and states aligned with the Soviet Union. Both crises were escalated by technological and organizational failures, compounded by human error.<ref>Gail Warshofsky Lapidus, "KAL 007 and Chernobyl: The Soviet management of crises." Survival 29.3 (1987): 215–223.</ref>