Editing Yom Kippur War (section)

===Israeli breakthrough and crossing of the Suez Canal===
[[File:143th Division during Yom Kippur War. VI.jpg|thumb|Israeli tanks crossing the Suez Canal]]
At this point, General Sharon advocated an immediate crossing at Deversoir at the northern edge of Great Bitter Lake. Earlier, on 9 October, a reconnaissance force attached to Colonel [[Amnon Reshef]]'s Brigade had detected a gap between the Egyptian Second and Third Armies in this sector.<ref name="abc-clio1">{{cite web |first=David T. |last=Zabecki |url=http://www.historyandtheheadlines.abc-clio.com/ContentPages/ContentPage.aspx?entryId=1281396&currentSection=1271019&productid=16 |title=Arab–Israeli Wars: 60 Years of Conflict |at=Chinese Farm, Battle of The |publisher=Historyandtheheadlines.abc-clio.com |date=3 December 2008 |access-date=28 March 2010}}</ref> According to General Gamasy, the gap had been spotted by an American [[SR-71]] spy plane.{{sfnp|el-Gamasy|1993|p=276}}

The Israelis followed the Egyptian failed attack of 14 October with a multidivisional counterattack through the gap between the Egyptian Second and Third Armies. Sharon's 143rd Division, now reinforced with a paratroop brigade commanded by Colonel [[Danny Matt]], was tasked with establishing bridgeheads on the east and west banks of the canal. The 162nd and 252nd Armored Divisions, commanded by Generals Avraham Adan and Kalman Magen, respectively, would then cross through the breach to the west bank of the canal and swing southward, encircling the 3rd Army.{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=118}}

On the night of 15 October, 750 of Colonel Matt's paratroopers crossed the canal in rubber dinghies.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|pp=374–375}} They were soon joined by tanks, ferried on motorized rafts, and additional infantry. The force encountered no resistance initially and fanned out in raiding parties, attacking supply convoys, SAM sites, logistic centers and anything else of military value, with priority given to the SAMs. Attacks on SAM sites punched a hole in the Egyptian anti-aircraft screen and enabled the IAF to strike Egyptian ground targets more aggressively.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|pp=389–391}}

On the night of 15 October, 20 Israeli tanks and seven [[Armored personnel carrier|APCs]] under the command of Colonel Haim Erez crossed the canal and penetrated {{convert|12|km}} into Egypt, taking the Egyptians by surprise. For the first 24 hours, Erez's force attacked SAM sites and military columns with impunity, including a [[1973 raid on Egyptian missile bases|major raid on Egyptian missile bases]] on 16 October, in which three Egyptian missile bases were destroyed, along with several tanks, for no Israeli losses. On the morning of 17 October, the force was attacked by the 23rd Egyptian Armored Brigade, but managed to repulse the attack. By this time, the Syrians no longer posed a credible threat and the Israelis were able to shift their air power to the south in support of the offensive.{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=511}} The combination of a weakened Egyptian SAM umbrella and a greater concentration of Israeli fighter-bombers meant that the IAF was capable of greatly increasing sorties against Egyptian military targets, including convoys, armor and airfields. The Egyptian bridges across the canal were damaged in Israeli air and artillery attacks.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979}}{{page needed|date=December 2024}}

Israeli jets began attacking Egyptian SAM sites and radars, prompting General Ismail to withdraw much of the Egyptians' air defense equipment. This in turn gave the IAF still greater freedom to operate in Egyptian airspace. Israeli jets also attacked and destroyed underground communication cables at [[Banha]] in the [[Nile Delta]], forcing the Egyptians to transmit selective messages by radio, which could be intercepted. Aside from the cables at Banha, Israel refrained from attacking economic and strategic infrastructure following an Egyptian threat to retaliate against Israeli cities with [[Scud missile]]s. Israeli aircraft bombed Egyptian Scud batteries at [[Port Said]] several times.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979}}{{page needed|date=December 2024}}{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|pp=124–125}}

The Egyptian Air Force attempted to interdict IAF sorties and attack Israeli ground forces, but suffered heavy losses in dogfights and from Israeli air defenses, while inflicting light aircraft losses. The heaviest air battles took place over the northern Nile Delta, where the Israelis repeatedly attempted to destroy Egyptian airbases.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979}}{{page needed|date=December 2024}}{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|pp=124–125}} Although the Israelis tended to come out on top in aerial battles, one notable exception was the [[Air battle of Mansoura]], when an Israeli raid against the Egyptian airbases of [[Tanta]] and [[Mansoura]] was repulsed by Egyptian fighter aircraft.<ref>{{cite web |title=Battle of el-Mansourah |url=http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_266.shtml |author=Dr. David Nicolle & Sherif Sharmy |publisher=Air Combat Information Group (ACIG) |date=24 September 2003 |access-date=2009-05-01 |df=dmy-all |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090414094408/http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_266.shtml |archive-date=14 April 2009 |url-status=usurped}}</ref>