Editing Willard Van Orman Quine (section)

====Rejection of the analytic–synthetic distinction====
{{See also|Two Dogmas of Empiricism#Analyticity and circularity|l1=Two Dogmas of Empiricism}}
In the 1930s and 40s, discussions with [[Rudolf Carnap]], [[Nelson Goodman]] and [[Alfred Tarski]], among others, led Quine to doubt the tenability of the distinction between "analytic" statements<ref>{{Cite book|title=Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard: Conversations on Logic, Mathematics, and Science|last=Frost-Arnold|first=Greg|publisher=Open Court|year=2013|isbn=9780812698374|location=Chicago|page=89}}</ref>—those true simply by the meanings of their words, such as "No bachelor is married"— and "synthetic" statements, those true or false by virtue of facts about the world, such as "There is a cat on the mat."<ref name="Quine 1961 p. 22">{{cite book | last=Quine | first=W. V. | title=From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays, Second Revised Edition | publisher=Harvard University Press | series=Harper torchbooks | orig-year=1961 | year=1980 | isbn=978-0-674-32351-3 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OalXwuw3MvMC | pages=22}}</ref> This distinction was central to [[logical positivism]]. Although Quine is not normally associated with [[verificationism]], some philosophers believe the tenet is not incompatible with his general philosophy of language, citing his Harvard colleague [[B. F. Skinner]] and his analysis of language in ''[[Verbal Behavior (book)|Verbal Behavior]]''.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Prawitz |first=Dag |date=1994|title=Quine and verificationism |url=http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00201749408602369 |journal=Inquiry |language=en |volume=37 |issue=4 |pages=487–494 |doi=10.1080/00201749408602369 |issn=0020-174X}}</ref> But Quine believes, with all due respect to his "great friend"<ref name="Burrhus">{{Cite book |title=The American Philosopher: Conversations with Quine, Davidson, Putnam, Nozick, Danto, Rorty, Cavell, MacIntyre, Kuhn |last=Borradori |first=Giovanna |author-link=Giovanna Borradori |publisher=University of Chicago Press |date=1994 |page=35 |isbn=978-0-226-06647-9}}</ref> Skinner, that the ultimate reason is to be found in neurology and not in behavior. For him, behavioral criteria establish only the terms of the problem, the solution of which, however, lies in [[neurology]].<ref name="Burrhus" />

Like other analytic philosophers before him, Quine accepted the [[definition]] of "analytic" as "true in virtue of meaning alone." Unlike them, however, he concluded that ultimately the definition was [[circular definition|circular]]. In other words, Quine accepted that analytic statements are those that are true by definition, then argued that the notion of truth by definition was unsatisfactory.

Quine's chief objection to analyticity is with the notion of [[cognitive synonymy]] (sameness of meaning). He argues that analytical sentences are typically divided into two kinds; sentences that are clearly logically true (e.g. "no unmarried man is married") and the more dubious ones; sentences like "no bachelor is married." Previously it was thought that if you can prove that there is synonymity between "unmarried man" and "bachelor," you have proved that both sentences are logically true and therefore self evident. Quine however gives several arguments for why this is not possible, for instance that "bachelor" in some contexts means a [[Bachelor of Arts]], not an unmarried man.<ref name="Quine 1961 p. 22-23, 28">{{cite book | last=Quine | first=W. V. | title=From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays, Second Revised Edition | publisher=Harvard University Press | series=Harper torchbooks | orig-year=1961 | year=1980| isbn=978-0-674-32351-3 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OalXwuw3MvMC | pages=22–23, 28}}</ref>